A more specific determinism "vs" free will debate.

[EC]

I would like to debate a non-Objectivist on the issue of why the fact of determinism in physics does NOT contradict the fact of free will. I consider myself to be an Objectivist and will take the Objectivist stance on the issue in an attempt to sharpen my ability to completely defend a true position.

I realized earlier tonight that my defense of this fact isn't as sharp as it needs to be so I need to practice with someone who will take on the irrational opinion that is the counter to my statements.

[donnywithana]

I would like to debate a non-Objectivist on the issue of why the fact of determinism in physics does NOT contradict the fact of free will. I consider myself to be an Objectivist and will take the Objectivist stance on the issue in an attempt to sharpen my ability to completely defend a true position.

I realized earlier tonight that my defense of this fact isn't as sharp as it needs to be so I need to practice with someone who will take on the irrational opinion that is the counter to my statements.

Have you read my post on the other Determinism vs Free Will debate thread? I don't know how my opponent feels, but I wouldn't be against having you and him work together against me. If he doesn't want a partner, feel free to PM me your arguments, as I doubt that the moderators want two debates on the same subject going on.

[jrs]

I would like to debate a non-Objectivist on the issue of why the fact of determinism in physics does NOT contradict the fact of free will.

The following two quotations seem to me to contradict each other. Please explain why they do not.

If, under the same circumstances, several actions were possible -- e.g. a balloon could rise or fall (or start to emit music like a radio, or turn into a pumpkin), everything else remaining the same -- such incompatible outcomes would have to derive from incompatible (contradictory) aspects of the entity's nature. But there are no contradictory aspects. A is A.

A course of action is "free," if it is selected from two or more courses possible under the circumstances. In such a case, the difference is made by the individual's decision, which did not have to be what it is, i.e. which could have been otherwise.

The only reason I can see for a distinction is psychological -- Objectivism seeks to empower people. If non-human objects act deterministically, then people can understand and control them. But if humans acted deterministically, then we might be the play things of external forces.

Edited December 12, 2005 by jrs

[donnywithana]

The following two quotations seem to me to contradict each other. Please explain why they do not.

The only reason I can see for a distinction is psychological -- Objectivism seeks to empower people. If non-human objects act deterministically, then people can understand and control them. But if humans acted deterministically, then we might be the play things of external forces.

Yup. Free Will empowers people, and that's why no one wants to question it. If there's no free will, then life is pointless, right? But the thing that no one wants to admit is that life IS pointless. Look around! Life is a phenomenon! That's not to say that you should kill yourself, but it's really just the way things are! Now, that's depressing, yes, so if you want to not believe in it, you can say that, but don't act like I'm an idiot for pointing out the simple fact of determinism in nature.

However, to address the idea of external forces playing with us: they don't have free will either, so it's not like they've got some advantage over us.

Humans are animals. Animals live for the sake of living. There's no why. Why is the sky blue? Because that's what happens when light passes through an atmosphere. Why is there life? Because that's what happens when chemicals come together that way. What's the point of life? What's the point of the universe?

[entripon]

The following two quotations seem to me to contradict each other. Please explain why they do not.

The only reason I can see for a distinction is psychological -- Objectivism seeks to empower people. If non-human objects act deterministically, then people can understand and control them. But if humans acted deterministically, then we might be the play things of external forces.

The answer is on page 69:

The content of one's choice could always have gone in the opposite direction; the choice to focus could have been the choice not to focus, and vice versa. But the action itself, the fact of choosing as such, in one direction or the other, is unavoidable. Since man is an entity of a certain kind, he must act in a certain way. He must continually choose between focus and nonfocus.

And to donny:

I don't think anyone can really believe that life is pointless; they can say so explicitly, but if on a fundamental level they actually agreed with what they were saying, they would just go lay down and die. You may say that your life has no purpose, yet you still pursue values, you still try to stay alive and be happy. You've made the irreducible choice to live, to accept existence, and that gives rise to purpose and value in your life.

*edit* The same thing applies to free will: if determinists really believed that they had no volition, then their mind would be paralyzed and they could not function at all as human beings.

Edited December 12, 2005 by entripon

[donnywithana]

I don't think anyone can really believe that life is pointless; they can say so explicitly, but if on a fundamental level they actually agreed with what they were saying, they would just go lay down and die. You may say that your life has no purpose, yet you still pursue values, you still try to stay alive and be happy. You've made the irreducible choice to live, to accept existence, and that gives rise to purpose and value in your life.

*edit* The same thing applies to free will: if determinists really believed that they had no volition, then their mind would be paralyzed and they could not function at all as human beings.

Ouch, you're making me refer to Kant, and I hate doing that. Kant said that reason must assume freedom as a condition of its existence in order to act, even if freedom was not actually a fact of its existence. An ape does not have free will, but it also does not know that it does not have free will and could not conceive of not having it, no matter what level of intelligence it attained. Namely, man.

[entripon]

Ouch, you're making me refer to Kant, and I hate doing that. Kant said that reason must assume freedom as a condition of its existence in order to act, even if freedom was not actually a fact of its existence. An ape does not have free will, but it also does not know that it does not have free will and could not conceive of not having it, no matter what level of intelligence it attained. Namely, man.

I didn't know that Kant said that (I gave up on the Critique of Pure Reason about halfway through), but if he did then he's partially right. Human reason has to (at least implicitly) know that it's free in order to function, and since our minds are not infallible, they in fact must be free for us to be able to reason (or else we would never be able to trust our conclusions (not that we would have a choice about whether to trust them or not (don't you love parentheses?))). On the other hand, if reason was taken in a broad sense to encompass any sort of faculty of identifying the nature of reality and the relationships between existents, there could hypothetically be a non-volitional consciousness that possessed the faculty to reason (in which case such a faculty would be necessarily infallible, or it wouldn't be able to be called reason).

I don't know whether apes possess volition or not; their close evolutionary link to human beings and the communications experiments done on them lead me to think that it's possible on some rudimentary level, although there's no hard evidence for such a thing. If they did, then they would have to in some form know of that fact, and if they didn't, then they wouldn't.

The more I argue for the existence of free will, the more I think such argumentation is a dead end road. Not that I don't enjoy discussing such things, but it's really not very productive. The only way for somebody to accept the existence of free will is to see it for himself, and since all argumentation presupposes the ability to direct one's focus and mental processes, there's not much way to argue *against* determinism except by pointing out the stolen concept therein and showing that volition does not contradict causality. I think I (and others) have done that, so there's not a whole lot more to debate.

[EC]

Consiousness and volition is not a contradiction to determinism in physics for the same reason that running software on a computer does not result in a contradiction or an impossibility because it cannot exist without its hardware.

The mind (volitional consiousness) is the software and the brain is the hardware it runs on. I know the next statement someone will make is that software is determined, i.e., it does what it it programmed to do. But this is exactly the reason why I have always maintained that it is possible for man to one day to create a working artificial intelligence without injecting the arbitrary. Simply put, nature has beat us to it, and we are the living self-evident evidence to my claim. But of course, our intelligence isn't "artificial", and neither would a working A.I. created by man really be "artificial" just because we had to use physical means to create it. What else would be used? Non-physical means?

[jrs]

... life IS pointless.

Then what is the point of your participation in this thread?

The answer is on page 69:

Notice that there were errors in your quotation which I have corrected.

The content of one's choice could always have gone in the opposite direction; the choice to focus could have been the choice not to focus, and vice versa. But the action itself, the fact of choosing as such, in one direction or the other, is unavoidable. Since man is an entity of a certain kind, since his brain and consciousness possess a certain identity, he MUST act in a certain way. He must continuously choose between focus and nonfocus. Given a certain kind of cause, in other words, a certain kind of effect MUST follow. This is not a violation of the law of causality, but an instance of it.

... the same entity, under the same circumstances, will perform the same action.

The action in question here is the particular choice of one of the alternatives rather than the process of choosing itself. The fact that there are two possible alternatives (focus or nonfocus) violates Dr. Peikoff's version of the law of causality which insists on only one possible outcome.

[EC]

The law of causality state that entities act according to there identity NOT that there is only one possible outcome in a given set of circumstances.

"The links you strive to drown are causal connections. The enemy you seek to defeat is the law of causality: it permits you no miracles. The law of causality is the law of identity applied to action. All actions are caused by entities. The nature of an action is caused and determined by the nature of the entities that act; a thing cannot act in contradiction to its nature. An action not caused by an entity <ftni_152> would be caused by a zero, which would mean a zero controlling a thing, a non-entity controlling an entity, the non-existent ruling the existent—which is the universe of your teachers' desire, the cause of their doctrines of causeless action, the reason of their revolt against reason, the goal of their morality, their politics, their economics, the ideal they strive for: the reign of the zero.

Bold in above quote is mine. Edited December 13, 2005 by EC

[Inspector]

The more I argue for the existence of free will, the more I think such argumentation is a dead end road. Not that I don't enjoy discussing such things, but it's really not very productive. The only way for somebody to accept the existence of free will is to see it for himself, and since all argumentation presupposes the ability to direct one's focus and mental processes, there's not much way to argue *against* determinism except by pointing out the stolen concept therein and showing that volition does not contradict causality.

I think you’ve nailed it quite rightly on the head there. I can recall a line from Atlas Shrugged:

When [a savage] declares that... he doesn't choose to accept the axiom that he exists, he blanks out the fact that he has accepted it by uttering that sentence, that the only way to reject it is to shut one's mouth, expound no theories and die.

While that pertains to the axiom of existence, rather than free will, it does address the issue of those who steal concepts as fundamental as this one.

[donnywithana]

Ok, well it's pretty clear when you have people saying that it would be possible for a computer to possess free will, it's an argument of semantics. A computer must react to a given input in one specific way. Thus, it does not have free will. If you agree that the brain operates as a computer does, then you are agreeing that humans also don't possess free will. I don't know how to put it any simpler than that.

As for the purpose of life, why does life have to have a purpose? The only thing that happens when you claim that life has a purpose is that you feel empowered. Great, enjoy it. I'm not going to try and bring people down, because it's evident that this is a contradiction that you cling to very fastly, and its elimination would not be welcome.

I'm trying to find the stolen concept in my argument, and I can't exactly find it. What's clearly happening is that I've missed a step in my explanation, therefore leading to a non sequitar. Here is a post from another thread in which I tried to prove my point step by step: Enjoy.

[EC]

Your wrong donnywithana and here's why.

I essentially said the mind is roughly equivalent to software and the brain to hardware with the difference being that the human mind has the faculty of volition while a computer program does not have such a capacity, yet. What is this capacity/faculty of volition that humans possess that computer do not yet? It is the ability to choose. I.e., the ability of the mind to chart its own course, write its own program, etc.

Computer software so far is written, such that, it incorporates an algorithm that can only follow deterministic rules and output a certain set of answers. Volition howeve, not only allows the user to program his own mind towards any task he might wish, it also allows him to decide not to program it to do nothing if he so chooses. He can sit and "vegetate". In other words, he can use his volition to follow any course of action or choose no course of action.

With his mind given inputs via his senses may come to completely different conclusions that if the same information was given to anothe person. That fact right there proves in a limited sense that volition exists and is not deterministic.

Therefore, to paraphrase Miss Rand, donny if you think that two facts of reality are somehow in contradiction with one another, then you need to stop and go back and check your premises. One of them must be wrong because contradictions cannot exist. A is A

[donnywithana]

What is this capacity/faculty of volition that humans possess that computer do not yet? It is the ability to choose. I.e., the ability of the mind to chart its own course, write its own program, etc.

Computers can do that.

Computer software so far is written, such that, it incorporates an algorithm that can only follow deterministic rules and output a certain set of answers.

Are you sure that the brain doesn't function the same way? Is your brain capable of absolute imagination? If so, can you tell me what radio light looks like? How about spacetime? Can you see that for what it actually is without resorting to inadequate approximations? Can you imagine infinity?

Volition howeve, not only allows the user to program his own mind towards any task he might wish, it also allows him to decide not to program it to do nothing if he so chooses. He can sit and "vegetate". In other words, he can use his volition to follow any course of action or choose no course of action.

How does he choose to do these things? Is the mind seperate from the brain? Does the brain follow solely cause-effect relationships (Newton's second law: an actor can only produce one specific consequence)? Is the "volitional" process a cerebral action itself? What causes this process, on a neurological level? Is it free of causal relationships?

With his mind given inputs via his senses may come to completely different conclusions that if the same information was given to anothe person. That fact right there proves in a limited sense that volition exists and is not deterministic.

But could that same brain at that same moment have come to a different conclusion than it did given the same impulses? If no, then I challenge you to rethink your premises. If yes, then I challenge you to rethink physical laws of causality.

[Inspector]

Could, could, could, could, could.

The fact is that volition is self-evident. Danny, the burden of proof is on YOU to show that it does not exist, not on anyone else to play whack-a-mole with your imagined "what if's."

The example with the hemispheres shows that the law of identity isn't a problem for volition.

So what else have you got?

[BryanG]

Argg! That's why I *hate* computer/mind analogies, you end up arguing about the identiy of a computer, and allow the identity of *mind* to be replaced with *brain*!

donnytwithana, from another thread

I hope you’re not asking why I’d try to persuade you at this point, because clearly I know that you can still make choices, and my input on those choices might affect them in some way.

Please explain - in what way do you think our “choices might be affected” if we have no volitional power to change them? *hint* It's a contradiction

What would that mechanism of change be? According to you, my philosophical course is preset by my biology, well outside my own- and most especially outside the influence of your “input”.

Would my brain structure/chemistry (i.e. my values) just happen to *spontaneously* change at the moment of your “input” - thereby allowing my mind to change, quite outside of my control? How is this possible?

donnytwithana, from post 9

I'm not going to try and bring people down, because it's evident that this is a contradiction that you cling to very fastly, and its elimination would not be welcome.

Are you saying you could “bring people down” (i.e. affect their mental state) if you wanted to? Are you again expecting some coincedental brain structure/ chemical change at the moment of you trying to “bring people down”?

How can you say that the “elimination” of *any* of our mental content would be “not be welcome”, welcome, or even possible, under the “non-volitional” position you advocate?

Inquiring brain/chemical structures want to know!

[donnywithana]

The example with the hemispheres shows that the law of identity isn't a problem for volition.

The log hemispheres example shows that specific attributes of inputs can be utilized by a system in exactly the way that the system was designed. Neurons can not decide whether or not they want to fire. The logs can not decide whether or not they want to roll. Brains function in exactly the way they are designed to in every situation.

Argg! That's why I *hate* computer/mind analogies, you end up arguing about the identiy of a computer, and allow the identity of *mind* to be replaced with *brain*!

Can we all agree whether or not the mind is a symptom of neurological activity? If you don't accept that your thought processes are the results of cerebral action, then I recommend that you review your knowledge of the human mind before trying to continue this conversation.

Please explain - in what way do you think our “choices might be affected” if we have no volitional power to change them? *hint* It's a contradiction

Ok, for the last time. Learning is not volitional. Dogs can learn. Choice is not volitional. Dogs can choose. Volition is the possibility for a brain to have acted in a different way than it did in a given situation. If you disagree with this definition, then review your understanding of what "volition" means.

What would that mechanism of change be? According to you, my philosophical course is preset by my biology, well outside my own- and most especially outside the influence of your “input”.

Would my brain structure/chemistry (i.e. my values) just happen to *spontaneously* change at the moment of your “input” - thereby allowing my mind to change, quite outside of my control? How is this possible?

Are you saying you could “bring people down” (i.e. affect their mental state) if you wanted to? Are you again expecting some coincedental brain structure/ chemical change at the moment of you trying to “bring people down”?

I don't even know what you just said, but I'll try and answer what I'm guessing you're asking. All animals are born with the capacity to analyze perceptual data. They are also programmed to deal with this data in certain ways. Your ability to "see" based on electrical impulses from your occular nerve rely on your brain's predisposition to interpret these impulses in a specific way. Humans possess the ability to analyze these electrical impulses to much more complex degrees. Humans can conceptualize, analyze, conclude, and remember. Future information can be integrated into the memory, and this information may undermine the conclusions previously reached by the brain. This may cause the brain to reevaluate the "knowledge" that it possesses for contradictions. Thus, the brain can change its conclusions. These processes are physiological and have nothing to do with volition.

To summarize thus far:

-Humans can analyze perceptual information, just like other animals.

-Humans can come to conclusions and question those conclusions' validity.

-None of this has anything to do with free will, they are simple properties of the human brain.

How can you say that the “elimination” of *any* of our mental content would be “not be welcome”, welcome, or even possible, under the “non-volitional” position you advocate?

More specifically:

-Your brain has concluded that free will exists and gives you agency over your actions

-I am proposing that the nature of your brain will determine the conclusion it will reach in a given situation

-This would not have any affect on your life, because it's simply an observation

-It does, however, further the idea that humans are simply a species of animal that exist for the same reason as other species, which is that they just happen to exist

-This disempowers humans, which makes them unhappy

-I don't want to make people unhappy

[softwareNerd]

A procedural question: I notice that this thread has 6 people posting. Since EC started it with the intention of having a debate, I'd like to ask EC: is this okay with you, or do you wants to have a more debate-like format?

[EC]

It's fine with me. Bring 'em on.

[jrs]

In any given set of circumstances, therefore, there is only one action possible to an entity, the action expressive of its identity.

The law of causality states that entities act according to their identity NOT that there is only one possible outcome in a given set of circumstances.

So you have resolved the contradiction by rejecting Leonard Peikoff's version of the law of causality. Right?

A procedural question: I notice that this thread has 6 people posting. Since EC started it with the intention of having a debate, I'd like to ask EC: is this OK with you, or do you wants to have a more debate-like format?

This chaos may be OK with EC; but I would prefer to have my messages separated from the flood pouring from donnywithana.

[softwareNerd]

This chaos may be OK with EC; but I would prefer to have my messages separated from the flood pouring from donnywithana.

Perhaps you and EC could work out some debate parameters via PMs. Or. if you want to invite someone else to debate that's fine too. I haven't read the posts in this thread, merely noticed that it didn't appear to be a "debate".

Here is what I suggest: two and only two people continue the debate and take it to a certain point. After that, open it to others. I'm sure the rest can wait a week or two to add their comments. Just a thought, because there have been multiple attempts to debate this topic, but none of them are turning out to be debates.

[BryanG]

My apologies to EC, I will confine any reply I have to donnywithana to his thread on the debate forum.

/Bryan

[EC]

jrs, I think you need to reread your own quote. What I said, what I quoted from AS, and what you quoted from OPAR are not in contradiction.

An entity acts according to its identity. This does NOT mean that it can't make choices i.e., use volition, but that it can NOT act in contradiction to its identity. In the case of man that means use of volition.

In other words, you are using your own rationalistic tendencies to take Peikoff out of context.

[jrs]

What I said, what I quoted from AS, and what you quoted from OPAR are not in contradiction.

How can YOU not see a contradiction between "there is only one action possible" and "NOT that there is only one possible outcome"?

Are you saying that the same action (by the same entity in the same circumstances) can have two outcomes?

Are you saying that focusing and non-focusing are the same action?

Do you think that one and two are the same?

You appear to be ignoring the plain words of pages 14 and 15 of OPAR.

You cannot just pick and choose which of several different versions of causality is convenient for your particular application and rationally claim to be consistent.

An entity acts according to its identity. This does NOT mean that it can't make choices i.e., use volition, but that it can NOT act in contradiction to its identity. In the case of man that means use of volition.

Fine. But that violates Leonard Peikoff's version of the law of causality, in spite of his and your protestations to the contrary.

In other words, you are using your own rationalistic tendencies to take Peikoff out of context.

Does being rationalistic mean not evading the plain meaning of the words in question?

Of what context am I taking Peikoff's words out? Please spell it out.

[dondigitalia]

You appear to be ignoring the plain words of pages 14 and 15 of OPAR.

You appear to be ignoring the plain words in a later section of OPAR.

You cannot just pick and choose which of several different versions of causality is convenient for your particular application and rationally claim to be consistent.

Right back atcha, buddy.

Fine. But that violates Leonard Peikoff's version of the law of causality, in spite of his and your protestations to the contrary.

How? Volition is part of man's identity. It is a type of causation.

Does being rationalistic mean not evading the plain meaning of the words in question?

No, being rationalistic means one is applying an epistemological method of obtaining knowledge by deducing inferences from ideas already held in one's mind. It usually involves a heapload of dropped context, since only induction can bring in outside (but relevant) context. A rationalist will not typically exclude all outside context, but will select context which supports his idea and reject all context which contradicts it.

I agree with EC that you have this tendency.

Of what context am I taking Peikoff's words out? Please spell it out.

Start on page 62, the section entitled "Human Actions, Mental and Physical, as Both Caused and Free."