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The Use Of Analogy In Argument

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Analogy is not an argument. Bad analogies can muddy an argument. (I remember Plato's Republic being full of them, to the extent that I found it tedious to read.)

However, good analogies can be useful tools of thought. When considering X, one might say (for instance):

  • X is like Y
  • Y implies Z
  • so X implies something like Z

Doesn't work as a formal argument. However, if X and Y are truly similar, "refuting" the "argument" forces one to ask what indeed is different about them. It forces one to look for differenting facts. It forces one to "chew" further on X and Y and deepen one's understanding of the two concepts.

I started thinking along these lines when I read the following:

Are there other fallacies that break a formal argument, but might be useful as tools of thought? For instance, how about "slippery slope". Suppose I claim X, and someone says that X is a slippery slope to Y. As long as the two are related (i.e. the objection is not completely arbitrary) considering why there is no such slippery slope can strengthen one's understanding of the subject.
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Are there other fallacies that break a formal argument, but might be useful as tools of thought? For instance, how about "slippery slope". Suppose I claim X, and someone says that X is a slippery slope to Y. As long as the two are related (i.e. the objection is not completely arbitrary) considering why there is no such slippery slope can strengthen one's understanding of the subject.
I don't think that fallacious argument are of any value at all, but the things referenced on these fallacy lists are not automatically fallacies. Rather, I think they often point to valid argument forms and point to ways that they can be misused. For example, the fallacy of appeal to authority rely lies in abstracting the concept "an authority" from proper context -- "in what". I am an authority in something: that doesn't mean all of my judgments are authoritative, just the ones where I do indeed know "the stuff". I'm not an authority in physics, so if I tell you that the law of conservation of baryon number is wrong, you shouldn't believe me. Sometimes these supposed fallacious arguments have limited validity, for example the "ad hominem tu quoque" can be valid to show that an ethical claim is unreasonable.
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Perhaps you should define exactly what you mean by "analogy." I use the term to mean basically the comparison between two different concepts by means of some conceptual common denominator. It's basically saying "A is like B." I would consider as analogies: Ayn Rands comparison between moral compromise and finding the middle of the road between food and poison. Or this statement from ITOE, "As far as can be ascertained, the perceptual level of a child's awareness is similar to the awareness of the higher animals: the higher animals are able to perceive entities, motions, attributes, and certain numbers of entities. But what an animal cannot perform is the process of abstracĀ­tion-of mentally separating attributes, motions or numbers from entities. It has been said that an animal can perceive two oranges or two potatoes, but cannot grasp the concept 'two.')" Here, I would say, she is drawing an analogy between the perceputal level of a child's awareness and that of the higher animals-- with some similarities and some differences-- which is to say an analogy need not be an exact identity, only there must be some CCD between the two things one is comparing. But fill me in if you think I'm using the term incorrectly or if you have a different meaning in mind.

Analogies can be usefull to "concretize" an abstract concept. It's possible to utilize an analogy which is a concrete parallell to an abstract concept, and that can be very illuminating, even if the terms have already been defined.

Or an analogy can be drawn between a principle which has been established, and a new formulation of the same principle- such as, "The fallacy of Intelligent Design is the same fallacy which has been perpetrated by Creationists for centuries." With the burden of proof then being on the person making the claim, but of course that claim is easily proved. Then the whole theory of Intelligent Design doesn't have to be refuted line for line-- one is simply referred to instances in which Creationism has already been refuted. One must simply establish that the two are the same, thus validating the analogy.

As for the example you gave, if the poster had established that there was an indesputable similarity between "melody is a primative vulgarity in music" and "logic is a primative vulgarity in philosophy," such as, perhaps the principle "an essential component of a given concept is a primative vulgarity within that concept," then by showing that the principle was based on a fallacy, wouldn't he be showing that any statement which is a formulation of the principle is flawed as well? Wouldn't that be an example of a logically valid and illuminating analogy, as well as "an argument"? Bad analogies can muddy an argument, but so can bad syllogisms, bad logic-- bad arguments!...

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For the record, my strawman accusation had nothing to do with the analogies he tried to draw. It was in reference to him turning my claim that "melody isnt essential to music' into the ridiculous "melody is a primitive vulgarity in music" (whatever that means).

I think that analogies are generally the best (= most effective) form of argument. If someone argues for some principle X, then show him how a consistent application of X to an analogous situation would force him into holding some view Y, where Y is undesirable. Its a form of reductio ad absurdum really. Bad analogies are a logical fallacy though.

Edited by Hal
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In that case, it would be improper to try to draw an analogy between "melody isn't essential to music" and "melody is a primitive vulgarity in music." Being inessential doesn't contain a value judgement, and being a primitive vulgarity in something almost implies that it is essential. Of course, that's no reason to throw out analogies altogether. Could there be value in straw-man type arguments? I would say no, because they emphasize or exagerate something that is nonesential and even not contained in the original argument, thus distorting the meaning of the whole debate.

I can't resist adding that melody is essential to music. Melody is a succession of musical tones. Even if it is the same note repeated monotonously, as in most hip-hop, electronica, or tribal music, it's still melodic. It's just that the melody would then be relatively primative. I note that there must be some rhythmical distinction, so that it becomes a succesion of different tones-- different in time. A single tone sounding for some duration would not be melodic and would not be music, in itself.

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Analogy is not an argument. Bad analogies can muddy an argument. (I remember Plato's Republic being full of them, to the extent that I found it tedious to read.)

Doesn't work as a formal argument. However, if X and Y are truly similar, "refuting" the "argument" forces one to ask what indeed is different about them. It forces one to look for differenting facts. It forces one to "chew" further on X and Y and deepen one's understanding of the two concepts.

All language is analogical. That is the best, most formal arguments can only attempt to set up in the audiences' mind an analogical approximation for the intention of the speaker. Further, most interesting statements (those more complicated than one establishing a simple measurement), the intended meaning often exceeds the ability of language to carry the full intent. Therefore, explicit use of analogy may be a tool that carries more rather than less meaning than basic sylogism.

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No language is conceptual. A person should try to define their use of words such that their meaning is crystal clear.

Unfortunately, there is no absolute foundation of words you can use (like axioms) that will allow you to construct a series of crystal clear definitions that will cause complex statements to mean the same to all audiences.

All language is conditioned by experience, culture, action and community. Even the choice of definitions is based on communal expectations rooted in a loose sense of shared experience.

Therefore, if you desire a particular outcome in the mind of your audience, it may be more effective to intentially read a well chosen poem than by attempting to construct a specific detailed sylogism.

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Unfortunately, there is no absolute foundation of words you can use (like axioms) that will allow you to construct a series of crystal clear definitions that will cause complex statements to mean the same to all audiences.
This is not true: in fact, this is the essential credo of skepticism and relativism. What you are saying is that some ideas are ineffable -- beyond the possibility of explanation; that words have no objective meaning. And yet I don't think you really believe that what I have just told you is how to make pancakes -- I'm betting that you really do understand the thrust of what I said, even if, in just these few words, I did not set forth the entirety of Objectivist epistemology and therefore you don't totally understand why language is not "analogical".

Because man is a volitional being, no matter what reasoning one sets forth, a willful person can always refuse to grasp the obvious meaning of words. In other words, I can tell you something that clearly should cause you to get a particular point, but you can still refuse to grasp the point, because of this pesky free will thing.

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This is not true: in fact, this is the essential credo of skepticism and relativism. What you are saying is that some ideas are ineffable -- beyond the possibility of explanation; that words have no objective meaning. And yet I don't think you really believe that what I have just told you is how to make pancakes -- I'm betting that you really do understand the thrust of what I said, even if, in just these few words, I did not set forth the entirety of Objectivist epistemology and therefore you don't totally understand why language is not "analogical".

I believe you are mistaken. Allow me to suggest that rather than trying to say that words have no meaning, I am suggesting that words cause in a very real and objective way synapses to fire in the mind of the audience. These synapses are related to the networks of meanings based on community and experience in the mind of the audience.

The fact (in which you are correct) that I know you were not talking about pancakes has much to do with our shared community and experience.

Further, if you wanted a crystal clear definition of language (thought I would only provide a vauge attempt), I would think you would agree that letters, words, sentances are at their most basic level, symbols.

TREE is not literally a tree, but is rather a symbol that through a shared sense of meaning puts a particular image in your head. The specifics of that image is likely conditioned by your local ecology (or the local ecology of your childhood). - I tend to imagine a white pine by default.

I hope you now hear that this is not an escape to meaninglessnes, but rather a stricter, more objective definition of the function of language and the neurology involved with processing language.

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The most important distinction I would make here between your position so far and the Objectivist one is that words stand for concepts, rather than images. It could be a concept of an image, but Objectivism ascribes a deeper meaning to concepts than merely the fading images of particular sensations. That's just a hint though, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology is the best source for the explenation of this and other fascinating aspects of the Ayn Rand's unique solution to the "problem of universals."

Further, if you wanted a crystal clear definition of language (thought I would only provide a vauge attempt), I would think you would agree that letters, words, sentances are at their most basic level, symbols.

TREE is not literally a tree, but is rather a symbol that through a shared sense of meaning puts a particular image in your head. The specifics of that image is likely conditioned by your local ecology (or the local ecology of your childhood). - I tend to imagine a white pine by default.

I hope you now hear that this is not an escape to meaninglessnes, but rather a stricter, more objective definition of the function of language and the neurology involved with processing language.

Edited by Bold Standard
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I don't think this talk of synapses, networks, supposed shared community and experiences, or "senses of meaning" advances our understanding of language at all. See Rand (ITOE) for a discussion of the nature of concepts, and the representational function of words. The Cartesian image theory of meaning is fairly thoroughly refuted (what is the visual image that is the meaning of "freedom" or "sour"?). In fact we cannot say anything meaningful about the neurological basis of concepts (either at the level of production or processing); and none of this has required mention of analogy.

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(what is the visual image that is the meaning of "freedom" or "sour"?)

Of course, that is precisely the grounds on which Hume and his descendents rejected precisely those types of concepts as "meaningless." [edit: oh, I thought you said "soul." I think "sour" is okay because supposedly with Hume you can have a perceptual image that's not visual. But I'm not sure about that..] But Rand refutes those guys too. :) Also, Dr. Leonard Peikoff's essay on the analytic synthetic dichotomy which is appended to the end of ITOE refutes all those type of arguments from top to bottom.

One meaningfull statement I've heard Objectivists make related to the neorological basis for concepts is that sensory perception is automatic-- in other words, causally determined, prior to the point at which volition enters into cognition. But it's not considered an essentially important issue.

But I'm still wondering what's the distinction between an analogy and a regular sylogism? Is an analogy generally intended to imply more approximation?

Edited by Bold Standard
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I don't think this talk of synapses, networks, supposed shared community and experiences, or "senses of meaning" advances our understanding of language at all. See Rand (ITOE) for a discussion of the nature of concepts, and the representational function of words. The Cartesian image theory of meaning is fairly thoroughly refuted (what is the visual image that is the meaning of "freedom" or "sour"?). In fact we cannot say anything meaningful about the neurological basis of concepts (either at the level of production or processing); and none of this has required mention of analogy.

Perhaps you cannot say anything meaningful about the neurological basis of concepts, but there certainly is such. It is simple enough to understand the construction of both 'freedom' and 'sour' as being built up from a network of simpler, more basic ideas that obviously don't have to be visual in nature.

The relationship between this discusion and analogy ought be clear. The object of a speach act is to produce understanding (or perhaps even agreement) on the part of the audience. The objective nature of the brain is such that an analogy may very well create the desired response in the audience more effectively than sylogism. This is precisely because our brains (and the symbolism that is language that our brains process) function on an experiential level.

American Heritage would have you believe sour was:Having a taste characteristic of that produced by acids; sharp, tart, or tangy.

Does this do the same thing to your mouth as watching someone suck on a lemon with the burning juices running down the corners of the mouth?

Even within Rand's writing, isn't it fictional prose that brings more conversions of mind than systematic philosophy?

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But I'm still wondering what's the distinction between an analogy and a regular sylogism? Is an analogy generally intended to imply more approximation?

Sylogism approaches information working up from an axiom to a more complex idea, while analogy approaches it by a non-systematic leap from a similarly complex idea. Both are approximations.

The former is an approximation based on the insufficiency of the firmness of axioms as well as the limitations of working within such a system of preset limits. (see Godel's incompleteness theorm)

The later is often more effective, in part, because it admits it's an approximation up front.

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What exactly do you mean by 'syllogism'? You seem to be using the word in a non-standard way since youre contrasting it with analogy, which suggests that you believe that most/all non-analogical arguments are syllogistic. This strikes me as obviously false, at least on my understanding of the term (AEIO). Even within purely formal logic, classical syllogisms dont come anywhere close to exhausting the valid forms of inference.

edit: Godel isnt relevant here; we're discussing language, not formal systems.

In fact we cannot say anything meaningful about the neurological basis of concepts

While I agree that the neurological basis of concepts is irrelevant to this sort of discussion, I dont see why theres any reason to think that nothing meaningful can be said about it. We can make many meaningful statements here, such as the hypothesis that concepts are represented in the brain as neuronal activation patterns functionally similar to those present in artificial neural networks.

Edited by Hal
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Now, are you trying to say that axioms are insufficiently firm, or that they're insufficient because they are firm? (And do you mean, and/or are you aware of the Objectivist meaning for "axioms?")

And when you say analogy is more effective because of admitting it's an approximation-- to what end, and in what respect, exactly?

Sylogism approaches information working up from an axiom to a more complex idea, while analogy approaches it by a non-systematic leap from a similarly complex idea. Both are approximations.

The former is an approximation based on the insufficiency of the firmness of axioms as well as the limitations of working within such a system of preset limits. (see Godel's incompleteness theorm)

The later is often more effective, in part, because it admits it's an approximation up front.

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Pastoral Engineer, Analogies are obviously helpful in thinking and in communicating. I doubt anyone here disagrees. Analogous to analogies would be pictures: visualization and illustration is helpful in thinking and communicating. That said, however, these tools can only take you so far. In the end, a picture and an analogy is not an argument.

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edit: Godel isnt relevant here; we're discussing language, not formal systems.

Using language with presise definitions to discuss objective reality is a formal system.

Now, are you trying to say that axioms are insufficiently firm, or that they're insufficient because they are firm? (And do you mean, and/or are you aware of the Objectivist meaning for "axioms?")

And when you say analogy is more effective because of admitting it's an approximation-- to what end, and in what respect, exactly?

There is no absolute starting point on which to fix an axiom. Any attempt to do so is inherantly artificial.

If a chosen axiom is intended to directly relate to reality, it must subject itself to criticism and can therefore no longer stand as an axiom, but itself become a debatable proposition.

The end that I described is achieving the brain state of understanding or even agreement in the audience.

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Using language with presise definitions to discuss objective reality is a formal system.
No it isnt. Also, how would you go about formulating number theory within the definitions/'axioms' we use in normal conversation? Edited by Hal
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But I'm still wondering what's the distinction between an analogy and a regular sylogism? Is an analogy generally intended to imply more approximation?
"A syllogism is discourse in which, certain things being stated, http://""' target="_blank">something other than what is stated follows of necessity from their being so" (Prior Analytics Book I part 1). Analogy is an argument of the form A:B::C:X -- it is a type of syllogism. I see no use in the term "syllogism", in modern discussions, unless you are doing a historical study. Hal's AEIO thing is an example of a specific idea of "syllogism", based on rules like "There is a major premise and a minor premise, and a conclusion", "at least one premise must be universal", etc. HWB Joseph's book An Introduction to Logic is rich with discussion on classical logic and the taxonomy of inferences, but it is not exactly an introductory textbook, and I suggest spending a few years reading it (I'm a slow reader).
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No it isnt. Also, how would you go about formulating number theory within the definitions/'axioms' we use in normal conversation?

Language is simply grammar and definitions this is precisely a formal system that is subject to the incompleteness theorm. You begin with your definitions (arbitrarily fixed by culture) and your rules of grammar (likewise arbitrarily fixed) as axioms and the rest takes off from there.

I have no doubt that a mathematician (which I am not) would be able to formulate number theory as a formal system. (or perhaps more than one)

"A syllogism is discourse in which, certain things being stated, <a href="http://""" target="_blank"></a>something other than what is stated follows of necessity from their being so" (Prior Analytics Book I part 1). Analogy is an argument of the form A:B::C:X -- it is a type of syllogism.

Actually Analogy is not a type of syllogism and several here have said it is not an argument. Your definition of syllogism suggests the conclusion flows of necesity, no such certainty exists in analogy. This is my point.

Syllogism provides a false sense of security in the conclusion because the audience may begin with different premises.

I remind you that my main point is simply that analogy may be more persuasive (with the objective of understanding or agreement) than a logically "perfect" construction. There does not exist a method that will prove a true, interesting, non-trivial statement to all sane comers.

There are no philosophical problems, only language games - Wittgenstein

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Actually Analogy is not a type of syllogism and several here have said it is not an argument. Your definition of syllogism suggests the conclusion flows of necesity, no such certainty exists in analogy.
That was Aristotle's definition, not mine, so I can't take credit. Given the way you're using "syllogism", I take it to be identical to so-called "deductive inference", and as such, analogy is not a deductive inference. OTOH, deductive inference techniques cannot be used to create significant new knowledge, i.e. it is only a bookkeeping tool to check that you haven't introduced as axiomatic something that was supposed to be inferred.
Syllogism provides a false sense of security in the conclusion because the audience may begin with different premises.
We have an expression we use -- "check your premises".
I remind you that my main point is simply that analogy may be more persuasive (with the objective of understanding or agreement) than a logically "perfect" construction. There does not exist a method that will prove a true, interesting, non-trivial statement to all sane comers.
Ah! But there is -- logic. If a person refuses to accept logic, then there's nothing you can do; but if you restrict yourself to logic and you obey logic, then you can prove statements that are true. But only if you resist the siren-call of arbitrary statements.
There are no philosophical problems, only language games - Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein was a beery swine who was just as schloshed as Schlegel - E. Idle.
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I take it to be identical to so-called "deductive inference", and as such, analogy is not a deductive inference. OTOH, deductive inference techniques cannot be used to create significant new knowledge, i.e. it is only a bookkeeping tool to check that you haven't introduced as axiomatic something that was supposed to be inferred.

Though it may not be the perfect choice for the word, I am reffering to all logical processes that attempt to begin with solid ground - a set of axioms - and attempt to build a structure of true facts. All such systems fail to create significant new knowledge as they all proceed directly from the set of axioms. They only result in an inherantly limited formal system.

We have an expression we use -- "check your premises".Ah! But there is -- logic. If a person refuses to accept logic, then there's nothing you can do; but if you restrict yourself to logic and you obey logic, then you can prove statements that are true.

The very fact that premises need checking proves that one cannot rely on such logic. There is no firm ground on which to stand.

Even if you wished to show a statement as axiomatic, you would need to either prove it as such or take it on faith. If you had to prove it as axiomatic, it would not be properly axiomatic.

In the end, I am a great fan of logic. I will just refuse attibute to it unsupportable qualities. Analogy is not necessarily better at furthering an argument, but it may be.

Wittgenstein was a beery swine who was just as schloshed as Schlegel - E. Idle.

Quite likely, yet W was also quite correct - as long as you can make it up the ladder in that condition.

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David, Aristotle's definition for analogy really helped me understand, thanks for that.

OTOH, deductive inference techniques cannot be used to create significant new knowledge, i.e. it is only a bookkeeping tool to check that you haven't introduced as axiomatic something that was supposed to be inferred.

I'm really surprised to see you espouse this view. This seems similar to the case Francis Bacon made against deduction, in favor of his revised induction. I don't see how you can come to the conclusion that deductive inference cannot create new knowledge, besides through deduction from a syllogism. And then, have you said something new, or not? Doesn't this approach prevent one from abstracting beyond perceptual level concepts?

There are no philosophical problems, only language games - Wittgenstein

It's my understanding that this is an expression of the philosophical tradition known as nominalism. It can be traced back to the medieval philosopher Roscelin, who claimed that universals did not exist, but were instead mere flatus vocis: "puffs of air." This approach was called nominalism from the Greek word meaning "name." His approach was criticized by Anselm and Abelard, and the first attempts to secure a theory of universals, in this period, were called "moderate realism," to contrast it from nominalism and Platonic realism. But it wasn't until Thomas Aquinas that Aristotle's theory of universals was fully rediscovered and integrated into Western thought, thus ending the Medieval period and establishing the foundations for the Renaissance.

Nominalism lingered to various degrees in the doctrines of the empiricists, such as Bacon, Hobbes (who I think Wittgenstein is paraphrasing in the above quote), and Locke, but it wasn't until David Hume that a consistent and extreme nominalism would come to dominate all of Western philosophic thought, and since then almost every major philosopher has adopted it, especially Kant's formation of it known as "the analytic synthetic dichotomy."

The Objectivist answer to this, and an attempt to establish a new theory of universals is contained in AR's Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, just to plug that once more. One simply can't present a meaningful philosophical response to centuries old, entrenched notions of epistemology and the origin of concepts on an internet message board.

Edited by Bold Standard
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