Things I've taken for granted in the O'ist Ethics.

[nimble]

Rand often speaks of ethics in terms of us acting within our nature. Then she goes on to describe our nature. And when I was confronted with an unusual attack on Objectivist ethics, I found myself defenseless. How does Rand make the claim that she knows human nature definitively, enough so that she can make moral judgments about things such as sex, love, work, crime, etc.

She claims we are rational, but rational is somewhat of a relative concept as it must be rational with respect to a given goal. For instance if the goal of a game is to lose, then trying to win is irrational, and vice versa.

Second, I am not sure it can be proved that men are by nature rational, rather than men are by nature irrational and they have to try to be rational.

Third, I realize that Rand claims that the goal of humans is life. My friend brought up a Nozickian critique that says to claim your own life as the goal is subjective. Basically, what objective reason do you have to value your life? To expound further, valuing life simply because it is life, seems arbitrary. Since value presupposes life, it seems like a circular argument to claim that life is to be valued, since life is a category that subsumes value.

Lastly, I was wondering why Objectivists put any emphasis on the determinist/Free will debate. I was defending free will against my friend, and he pointed out that it is a false dichotomy. That there is no way to measure or prove free-will and conversely the same applies to determinism. And he claims that this debate is just some trash left over from the dualist period of philosophy, which needs to be thrown out.

Help me with first what the Objectivist stance is, and better yet, why the stance is.

[Felix]

Hm. Good questions. First of all: It is always good to ask important questions if you are not sure about something. It is the basis of honesty. So don't worry.

My friend brought up a Nozickian critique that says to claim your own life as the goal is subjective. Basically, what objective reason do you have to value your life?

Indeed, if you look at John Galt's quote in Atlas Shrugged, it says: 'Man has to be man - by choice; he has to hold his life as a value - by choice; he has to learn to sustain it - by choice; he has to discover the values it requires and practice his virtues - by choice.' (p.927)

In the end it boils down to the question: Do you want to live or not?

And living here means living fully. Not just survival. According to Objectivism, the question if you want to live your life or not is a premoral question. There is no duty in morality. You don't have to choose to live. You can choose to die. But IF you choose to live, then you must also do all the other things to the highest extent you can because of that very choice. It's an either-or choice and most people refuse to make it clearly.

Rand often speaks of ethics in terms of us acting within our nature. Then she goes on to describe our nature. And when I was confronted with an unusual attack on Objectivist ethics, I found myself defenseless. How does Rand make the claim that she knows human nature definitively, enough so that she can make moral judgments about things such as sex, love, work, crime, etc.

I agree with the basic premise that man must live according to his nature. Finding out that nature, therefore is of major importance to every human being. You need to eat and sleep. And as far as I am concerned, you also need good work and good sex. At least the good sex part was criticized a lot on this forum because I gave it a major significance based on my understanding of evolution and biology. I hold that man as an animal has certain biological drives that need to be fulfilled to be happy and that everything else leads to misery. I also hold that sex is the main drive for evolutionary reasons. This leads to a big chunk of what could be called genetical determinism. I still struggle with how this can fit into the Objectivist framework.

So I'm not capable of giving you a good answer about the Objectivist viewpoint.

She claims we are rational, but rational is somewhat of a relative concept as it must be rational with respect to a given goal. For instance if the goal of a game is to lose, then trying to win is irrational, and vice versa.

Yes, you have to be rational within a certain context. Reason without context is worthless. There is no problem here. Have you read OPAR? (I'm currently doing so.)

Lastly, I was wondering why Objectivists put any emphasis on the determinist/Free will debate. I was defending free will against my friend, and he pointed out that it is a false dichotomy. That there is no way to measure or prove free-will and conversely the same applies to determinism. And he claims that this debate is just some trash left over from the dualist period of philosophy, which needs to be thrown out.

Free will, according to Objectivism, is axiomatic. That means that for every thought you have, you need to choose it. You can not think any thought without free will. Therefore thinking is based on free will. That is the way I understood Peikoff. If this is wrong I am happy to be corrected.

I hold that it is very possible to alter human behaviour from the outside. You can change the way people perceive something quite effectively and you can change their feelings and motivations by hypnosis. But the final choice has to be made by free will in the end. The problem with free will is that it goes against current physical theory which holds that the world is determined (on a macro-scale) and stochastic (on a micro-scale). Since this is something that puzzles me, too: Thanks for asking.

Maybe someone with more experience can give more fruitful answers. But it's good to see that you question what you read. Never take anything on faith.

[Thales]

She claims we are rational, but rational is somewhat of a relative concept as it must be rational with respect to a given goal. For instance if the goal of a game is to lose, then trying to win is irrational, and vice versa.

Rational isn't relative. To be rational is to follow logic and the evidence.

Second, I am not sure it can be proved that men are by nature rational, rather than men are by nature irrational and they have to try to be rational.

The faculty of survival for man is his rational faculty. Without this faculty, there would be no man made things in the world. No medicine, no moon launches, no music, not even any basic tools. A man can be irrational, which is why it's important to emphasize being rational. Iows, there is a choice here.

Third, I realize that Rand claims that the goal of humans is life. My friend brought up a Nozickian critique that says to claim your own life as the goal is subjective. Basically, what objective reason do you have to value your life?

Have you read the essay on the Objectivist ethics in the Virtue of Selfishness? It's all right there.

To give you a hint, the life-death alternative is what forces this on everyone. If you want to stay alive, i.e. in existence, you have to do certain things.

Lastly, I was wondering why Objectivists put any emphasis on the determinist/Free will debate. I was defending free will against my friend, and he pointed out that it is a false dichotomy. That there is no way to measure or prove free-will and conversely the same applies to determinism. And he claims that this debate is just some trash left over from the dualist period of philosophy, which needs to be thrown out.

Free will is self-evident. Iows, it can't be proven, because it's a basic axiom. It is the foundation of proof.

[DavidOdden]

She claims we are rational, but rational is somewhat of a relative concept as it must be rational with respect to a given goal. For instance if the goal of a game is to lose, then trying to win is irrational, and vice versa.

There's a difference between being a rational being, i.e. having the faculty of reason, and behaving in a particular manner that relies only on reason and observation. That doesn't make "rational" relative (in the evil sense). It is contextual, for example if your goal is to live then the rational thing to do is do certain things.

Second, I am not sure it can be proved that men are by nature rational, rather than men are by nature irrational and they have to try to be rational.

Yet it's true, even if you're not sure. But again, the fact that man has the capacity to reason does not mean that all men use the capacity.

Third, I realize that Rand claims that the goal of humans is life. My friend brought up a Nozickian critique that says to claim your own life as the goal is subjective. Basically, what objective reason do you have to value your life? To expound further, valuing life simply because it is life, seems arbitrary. Since value presupposes life, it seems like a circular argument to claim that life is to be valued, since life is a category that subsumes value.

Life is really the standard for judging other values. You cannot derive the decision to live from other rational processes: that would imply that something else is more important than life, and is the "real" standard for evaluating actions. However, just because you cannot judge the value of life (you can just say "it is my fundamental goal) does not mean that it is not a value. If you decide not to exist, that answer to the fundamental question should lead you to certain acts (like, taking poison). If you decide to live, there are other things you should do. If you opt for death and take poison but then vomit it out, you are acting irrationally because vomiting out the poison acts against your fundamental goal. Reason alone cannot tell you to live.

[JMeganSnow]

The problem with free will is that it goes against current physical theory which holds that the world is determined (on a macro-scale) and stochastic (on a micro-scale). Since this is something that puzzles me, too: Thanks for asking.

Um, actually this is a problem with current physical theory, not with volition. The reason that volition is axiomatic is that it is self-evident. If we didn't have volition, there would be no debate. So, in order to propound determinist theory, the proponents are contradicting themselves. Oops.

If one of the special sciences arrives at a conclusion that contradicts a self-evident fact that is pre-science, then it's obviously wrong and needs to be reevaluated. Keep in mind that physical theory at this point, especially in the math-intensive areas, is trying to come up with something that predicts the outcome of an event. No one's come up with math to predict people yet. Not even close.

This is why different sciences are separate. Trying to reduce everything to physics is just as erroneous as trying to reduce everything to sociology.

Edited November 22, 2005 by JMeganSnow

[Felix]

Um, actually this is a problem with current physical theory, not with volition. The reason that volition is axiomatic is that it is self-evident. If we didn't have volition, there would be no debate. So, in order to propound determinist theory, the proponents are contradicting themselves. Oops.

If one of the special sciences arrives at a conclusion that contradicts a self-evident fact that is pre-science, then it's obviously wrong and needs to be reevaluated. Keep in mind that physical theory at this point, especially in the math-intensive areas, is trying to come up with something that predicts the outcome of an event. No one's come up with math to predict people yet. Not even close.

This is why different sciences are separate. Trying to reduce everything to physics is just as erroneous as trying to reduce everything to sociology.

The thing that makes me wonder is that you can hypnotise a person and tell him that he should open his jacket when you rub your nose. Then this person wakes up, knows nothing of what you said. You rub your nose and that person opens his jacket. And if you ask, that person will give you a good reason, like it's hot or that the jacket is uncomfortable. The only problem is that the cause was the hypnotic command.

Besides, fields of knowledge are not seperate. They overlap and you can use insights from evolution theory in economics and the other way around. Chemistry and physics certainly meet each other at one point. So do philosophy and economics, psychology and sociology or biology and chemistry. If there is supposed to be no contradiction in your knowledge, then you can reduce everything to the very basics. And these basics are given by physics.

That's my argumentation against free will. I think that the idea that free will is self-evident is just a cheap sneak-out to avoid having to deal with the arguments. The argument for free will as the basis of thought is good, but how do you deal with the hypnosis-argument?

I'm still thinking about this.

[nimble]

Seriously, I believe the debate between free-will and determinism is a non debate. I don't think the term free-will actually describes what we have. And I don't think the way determinists explain their theory, actually depicts reality either. First determinism can never be proven. To prove it would be to say that all actions before, current and future are predictable and determined. However, lets take the example of a man choosing between an apple and an orange.

At time t1 the two objects sit on a table and he has not eaten them yet.

At time t2 he grabs and eats the apple.

Now first, once t2 happens, there is no saying that you could have done otherwise, because literally, you couldnt have done otherwise, since t2 has already happened. (This shows that the free-willers can use their usual argument that 'you can do otherwise')

At time t1, no one can claim that the man will choose any particular object. Any claim to knowledge about his decision is false, because it hasn't happened yet and therefore the claim is just hypothesis. (Therefore determinists can never claim that you can't do otherwise)

For these reasons, I think the debate between free-will and determinism is just some little argument left from the period of dualism, where mind and body were seperate and everyone was trying to figure out which controlled the other.

[Thales]

Seriously, I believe the debate between free-will and determinism is a non debate.

Not to be too critical, but you've not even acknolwedged the points made concerning your other questions.

I don't think the term free-will actually describes what we have. And I don't think the way determinists explain their theory, actually depicts reality either. First determinism can never be proven. To prove it would be to say that all actions before, current and future are predictable and determined. However, lets take the example of a man choosing between an apple and an orange.

At time t1 the two objects sit on a table and he has not eaten them yet.

At time t2 he grabs and eats the apple.

Now first, once t2 happens, there is no saying that you could have done otherwise, because literally, you couldnt have done otherwise, since t2 has already happened. (This shows that the free-willers can use their usual argument that 'you can do otherwise')

It's a tough concept, but at the same time it's a self-evidency. That we choose is something that we observe ourselves doing every time we do it.

You can look at this from another perspective as well. If we didn't have free will, then we couldn't be responsible for our decisions. If we aren't responsible for our decisions, then we are mindless automatons. If we're mindless automatons nobody could have any direction in life. Nobody could have any goals or expectations. A person couldn't own his life. We'd just be like computers giving output for input. At the end of the day, that doesn't square with the way the world is. It makes much more sense to recognize that men do have the power to choose.

[Hal]

There's a difference between being a rational being, i.e. having the faculty of reason, and behaving in a particular manner that relies only on reason and observation.

..

But again, the fact that man has the capacity to reason does not mean that all men use the capacity.

What exactly is the 'faculty' of reason? I ask this not in a sarcastic way; the idea of people having 'faculties' is a recurring theme within Aristotelian philosophy which I've never fully understood. I assume that talking about faculties isnt meant to imply a commitment to modularity theories of the mind, nor does it imply that there is a certain region of the brain which is devoted to 'reason'. But then, what precisely is a 'faculty'? Could a computer be programmed to have a rational faculty? Or is 'man has the rational faculty' just a way of saying 'men sometimes act in a way which we call rational'?

Seriously, I believe the debate between free-will and determinism is a non debate. I don't think the term free-will actually describes what we have. And I don't think the way determinists explain their theory, actually depicts reality either. First determinism can never be proven. To prove it would be to say that all actions before, current and future are predictable and determined.

If (neuro)scientists can find some purely deterministic model of the human brain at a neuronal level which allows completely accurate predictions to be made, then I would say that determinism has been proven and the theory of volition will need to be abandoned. But I think that this scenario is highly unlikely to occur, as I expect volition will turn out to be real.

If one of the special sciences arrives at a conclusion that contradicts a self-evident fact that is pre-science, then it's obviously wrong and needs to be reevaluated. Keep in mind that physical theory at this point, especially in the math-intensive areas, is trying to come up with something that predicts the outcome of an event.

Statements which seem self-evident often turn out to be wrong. It was once self-evident that life couldnt emerge from non-life. It was self-evident that the statement "event A occured before event B" couldnt literally be both true and false for different people. It was self-evident that a moving object required a constant input of force to keep it going. It was self-evident that objects stayed the same length no matter how fast they were moving relative to the observer. It was self-evident that time travel into the future was impossible. It was self-evident that the entirity of our visual fields are in colour. It was self-evident that all physical objects had to have mass. It was self-evident that space had to be Euclidean. It was self-evident that space and time were infinitely divisible. Yet all of these things are wrong.

I think the free-will theory is true. But its not impossible that it will turn out to be incorrect, just like everything mentioned above. You are of course correct that predicting human behavior from a reductionist point of view is far beyond anything people are able to do just now. But assuming that mental states and brain states are correlated, and that particles in the brain obey the same deterministic physical laws as particles anywhere else in the universe, there doesnt seem to be a place for genuine free will.

Edited November 23, 2005 by Hal

[AisA]

Yet all of these things are wrong.

How do you know? If, as you claim, one cannot even trust the self-evident because it may turn out to be wrong later, on what basis do you now claim any knowledge, including the knowledge that all the things you listed are wrong?

[Hal]

How do you know? If, as you claim, one cannot even trust the self-evident because it may turn out to be wrong later, on what basis do you now claim any knowledge, including the knowledge that all the things you listed are wrong?

One certainly can trust the self-evident, given that it has not been contradicted by experimental evidence. But one cannot say that "self-evident things MUST be true - and any evidence that suggests they arent is automatically wrong". Currently, believing in free-will is perfectly rational (just like believing that life cannot emerge from non-life was rational in the 18th century). But if free-will is contradicted by later findings in neuroscience, it will have to be abandoned.

Edited November 23, 2005 by Hal

[DavidOdden]

What exactly is the 'faculty' of reason?

Capacity, ability, potential.

Could a computer be programmed to have a rational faculty?

I don't think so, though maybe I haven't thought of this the right way. A machine might (imaginarily-speaking) be built which has a rational faculty, and you might be able to program a computer to build such a machine. I guess it depends on the status of self-modifying machines. Whether any other beings in the universe can reason is an open (scientific) question, and as such it has no definitive answer in Objectivism.

[Hal]

Capacity, ability, potential.

Fair enough. I think theres just something about the form of that sentence which makes me uneasy. I always interpret 'having a rational faculty' to imply that a rational faculty is some kind of weird existent which exists inside our minds and allows us to perform conceptual thought (sort of like how people used to believe that life was caused by a certain mist, the breath of life, being present inside our bodies).

I think that the distinction you made between the use of the term 'rational' in the context "man is rational", and the context "that man is acting rationally" is very important though. The first one does indeed refer to a potential for rational behavior, whereas the second is describing actual behavior. Theres nothing wrong with saying "man is rational, but does not always act rationally" provided this is kept in mind.

Edited November 23, 2005 by Hal

[AisA]

One certainly can trust the self-evident, given that it has not been contradicted by experimental evidence. But one cannot say that "self-evident things MUST be true - and any evidence that suggests they arent is automatically wrong".

Yes, one can say precisely that with respect to the axioms of Objectivism. Any notion that something exists besides existence is false and should be rejected immediately. Any notion that a thing can be what it is and not be what it is, at the same time and in the same respect, is likewise false and should be rejected immediately. Any notion that consciousness is an awareness of something other than that which exists is likewise false and should be rejected immediately. Do you disagree?

I think the problem lies in the definition of "self-evident". Objectivism's definition would be: that which can be grasped by direct perception. Many of the things you listed as "self-evident" would not qualify under that definition.

By the way, I would like to hear what makes you think time travel is a possibility.

[JMeganSnow]

One certainly can trust the self-evident, given that it has not been contradicted by experimental evidence. But one cannot say that "self-evident things MUST be true - and any evidence that suggests they arent is automatically wrong". Currently, believing in free-will is perfectly rational (just like believing that life cannot emerge from non-life was rational in the 18th century). But if free-will is contradicted by later findings in neuroscience, it will have to be abandoned.

I didn't say it is true because it is self-evident, I said it is axiomatic because it is self-evident; since the fact is directly perceivable though introspection, i.e. you can observe your consciousness in the process of making choices, it is not deduced or induced through reason; there is nothing prior to it that you observe and then abstract in order to derive that you have reason. It's as obvious as a thunderstorm.

In order to be accepted as true it still needs to be validated, self-evidency is not sufficent demonstration for that, as demonstrated by the numerous people who still refuse to believe it.

Free will can never be contradicted by later findings in neuroscience, because the existence of the scientific method, hence neuroscience, depends on an epistemology of reason, and reason depends on volition. Without a volitional consciousness reason would be neither necessary nor possible.

So, a neuroscientist concluding that volition was only an illusion would, in effect, be declaring that he had used volition to discover that it didn't exist in the first place.

Oh, and I'm "travelling" through time as we speak, otherwise it should be rather difficult for me to type this message, much less post it.

[JMeganSnow]

That's my argumentation against free will. I think that the idea that free will is self-evident is just a cheap sneak-out to avoid having to deal with the arguments. The argument for free will as the basis of thought is good, but how do you deal with the hypnosis-argument?

I'm still thinking about this.

It's important to distinguish between hypnosis, which is a similar state to somnambulism where the person's conscious mind is completely detached and their subconscious controls all motor functions, and post-hypnotic suggestion, which is what you've described.

You are aware that there are some people that can't be hypnotized? And taking off your jacket isn't exactly a big deal. You can only deal consciously with so much information at a time. But your brain takes in all kinds of information all the time. You become aware of this as "feelings", "impulses", "hunches", "intuitions", etc.

Your subconscious is not the seat of free will and it is only through repeated conscious actions that you can change or affect it. Your conscious mind is the part of you that actively makes decisions. Feeling a vague and unidentifiable urge to do something completely unimportant (such as take off your jacket), most people will not exert the effort required to screen out the impulse. Exercising your free will generally takes effort and continuous conscious thought.

The existence of the subconscious (and the weird effects that it can create) does not, however, invalidate the existence of your conscious mind any more than optical illusions invalidate the faculty of sight.

[Hal]

Do you disagree?

No, I agree with all that. But although free-will is taken as axiomatic, it is not one of the 3 basic axioms of Objectivism. There is no inherent contradiction in denying freewill, like there is in denying either existence or consciousness.

I think the problem lies in the definition of "self-evident". Objectivism's definition would be: that which can be grasped by direct perception. Many of the things you listed as "self-evident" would not qualify under that definition.

Well, direct perception is a tricky phrase here. Technically, we do not directly perceive that we have free-will. We perceive that it feels like we have free will. Even if the determinists were correct, we would still experience the world in the same we do now - noone denies that the feeling of free-will exists. The dispute is over the physical cause of this feeling. T

This feeling certainly justifies assuming that free-will exists in the absence of other evidence, but it is not conclusive proof.

By the way, I would like to hear what makes you think time travel is a possibility.

Well, I suppose a proper definition of time-travel is appropriate, since its a pretty vague concept. But I simply meant the time dilation allowed by special relativity; that (eg) if someone gets into a spaceship and flies away from earth at a fast enough speed, before returning, then he may have aged only 5 years while 100 years have passed on earth. For all intents and purposes, he has travelled 95 years into the future.

This sort of thing has been demonstrated experimentally, albeit on a far smaller scale (eg clocks 'losing' a few nanoseconds when flown round earth in high speed planes).

Edited November 23, 2005 by Hal

[Felix]

So, a neuroscientist concluding that volition was only an illusion would, in effect, be declaring that he had used volition to discover that it didn't exist in the first place.

No. He would have provided proof that free will was nonsense in the first place and replace it with his theory. And he can explain exactly how he came to his conclusions with his new theory. There is no contradiction here. The problem is that you are not willing to give up your theory of free will. These two theories (free will and neuro-determinism) contradict each other, yes. But there is no internal contradiction inside his theory. Just like there is none inside yours. Except for the problems with physical theory.

Just like there is no place for god in that model there is no place for free will. Claiming it to be self-evident is just refusal to deal with the issue. You need to offer how that still fits into the most current knowledge or you contradict yourself. You hold two opposing views in your mind at the same time.

One says that there is something like free will because it is self-evident (very convincing) the other says that everything is determined (or, at the microscopical level, even stochastic). The latter is repeatedly shown in experiments to be in accordance with reality. The first is an assumption based on private first guess.

That's what makes it hard for me. I can't have both. So I stick with science. You'd have to find another theory that would include conciousness into physics as many have tried with quantum physics (I have yet to read their position and take courses on quantum physics) or you end up abandoning free will. The problem is that existence being independent from conciousness is another self-evident axiom. And as far as I see it, they contradict each other. That means: At least one of them is false. And I'd bet on free will.

My problem is: I still (love to) think that I have free will. And for living my life that's a very powerful assumption. But the evidence is against me. If your heart and your mind are in conflict, follow your mind.

At least that's what John Galt said.

[DavidOdden]

There is no inherent contradiction in denying freewill, like there is in denying either existence or consciousness.

How can you deny free will? I thought that was impossible.

[JMeganSnow]

No. He would have provided proof that free will was nonsense in the first place and replace it with his theory. And he can explain exactly how he came to his conclusions with his new theory. There is no contradiction here.

Yes there is. If I were to say that by observing reality and taking measurements I was able to scientifically conclude that nothing actually exists you'd declare I was insane. What precisely was I observing and measuring? Observing and measuring both assume that something exists that can be observed and measured!

Ditto with volition. Reason, which is the process of integrating and processing the evidence of your senses by means of forming abstractions, that is to say concepts and propositions, does not operate automatically. It is a volitional process. The proof is dramatically obvious: people can be wrong. If determinism was correct the same inputs would always unerringly produce the same outputs, like a computer. The scientific method requires the use of reason, it requires you to exercise your volition. It would not matter whether a neuroscientist could "explain" how he "deterministically" arrived at his conclusions: the fact would be that he had exercised his volition in the process of reasoning and that his conclusions were false. Period end of story.

A typical cop-out of this is to claim that people are too complex for anyone to ever have precisely the same inputs/outputs, so that explains all the variation. But what is the result of a statement of this kind? That neuroscience is inherently bogus because it is not possible to understand the subject of its study!

The truth is that you can know everything there is to know about the brain, how it works, etc, and people will still have free will; they will not be fully and unerringly predictable. You can predict how certain people will act IF they are VOLITIONALLY rational and objective because their motivations will conform with reality. But you will never be able to predict irrational people. Try it. It's amazingly frustrating.

For instance, psychoanalysts for years have been claiming to "explain" that your actions were the result of some sort of conflict between the mystic entitites known as your id, ego, and superego and that you had no control whatsoever. The fact that they could "explain" the origins of your actions had no bearing on the truth of their assertions.

If you are like I was when confronting this problem, oh, about two years ago (jeez! Was it only that long?!) your problem is not that you feel volition is true but are forced to accept determinism on the bulk of the evidence, the problem is that you are afraid that volition is true and are clinging to determinsm so that you won't have to assert your certainty and, most of all, your responsibility in the face of many people who disagree with you. I sincerely doubt that you know any more about neuroscience than I do, but if you are going to claim that you cannot observe volition in action when you sit at your desk and think "Okay, now I'm going to pick up the mouse", and then do it, and then "and now I'm not going to pick up the mouse" and then do that, then no one can help you.

As for "illusory" volition, which has been discussed before, what, exactly, would be the nature of an "illusory" volition that acted in all respects exactly like volition? It would be volition, that's what. As the less-philosophical say, "if it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck" (and possesses all the other attributes of a duck) then on what basis can you claim that it's an illusory duck? It's a duck! In this context the term "illusory" is rendered completely meaningless: its purpose is not to convey information but to cause you to doubt your own certainty.

[FeatherFall]

...One says that there is something like free will because it is self-evident (very convincing) the other says that everything is determined (or, at the microscopical level, even stochastic). The latter is repeatedly shown in experiments to be in accordance with reality...

The latter has never been proved, and to my knowledge, no correlation has ever been shown. The scientists' experiments would have had to identify the specific chemical decision making processes and shown a causal link to the test subjects convictions/choices. There is currently no way to interpret a person's conceptual knowledge by way of brain chemistry/physics, so an experiment to verify non-volition is impossible at this juncture.

I bear witness to every choice I make, and the notion of volition is further verified by way of the fact that it is one of the requirements of concept-formation. On the other hand, simply because the faculty of volition would have to exist as a matter/energy component of the brain is no reason to dismiss it.

-edit for clarity

Edited November 24, 2005 by FeatherFall

[Felix]

Yes there is. If I were to say that by observing reality and taking measurements I was able to scientifically conclude that nothing actually exists you'd declare I was insane. What precisely was I observing and measuring? Observing and measuring both assume that something exists that can be observed and measured!

Hm. This is something I do everytime I get concious when dreaming. The I observe everything and can conclude: This is a dream! It's a funny thing to do, in fact. But I doubt that science is possible in a dream environment. I wake up too early. And my mind screws up any try to measure something.

Ditto with volition. Reason, which is the process of integrating and processing the evidence of your senses by means of forming abstractions, that is to say concepts and propositions, does not operate automatically. It is a volitional process. The proof is dramatically obvious: people can be wrong. If determinism was correct the same inputs would always unerringly produce the same outputs, like a computer. The scientific method requires the use of reason, it requires you to exercise your volition. It would not matter whether a neuroscientist could "explain" how he "deterministically" arrived at his conclusions: the fact would be that he had exercised his volition in the process of reasoning and that his conclusions were false. Period end of story.

No. You just stick to your free-will story. If he can explain the principles of how this actually works and can predict outcomes again and again, then he has a strong case. I am the first one to admit that this is not possible right now. My problem is that I find it impossible that something else but determinism or pure chance can exist. Especially the claim that only humans have volition is very weird. Animals have brains, too. They live in the same universe according to the same physical laws. So humans must somehow have a magic part in their brain that creates volition. Otherwise they, just as animals, are determined. For the same reason.

A typical cop-out of this is to claim that people are too complex for anyone to ever have precisely the same inputs/outputs, so that explains all the variation. But what is the result of a statement of this kind? That neuroscience is inherently bogus because it is not possible to understand the subject of its study!

Hm. Good argument. As I already said: Right now, nobody has ever done this. This field is indeed very complicated. It is, however, not too complicated. But my argument doesn't come from neuroscience. It finds its basis in physics. And everything in reality, according to physics, has to be determined (or stochastic at the subatomic level, which is no better). This is the challenge. How does free will fit in here? The only way out would be that neuroscience found out that there is the magic part in the human brain I was talking about.

But it won't. Neuroscience is based on medicine, which is based on chemistry, which is based on physics.

Now if science is noncontradictory, then how do you find real volition in neuroscience? You won't.

The truth is that you can know everything there is to know about the brain, how it works, etc, and people will still have free will; they will not be fully and unerringly predictable. You can predict how certain people will act IF they are VOLITIONALLY rational and objective because their motivations will conform with reality. But you will never be able to predict irrational people. Try it. It's amazingly frustrating.

How? How can there be volition if the entire brain is explainable with physics? That is the basis of my question. The fact that some people are insane doesn't contradict this. Their brain, too, can be explained with the model and you find out what they do. It may be stupid, but it is still determined. If you know someone has a fear of snakes and you show him a snake, what will he do?

If you are like I was when confronting this problem, oh, about two years ago (jeez! Was it only that long?!) your problem is not that you feel volition is true but are forced to accept determinism on the bulk of the evidence, the problem is that you are afraid that volition is true and are clinging to determinsm so that you won't have to assert your certainty and, most of all, your responsibility in the face of many people who disagree with you. I sincerely doubt that you know any more about neuroscience than I do, but if you are going to claim that you cannot observe volition in action when you sit at your desk and think "Okay, now I'm going to pick up the mouse", and then do it, and then "and now I'm not going to pick up the mouse" and then do that, then no one can help you.

Hm. That is an interesting point. But I rather find it horrible that I should have no free will. It would mean that I cannot be proud of anything I have done. It means that I have no control over my future. This is horrible. This would be comfortable if I had a bad life. Then I could say: It wasn't my fault! But I won't.

The belief in free will is for me some sort of a religious belief. That means it is a belief without basis in reality. It's based on personal feelings. But in opposition to most religious beliefs, this one is rather empowering. It says that you can influence things.

Your other point. I can observe my volition, yes. That's how I perceive it. I am completely sure on a perceptual level that everything I do is my free choice.

But if I look at a pencil in a glass of water, it is bent. I can see it. Just look at it: It's bent. End of case! The problem is: Science tells me it isn't.

As for "illusory" volition, which has been discussed before, what, exactly, would be the nature of an "illusory" volition that acted in all respects exactly like volition? It would be volition, that's what. As the less-philosophical say, "if it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck" (and possesses all the other attributes of a duck) then on what basis can you claim that it's an illusory duck? It's a duck! In this context the term "illusory" is rendered completely meaningless: its purpose is not to convey information but to cause you to doubt your own certainty.

It is illusory if it looks like it to me and I am very certain. But after serious scientific investigation it's not. Just like the pencil in the water.

My problem is that contradiction. I don't know how to live without the assumption of free will. However all I know about physics tells me that free will doesn't exist. And I see no way to mix the two noncontradictiory.

This is quite a powerful threat to my comfort.

[mrocktor]

However all I know about physics tells me that free will doesn't exist. And I see no way to mix the two noncontradictiory.

This is quite a powerful threat to my comfort.

You will remain uncomfortable for as long as you continue to try to fit reality to theory. When you decide to fit theory to reality, you will realize that all you know about physics is not all there is to know about physics, and that somehow volition is possible, as it must be since you observe it every conscious moment of your life.

mrocktor

Edited November 24, 2005 by mrocktor

[Felix]

You will remain uncomfortable for as long as you continue to try to fit reality to theory. When you decide to fit theory to reality, you will realize that all you know about physics is not all there is to know about physics, and that somehow volition is possible, as it must be since you observe it every conscious moment of your life.

mrocktor

It's this somehow that screws it up for me. If I just stick to the somehow even if all I know about physics tells me exactly the opposite, I'm no better than the guy talking to god in his spare time. All he has is a somehow and no argument can reach him. I need a reason, you know. And I don't have one. In addition to that I doubt that I will find it.

If physics is wrong, where is that and why?

[softwareNerd]

Acknowledging ignorance about a cause is more useful than making up an arbitrary fictional "reason" for some perceived fact. Guessing at a reason -- in the form of a hypothesis -- may be useful. However, it does not help to postulate hypotheses arbitrarily either.

Edited November 24, 2005 by softwareNerd