Does the linguistic philosophy on possibility disprove the objectivist claim that arbitrary claims aren’t possible

[HappyDays]

As I understand, objectivism believes claims without evidence are not to be regarded as possible. Does the work on possibility through distinguishing propositions which are true in all possible worlds by definition (eg water is H2O) vs possible/contingent truths (eg water is blue or water is red) which include many claims without empirical validation (such as water possibly being red in the future) as the claims made about properties aren’t essential to the concept or proper name  (this goes into two dimensional semantics and the main people associated with it are David Chalmers, Hilary Putnam, Saul Kripke etc. although similar ideas of the same concept or proper name (referent) having distinct possible senses goes back to Gottlob Frege as well as the latter Ludwig Wittgenstein in his theory of language games)  

Edited May 10 by HappyDays

[necrovore]

In a way, you are comparing apples and oranges.

Truth is not determined by linguistics alone but has to be determined by the relationship between the linguistics and the real world.

The linguistic philosophers look only at the linguistics. They take the rationalist perspective that the laws of logic are "handed down from God" and are independent of reality. When they take that perspective, they then use it to assess "linguistically" whether a statement is logical or not.

However, even the laws of logic arise out of reality. It is reality that does not permit contradictions, and that is where we get the idea in logic that contradictions are not permitted.

Ayn Rand holds that the important thing is not the linguistic structure of a statement but its relationship to reality: whether it is true or false or arbitrary is a description of that relationship, and therefore cannot be derived from the statement alone.

That's an entirely different thing from what the linguistic philosophers are looking at.

[stansfield123]

Regarding your water example: have you looked into the Physics of it before giving that example? 'cause I don't understand the distinction you're trying to make between the color of water and its chemical composition.

The physical laws which govern "color" (the frequency of light, when reflected by water) are just as universally applicable as the chemical composition of water. The color of water changes if it's hit by light of a different frequency, sure. But that has nothing to do with "different worlds" or possibilities. It changes in this world too, and it changes in a perfectly predictable manner. Every bit as predictable as what happens to water if you add sulfuric acid to it.

Same for how we perceive that frequency of light (aka "color"). That's governed by universal laws too. Some people may not see some colors, and others may see different colors when the same frequency of light hits their eye ... but that has nothing to do with the nature of water or the nature of perception. That has to do with the nature of the mechanism that's "measuring" the frequency: it's not working as it should. Good news is, we've built more accurate tools, which measure that frequency accurately. So we can figure out the color of water even when our eyes fail. And it doesn't arbitrarily change. The interaction of water and light is governed by fixed laws.

So the issue you're raising, really, is that the human eye (or the human brain, not sure which bit exactly is the problem, when someone's perception of color is off) can be flawed. I don't think that's the issue you're trying to raise, though...

Edited May 10 by stansfield123

[DavidOdden]

Water is a first-order directly perceived existent, like “dirt”, “man” or “banana”. Such terms are ostensively defined, i.e. we know it when we see it. The chemical composition of water was not known to man for almost all of human existence, until just a few years ago, yet we knew water when we saw it. Various judgments about water are contextually true, the most consistent being its physical makeup where we include ²H₂O as not defeating the claim “This is water”, also many numerous salts that you don’t notice. Obviously, the claim about “water” is a claim about a word of English and it is not necessarily true for some other language that also has a word “water”. It is an an unresolved scientific claim whether ice, snow and steam are judged (in contemporary society) to be instances of the concept “water”, just as “child” is judged to be an instance of the concept “man”. 

The concept “possible world” is very problematic, since it is essentially undefined and is abused to mean “imaginable, hallucinations included”. There is a “possible world” in which being whipped and burned is the same as not being whipped and burned. All you have to do is say “I can imagine a world in which…”. You can apply the law of non-contradiction to the words “is composed of H₂O” and determine that there is a contradiction (actually, a denial) in asserting “water is not H₂O”, but then you have to apply slightly fancier methods to reject judgments like “snow is not H₂O” (also “snow is hot”). Is there a “possible world” in which snow is hot, or steam is cold?

“Possible world” has some utility in discussing hypotheticals in an integrated knowledge context. It is possible to imagine a world with chordate animals that have 5 legs, we just know that we do not live in that world. This is because we have sufficient knowledge of evolution and anatomy that we can somewhat pin down the reason why it is possible.

 

[HappyDays]

9 hours ago, stansfield123 said:

Regarding your water example: have you looked into the Physics of it before giving that example? 'cause I don't understand the distinction you're trying to make between the color of water and its chemical composition.

The physical laws which govern "color" (the frequency of light, when reflected by water) are just as universally applicable as the chemical composition of water. The color of water changes if it's hit by light of a different frequency, sure. But that has nothing to do with "different worlds" or possibilities. It changes in this world too, and it changes in a perfectly predictable manner. Every bit as predictable as what happens to water if you add sulfuric acid to it.

Same for how we perceive that frequency of light (aka "color"). That's governed by universal laws too. Some people may not see some colors, and others may see different colors when the same frequency of light hits their eye ... but that has nothing to do with the nature of water or the nature of perception. That has to do with the nature of the mechanism that's "measuring" the frequency: it's not working as it should. Good news is, we've built more accurate tools, which measure that frequency accurately. So we can figure out the color of water even when our eyes fail. And it doesn't arbitrarily change. The interaction of water and light is governed by fixed laws.

So the issue you're raising, really, is that the human eye (or the human brain, not sure which bit exactly is the problem, when someone's perception of color is off) can be flawed. I don't think that's the issue you're trying to raise, though...

This doesn’t address the two dimensional semantics people I brought up’s argument that you can distinguish between possible (existent in some conceivable  world, such as the light reflecting from water being red) and necessary (existent  in all possible worlds by virtue of being included under a proper name, a Kripkean causal referent if you will) 

[necrovore]

Objectivism rejects the "necessary" versus "contingent" dichotomy in traditional philosophy.

Instead it holds a distinction between the "metaphysically given" and the "man-made," the former being defined as not being the product of anyone's choice.

If something is not the product of anyone's choice, nobody could have chosen for it to be any different, so it had to be what it was. In that sense, it was inevitable; it is "necessary" in that respect.

Some alternatives are easier to imagine than others, but something is not "less necessary" merely because it is easier to imagine alternatives to it.

Edited May 10 by necrovore

[HappyDays]

1 hour ago, necrovore said:

Objectivism rejects the "necessary" versus "contingent" dichotomy in traditional philosophy.

Instead it holds a distinction between the "metaphysically given" and the "man-made," the former being defined as not being the product of anyone's choice.

If something is not the product of anyone's choice, nobody could have chosen for it to be any different, so it had to be what it was. In that sense, it was inevitable; it is "necessary" in that respect.

Some alternatives are easier to imagine than others, but something is not "less necessary" merely because it is easier to imagine alternatives to it.

I don’t see how this responses to the arguments presented by the two dimensional semantics people, saying what you believe is useless to me unless you explain why you believe it. Do you actually have a rebuttal to the arguments by Kripke, Chalmers etc. or are you just going to say “well my philosophy says XYZ”

[DavidOdden]

You could start by paraphrasing the proof that there is a possible world where water is red.

[KyaryPamyu]

 The OP begins with "As I understand," inviting readers to confirm or correct his interpretation:

On 5/10/2025 at 4:41 AM, HappyDays said:

As I understand, objectivism believes claims without evidence are not to be regarded as possible.

I will oblige. The Objectivist theory you are referring to actually states that claims made without evidence—so-called “arbitrary” claims—have no cognitive status. They therefore resist evaluation as “true,” “false,” “possible,” or “impossible.” This theory has nothing to do with what might be true of the world.

As for contingency, whereas some people claim that evolution could have taken a different path, or that Earth might have had two moons under different conditions, Objectivism would say "No, there is no other way things could have been." In short, for Rand-Peikoff, necessity = determinism. The only exception they allow, as @necrovore pointed out, is the special case of human actions and products.

That is, whereas the Earth having only one moon was metaphysically necessary, specific human actions are not metaphysically necessary, insofar as each action could have been otherwise. Naturally, we now have to reconcile the claim that everything is necessary with the claim that human actions could have been different. In OPAR, Peikoff tries to do just that. He starts by saying that if human volition did not have a cause, it would ipso facto be mystical. After assuring us that volition is fully natural, he proceeds to reconcile the tension between necessity and volition by arguing to the effect that it's metaphysically necessary for human actions to not be metaphysically necessary—a paradox that resembles saying that God's identity is to have no identity.

Moving on to the 2D semantics you mentioned, that theory tries to explain why a proposition that applies in all possible cases can also, at the same time, only apply to a select few cases. Its proposed solution is that the proposition in question actually expresses two distinct propositions. To illustrate this, consider the proposition "water is H₂O." If by water you mean "The clear and drinkable liquid found in lakes and oceans," then this definition might accidentally refer to ammonia (NH₃) on a planet where life forms evolved to drink ammonia from lakes and oceans. On the other hand, if by water you mean "H₂O," then your proposition basically translates to "H₂O = H₂O," a tautology that is true absolutely everywhere, on this planet and in all other possible locations. This is reminiscent of Objectivism’s view on definitions, namely that definitions must evolve and be refined in order to keep up with newly discovered knowledge. 

2D semantics shows why some propositions are both analytic (true without exceptions) and synthetic (only true under specific conditions). Objectivism, however, would not care much about that, because Peikoff gives the A-S distinction an idiosyncratic interpretation that seems to suggest that Kant saw empirical (synthetic) truths as not metaphysically necessary. But in fact, Kant shared Peikoff's overly deterministic view of nature. Even for Kant, once empirical conditions are fixed, only one outcome could follow—such as the Earth having just one moon. Where Kant speaks of contingency, he means that the truth of a regular proposition is contingent on empirical facts, whereas the truth of a tautology or a definitional proposition is derived from its abstract form.

Out of curiosity, @HappyDays—do you lean toward any particular philosophy, or are you just exploring broadly for now?

Edited May 12 by KyaryPamyu

[necrovore]

2 hours ago, KyaryPamyu said:

After assuring us that volition is fully natural, he proceeds to reconcile the tension between necessity and volition by arguing to the effect that it's metaphysically necessary for human actions to not be metaphysically necessary—a paradox that resembles saying that God's identity is to have no identity.

I think Peikoff's position (or Rand's position according to Peikoff) is that things behave according to their natures, and that non-conscious matter and energy have a nature (deterministic), but consciousness also has a nature, and that free will is an aspect of the nature of consciousness, so it is not a contradiction that free will as a characteristic does not exist outside of consciousness.

So I don't see the paradox.

It seems the paradox arises out of the necessary vs. contingent viewpoint, which Objectivism does not have. So this might be another example of how Objectivism doesn't quite fit the concepts of academic philosophy as such philosophy is usually done. Objectivism is the "black swan," I suppose; it does not fall neatly into those categories.

[KyaryPamyu]

15 hours ago, necrovore said:

I think Peikoff's position (or Rand's position according to Peikoff) is that things behave according to their natures

Indeed. And this position can easily be abused. Suppose someone claims that the creation of the world (e.g. by a god) is supernatural or mystical. We can reply: "No, my friend, you are confused. Naturalism simply means that things behave according to their natures. Since God's nature is to be a creator, his creating of the world is a trivial example of naturalism in action."

It follows that playing the "according to its nature" card risks becoming vacuous if we don’t specify what counts as a legitimate nature. If we allow any behavior to be justified by appealing to a thing’s "nature," we drain the distinction between natural and mystical of its meaning.

15 hours ago, necrovore said:

It seems the paradox arises out of the necessary vs. contingent viewpoint, which Objectivism does not have.

To take a position on volition is to make a statement about the nature of the mind. For example, "mind is unfree because its nature is deterministic"; "mind is free because its nature is volitional." Every philosophy implicitly links a thing’s identity to its behavior. This is the kind of formal truism Voltaire mocked when he quipped:

First Doctor: “Most learned bachelor whom I esteem and honor, I would like to ask you the cause and reason why Opium makes one sleep?”

Bachelor: “The reason is that in opium resides a dormitive virtue, of which it is the nature to stupefy the senses.”

(Le Malade Imaginaire)

But this issue—the connection between identity and behavior—is entirely different from the necessary vs. contingent distinction.

First, a clarification of the terms. "Contingent" means that something could have been otherwise; for Peikoff, the seat of contingency is the man-made, because "no human choice—and no phenomenon which is a product of human choice—is metaphysically necessary" ("The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy," ITOE, 110). "Necessity," on the other hand, means that nothing could have been otherwise, if something is the case then it is necessarily so.

At this point, we must take heed: this has nothing to do with the Law of Identity. This law does not imply either determinism or free will. It simply states that if something is real, then something determinate is true of it. For example, determinism might be true of matter, volition might be true of mind etc.

If Rand-Peikoff were simply content with saying that the mind is free because it has a 'free nature'—as the Bachelor says that opium anesthetizes us due to its dormitive virtue—then they would've been perfectly right, albeit spouting a formal truism. However, they say this is not enough. No. The volitional nature of the mind must have a "cause"—that is, a deterministic cause that produces the mind's non-deterministic nature. This leads to a logical paradox where the meaning of the terms is obliterated. If it is metaphysically necessary for human actions to be metaphysically contingent, then we are saying that contingency is necessitated. But to say that it is necessary that something be non-necessary is to collapse both terms—necessity and contingency—into meaninglessness.

This kind of wordplay is similar to aphorisms like “the only eternal constant is change” or “I’m limited by my lack of limits.”

It has nothing to do with Objectivism not recognizing a necessary-contingent distinction, which it does (under the name "metaphysical versus man-made facts")—and indeed must do, because the only metaphysical theory that doesn't recognize this distinction is hard determinism. Rather, it has everything to do with incoherent reasoning masquerading as explanation.