Questions -- Chapter 2 Of Opar

[hunterrose]

After a long hiatus, I'm analyzing chapter 2. To start off:

Since concepts, according to Objectivism, are integrations of perceptual data, there can be no concepts apart from sense experience. There are no innate ideas, ideas in the mind at birth. Consciousness begins as a tabula rasa (a blank slate); all of its conceptual content is derived from the evidence of the senses.

How is it concluded that there are no innate ideas, or rather perhaps that all ideas/concepts are fundamentally derived from external reality (as opposed to dreams, thoughts, etc?)

[Ogg]

Dreams and thoughts are simply reorderings of concepts already created by perceptual data. Without perceptual data, no concepts would be able to be formed, and so no thought or dream would be possible.

[Proverb]

Excellent reply Ogg. I would only like to clarify one point: Dreams and Thoughts are abstractions formed from perceptual level concepts.

Also, though dreams, abstract thought, and abstract concepts may seem at their surface to be 'innate' or apart from reality (which many people actually believe is the case) it is only the result of an unconcious automization of deriving higher level concepts from their perceptual roots.

[Bold Standard]

Dreams and Thoughts are abstractions formed from perceptual level concepts.

That's true about thoughts, of course, but dreaming is a physiological process I would be reluctant to confine to "abstractions." Of course, thinking about the dream is an abstraction, so in a certain context you could say dreams are abstractions-- ie "I dreamed you came to see me." But if you wake up in a sweat and don't know why, and someone says "you were having a bad dream," they mean something more than just the abstract element of the dream (most likely).

Edited May 5, 2006 by Bold Standard

[DavidOdden]

That's true about thoughts, of course, but dreaming is a physiological process I would be reluctant to confine to "abstractions."

I don't see the difference. Dreaming and thinking are physiological processes; dreams and thoughts are the product of those processes. A thought about a chicken is not a chicken, so it is an abstraction, as is a dream about a chicken. What makes the difference is the extent to which they are consciously controlled -- generally, dreams happen when you're not conscious.

[Hal]

dreams happen when you're not conscious.

A minor semantic quibble, but people are conscious while they are dreaming - this is what distinguishes dreamsleep from deep sleep and comatose states, where you arent conscious of anything (and hence dont dream). If youre actually having experiences, youre conscious by definition. Edited May 5, 2006 by Hal

[hunterrose]

Dreams and thoughts are simply reorderings of concepts already created by perceptual data.

Okay, but how to you validate that? Is it set forth itself as an axiom, or is it derived? I would imagine that there is some argument

• Because _____________, consciousness begins tabula rasa and all concepts/thoughts are produced by consciousness acting on stimuli external to the mind.
  

I suppose that this is really part of a larger question. In chapter 2, there is distinction being made between external reality (objects) and internal reality (thoughts, dreams, etc.) The difficulty to me is that chapter 1 doesn't particularly make this distinction (see below,) and thus chapter 2 seems to start with it being taken for granted.

A few quotes from chapter 1 that may be relevant:

The concept [of existence] does not specify that a physical world exists.

If it doesn't automatically follow here that there is a physical world, at what point in the argument does it necessarily follow that there's an external(physical) world and concepts are based on that physical world (as opposed to the existence of innate thoughts?)

A consciousness conscious of nothing but itself is a contradiction in terms: before it could identify itself as consciousness, it had to be conscious of something. [Rand]

This sounds promising, but I admit that I'm not exactly sure how to take this. If by "consciousness" it is meant solely the faculty to perceive that which exists, then I largely agree but don't know that it is pertinent... but if "consciousness" is meant to include both (thinking, idea-holding) mind and (perceiving)consciousness, then, while it likely applies to my chapter 2 question, I'm not sure I would agree with the quoted premise.

Existence as Possessing Primacy over Consciousness

Reading back over the section, this does seem to begin presenting the existence of things outside the mind/consciousness e.g. the volcano example. But this too seems to take for granted that there is an existence external to the mind.

[ian]

But this too seems to take for granted that there is an existence external to the mind.

I don't think there's any taking for granted that there are things outside the mind. You take it for granted that if there is consciousness, there is something that exists. But the thing might be internal (a feeling of hunger, an imagined face) or external (a table).

Figuring out what is internal and external is something that is not simple. I think there is an example in the appendix of ITOE talking about how ancient philosophers thought their breath was not physical (or something like that). The point is, our mindset where it seems obvious what is in here and out there was painstakingly created over many centuries.

Edited May 5, 2006 by ian

[Ogg]

Because of the law of causation, the mind begins tabula rasa and all concepts are formed by the integration of perceptual data, which come from the physical world. This is because if no event has created concepts in the mind, then no concepts can logically be there; concepts can only be formed by integration and differentiation of perceptual data, or of other concepts (which, in turn, must be formed by integration and differentiation of perceptual data, or of other concepts, and so on). Thus, it is impossible to have any concept if no perceptual data has been collected.

The reason that a physical world is not implied in the fact that someone is conscious is that one can be conscious of one's self and one's mental proceses without sensory any sensory data gathered from the outside world. The conclusion that there is a physical world come from the fact that sensory data is gathered; one cannot sense mental entities or processes, so a physical world must exist. Since one cannot sense one's own mind, all sensory and, therefore, perceptual data must come from the physical world, and since concepts can only be formed from percepts or from concepts that are based on percepts, all concepts must be based on perceptual data, and thus on the physical world.

[Hal]

Because of the law of causation, the mind begins tabula rasa and all concepts are formed by the integration of perceptual data, which come from the physical world. This is because if no event has created concepts in the mind, then no concepts can logically be there; concepts can only be formed by integration and differentiation of perceptual data, or of other concepts (which, in turn, must be formed by integration and differentiation of perceptual data, or of other concepts, and so on). Thus, it is impossible to have any concept if no perceptual data has been collected.

While its certainly true that, in practice, concepts can only be formed by integration of perceptual data, I feel suspicious about claims that anything else would be 'impossibile'. For example, there doesnt seem to be any philosophical reason why an advanced knowledge of neuroscience wouldnt allow us to 'implant' concepts directly in people's minds, by physically altering the structure of their brain. Assuming that all our concepts are somehow represented in our brains, it seems like it would be possible (in theory at least) to create this representation directly rather than going through the channels which we currently use. This is obviously speculation since not enough is known about the brain yet to say with any degree of certainty what is possible, but this is preceisely why statements about things being 'impossible' are premature.

As a concrete example of this, there doesnt seem to be any reason why I would have to see a red object in order to form the concept of 'red' - the experience of seeing red could almost certainly be induced in me by playing around with my brain (or perhaps by pressing on my eyelid with my finger). Saying that 'people who have never seen a cat couldnt ever form the concept of 'cat'" seems similar to saying "people who grew up in a black and white laboratory enviornment wouldnt be able to dream in colour". While this may or may not be true, I dont think we could decude the answer from philosophy alone - its a scientific question which can only be answered by empirical investigation.

edit: And assuming that people who grew up in a black and white environment could dream in colour, wouldnt this conclusively demonstrate that the Humean claim about "dreams just being rearrangements of things we experence while awake" was false? Also, would this prove that our concepts of colours are innate? (this is really a question about what exactly the word 'innate' means, since I dont think its clear. There seems to be at least 2 subtelty different ways its being used within this thread - its one thing to say that we are born possessing concepts, and quite another to say that the brain is capable of generating its own experiences from which concepts can be formed).

Edited May 7, 2006 by Hal

[Ogg]

I suppose that implanting concepts into the mind through physical means would be possible, and would be consistent with the law of causation, however doing so would require knowledge of how the mind is structured, and knowledge of what, physically, makes a concept. These nanomachines would need to be programmed with a certain process in order to implant the concept, and thus that concept's structure would already have to be known by someone, who would have had to have formed that concept from perceptual data or concepts which were also based on perceptual data. Even in that special case, the basis for the concept would still need to be percepts.

I suppose that someone could implant the concept of red in your head, but as stated above, it would have originally come from perceptual data somewhere. Rubbing your eyelid produces perceptual data, and concepts based on that would be based on perceptual data. I never implied that one had to see a cat to form the concept of a cat, merely that one would have to see something or have some concept formed that would lead them to the concept of cat. Reading a paragraph about a cat would create the concept of cat in your mind, and that would be based on pre-existing concepts in your mind (those concepts denoted by the words in the paragraph). One could not create the concept of cat if all one ever saw was tables and chairs and paragraphs about cats written in gobeldygook. People who can only see intensities of light and not differentiate between wavelengths would not be able to conceptualize the concept of red without knowledge of wavelengths of light. If you doubt this, try a simple experiment: imagine what a sound outside the frequency range of your hearing is like, or imagine what gamma rays (which is a frequency of light outside human capacity to sense) look like. This is impossible, and I'm willing to bet you never heard sounds outside the range of your hearing or saw gamma rays in your dreams (with the possible exception of having the concept of gamma rays from scientific conceptual knowledge and then had a dream involving that. That would be possible, and you could remember that you 'saw' gamma rays in your dream, but it would be impossible to create an accurate perceptual image in your recollection of the dream). If it is impossible to imagine something, it is impossible to dream it. It is impossible to imagine something that has no connection whatsoever to your conceptual knowledge or perceptual experience.

[hunterrose]

Figuring out what is internal and external is something that is not simple... The point is, our mindset where it seems obvious what is in here and out there was painstakingly created over many centuries.

Perhaps, but seemingly obvious things don't make for very philosophical arguments.

This is really a question about what exactly the word 'innate' means, since I dont think its clear. There seems to be at least 2 subtly different ways its being used within this thread - its one thing to say that we are born possessing concepts, and quite another to say that the brain is capable of generating its own experiences from which concepts can be formed.

Good point. I should have been more clear that I meant 'innate moreso in the latter sense, and was posing the question of whether the mind can come with innate things from which concepts could be formed (as opposed to innate concepts.) And thanks for the Hume info.

Because of the law of causation, the mind begins tabula rasa ...

Since one cannot sense one's own mind, all sensory and, therefore, perceptual data must come from the physical world.

In terms of 'innate' as things from which concepts could be formed (as opposed to concepts themselves,) I don't think causality itself would preclude innate content. Causality says that actions are necessarily caused, not existents. And while I don't have any significant disagreements that concepts are derived, I do question the idea that they must necessarily be (ultimately) derived from an external, physical world. At the moment, I don't see where it necessary follows that there is no (or cannot be?) innate internal content the consciousness can be aware of.

[Ogg]

It's impossible because it's impossible to conceptualize the contents of an empty mind, which at some point some mind would have had to be. Something would have had to make the concepts at some point, and if you didn't have any sort of external world, this would not be possible, therefore there would have to be contact with the external world at some point in developing concepts in the first place.

[hunterrose]

So you're saying the mind has to be tabula rasa at some point? Why?

[DavidOdden]

So you're saying the mind has to be tabula rasa at some point? Why?

The mind does indeed come with "innate things from which concepts could be formed", namely the faculty of reason (one aspect of which is the ability to form concepts). Tabula rasa does not mean "complete vacuum", it means that at birth, we have no conceptual content in our minds -- we do have the blackboard, chalk, and an eraser.

The tabula rasa claim is not just an a priori philosophical assertion, it is a conclusion that integrates both the philosophical and observation. Concepts are optional and unbounded, meaning that you don't have to and probably haven't formed the concept "gabba" (meaning "all-white reindeer") -- and there are an unlimited number of concepts that could be formed. So it would be impossible for all concepts to be pre-formed and present in the mind. To claim that some concepts are present in the mind from birth, you must both say why those particular concepts are built in (while infinitely many others are not), and you must give a proof that those particular concepts are built in, in the same way that the faculty of reason is built in. The mind has to be tabula rasa at birth because it is tabula rasa at birth. If you have a strong argument that the human mind comes with certain concepts already present, at birth, you can present the argument and we can see whether it's a compelling argument].

[Footnote: the "at birth" boundary is, of course, a metaphor, based on an older and no longer credible belief that the developing fetus gets no sensory input in the womb. We now know that simple elements of language acquisition take place in utero, so the experiential basis of concepts precedes birth by some months. We may as well continue saying "at birth" since there is no better expression.]

[BNeptune]

The mind is tabula rasa because we have conceptual consciousness. A baby is born with no concepts; its first step is being bombarded with sensory data, which it forms into percepts. Eventually, those percepts (brown spot, white spot, etc) become unnamed concepts (table, floor, mom). Once the toddler grasps these first-level concepts, he moves onto higher level ones (table, chair, bed -> furniture). It is impossible for someone to be born with the concept of "furniture" just as much as it is impossible for him to be born with the concept of "chair."

We're born completely blank because the perceptual is the self-evident. Your mind automatically receives percepts, and at some point combines them to form your first condensation.

Just what innate idea are you trying to defend? That dreams are mystic revelations from our tribal ancestors? Combining revelation with instinct?

Edited May 10, 2006 by BNeptune

[DavidOdden]

We're born completely blank because the perceptual is the self-evident.

I disagree with this: the fact that the perceptual is the self-evident does not cause humans to be born tabula rasa. It is simple a fact that humans are born tabula rasa. The fact that the perceptual is (the) self-evident gives rise to the fact that we can know existence.

[hunterrose]

The mind is tabula rasa because we have conceptual consciousness. A baby is born with no concepts; its first step is being bombarded with sensory data, which it forms into percepts. Eventually, those percepts (brown spot, white spot, etc) become unnamed concepts (table, floor, mom). Once the toddler grasps these first-level concepts, he moves onto higher level ones (table, chair, bed -> furniture). It is impossible for someone to be born with the concept of "furniture" just as much as it is impossible for him to be born with the concept of "chair."

To borrow your example, I'm not questioning whether a baby is born with so much the concept of "chair." I'm questioning whether every percept/sensation (e.g. "brown") must necessarily be originally derived from a physical world, at birth or post-birth.

Just what innate idea are you trying to defend? That dreams are mystic revelations from our tribal ancestors? Combining revelation with instinct?

I'm not particularly trying to defend anything; my intent right now is to understand the rationale for OPAR arguments, not so much to endorse alternatives.

...The mind has to be tabula rasa at birth because it is tabula rasa at birth. If you have a strong argument that the human mind comes with certain concepts already present, at birth, you can present the argument and we can see whether it's a compelling argument.

I assume this equally applies to percepts/sensations at birth (or more specifically, not derived from a physical world?)

In chapter 1, it's left unanswered as to whether there is a physical world, and (thus) no differentiation is made between consciousness of external stimuli and consciousness of internal stimuli. I see no problem with it not being addressed there, but in chapter 2, there are the statements that:

1. there is a physical world
   
2. all sensations/perceptions are originally derived from the physical world
   

To say that cosideration of 2. requires evidence makes the evidence of a physical world even more relevant.

Is it not equally requisite that a compelling argument be made that there is a physical world?

[Maarten]

This is a part from the discussions in ItOE:(page 249)

Prof A: But it doesn't exclude consciousness. That is, when you say "existence exists" you don't mean: "I am only speaking about external reality and I don't mean consciousness."

AR: No.

Prof A: Which is what you are saying when you say "the external world exists."

AR: Yes. The axiom "existence exists" is wider than the concept of the external world. It includes everything, as I indicated, including your mental states, mental processes, and such phenomena as ideas or feelings, which are not in the same category as physical reality, but they exist.

Prof A: Would it be fair then to say that there are three stages here at least? The primary philosophic one is existence-

AR: Right.

Prof A: -which covers everything no matter what. Then at a certain point you make the distinction between the "out there" and the "in here", the external and the conscious.

AR: Right.

Prof A: And then at a later, much more sophisticated stage, you form the concepts pertaining to the nature of what is out there, such as "matter" and "physical."

This made the whole concept of reality much clearer to me. Well, along with the rest of the discussion, but I can't really quote the whole thing

[hunterrose]

Good point, I'd forgotten about that ITOE part.

I don't recall if ITOE made the argument for the second stage (dividing existence into external and internal,) but I'll check.

[BNeptune]

I disagree with this: the fact that the perceptual is the self-evident does not cause humans to be born tabula rasa. It is simple a fact that humans are born tabula rasa. The fact that the perceptual is (the) self-evident gives rise to the fact that we can know existence.

Sorry, that's what I meant. We're only able to reach the conceptual level through the perceptual level; you can't just skip over it. All I meant...