Metaphysical Possibility: Does It Exist?

[dondigitalia]

I have rethought this a little. The concept of omniscience is formed by: taking the concept of "knowing", and trying to find "non-knowing," from which we can also draw "all-knowing." Omniscience is only a concept in the sense that "non-extistance" is a concept. Neither have metaphysical referents, which is what makes them invalid concepts.

Since the concept of omniscience is invalid, any propositions using the concept are also invalid, as are any concepts attempting to integrate them(i.e. God).

[stephen_speicher]

Stephen,

Re: your book on Einstein: when do you expect it to be finished, and who is the intended audience? 

I have devised a somewhat unique approach which should make the book of interest to both the layman and the expert. As to when ... This is a long-term project, and I cannot even make a reasonable estimate yet. I pay a great deal of attention to detail, and getting every historical and technical fact right takes a lot of time and effort.

[stephen_speicher]

I think there is still a confusion regarding the "metaphysically possible". If something is possible it means it might be true RIGHT NOW, AS WE SPEAK.

Whether or not it is true right now, as we speak, is an epistemological issue, one for which there must be some evidence. That it is metaphysically possible, as I am using the term, is not evidence, one way or the other, for whether it is true right now, as we speak. Metaphysical possibility carries no significance for epistemological assessment of an actual existent.

By metaphysical possibility you mean "does not contradict the basic laws of existence". But so are arbitrary claims such as: "there are three aliens who look like green monkeys dancing and singing the Rumba on the far side of Jupiter" (I think Peikoff gave a similar example in OPAR).

But I am not making the claim that there are "three aliens ..."

A horse with a horn is a fictional character -- there is no evidence that such an animal actually does exist in physical reality -- but a horse with a horn can be a referrent in my consciousness, or in a book, or the subject of a painting. The reason it can be those things is because a horse with a horn is metaphysically possible.

However, not only is there no evidence that a square circle actually exists in physical reality, but it cannot be an actual referrent in my consciousness, nor in a book, nor the subject of a painting. The reason a square circle cannot be those things is because it is not metaphysically possible.

[stephen_speicher]

To make the point clearer, in the strictest sense, it is not metaphysically possible for reality to be anything other than it is.  So, therefore, if there are no non-white swans it is not metaphysically possible for there to be white swans (barring your choice to toss a swan in paint).

Can you please tell me what it is about the physical nature of a swan which makes it metaphysically impossible to be other than the color white?

[MinorityOfOne]

Ember,

The difference of apparent meaningfulness between "square circle" and "omniscient being" is simply how much you're holding in mind. An omniscient being is no less incoherent than a square circle: it's just less obviously so. When people think of omniscience, their thought process is something like the following: "Well, I know some stuff. Not everything, but what if somebody did?" It's vague, and it doesn't take everything into account: HOW would this omniscient being know everything? What contradictions would that entail? It's only by failing to grasp or to hold in mind the answers to these questions that somebody might think omniscience is less senseless than the square circle.

A more interesting case is something like a unicorn. Now, all three of these examples are mental integrations of a sort: they consist in abstracting properties from a bunch of things and mentally recombining them. With the square circle, the properties are obviously contradictory. With the omniscient being, they are less obviously contradictory. In a very literal sense, if somebody asked me if I know what they mean by "omniscient", I'd say: "No, and neither do you." With the unicorn (assuming you're not thinking it has magical powers), by contrast, they're not at all contradictory. So doesn't it have meaning? Yes, but only as a mental entity -- only in the same way that "Howard Roark" or "Sherlock Holmes" is meaningful.

That's my position, anyway. By the way, I absolutely despise philosophy of language, so be aware that I probably won't be up for an extended debate about this...

[DPW]

dondigitalia writes:

Omniscience is only a concept in the sense that "non-extistance" is a concept. Neither have metaphysical referents, which is what makes them invalid concepts.

Right. Invalid concepts are dependent on (i.e., derived from) valid concepts, which is why we can understand their meaning even when their referents are non-existent.

To put it another way, a concept means its referents. An invalid concept does too, only its referents do not exist. Does that mean an invalid concept means nothing? NO! It means its referents, which are things that do not exist. In other words, the referent for "dragon" is NOT non-existence, but something that does't exist. What thing? (Holds up a drawing of a dragon) This thing.

A referent does not mean an existent. A referent can be an imaginary creation, which we can communicate through various means such as drawing.

UPDATE:

Matt writes:

The difference of apparent meaningfulness between "square circle" and "omniscient being" is simply how much you're holding in mind. An omniscient being is no less incoherent than a square circle: it's just less obviously so.

I want to stress that I'm not disagreeing with Matt's point, which is correct. What I was explaining was how we can collectively arrive at invalid concepts, how we can talk about God or dragons and not smack the other person for talking gibberish.

Matt is correct: the existence of an omniscient being is just as incoherent as that of a square circle - but to recognize the absurdity of the former demands that you hold a greater context at the front of your mind. Peikoff talks about this point in detail in the third or fourth tape in his "Advanced Studies in OPAR" lecture series.

[DPW]

Stephen Speicher writes:

Can you please tell me what it is about the physical nature of a swan which makes it metaphysically impossible to be other than the color white?

1. As I said, I don't think "metaphysically impossible" is a valid concept. As Peikoff puts it in Chapter 1 of OPAR (I'm paraphrasing from memory): apart from the man made, the only thing possible, is that which is actual. If all swans are white, then they have to be white. They can't be otherwise and they couldn't have been otherwise.

2. But are they all white? Well, there are two ways I could determine that. One, I could examine all swans that exist, that have existed, or that will exist. Unfortunately, I can't do that. What I can do is examine what makes a swan white and ask, could this factor be affected by other factors such that there is a potential a non-white swan exists, existed, or will exist? If the answer is "yes" all I've proven is that there could potentially be a non-white swan. I have NOT proven that potential has been actualized. I have not even proven that the actualization of that potential is possible. To prove it is possible (i.e., to prove that it is possible there is a non-white swan), I need more evidence.

Notice what I'm doing here. In paragraph 1, I've examined the metaphysical question. In paragraph 2, I've examined the epistemological question from two seperate aspects: I've asked whether swans have a certain potential (to be non-white), and whether that potential has been actualized (do non-white swans exist?); I've asked whether it is possible for non-white swans to exist (do they have that potential?), and I've asked whether it is possible that non-white swans exist (have they actualized that potential?).

Metaphysical possibility is, in my view, an anti-concept that destroys the distinction between 1 & 2. It wipes out the principle that the metaphysically given is absolute, it leads to the analytic synthetic dichotomy, and it destroys our ability to retain knowledge of non-actualized potentials.

A word on that last point: In my view, what you are refering to by the "metaphysically possible" is simply a non-actualized potential (or, a potential for which we do not know whether it has been actualized). I say the identification of a potential, whether it is actualized or not, qualifies as real knowledge...it's part of the identity of the thing that has the potential. But you claimed we exclude the metaphysically possible from our epistemology. If the metaphysically possible is the non-actualized potential, then that is an error.

[stephen_speicher]

As I said, I don't think "metaphysically impossible" is a valid concept.

Don, you have now stated that a non-white swan could exist, and that there is no evidence that one exists now. This is just what I have been saying. We do not seem to be disagreeing on the facts, but rather on each other's interpretation of "metaphysically possible" and "potential." I already addressed that point, so I'll let the subject be.

[DPW]

Don, you have now stated that a non-white swan could exist, and that there is no evidence that one exists now. This is just what I have been saying. We do not seem to be disagreeing on the facts, but rather on each other's interpretation of "metaphysically possible" and "potential." I already addressed that point, so I'll let the subject be.

Okay, but I just want to clarify one point. The conclusion, "There could be a non-white swan," is, as I describe it, a conclusion reached - not from the mere fact it doesn't involve a self-contradiction in the way "square circle" does - but on the basis of evidence.

The evidence, in this case, was the facts about a swan's identity that cause a swan to be white, and my knowledge that factors such as genetic quirks, environmental changes, etc., could affect these factors such that the factors that make a swan white have the potential to make a swan non-white, under certain conditions. That is why, in my view, we do not leave this fact out of our epistemology - we include it as a potential, because it is a conclusion about the potentiality of the swan reached through evidence. We simply do not have evidence that potentiality has been actualized.

[stephen_speicher]

Okay, but I just want to clarify one point.  The conclusion, "There could be a non-white swan," is, as I describe it, a conclusion reached - not from the mere fact it doesn't involve a self-contradiction in the way "square circle" does - but on the basis of evidence. 

I hope that your inclusion of this clarification does not imply that you think invalid or nonsensical concepts, such as a square circle, to be the only criteria I employ. The essential here is identity, in any aspect of reality. If I could show that the color of swans were an inextricable aspect of their nature, such a fundamental part of their identity, of what actually makes them be a swan, then I would say that another color would be metaphysically impossible, meaning not possible in reality. In that case I could still conceive of what a differently colored swan would be like, but it would not be a swan. It would have a different identity.

All metaphysical reality which is, is what it is, and it could not be other than what it is, since all physical processes are determinstic. But that does not mean we cannot talk of things which could exist in reality, even though we have no evidence that such a thing actually does exist. That is is what I mean by metaphysically possible. We have absolutely no evidence that a species with the sensory aparatus to perceive atomic structure directly, actually exists somewhere in the universe. But, that did not stop Ayn Rand from using that species to illustrate an essential point about inferences via differing forms of perception.

[DPW]

I hope that your inclusion of this clarification does not imply that you think invalid or nonsensical concepts, such as a square circle, to be the only criteria I employ. The essential here is identity, in any aspect of reality. If I could show that the color of swans were an inextricable aspect of their nature, such a fundamental part of their identity, of what actually makes them be a swan, then I would say that another color would be metaphysically impossible, meaning not possible in reality. In that case I could still conceive of what a differently colored swan would be like, but it would not be a swan. It would have a different identity.

All metaphysical reality which is, is what it is, and it could not be other than what it is, since all physical processes are determinstic. But that does not mean we cannot talk of things which could exist in reality, even though we have no evidence that such a thing actually does exist. That is is what I mean by metaphysically possible. We have absolutely no evidence that a species with the sensory aparatus to perceive atomic structure directly, actually exists somewhere in the universe. But, that did not stop Ayn Rand from using that species to illustrate an essential point about inferences via differing forms of perception.

Okay, then you were right. We agreed on the facts, and disagreed on the words. Thanks for the clarification!

[Tom]

Potentials are ontological, but counter-factuals are epistemological.

[DPW]

Potentials are ontological, but counter-factuals are epistemological.

It depends on what you mean by a counter-factual, because "metaphysical possibility" as Stephen uses the term does not just mean "not actual." It means a not actualized potential (or, a potential which we do not know whether or not it has been actualized).

For example, Stephen would not say it is "metaphysically possible" for ice to sink in water, just as I would say that is not a potentiality of ice - it's not even conceivable ice would sink in water. To put the matter bluntly, you can't even imagine ice sinking in water.*

But, am I correct that the idea of ice sinking in water would be a counter-factual? If so, then "metaphysical possibilities" (i.e., potentialities) are NOT counter-factuals.

[dondigitalia]

It depends on what you mean by a counter-factual, because "metaphysical possibility" as Stephen uses the term does not just mean "not actual."  It means a not actualized potential (or, a potential which we do not know whether or not it has been actualized).

For example, Stephen would not say it is "metaphysically possible" for ice to sink in water, just as I would say that is not a potentiality of ice - it's not even conceivable ice would sink in water.  To put the matter bluntly, you can't even imagine ice sinking in water.*

But, am I correct that the idea of ice sinking in water would be a counter-factual?  If so, then "metaphysical possibilities" (i.e., potentialities) are NOT counter-factuals.

I wouldn't say that it is possible for ice to sink in water at all - metaphysically OR epistemoligically.

Ice is less dense than water, so in reality, it floats.

Since, epistemologically the concept ice represents (along with all other characteristics) a substance that floats in water, any statement to the contrary is self-contradictory.

Yes, you are correct that potentialities are not counter-factuals. But, it must be either specified or contextualized that it is a potentiality and not an actuality. In the case of the black swan, for instance, the potenitality for genetic mutations is a characteristic subsumed under the concept "swan." By identifying this characteristic, we also identify the potentiality of a black swan.

[DPW]

I wouldn't say that it is possible for ice to sink in water at all - metaphysically OR epistemoligically.

Ice is less dense than water, so in reality, it floats.

Since, epistemologically the concept ice represents (along with all other characteristics) a substance that floats in water, any statement to the contrary is self-contradictory.

I guess I was unclear because that's exactly what I was saying - that is isn't possible or potential and therefore not, in Stephen's terms, epistemologically possible nor metaphysically possible.

[dondigitalia]

I understood that we agreed. I was just fleshing it out some (mostly for my own clarification), I was editing in the last paragraph where my agreement was stated at the same time you were posting.

[stephen_speicher]

I just noticed this post. (For me, at least, there are too many posts in this group to keep up with.)

For example, Stephen would not say it is "metaphysically possible" for ice to sink in water, just as I would say that is not a potentiality of ice - it's not even conceivable ice would sink in water.  To put the matter bluntly, you can't even imagine ice sinking in water.*

Please pardon the double negative, but Stephen would not "not say it is "metaphysically possible" for ice to sink in water." In fact, although there is also earlier work, a very high density ice (1.25 g/cm^3) was discovered less then two years ago, and that ice will sink in water. See "Structure of a New Dense Amorphous Ice," J.L. Finney et al., Physical Review Letters, Vol. 89, No. 20, Nov. 11, 2002.

[stephen_speicher]

I wouldn't say that it is possible for ice to sink in water at all - metaphysically OR epistemoligically.

Ice is less dense than water, so in reality, it floats.

Since, epistemologically the concept ice represents (along with all other characteristics) a substance that floats in water, any statement to the contrary is self-contradictory.

That would be a much too restrictive concept of ice. If you simply develop your concept on what ice does, then you will miss what ice is. A proper concept of ice would have to include the essential of a phase transition to a crystalline state, from the liquid state of water.

Once properly understood, it would be possible for ice to sink, and, as I explained in my just prior post, there are states of ice which do sink in water.

[DPW]

Please pardon the double negative, but Stephen would not "not say it is "metaphysically possible" for ice to sink in water."

The point wasn't ice, the point was the relationship between potentialities and metaphysical possibility, for which ice not sinking was an example used to illustrate my claim that we were talking about the same thing. Granted, ice not sinking is a contextual truth, but I didn't think I needed to point that out in this case since we weren't arguing about the properties of ice.

[stephen_speicher]

The point wasn't ice, the point was the relationship between potentialities and metaphysical possibility, for which ice not sinking was an example used to illustrate my claim that we were talking about the same thing. Granted, ice not sinking is a contextual truth, but I didn't think I needed to point that out in this case since we weren't arguing about the properties of ice.

Don, I hope you realize that when I come across a post which purports to speak for me ("Stephen would not say ..."), and when it does not reflect what I would say, that I need to speak up lest others take those words to be mine.

Nothing personal here. I think you and I agree on most of the essentials of the main issue, and disagree on lesser concerns. I was content to leave things at that. I just needed to clarify what I would or would not say, and the reasons why.

[DPW]

Don, I hope you realize that when I come across a post which purports to speak for me ("Stephen would not say ..."), and when it does not reflect what I would say, that  I need to speak up lest others take those words to be mine.

Nothing personal here. I think you and I agree on most of the essentials of the main issue, and disagree on lesser concerns. I was content to leave things at that. I just needed to clarify what I would or would not say, and the reasons why.

No problem, Stephen!

[Reason's Ember]

The "ice example" is interesting, because I think it encapsulates some of the problems that I am still grappling with in Objectivist Metaphysics and Epistemology. For a quick reference, David Ross also takes up this example: http://enlightenment.supersaturated.com/es...xt/ioe1/09.html.

Note: when I identify a position as "Objectivist" in what follows, it should be read as "my understanding of Objectivism." I am doing this self-consciously so that someone can correct me when I am off the mark.

In his essay on the Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy, Dr. Peikoff specifically uses the example of "doubting that ice will always float in water" as an aberrant thought-experiment that contradicts the Identity of ice. He doesn't say the thought-experiment contradicts the known empirical facts we have about ice or our current understanding of the properties of a collection of H20 molecules as it undergoes different changes in phase. Peikoff says that "sinking ice" would be a contradiction of ice's Identity, which is understood in Objectivist thought as a metaphysical principle of the form that reality takes.

(In other circles, "Identity" might simply be considered a tool of coherent logical thought about reality--i.e., an epistemological principle whose relationship to the metaphysical reality it is used to represent still needs to be established. Objectivists would see no real distinction here--coherent logical thought is thought establishing the nature of reality, whose inherently logical character exists independently of our knowing of it and our bringing it explicitly to mind: "A is A," "existence exists," etc.).

Consequently, Dr. Peikoff believes that doubts about ice's universal proneness-to-float should be dismissed as arbitrary and that any extended theoretical reflection based upon them would be groundless.

Now, Stephen raises an extreme limit case where ice does indeed sink. I don't know the facts about this particular limit case, but let's say for the sake of the argument that the conditions in which ice sinks are highly artificial and only obtain in the laboratory.

In other words, there's no reason to doubt that the property of always-floating-in-water belongs to the Identity of ice--that is, there is no reason to doubt this fact prior to looking for evidence that contradicts it. In other words, the doubt about ice's Identity precedes the perception of new, contradictory evidence regarding the facts of the matter.

Epistemologically, such doubts can be primary. They can be the product of a "notion," which are occasionally fanciful. The act of re-examining the evidence and creating the special laboratory conditions is secondary (again, this may not fit the facts of the ice example, but it is easy to imagine other examples where this pattern of discovery might hold).

I see a motivation behind Objectivist M&E, which is to put a stop to obsessive philosophical nit-picking and the excesses of "fallibilists" who emphasize how often we make errors in Identification. The problem is that fallibilists give aid and comfort to irrationalists who say that the whole notion of "knowing reality" is a comforting fiction and that science is on the same ground, "metaphysically speaking," as astrology in its attempts to describe reality as it is independently of our perceiving it. That conclusion--and its effects on our intellectual climate--has to be rejected at at all costs (See, Sokal Hoax, http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty...rs/bog_tls.html ).

However, it has to be rejected without jumping the gun about sinking ice, the existence of life on Mars, the continuing presence of WMD in Iraq, etc.

If someone had asked me about the possibility of "ice sinking" prior to reading Stephen's post, I might have said, "when pigs fly."

[DPW]

Reason's Ember writes a very thoughtful post concerning various epistemological matters including the viability of universal claims, and the motivation to pursue evidence that might potentially conflict with one's current knowledge. In fact, the answer to his concerns are covered in OPAR, where Peikoff discusses the contextual nature of certainty.

Suppose we observe that when we drop a cube of ice in water, it floats. Thanks to the law of identity, we know that, under the same conditions, ice will always float in water. There's just one problem - in reality, there is no such thing as "exactly the same conditions."

But let us suppose we drop different pieces of ice in different amounts of water, under all kinds of varying conditions (temperature, altitude, etc.), and each time, the ice floats. What are we learning? We are learning more about the conditions under which ice floats in water. But we don't yet know enough to conclude with certainty that "Ice floats in water." Induction, to be valid, cannot be a matter of counting instances - we must discover a causal explanation for why ice floats in water.

Finally, we reach an answer - water is more dense than ice. We conclude with certainty: "Ice floats in water." But this conclusion is contextual, as is all human knowledge. Implicit in our conclusion is, "Ice floats in water...under all the conditions we have yet to discover."

Now let us suppose that one day we drop ice in water and it sinks. Do we throw up our arms and say, "Well, it seems ice does not float in water after all"? Do we shrug and say, "Man, I always suspected the law of identity was a fraud"? No, we seek to discover what new condition is present that explains why the ice sank.

Having discovered that new condition, we can thereby amend our former conclusion, "Ice floats in water," to, "Ice floats in water when (whatever the conditions are), but sinks when (whatever the conditions are)." Notice this new conclusion does not contradict our old one - it represents a growth of knowledge, not a contraction. We know more about ice and about water, because we know more about the conditions that must obtain for ice to float in water. In the same way, we can still say that ice sinking in water is impossible - it is and always will be impossible, under certain conditions.

Reason's Ember goes on to say:

In other words, there's no reason to doubt that the property of always-floating-in-water belongs to the Identity of ice--that is, there is no reason to doubt this fact prior to looking for evidence that contradicts it.

There's a confusion here. First, it is illegitimate to conclude ice always and under all conditions, known and unknown, floats in water. That would require omniscience. But that does not invalidate a universal conclusion, i.e., "Ice floats in water," keeping in mind that such a conclusion is inherently contextual.

Now, you might ask, "Ice doesn't always float in water, but we would have never discovered this unless we first doubted our initial claim." This misses the point entirely. Since new knowledge rests on previous knowledge and does not contradict it, there is every reason to continually expand one's context. On the contrary, it is the person who thinks that one instance of ice sinking in water will invalidate all his knowledge about water who will shy away from such a discovery.

I suggest you read the relevant section in OPAR and then ask any questions that might occur to you. This is a complicated subject, but few subjects are more important (or, in my view, more interesting).

[dondigitalia]

Finally, we reach an answer - water is more dense than ice.  We conclude with certainty: "Ice floats in water."  But this conclusion is contextual, as is all human knowledge.  Implicit in our conclusion is, "Ice floats in water...under all the conditions we have yet to discover."

Don -

I agree with all of the relevant information in your post, but just wanted to correct this.

[Most] Ice floats because it is LESS dense than water. In the example given by Stephen, we have a form of ice that is more dense, so it sinks.

[DPW]

Don -

I agree with all of the relevant information in your post, but just wanted to correct this.

[Most] Ice floats because it is LESS dense than water. In the example given by Stephen, we have a form of ice that is more dense, so it sinks.

Thanks. I should have a disclamer at the top of all my posts: "Disregard any scientific claims - they are for illustrative purposes only, and are likely wrong."