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Differences between rationality and objectivity?

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kesg

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Does anyone have any comments on Tara Smith's taped lecture series called Rationality and Objectivity or, more generally, what differences, if any, exist between rationality and objectivity?

Her conclusion was that the two are not exactly interchangeable and that rationality was the broader term. I agree, but perhaps for slightly different reasons. Her view was that rationality tells you what to do, and objectivity (as described in Chapter 4 of OPAR) gives you more specific advice on how to do it. My view is that objectivity is the intellectual component of rationality, which also has an existential component.

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I'm not sure I understand your point.  I haven't heard Ms. Smith's lecture, so that's probably why. 

I will only say that without objectivity, i.e., adherence to reality, there can be no rational thought, merely rationalization.

Tara Smith made this point, among many others. Her focus was on whether objectivity, as Leonard Peikoff described it in in Chapter 4 of OPAR, required mental activity above and beyond identifying and integrating the facts of reality.

Her answer seemed to be yes, but I'm not so sure. One cannot properly form or use concepts and propositions -- i.e. properly identify and integrate without contradiction the material provided by our senses -- without holding context and being able to retrace them to their roots in perceptual data. My thought is that objectivity goes to the intellectual component of exercising reason, while rationality -- the broader term -- goes not only to this component but also acting accordingly in our daily choices and actions.

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I've understood objectivity as the proper method of concept-formation and -validation. Rationality is the foremost virtue of the Objectivist ethics, ie, how to act all the time and not just in gaining and validating knowledge. Objectivity describes knowledge: with reference to reality; rationality describes all action: with reference to reality.

I don't know what Tara Smith has to say about it, though.

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I've understood objectivity as the proper method of concept-formation and -validation.  Rationality is the foremost virtue of the Objectivist ethics, ie, how to act all the time and not just in gaining and validating knowledge.  Objectivity describes knowledge: with reference to reality; rationality describes all action: with reference to reality.

I agree completely.

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I don't know about this person, Tara Smith, who you are referring to. A common way of making the distinction in philosophy is in relationship to the properties of a proposition or state of affairs.

Take the following scenario.

I am working on my computer. I leave the room, which only has one door, to get a cookie from the refrigerator. I encounter someone in the kitchen. He asks me what I've been doing. I say working on my computer. He says, "that's impossible, there's no computer in your room." Now, I know I was using the computer, and given that there's only one door, I know there is no rational reason to believe the computer was taken out of my room. So I ask him, "why do you think there is no computer in my room." He says, "I just know." In others words, he does not offer any evidence. We go back to my room. The computer is gone. Further investigating proves that someone crawled through the window and stole the computer.

Thus, the other person had the "objective" or "true" belief about the proposition, because it corresponded to fact.

I, on the other hand, had the "rational" belief about the proposition, because it was based on the best account of the known evidence.

Obviously, all things being equal, the rational method is the better one for arriving at the truth, but it does not guarantee truth or objectivity by itself, only in an ideal state of complete evidence.

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Although the proposition may be true, it is not objective. If I assert two propositions: (1) The light is on in the other room; (2) The light is off in the other room; and I have no evidence for either ... one proposition is indeed true and the other false, but neither proposition is objective. Objectivity is a method - the proper method - of concept-formation and -validation; it's not a a description of a concept. Objectivity can be characterized as the relationship between concept and consciousness; truth, the relationship between concept and existence.

The rational method guarantees objectivity - and truth within a context of knowledge.

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I don't know about this person, Tara Smith ...

Tara Smith is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at UT Austin, author of several books and articles in the field. She is also an Objectivist.

http://www.utexas.edu/cola/depts/philosoph...les/smith/tara/

The scenario which you gave, and the conclusion which you drew, is a common one among philosophers, at least those who treat truth as being worthy of philosophical pursuit. In contrast to your conclusion, the Objectivist notion of truth is somewhat different: "Truth is the product of the recognition (i.e., identification) of the facts of reality."[1]

Truth is a relationship between a proposition held in the mind of a man, and the facts which correspond to that proposition. Correspondence to facts is a necessary condition for a truth, but is not sufficient in and of itself. Objectivism details a very specific form of epistemology which is needed for the proper functioning of a rational mind.[2] An arbitrary statement uttered by a man has no more epistemological significance than if the statement consisted of utter gibberish. That the man in your scenario just happened to mention something which later corresponded to reality, does not make his arbitrary statement true. Such a "truth" has no more meaning than had the statement been made by the wind arranging leaves which happen to spell out the same words.

The Objectivist concept of objectivity has both a metaphysical element (the facts) and an epistemological element (that such facts are known to us only by a proper epistemological method). In Objectivism "truth" is not something 'out there' to be directly perceived, but rather a relationship between the mind of a man and the facts of reality.

[1] Ayn Rand, "Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology," NAL Books, p. 48, 1979/1990.

[2] Ibid.

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I think we are in agreement for the most part and arguing semantics.

To me, objectivity describes the truth of a state of affairs that is not dependent on the personal perspective of the observer making a knowledge claim (in theory, it is not dependent on any observer).

What you are talking about, the rational method, I would call, "establishing a proposition's claim to objectivity." This process is very familiar; we correct our observations for personal biases or instrumental distortions, etc.

The rational method guarantees objectivity - and truth within a context of knowledge.

I agree with that statement, but "truth within a context of knowledge" is doing a lot of work to close the argument. What do you mean by that? I assume by "within a context of knowledge" you mean something like "within a context that has all of the relevant evidence pertinent to examining the proposition." That's true in principle, by definition. The real problem is with practice. In practice, we rarely know what all of the pertinent evidence is in advance of making a judgment.

When exactly in the objectivity-establishing process does the "guarantee" of truth emerge? In the examples above, it's obvious: we walk into the room to check. A sceptic, however, will always propose scenarios that complicate the claim to knowledge ("What if a prankster came in, stole your computer, and put in its place a super sci-fi replica that had all of the same properties as your old computer "?). Obviously, these scenarios are academic, but they are useful for clarifying the concept of knowledge. And they can have very relevant applications, eg., "how do you know the WMD still exist in Iraq if you have no direct current evidence?," etc.

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The Objectivist concept of objectivity has both a metaphysical element (the facts) and an epistemological element (that such facts are known to us only by a proper epistemological method). In Objectivism "truth" is not something 'out there' to be directly perceived, but rather a relationship between the mind of a man and the facts of reality.

Thank you for the clarification and the link to Tara Smith.

What you are describing, in my terminology, is "knowledge"--def., justified true belief. The whole trick to epistemology is determining the critieria by which a belief is justified. My personal opinion is that different fields of knowledge have different criteria and methods of justification. My understanding (perhaps misinformed) of Objectivism is that it believes in one truth-procedure, derived from metaphysical axioms and applicable to all questions of fact. That would be the holy grail of philosophy, if it existed.

The statement I quoted above is very suggestive, but it suggests a degree of mind-dependence for the truth about reality, which I actually agree with, but I did not think that Objectivists would.

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Thank you for the clarification and the link to Tara Smith.

You're welcome. And, I always like to refer people to her books on aspects of Objectivism, but not only because she is such a delightful person. Rather than repeating Objectivism in the form and style by which it was presented by Ayn Rand, she breaks the issues down into their component parts and reassembles them into ideas which are fresh and uniquely worded. In other words, she really grasps the principles and communicates them in a style all her own. For those of us who are quite familiar with the Objectivist literature, it is a bit like hearing the ideas communicated in a language which you did not know you understood. (Okay, enough gushing ...)

What you are describing, in my terminology, is "knowledge"--def., justified true belief.

"justified true belief is a bit of a redundancy on "true." In Objectivism true already implies that one is justified, i.e., that one has used the proper epistemological method to arrive at the truth. The only way in which I can see using the term "justified belief" at all, is if you were to determine that what you held as a truth, is not. One then could say that "At the time I concluded that such and such was true, but I realize now that I was in error. I never really really had the truth, but rather I had a justified belief."

See, facts just are -- what exists, exists -- and facts can be thought of as being the standard of truth, a metaphysical part of reality. But truth depends on the existence of a consciousness, and it refers to the relationship of a proposition to the facts. If this is what you mean when you mentioned the "mind-dependence for the truth," then we do agree. But, if the "mind-dependence" is meant to be subjective, meaning minus objective standards to reach the truth, then in that case we remain in disagreement.

As to your comment that "different fields of knowledge have different criteria and methods of justification," I have no problem with that if what you mean is the specifics, the specialized knowledge and techniques unique to a given field. But that would be focusing more on the content of a field, not on the epistemological principles which remain the same regardless of what area of reality those principles are applied to. First and foremost in this regard would be logic, the method of using reason, and that applies to all conceptual knowledge, regardless of which field we investigate.

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What you are describing, in my terminology, is "knowledge"--def., justified true belief. 

No it isn't! A belief is what you have when you haven't fully grasped a fact(s) of reality, either by perceptual observation or by a process of reason [logic] based on perceptual observation. ITOE, page 35. If there is some evidence to support the belief, and no known facts that contradict it, you may be justified in thinking that it may be true. The belief may even be true, but you still don't know enough to prove that it is true. You don't yet know it. It isn't yet knowledge because you haven't yet logically validated it to be true.

For further details, see Chapters 4 and 5 of OPAR. To put it in ITOE terms, belief is not a conceptual common denominator, of which "knowledge" is a narrowing or subdivision. The CCD of knowledge and belief is "products of psychological processes."

I had recently come across an excellent essay that explained this very point in a bit more detail:

The Dead End of Modern Philosophy’s Search for Knowledge

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What you are describing, in my terminology, is "knowledge"--def., justified true belief.
No it isn't!  A belief is what you have when you haven't fully grasped a fact(s) of reality, either by perceptual observation or by a process of reason [logic] based on perceptual observation.  ITOE, page 35. If there is some evidence to support the belief, and no known facts that contradict it, you may be justified in thinking that it may be true.

The above is a misuse of an actual definition in ITOE. The citation is a definition of the term "knowledge" by Ayn Rand, and "kesg" just forms the negative of that definition and presents that as if it were evidence for the Objectivist defintion of belief. Assuming what is meant to be demonstrated is bad enough, but appealing to Ayn Rand in the process makes such an assumption even worse.

There is more than one dictionary definition of the word 'belief," and one such definition, from the OED, is the "acceptance of a proposition ... or to a fact or truth on the evidence of consciousness." I suspect that something like this may be the sense in which the original poster intended his use of belief, especially since his use of belief is qualified by "justified" and "true." I also suspect that that is the sense which Ayn Rand herself intended when she wrote "how do I reconcile my atheism with my belief in free will." [Emphasis mine.] I am quite confident that Ayn Rand's notion of free will was on the epistemological level of knowledge, not faith.

Clearly there are other usages of the term belief, and we can usually discern the intent of the writer by the context. I think that the original poster's words are deserving of some criticism in terms of precision of wording, but not deserving of a metaphorical spanking by a misuse of ITOE as the weapon.

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I think that the original poster's words are deserving of some criticism in terms of precision of wording, but not deserving of a metaphorical spanking by a misuse of ITOE as the weapon.

I don't think that I have misused ITOE in any way. Maybe if you can point me to a cite in the actual text of ITOE -- or anywhere in the entire Objectivist literature -- that equates knowledge with justified true belief, I would appreciate it.

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I don't think that I have misused ITOE in any way.  Maybe if you can point me to a cite in the actual text of ITOE -- or anywhere in the entire Objectivist literature -- that equates knowledge with justified true belief, I would appreciate it.

Please read what I actually said, as well as what you yourself wrote.

Your words: "A belief is what you have when you haven't fully grasped a fact(s) of reality, either by perceptual observation or by a process of reason [logic] based on perceptual observation. ITOE, page 35."

To which I responded: "The above is a misuse of an actual definition in ITOE. The citation is a definition of the term "knowledge" by Ayn Rand, and "kesg" just forms the negative of that definition and presents that as if it were evidence for the Objectivist defintion of belief."

If this was not clear to you, let me try again in slightly different words. You assume that the definition of "belief" is the negative of the definition of "knowledge," and you then use Ayn Rand's definition of knowledge, presented in the negative, as demonstration that such is "belief." You have assumed what you wanted to demonstrate, and you have done so by appealing to Ayn Rand, when in fact Ayn Rand presented her definition of knowledge, yet you used her words in a manner as if she had defined belief.

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You assume that the definition of "belief" is the negative of the definition of "knowledge," and you then use Ayn Rand's definition of knowledge, presented in the negative, as demonstration that such is "belief." You have assumed what you wanted to demonstrate, and you have done so by appealing to Ayn Rand, when in fact Ayn Rand presented her definition of knowledge, yet you used her words in a manner as if she had defined belief.

Several things:

1. I do differentiate "belief" from "knowledge," using the conceptual common demoninator "products of psychological processes." What differentiates knowledge from opinion is a grasp -- which on the conceptual level means a full logical validation -- of a fact. A justified belief, even a justified belief that happens to be true, may be at least partially validated, but not yet fully validated. That's why we say we merely believe, or even have good reasons to believe, that some proposition is true, but do not yet know that it is true, even if it is true -- which is why it isn't yet knowledge!

2. You will not find this treatment of the difference between knowledge and belief in ITOE, and I never said or implied anything to the contrary. Nor did I intend to do so.

3. I went back and re-read my earlier posts, and in all fairness I don't think I implied that Ayn Rand had defined belief. As far as I know, she never did so in her writings -- but to the best of my knowledge, neither did she define knowledge as a "justified true belief" or suggest that a justified true belief is the same thing as a grasp of a fact. I don't think they are. I believe, but do not know with certainty, that she didn't think so, either. :)

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Ed., I thought I had posted this earlier, but apparently I did not. I appreciate Stephen Speicher's attempt to understand what I was saying, rather than merely debate verbal issues and jargon.

In reference to the article you linked:

The modern philosophers focus their attention on the ”what” of knowledge.  The propositions, facts, claims has to be true and one has to be justified in accepting them.
This is one of my pet peeves about some thinkers influenced by Rand, and I've seen it a lot in Leonard Peikoff: they have a tendency to make straw man arguments against "modern philosophers." Either he should name a living philosopher who can talk back, or he should provide adequate textual evidence.

If you read my statements above, I clearly noted that knowledge of a proposition is "justified true belief", which does, contrary to this author, include a "how" as well as a "what" of knowledge:

Justified = arrived at through a rational process of deliberation (logical inference + observation, etc.)

True = corresponds to the facts of reality

Belief = I assent to the proposition when it is present in my consciousness

(I should note that there’s actually a problem here in my definition of belief, because what happens to my beliefs when they are temporarily out of consciousness?---do I still possess them?–or do I only possess them when I am in an actively conscious state of recalling them? It’s an interesting theoretical issue, but I don’t think it needs to detain us).

But the ”how” of knowledge for them is only a matter of acceptance, even though it has to be justified.

That's the basic non sequitur. Rational justification, as I outline it above and any sensible person would, is an active process, volitional if you will. Where did he ever get the idea that "modern philosophers" implied otherwise or that we just passively accept truths? (Answer, it's impossible to know, because the views he attributes are not referenced).

And then the non sequiturs continue to pile up:

There is nothing to grasp, nothing to gain, nothing to discover, nothing to identify, nothing to integrate, nothing to understand there’s nothing but passive acceptance! Knowledge for them is simply justified acceptance of truths as true.
Again, this is a straw man. “Simply justified” is the whole process of discovery and integration he is talking about.

Now, in your own post, you say:

If there is some evidence to support the belief, and no known facts that contradict it, you may be justified in thinking that it may be true. The belief may even be true, but you still don't know enough to prove that it is true. You don't yet know it. It isn't yet knowledge because you haven't yet logically validated it to be true.

I agree with this. That's a good definition of what a theory of knowledge should aim to meet. The challenge to "know that you know" is as old as Socrates in Western Philosophy, and it's what drives advancement in science. Now, the basic problem of epistemology is determining what constitutes "logical validation" in the absence of complete evidence. This is not just a pragmatic problem. It's a problem of how you know with certainty that there are no objections, even in principle, to your knowledge claim? How do you know that you are not failing to see something else that is at work in reality? It is always a possiblity, in principle, that one cannot perceive all of the relevant facts about a given state of affairs. If that's true (for the sake of the argument), either knowledge is always provisional and every statement of truth is open to some principled doubt, or something is missing.

The axiom of the validity of the senses does show, IMHO, that total skepticism is impossible, but it does not show that this or that skeptical judgment is conclusively invalid ("skeptical judgment" here meaning a dispute of someone's claim to certainty about a proposition).

So the epistemological question is: when is the "click" of cognition justified without any further questions? Descartes's answer, which started modern epistemology rolling, was to say that knowledge or certainty was established when "clear and distinct" ideas were presented to consciousness in a way that could not even be refuted in principle (see, Discourse on Method). Leibniz described something similar by his poetic idea that something is true if it is true "in all possible worlds." The examples they used were typically from mathematics. There is no principled doubt that 2 + 2 = 4. The truths of mathematics hold in "all possible worlds." Descartes famously tried to analyze every proposition until it met that standard.

Obviously, that cannot be right and not just because of the insane philosophical conclusions that this criterion of knowledge produced in Descartes' case.

I have a clear and distinct image of a flying pig right now. I see it, and I know that see it. But I also know that pigs cannot fly (based on all the evidence that I have from experience and that science can give me). To justify my claim that pigs cannot fly and that my clear and distinct image of pigs flying is nonsense, we could point out that pigs flying would be a contradiction of other known facts of experience (e.g., pigs do not have wings or any other apparatus that would allow them to fly). However, it's conceivable (in principle) that pigs have some flying apparatus hidden from perception that you and I do not know about yet. The theory that pigs do not fly is underdetermined by the evidence we have. Until the point that I saw my pig flying, it is possible that the pig species had just chosen to roll around in the muck and remain a land-based animal.

Though this thought-experiment is obviously absurd and meant to be, there are plenty of things that were thought absurd at one point that science eventually had to accept as the best possible explanation for a given phenomenon (e.g., read what people thought about Newton's theory of gravity and "action at a distance" when he first presented it).

So, the question still is, "how do you know that you know?"--what constitutes certainty? "Grasping reality" is a good definition, but in practice, how does it tell me that pigs don't fly?

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Kesg: Does anyone have any comments on Tara Smith's taped lecture series called Rationality and Objectivity or, more generally, what differences, if any, exist between rationality and objectivity?

I take "objectivity" to mean - putting the facts of reality above any personal wishes or external influences.

I take "rationality" to mean - following reason.

The second seems to be broader: as reason includes more than just putting the facts of reality above anything else. It includes the proper concept-formation, deduction or induction process, and so on.

However, the first is ubiquitous in every action of reason. You have to be objective in concept-formation, deduction, induction, abstract thinking, decision making... whatever.

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I take "objectivity" to mean - putting the facts of reality above any personal wishes or external influences.

I take "rationality" to mean - following reason.

The second seems to be broader: as reason includes more than just putting the facts of reality above anything else. It includes the proper concept-formation, deduction or induction process, and so on.

However, the first is ubiquitous in every action of reason. You have to be objective in concept-formation, deduction, induction, abstract thinking, decision making... whatever.

This is a pretty good summary, IMO. I have since done some additional reading and would add two points emphasized by Ayn Rand. First, objectivity also has a metaphysical component, i.e., the idea that existence exists and is what it is independent of anyone's consciousness. Second, the epistemological component of objectivity is essentially the idea that man must acquire knowledge of that reality by a certain means (reason) in accordance with certain rules (logic). Rationality is the volitional exercise of reason, and -- as you put it so well -- objectivity (logic) is involved in every single step of the process.

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... I don't think I implied ...

Here are two different wordings.

(1) Belief is not [knowledge], as Ayn Rand defined knowledge on p. 35 of ITOE.

(2) Belief is not [knowledge] --ITOE p.35.

The first expresses that I, kesg, think that belief is not knowledge, and if you go to page 35 of ITOE you can find Ayn Rand's definition of knowledge.

The second expresses that if you go to page 35 of ITOE you will find Ayn Rand stating that belief is not [knowledge].

You very well may have meant (1), but you said (2), and (2) is not correct. Do you see the difference?

In addition to this, I also pointed out that "belief" has two different meanings -- one as rational conviction, one as not -- and that it is important to look at the context to see the intended meaning. I even gave you an example where Ayn Rand herself used "belief" to be synonymous with "knowledge." The reason I pointed this out was because I think you did not fairly see the context of "Reason's ember's" statement of belief, and instead of discussing ideas it seemed as if you used ITOE as a weapon to batter something which "Reason's ember" may not have meant.

Look, "kesg," like yourself I too do not equate knowledge with belief, if we are to take belief to be something other than rational conviction. But, "Reason's ember" said much more than simply equating belief with knowledge, and if we are to discuss ideas with non-Objectivists I think it important to grasp what they mean, and not just respond with what might appear to them as Objectivist jargon.

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"Reason's ember," excuse me for butting into your conversation with another. You make a lot of very interesting points, each worthy of a separate discussion, and I do not intend to splinter the discussion you are having. I do, however, want to make a single point, one which I think you will find interesting about Objectivism.

The theory that pigs do not fly is underdetermined by the evidence we have.  Until the point that I saw my pig flying, it is possible that the pig species had just chosen to roll around in the muck and remain a land-based animal.

There is a distinction between that which is metaphysically possible and that which is epistemologically possible.

It is metaphysically possible for a pig to have wings of such a nature that the exercise thereof would enable the pig to fly. I suppose one might also say that, metaphysically speaking, it is possible that a pig could possess some other form of propulsion system.

But, if we include into our epistemology all things metaphysically possible, then, apart from axiomatic statements and perceptual knowledge, we can never be certain that any of our knowledge is, in fact, knowledge. Such a standard would ignore the objective nature of knowledge, in the manner in which I previously discussed truth as a relationship between a proposition and the facts of reality. Either we have knowledge, or we do not. We cannot impose a standard of omniscience upon knowledge, since man is man and not some ghostly god. All things metaphysically possible is not the same as all things epistemologically possible.

In addition, and, this is for a separate discussion, when you reduce the knowledge you have of an entity to its nature -- to its identity -- that process itself excludes all things metaphysically possible. Identity trumps possibility.

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Just to wrap up on some points.

As to your comment that "different fields of knowledge have different criteria and methods of justification," I have no problem with that if what you mean is the specifics, the specialized knowledge and techniques unique to a given field. But that would be focusing more on the content of a field, not on the epistemological principles which remain the same regardless of what area of reality those principles are applied to. First and foremost in this regard would be logic, the method of using reason, and that applies to all conceptual knowledge, regardless of which field we investigate.
A few examples of what I mean.

When establishing the fact that George Washington crossed the Delaware on the day after Christmas in 1776 in order to attack the British and Hessians, I do not need to define the neuro-chemical transmitters that are the physical substrate of his mental decision. I can analyze his intentions without this sort of "physics envy." As this is sometimes put, there is a separate "order" of analysis that is objectively valid.

Similarly, when establishing that there are real entities called chairs whose essential nature is for me to sit on them, I do not need to worry about the fact that from the perspective of physics there is no "chair," only atoms in space. An entity can have a function defined by social use and still be objectively real.

A more interesting case is in something from literature. I can analyze the meanings of a symbol like the serpent in Paradise Lost from my knowledge of biology, or I can analyze it within a system of meanings derived from the text itself and other examples of literature (such as the Genesis story, etc.).

In addition, and, this is for a separate discussion, when you reduce the knowledge you have of an entity to its nature -- to its identity -- that process itself excludes all things metaphysically possible. Identity trumps possibility.

To me, that just pushes the question of justification back one step. In the absence of omniscience, how do you know you have established identity?--i.e, that your account does not exclude something?

In my opinion, the only principled stance to take towards one's own beliefs is an openness to revision. That does not mean all beliefs are fair game. It just means that there is always room for improvement.

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In the absence of omniscience, how do you know you have established identity?--i.e, that your account does not exclude something?

Well, no one said that the life of a profesional intellectual or scientist was going to be an easy one. :D

But, you are correct; we are not omniscient, so we do not apply an omniscient standard for determining what is knowledge. The fact that someone, somewhere, sometime, failed to account for all the relevant facts in reaching certainty about a particular issue, is irrelevant to us following the proper method in achieving certainty about any knowledge which we acquire. There is really nothing unusal or special about the method required -- we scrupuously validate all of the relevant evidence and determine that we have not excluded any. The same basic thing which reasonable kids do, but now on an adult level.

Now, of course, in order to do this properly we need to learn the proper method of reasoning -- the principles of logic -- so that we are mentally equipped to separate fact from fiction. We need to hone our observational skills to make sure that our perceptual base is wide-enough for the proper inferences. We need to have an unwavering commitment to fact and not allow emotional considerations to affect our judgments. We need to develop a character with such a strong sense of honesty and integrity that we will never overlook anything relevant, or attempt to fake anything which we learn. We must be motivated to be scrupulous in our investigation and be prepared to exert whatever mental effort is required.

In short, what we need to reach certainty is to operate on a mental and physical level appropriate to man. This is doable. Omniscience is not.

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Here are two different wordings.

(1) Belief is not [knowledge], as Ayn Rand defined knowledge on p. 35 of ITOE.

(2) Belief is not [knowledge] --ITOE p.35.

The first expresses that I, kesg, think that belief is not knowledge, and if you go to page 35 of ITOE you can find Ayn Rand's definition of knowledge.

The second expresses that if you go to page 35 of ITOE you will find Ayn Rand stating that belief is not [knowledge].

You very well may have meant (1), but you said (2), and (2) is not correct. Do you see the difference?

I went back and checked what I originally wrote, and I now see where you are coming from. You're right -- I meant one thing, but I didn't write it the way I meant it.

Look, "kesg," like yourself I too do not equate knowledge with belief, if we are to take belief to be something other than rational conviction. But, "Reason's ember" said much more than simply equating belief with knowledge, and if we are to discuss ideas with non-Objectivists I think it important to grasp what they mean, and not just respond with what might appear to them as Objectivist jargon.

No argument from me on this last point.

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