Objectivism And The Correspondence Theory Of Truth

[dan_edge]

Introduction

This essay is a discussion of the Correspondence Theory of Truth (CTOT) and how the theory fits into the philosophy of Objectivism. I will argue that properly understood, the CTOT is compatible with Objectivist epistemology. I will also discuss pitfalls that must be avoided to keep the door closed to skepticism.

Readers should note that I am writing here for two distinct audiences. The first is the Objectivist community at large, those who are already familiar with the philosophy. I am also presenting this essay to my Senior Seminar in Philosophy class at the University of South Carolina for peer review.

To the Objectivist community: Some have expressed dissatisfaction with an unqualified acceptance of the Correspondence Theory, and with good reason, as I hope to demonstrate. A proper understanding of the Correspondence Theory is necessary to defend against Juggernaut of skepticism that has been sweeping the academic community for the past century.

To my classmates: This paper is based on information contained in my in-class presentation of Objectivist Epistemology, and it assumes the truth of Objectivism. I will glaze over some technical aspects of Objectivist principles. I encourage any of you to approach me with questions about these principles as you are working through the text.

----------------

The Correspondence Theory of Truth

The first formal expression of the Correspondence Theory of Truth (CTOT) can be traced back to Aristotle, who wrote: “To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true” (Metaphysics 1011b25), though Plato wrote very similar formulations (Cratylus 385b2, Sophist 263b). Kant considers the issue so obvious that it doesn't even deserve arguement, writing "“The nominal definition of truth, that it is the agreement of [a cognition] with its object, is assumed as granted.” (Critique of Pure Reason, 82). The Correspondence Theory has endured over the centuries, in part because it is seemingly so axiomatic, so elegant in its simplicity.

According to the CTOT, a statement is true iff (if and only if) it corresponds to reality. If I make the statement "Dr. Donougho is the Professor of my Philosophy class," this statement is true iff Dr. Donougho is, in fact, the Professor. If anyone else is the Professor (or if I don't have a Professor), then my statement is false. According to most interpretations of the CTOT, my statement would be false even if I have every reason to believe that Dr. Donougho is the professor, but he is not in fact because some impostor has taken his place. One's context of knowledge is irrelevant. Please keep this in mind, as we will have reason to return to it in a moment.

The Correspondence Theory of Truth is an alluring philosophical principle on many levels. At root, it is an epistemological expression of axiomatic metaphysical principles. Two such axiomatic principles in Objectivism are the Law of Identity and the Primacy of Existence. The Law of Identity states that "A is A," or "a thing is what it is." The Primacy of Existence states that "existence has primacy over consciousness," implying that consciousness has no effect on the identity of entities. If one accepts these metaphysical principles, then the task of man becomes to discover the identity of the world around him. His consciousness does not have the capacity to create, only to identify reality.

The Standard of Omniscience

The biggest problem with the common interpretation of the CTOT is that it sets a standard of omniscience for truth, making certainty impossible. If we accept that certainty is impossible, then we leave the discipline of philosophy open to skeptics (who will gleefully agree that reality is unknowable) and mystics (who offer a supernatural source for certainty).

As mentioned earlier, one's context of knowledge is deemed irrelevant when determining the truth value of his statements. If I say that "Dr. Donougho is my Professor," then my statement is false even if I have every reason to believe that it is true. These kinds of situations are not uncommon. The history of man is marked by an ever-expanding degree of knowledge about the nature of reality. In the realm of science, when new data is discovered that contradicts old theories, then the old theories are discarded, and new ones devised. Does this mean that the old theories were always false? How can we ever be certain that our theories will not be contradicted by new evidence at some point in the future? This creates a problem. If truth is determined without regard to context, then one's context must be all-encompassing (i.e., omniscient) to make a claim of certainty. An omniscient standard of truth is incompatible with Objectivism.

Knowledge As Contextual

Objectivist epistemology lays the foundation for a bridge between subject and object, and the reconciliation between the CTOT and certainty. Objectivism states that absolute certainty is possible within a specified context of knowledge. Any statement made by a human being necessarily implies the preamble "within my context of knowledge." This preamble is necessarily implied because man, by his nature, is a being of limited consciousness. He is not omniscient.

For example, Newton's Laws of Motion are true, and will always be true, given Newton's context of knowledge at the time. Einstein has access to better technology and higher levels of mathematics, and was able to expand man's understanding of Physics. He discovered new data that could not be explained by Newton's Laws, and he was able to construct a new theory which did account for the data. It would be false for Einstein to state that Newton's Laws will always always be true regardless of context, but Einstein could agree that, give Newton's context of knowledge at the time, his theories are still true.

The contextual nature of knowledge allows man to continually expand his understanding of the world around him, while at the same time avoid being paralyzed by uncertainty. The rational man forms principles on the basis of evidence, and treats them as absolute unless and until he discovers new evidence that would require him to restructure those principles. This methodology can be applied to ethics, politics, and esthetics, as well as science.

The Implied Conditional of Absolute Principles

Another helpful way of viewing absolute principles is in the form of a logical conditional. One can assert "If there are no aspects of reality outside the context of my knowledge which come into play, then principle X will always hold true." If one has properly formed his principle, and integrated it with all of the evidence available to him, then this statement will always be true, forever and ever.

One can view this logical conditional the same as any other, in terms of truth value. We can represent the statement as:

p-->q

Where

p = there are no aspects of reality outside the context of my knowledge which come into play

And

q = principle X will always hold true

Note that the truth value of this statement follows the same format of any other conditional statement. If 'p' is true, then 'q' must be true. If 'q' is false, then 'p' must also be false. And if 'p' is false, then the truth value of 'q' is indeterminable.

Let's return to Newton to demonstrate this method in action. Newton makes the claim that "if there are no aspects of reality outside the context of my knowledge which come into play, then The Laws of Motion will always hold true." If Newton acquires evidence that his Law of Motion does not apply to a particular case (for example, when entities approach the speed of light), then he knows that an element outside his context of knowledge has come into play. Now, he is challenged to integrate the new data with his old principle, modify it, or discard it favor of a new one. Note that, while 'p' and 'q' in the above example can have varying truth values, the logical statement p-->q is itself an absolute principle.

A New Perspective on CTOT

I have argued that theories and principles can be held with absolute certainty within a specified context. How then can one marry this with the CTOT?

When one formulates a theory based on evidence he has gathered, and integrates it without contradiction into the whole of his knowledge, then his theory does indeed correspond with reality. He has properly identified a relationship between his consciousness and some specified aspect of reality. It is important to keep in mind that a conceptual consciousness is an entity in reality, and an understanding of that consciousness is an instance of correspondence. One's integration of data into concepts and principles corresponds to the reality of his conceptual consciousness, and the contents therein.

One will never be able to step outside of his consciousness and make propositions based on information unavailable to him, but that does not mean that his limited theories do not correspond to the aspects of reality within his contextual range. It is unfair, and indeed irrational, to demand that man define "truth" in terms of the metaphysically impossible, i.e., omniscience.

The Importance of Semantics

An understanding of epistemological concepts is critical to maintain the integrity of philosophy as a discipline. In academic circles, classrooms, journals, online discussion forums, and even private philosophical conversations, the defenders of rationality must insist on the precise use of epistemological terms like "truth" and "certainty." The reason why there is so much misunderstanding about the proper application of the CTOT is that many just assume that the CTOT requires a standard of omniscience. This misunderstanding must be identified, clarified, called out, and rooted out of existence.

When engaged in discussion with an intellectual opponent, especially on issues of epistemology, take care that your opponent is not demanding that you step outside your context of knowledge in order to make a claim of certainty. A flaccid refrain of rationalistic "what ifs" does not take the place principled, logical, evidenced-based discussion. In the of spirit of Socrates, define your terms, and challenge your opponent to define his.

Communication

I must anticipate a challenge to my argument with respect to communication. If all knowledge is contextual, and each individual is working from his own context, then how can one defend against the charge of relativism? Is it reasonable to assume that one can effectively communicate with other individuals, and that the ideas being communicated are understood in the proper context?

My answer to this last question is 'yes!', given that one goes to the effort of defining his terms. This is why the precise definition of philosophical terms within one's own mind is so important. Individuals may define concepts in subtly different ways, so when a misunderstanding arises, the first step is to make sure that participants in a discussion understand each others' context of knowledge with respect to the issues being discussed. Misunderstandings are always possible, but can be limited through proper discourse of ideas.

Also, while individuals may have different contexts of knowledge at any given time, as men we all have access to perceptual concretes. Another method of clarifying interpersonal communication is to logically reduce ideas as close as possible to the perceptual level.

Looking Forward: A Complete Theory of Induction

There are many challenges in the field of epistemology that must still be overcome. The most important of these, in my view, is a more complete theory of induction. Logical induction is man's method of forming rational principles based on evidence of the world around him. Ayn Rand presented a powerful theory of induction with respect to concepts in her Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, but some questions remained unanswered.

First, what degree of evidence is required to form a (contextually) absolute principle? In Objectivism - The The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, Leonard Peikoff discusses degrees of certainty with respect to principles (p67). He classifies theories on a graduate scale, from "possible," to "probable," to "certain." But what delineates these degrees of probability? More importantly, at what point can one settle on any given principle as "certain?" One clue offered by Peikoff is that in order to settle on a principle, "all evidence points in one direction, there is no evidence in any other direction, and no contradictory evidence." This idea is helpful, but insufficient.

If philosophers can agree on the CTOT and proper standards of rational discourse, then I believe these questions are answerable within our lifetimes. The only way to defeat the specter of skepticism in the academic community is through our consistent and determined effort to define our terms in philosophy with the most rigorous logical integrity.

--Dan Edge

[DavidOdden]

I dunno if you want harsh criticism, but I offer you a few comments. Not meaning to pick too many nits, but you don't want to glaze over technical aspects of Objectivist principles, though you might gloss over those aspects.

The central problem with CT is the notion "correspond". Statements like "'X' is true iff in fact X" are necessitated by the problem of coping with the notion "corresponds": I've never seen a coherent definition of this property "correspond". This is a traditional way of expressing the theory (so you are not at all to be faulted for repeating this), but I've always found it to be supremely uninformative, since it reduces epistemology to a silly formulaic exercise. The contemporary presentation of CT ignores the question of what is true.

Why do epistemologists talk about statements, when we really mean sentences? I have no idea what a "statement" is, other than being a semi-mystical philosophical device for saying that yes there is a problem but we don't want to deal with it. "Dr. Donougho is the Professor of my Philosophy class" is not just a statement, it is a declarative sentence in a specific language. Truth claims are inextricably tied to natural language semantics, and I don't see why people can't just recognise that fact. This becomes especially obvious with considering the question whether "My oldest daughter know your mother" is true -- all they can say is "The statement 'My oldest daughter know your mother' is true just in case my oldest daughter know your mother". Any Objectivist will recognise that this is a contextual problem on steroids. This statement is both true and false, horrors! It's false for me and you, and true for certain other people in the world. Indeed your very example includes a contextual variable, "my".

I disagree with your claim that the biggest problem for CT is that it requires omniscience, since I think there is an even bigger problem, namely that contemporary CT fails to come to grips with the question of what is true. The Objectivist theory of truth, which is based on recognition of reality, is capable of distinguishing between recognition and a sentence. Objectivist epistemology is psychological in nature, meaning that it is not concerned just with abstract symbolism, but instead is a theory about an aspect of the human mind (hence the crow discussion in ch. 7 ITOE). It would be entirely irrational to speak in such a way that no contextual assumption would be made. Every word of every language assumes a vast context which is implicit, and that context should not be explicitly repeated without reason.

Here is an example of two common supposedly false sentences which are contextually true, namely "All crows are black" and "All swans are white". Some species of the genus corvus are by nature black, and some species of the genus cygnus are by nature white: in fact in the context or ordinary discussion, these are true since "crow" ordinarily refers to c. caurinus (or some other species that also exists in North America that I'm not familiar with), and does not refer to c. albus (which is black and white), and "swan" does not ordinarily refer to cygnus atratus (which is predominantly black). The person who, knowing only of the existence of c. caurinus, utters the statement "All crows are black" has indeed recognised a fact of reality. By the social standards of ornithology, he has mis-stated that recognition.

This is not to suggest that the omniscience problem is not a significant problem: I just think that the biggest problem for CT is the context-dropping problem. The tail end of my previous paragraph indicates where exactly I think the omniscience problem and the context problem logically connect. Your anticipation of a challenge to mention of context and your comments about misunderstanding and proper discourse of ideas are correct, and in my opinion should be elaborated on.

I am not sure whether I can say that Newton's Laws of Motion are in some sense true, even though this is widely taken to be a case of contextual truth. The problem lies in determining what context was omitted in Newton's expression of these laws, and frankly I cannot tell what that context is (I find the Principia to be excruciatingly difficult to really understand). I understand that he did have misgivings about the universality of his laws, and he clearly did not logically validate the laws as being certain in a general sense, in fact irrational religious belief did allow him both to postulate God as an absolute reference point and to interpolate without empirical warrant based on the common view that God is the supreme aesthetician and would never create a clunky universe. So the question has to be raised, whether a "true statement" or whatever it is that CT focuses on has to be logically validated. Under the Objectivist view of truth with its emphasis on recognition of a relationship to reality, I think it does. Thus parrots do not make true statements when they utter sounds that resemble mathematical truths, and the wind does not make a true statement when it seems to declare "A is A". So the question of the contextual nature of knowledge would be better served by looking at widening the empirical basis of knowledge, without the complication of religion. Although, I know that is hard to do given the pervasiveness of religion.

[dan_edge]

I dunno if you want harsh criticism, but I offer you a few comments. Not meaning to pick too many nits, but you don't want to glaze over technical aspects of Objectivist principles, though you might gloss over those aspects.

I posted this hoping to get some good criticism. I am an amatuer writer and would like to improve, so let the fire rain down!

The central problem with CT is the notion "correspond".

You're right, a definition of the term "correspondence" is in order, and should have been included in my paper. Correspondence would seem to denote a very exact similarity, in this case between the concepts of a conceptual consciousness and the identity of some characteristic(s) of an entity. When referring to the relationship between concepts and entites, I would say that "correspondence" is "the conceptual representation of the identity of some aspect of an entity." I'm not very happy with that definition, but it's a start.

Why do epistemologists talk about statements, when we really mean sentences?

I think the term 'statement' is used to clarify that one is dealing a collection of concepts, without reference to any particular language. Maybe it's just a question of focus: sentetence mean statement qua grammatical unit. I think the two terms can be used pretty much interchagably in this discussion.

This is not to suggest that the omniscience problem is not a significant problem: I just think that the biggest problem for CT is the context-dropping problem. The tail end of my previous paragraph indicates where exactly I think the omniscience problem and the context problem logically connect. Your anticipation of a challenge to mention of context and your comments about misunderstanding and proper discourse of ideas are correct, and in my opinion should be elaborated on.

I'm not sure if I agree with you that the context-dropping issue is more significant, I'll have to think about it some more. The omniscience issue comes up more often in conversation, in my experiece. You're right, I need to elaborate a lot more on communication of ideas, I just couln't squeeze it in to the page limitation of the paper.

Thanks for the comments, I may respond more fully when I have the time.

--Dan Edge

[Adrian Hester]

Why do epistemologists talk about statements, when we really mean sentences? I have no idea what a "statement" is, other than being a semi-mystical philosophical device for saying that yes there is a problem but we don't want to deal with it.

In logic, statements are sentences that must be true or false. Orders and questions would be sentences but not statements.

"Dr. Donougho is the Professor of my Philosophy class" is not just a statement, it is a declarative sentence in a specific language.

Well, if it's a declarative sentence in a specific language, then I suspect logicians would say that therefore it's precisely a statement.

[dan_edge]

It would be entirely irrational to speak in such a way that no contextual assumption would be made. Every word of every language assumes a vast context which is implicit, and that context should not be explicitly repeated without reason.

...

Your anticipation of a challenge to mention of context and your comments about misunderstanding and proper discourse of ideas are correct, and in my opinion should be elaborated on.

David,

I was thinking this morning about what you wrote, and I'm starting to understand how important it is to mantain context in one's own thoughts and in communication with others. You're right that it is "entirely irrational to speak in such a way that no contextual assumption would be made." If one repeated the implicit context of a statement every time, then he would have no economy of thinking whatsoever. There's a lot to write about here regarding economy of thinking and communication, hopefully I will be able to come back to thta and expand this essay soon.

Thanks,

--Dan Edge

[Hal]

For example, Newton's Laws of Motion are true, and will always be true, given Newton's context of knowledge at the time. Einstein has access to better technology and higher levels of mathematics, and was able to expand man's understanding of Physics. He discovered new data that could not be explained by Newton's Laws, and he was able to construct a new theory which did account for the data. It would be false for Einstein to state that Newton's Laws will always always be true regardless of context, but Einstein could agree that, give Newton's context of knowledge at the time, his theories are still true.

I still disagree with this. If I've been convincingly framed for a crime I did not commit, then the jury might be perfectly justified in finding me guilty.Within their context of knowledge, given all the available evidence which they had access to, they were correct to believe that I committed the crime. Yet despite this, I did not do it. It doesnt matter that I'm "guilty within their context of knowledge", because the objective truth here is that I am innocent and they are wrong.

Newton's laws are the same. He was perfectly justified in believing them, just like we are perfectly justified in believing in special relativity and QM. But, they are not true. They do provide a good approximation to the truth and they are certainly useful within most normal contexts, but that is it. If I were to claim that pi is equal to 3.141592, then I would be wrong. This approximation of pi to 7 significant figures might be good enough for all practical purposes and we could probably use it to build bridges and put men on the moon. But, it is still an approximation and not the true value. In my highschool chemistry class we were taught that electrons were like little balls which oribitted the nucleus of an atom, and while this picture is not correct, it is still useful for understanding high level notions like valence and chemical bonding. A simplification can be good enough when our context doesnt require us to get bogged down in the fine details, but this does not make the simplification true.

I think the main problem here is that if we accept the 'contextual theory', then truth becomes synonymous with 'justified belief'. To say that some statement p is true within the context of Smith's knowledge is just a slightly confusing way of saying that Smith is justified in believing p (what else could it mean?). But truth is meant to be a metaphyisical notion, not an epistemological one.

We need a set of concepts to cover the case where Smith is justified in believing p even when p is not correct, and this is one of the roles which the notions of 'true' and 'false' play in our language. If we agree to redefine these terms, then we will lose the ability to make this important distinction.

edit: I would also agree with David's claim that this issue is secondary to both the lack of a well-defined notion of 'correspondence' (especially one which covers statements like "unicorns have horns", and "if Hitler had not invaded the Soviet Union, Germany would have won WW2"), and that any abstract formulation of the 'essence' of truth is likely to ignore how language actually works in practice (in fact I'd go slightly further and claim that even asking for a 'theory' of truth is misguided. The Objectivist 'theory' of truth isnt really a theory, its a common-sense definition of what the word 'true' means).

Edited April 21, 2006 by Hal

[Maarten]

I think that truth is the epistemological notion and fact is the metaphysical one. Truth is reality as grasped through a certain type of consciousness, and because humans are not omniscient you can't make truth an absolute, as you seem to be doing.

Facts (or existents) refer to the metaphysical side of things, and are therefore independent of our consciousness, but truth does not exist without consciousness. To who would it be truth?

I don't have my books here, but I am fairly sure that what you are saying is not the standard Objectivist view of this.

Edited April 21, 2006 by Maarten

[DavidOdden]

I think the main problem here is that if we accept the 'contextual theory', then truth becomes synonymous with 'justified belief'.

Not exactly, since truth is recognition of fact, which means that the sentence has to actually describe a fact. The soft underbelly of "justified belief" theory is that is lacks standards of justification. A good Objectivist account says not "you have to come up with an excuse, to hold this belief", but rather "you have to logically validate the conclusion, and reduce it to the axiomatic". Newton never did that. Nor did Smith or Jones.

A valid approximation does describe a fact, from a particular perspective -- let's say up to the limits of resolution on some measuring device. Inventing a more powerful scope does not cancel these facts, but it now adds facts that were only "potential" (that is, aspects of reality that could not actually be focused on previously, but because of a technological advance now can be). We will probably prefer a theory that accounts for the broader range of facts (unless, speaking for example of Newton v. Einstein, it is practically impossible to make use of the "broader" theory).

But truth is meant to be a metaphyisical notion, not an epistemological one.

That is one view, but I reject it. At best it's a terminological confusion of "fact" and "truth". So, to quote from ITOE p. 48 "Truth is the product of the recognition (i.e., identification) of the facts of reality". A fact is something that exists in reality.

We need a set of concepts to cover the case where Smith is justified in believing p even when p is not correct,

One word that works nicely is " mistake". We can further narrow the scope with adjectives like "understandable" vs. "inexcuseable", depending on the nature of the justification.

[Hal]

Not exactly, since truth is recognition of fact, which means that the sentence has to actually describe a fact. The soft underbelly of "justified belief" theory is that is lacks standards of justification.

While this is correct, I wouldnt say that its directly relevant to theories of truth. We definitely need to define standards of justification for the purpose of doing epistemology, but I dont think it is relevant to the notion of truth, since I think that 'the truth' always transcends what we know or believe about it. To go back to the courtroom example, the standards which the jury use to decide my guilt have nothing to do with whether I'm actually innocent. It doesnt matter if the courtroom is a rational one which uses high standards of evidence and due process, or if its a kangaroo court in a dictatorship - I will still be innocent regardless. Using rational standards of justification means that the jury is more likely to arrive at the truth, but they are not constitutive of the concept of 'true'. Reality exists above and beyond what any person or group of people believes about it, whether they are justified or not.

A good Objectivist account says not "you have to come up with an excuse, to hold this belief", but rather "you have to logically validate the conclusion, and reduce it to the axiomatic". Newton never did that. Nor did Smith or Jones.

I disagree - I would claim that people were just as justified in believing Newtonian Mechanics as we are in believing any of modern science. The theory of evolution is almost certainly less well confirmed than Newton's laws, but I wouldnt say that we havent logically validated it. I think Objectivsts often apply unfair standards when assessing Newton's claims - they already know that he was wrong in believing his laws were universal, so they try to find reasons which show that this belief was unjustified. But we today believe our theories despite having far less evidence than the Newtonians did, so this sort of thing is fairly disingenous. If Newton's conclusions werent logically validated, then pretty much none of modern science is either.

For example, it was invalid for Newtonians to extrapolate their claims beyond the context in which they where explicitly demonstrated valid (eg to believe that the laws applied on the subatomic scale, or when checked with very accurate methods of measurement), then there is no justification for us to believe that causality still applies on Neptune, or that the laws of physics will continue to hold true next year.

edit: in fact, given that Objectivism rejects the notion of a priori truth, claiming that the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum physics is invalid because subatomic reality 'must' be deterministic would be equivalent to saying that quantum physics is invalid because it 'must' obey Newton's laws. In both cases, youre taking a set of empirical laws which have bene formulated from our observations of the macroscopic world, and assuming without justification that they must apply in a new context.

edit2: to clarify something, I've used the term "Newton" and "the Newtonians" interchangably in the above post. I dont know what Newton himself actually believed or claimed, but the universality of his laws was widely believed by most scientists up until the 20th century. And I think they were right in doing so.

Edited April 21, 2006 by Hal

[Proverb]

Truth within 'context A' requires the rational integration of the facts of reality within the whole of 'context A'

Truth is inextricably linked to both a context and a process both of which are elements of conciousness from which truth is also inseperable.

It seems beautifully circular to me.

Truth requires Context requires Facts requires Perception requires Consciousness requires Truth.

or

Fact->Perception->Consciousness->Context(or knowledge)->Truth

I'm being very simplistic so I'm not sure I even added anything here.

[DavidOdden]

We definitely need to define standards of justification for the purpose of doing epistemology, but I dont think it is relevant to the notion of truth, since I think that 'the truth' always transcends what we know or believe about it.

It would be simplest, I think, for me to just recapitulate by saying againt that when you are using the word "the truth" here, you are referring to "fact". Facts are the transcendant things that aren't about consciousness. Truth is cognitive in nature. If something isn't a fact, then your proposition isn't "truth" -- the required relationship to fact isn't suspended because you have mistaken beliefs about the evidence.

The theory of evolution is almost certainly less well confirmed than Newton's laws, but I wouldnt say that we havent logically validated it.

Are you speaking of the pre-Einstein evidence for Newton or Newton's evidence for Newton? Darwin's evidence, or the modern evidence? We know that Newton's theory has been falsified, so speaking acontextually of Newton's theory as "true" is just wrong. "Reason to doubt" was known in the early 19th century, so the period when Newton's theory could be said to be contextually true is kind of short. As you know, what the "theory of evolution" refers to is much less of a scientific statement than Newton's Law of Gravity. What it would mean to logically validate the theory of evolution is quite different. Perhaps it would help if you would say what you think Darwin's Law of Evolution states, so that we can see to what extent it has been logically validated. The point to recall (if you recall the point from earlier chat about evolution) is that nothing in Newtonian gravity is self-evident, whereas much of the theory of evolution is self-evident.

I think Objectivsts often apply unfair standards when assessing Newton's claims - they already know that he was wrong in believing his laws were universal, so they try to find reasons which show that this belief was unjustified.

Piff. That's not why. The one potentially "unfair" standard is holding to what we contemporarily understand to be a rational standard of scientific proof. (Generally) we do not let god play a role in validating a theory, and we can tolerate a theory where god is a sick, twisted bastard who messes with our minds by creating a university with bizarre and complicated discontinuities in physical law. I am open to arguments that, in the scientific and philosophical milieu in which Newton worked, he had "proven" his theory; but that was then and this is now.

But we today believe our theories despite having far less evidence than the Newtonians did, so this sort of thing is fairly disingenous.

Are you suggesting that there is some huge corpus of knowledge that we used to have that has somehow gotten destroyed without a trace? We have vastly more knowledge now than we had back then. This is becasue (unless you are right that there was some massive knowledge-destruction event that we don't know about), we know everything that we knew then, plus a billion time more that we've learned since.

For example, it was invalid for Newtonians to extrapolate their claims beyond the context in which they where explicitly demonstrated valid (eg to believe that the laws applied on the subatomic scale, or when checked with very accurate methods of measurement), then there is no justification for us to believe that causality still applies on Neptune, or that the laws of physics will continue to hold true next year.

Although this has been tested and the known laws do remain valid anywhere that we have observed relevant phenomena. The significant difference is that we have covered vastly more of the universe that Newton had.

I dont know what Newton himself actually believed or claimed, but the universality of his laws was widely believed by most scientists up until the 20th century.

I've seen quotes (Stephen Speicher dug them up a few years ago) from the Principia which suggested some misgivings on his part about overstating the universality of the laws. The point is not the ad hominem one about Newton's personal beliefs, but what proposition one is referring to when you talk about these laws. If the proposition is that Fg=(G(m1*m2)/r^2) is valid to arbitrary precision for any separation and two masses, then this is just plain false. But this is not in dispute --- what is in dispute is whether excluding certain masses and separations ("really big and really close", for example), the law is valid up to a certain precision.