OPAR

[aleph_0]

Since every Objectivist for the past three years has been hounding me to read Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, I've finally begun it and hope to have it down over the weekend. In the mean-time, however, I have some questions about the text and figured it would be helpful for me and anybody else interested in the text to have an on-going review of it. So while the questions here will necessarily be diverse, hopefully this topic can serve just that purpose. If any moderator finds these questions too diverse, I don't mind splitting them up and putting each in its category of metaphysics, epistemology, etc., but I only join them here because to split them would mean a real proliferation of topics.

1) To begin with, though a nit-picky semantic note, is existence really identity? In the same way that Mohammad Ali is Cassius Clay? They refer to the exact same thing? That doesn't seem quite right to me. Certainly, anything that exists, exists in some way (that actually takes a short proof, but I find no problem with that particular notion); and certainly, anything with an identity, exists. Yet that doesn't mean that existence and identity are the same. For a quick sort of heuristic, just look at how first-order logic distinguishes between their functions. For a bit more in-depth consideration, though, take the classic example of a being with a heart. Every being with a heart has a kidney, and every being with a kidney has a heart--so the concept 'has a heart' is extensionally equivalent to 'has a kidney' (that is, they refer to the same things), but intensionally they are distinct because they have different meanings. Likewise, "existence" might refer to all things that have identity, and "identity" might refer to all things that exist, but they are not the same.

2) My next question is, does Objectivism take objective reality to be axiomatic or proved by induction? Certainly existence is taken as axiomatic, and certainly Objectivists believe in objective reality, but the most readily proven forms of existence are non-objective: Consciousness and the senses. So do we innately and necessarily believe in objective reality--that is, a reality outside of ourselves and not subject to our minds or our will--or do we use our senses to inductively prove it?

3) How does magic defy the law of identity? To me it does not seem like an internal contradiction, but simply bad induction--unless, of course, the magic in question proposes that it can create a contradiction. But otherwise, it simply takes the identity of a given thing to be other than its identity, which is a mistake but not a contradiction. For instance, if I were to say that my car (were I to have one) can go 500 miles per hour, I would not have contradicted myself. I would simply have taken the car's identity to be other than it is, perhaps because the car dealer had misled me. Likewise, if a shaman claims that his knotted stick can cause rain, it's not a contradiction, but a bad calculation. Maybe his great-great-grandfather picked up the stick and it started to rain and he, using bad induction, concluded that the stick caused the rain. And thus the stick was passed down from generation to generation. But that's not a contradiction. The shaman isn't claiming that the stick causes rain and it doesn't cause rain. He's claiming simply that it causes rain under the right circumstances (say, when the sky is happy, and he makes the further mistake that the sky can be happy).

4) Causality as an axiom: I am a bit ambivalent about this, only because it is not through innate knowledge that we know how some things behave. By innate knowledge, I simply mean axioms or those things which are given to us [logically] before we start the game of philosophy, and not innate ideas in the way that Chomsky has proposed. We have to observe things in different contexts to see how they will behave in those contexts. So the particular identity of a thing is not known until after observation--surely nobody has a problem with this much. But must we say that a given thing will have a given outcome? Peikoff dismisses the relevance of the Uncertainty Principle, but I find it useful to bring up and I'm not sure why he dismisses it. Experiments have proven, and I haven't the faintest idea how, that the only two ways about Uncertainty are the orthodox position, which is most widely believed, and the multiverse position which is both un-provable and highly problematic. But by the orthodox position, a given situation will not necessarily have one and only one possible outcome. So not only do we not know what things have what causal nature, but do we even know that things always occur out of causation or that a certain thing situation will have only one cause? If we recognize that the question, "Why does existence exist" is nonsensical, might we also consider the question, "Why do these things that just occur without causation happen?" equally nonsensical?

5) This is not so much a disagreement with the book as a question about, perhaps, Objectivist culture and the standards of proof it accepts. I've noticed, as I've come from a rural protestant background into academia, and from there into a largely Jewish culture (studying at Brandeis University), and from there to Pittsburgh where I'm in the middle of a lot of black culture, each different group has different standards of what constitutes proof. Each one speaks in a slightly different argumentative language, and I've noticed that the Objectivist "language" is often jaded against use of thought experiments and hypotheticals whereas I rather like them and find that they help get to the heart of a problem by wiping out unnecessary details of circumstances. Now the hypotheticals have to be relevant and actually demonstrate what they set out to demonstrate, and they cannot contain a contradiction like a round square or polite Frenchmen, but in the sciences and math I find them rather useful. I can provide many examples if desired. But I read here about Ayn Rand's "intentionally bizarre" hypothetical of atoms that are conscious, which she used to illustrate a point about epistemology. Peikoff himself, elsewhere, has used unlikely hypotheticals. So I'm wondering from whence and why are Objectivists so often repulsed by them.

I have skipped over much of what Peikoff said, all in a silent nod of approval, but if anybody else has problems with what they've read in this work, I think it would be fun to contribute and have a general discussion of this book. I have more questions, but I think this is enough for now.

[Editted for grammar/spelling]

Edited July 28, 2006 by aleph_0

[radn]

To begin with, though a nit-picky semantic note, is existence really identity? In the same way that Mohammad Ali is Cassius Clay? They refer to the exact same thing? That doesn't seem quite right to me. Certainly, anything that exists, exists in some way (that actually takes a short proof, but I find no problem with that particular notion); and certainly, anything with an identity, exists. Yet that doesn't mean that existence and identity are the same.

I don't have much time for online discussion, but I'll jump in to say this. Of course the two words don't mean the same thing, but AR's point is that if something is, it has a specific nature. She is looking beyond the language and into the facts.

This is a basic error that critics of Rand's thought continually make. They are language-plus-logic-focused, whereas Rand is concepts-based-on-observation-plus-logic-focused. She wants to make new identifications, not tease out old connections. In a sense, she strives to rewire the human brain--if you can grasp what I am referring to.

Until you understand what is meant by "Existence is identity," and the thinking method behind that statement, I think you are not ready to have any other questions answered. It would only lead to a blizzard of further questions based on language plus logic only. Keep thinking! I mean this in a friendly way.

[DavidOdden]

To begin with, though a nit-picky semantic note, is existence really identity? In the same way that Mohammad Ali is Cassius Clay? They refer to the exact same thing?

If you want to do nit-picky semantic points, one obvious question to raise is "What do you mean by "is"?". Existence is "that which is". Identity, on the other hand, is "the nature" of a thing that is. The concepts are related, in that nothing exists without having an identity, and there is no such thing as a "floating identity", not being the identity of a thing that exists. They are inseparable -- but they are different facts, and you can focus on the fact of something existing without focusing on the details of its nature. To put it another way, they differ in what they are emphasizing.

Mohammad Ali is a name for a particular existent, but specifically referring to a period of his life after 1964, and Cassius Clay refers to a different period of his life. "Existence" and "Identity", OTOH, don't refer to a particular period of time before/after 1964. Okay, that's obvious, but the point is that you're not beng clear about the way in which you see the notion "is the same". The Clay/Ali distinction also is about different emphases, but the difference is not the same as the difference between existence and identity.

Certainly, anything that exists, exists in some way (that actually takes a short proof, but I find no problem with that particular notion);

Do you mean in the sense "it is perceptually self evident -- that is the only proof needed"? No other proof is needed.

My next question is, does Objectivism take objective reality to be axiomatic or proved by induction?

What do you mean by "objective reality" -- how is is different from "reality". Are you trying to distinguish "external reality" and "consciousness"? The first axiom says just that there is existence. Since you presumably get this, then you have to get the fact that you get it, i.e. you exist being conscious. By the time you get to a concrete aspect of external reality such as the fact that a bug landed on your dinner, you have to have formed many inductive concepts in order to grasp the fact described by that clause.

So do we innately and necessarily believe in objective reality--that is, a reality outside of ourselves and not subject to our minds or our will--or do we use our senses to inductively prove it?

We have no innate knowledge. We do have innate faculties, i.e. abilities that are part of the identity "man" (breathing, digestion, reason). Now skipping...

I've noticed, as I've come from a rural protestant background into academia, and from there into a largely Jewish culture (studying at Brandeis University), and from there to Pittsburgh where I'm in the middle of a lot of black culture, each different group has different standards of what constitutes proof.

Uh huh, but at most one of them can be right.

Each one speaks in a slightly different argumentative language, and I've noticed that the Objectivist "language" is often jaded against use of thought experiments and hypotheticals whereas I rather like them and find that they help get to the heart of a problem by wiping out unnecessary details of circumstances.

One fundamental reason is that usually they are not relevant and do not actually demonstrate what they set out to demonstrate, and they typically contain contradictions like a round square or polite Frenchmen. I can't address your personal experiences with Objectivists and in fact have experienced that error myself. Let me just point out why hypotheticals are not anathema to Objectivism. Concepts subsume multiple units, not just the particular ones which you have experienced at a given time. That means, for example, that "leopard" refers not just the specific leopards which you have seen on specific dates, but all leopards. Leopards have an identity, one aspect of which is that they hang out on tree branches, also they live in Africa (and other places, but who cares), and they can kill people. These and other facts can be integrated into a general principle that distinguishes moral and immoral behavior, namely, there are certain kinds of choices that you could make, in specific contexts, which would be immoral -- suicidal -- that have to do with leopards. This principle (about incautiously hanging out under certain kinds of trees in parts of Africa) is hypothetical, because it describes a situation that is not a fact -- I am not not sitting unarmed and without looking under a certain tree on the Serengeti plains. The principle says that I should not do so. Principles are all hypothetical, and that is what makes them different from concrete historical descriptions.

Though experiments, though, are usually useless because they impose surreal perversions of reality. Usually, the best reply is "Az di bobe volt gehat betzim, volt zie geven mayn zeyde".

[KendallJ]

2) My next question is, does Objectivism take objective reality to be axiomatic or proved by induction? Certainly existence is taken as axiomatic, and certainly Objectivists believe in objective reality, but the most readily proven forms of existence are non-objective: Consciousness and the senses. So do we innately and necessarily believe in objective reality--that is, a reality outside of ourselves and not subject to our minds or our will--or do we use our senses to inductively prove it?

Mixed terms here. Objectivism takes reality to be axiomatic. By definition this cannot be induced, since induction is a form of reasoning from prior knowledge. Axioms are "validated" by direct sensory perception. This means that there is no inducitive process with reality, and the response to someone who objects is not to try reason, it is simply to say "Look around". We don't believe in reality by faith, we hear it, see it, smell it, touch it, etc.

[KendallJ]

5) This is not so much a disagreement with the book as a question about, perhaps, Objectivist culture and the standards of proof it accepts. I've noticed, as I've come from a rural protestant background into academia, and from there into a largely Jewish culture (studying at Brandeis University), and from there to Pittsburgh where I'm in the middle of a lot of black culture, each different group has different standards of what constitutes proof. Each one speaks in a slightly different argumentative language, and I've noticed that the Objectivist "language" is often jaded against use of thought experiments and hypotheticals whereas I rather like them and find that they help get to the heart of a problem by wiping out unnecessary details of circumstances. Now the hypotheticals have to be relevant and actually demonstrate what they set out to demonstrate, and they cannot contain a contradiction like a round square or polite Frenchmen, but in the sciences and math I find them rather useful. I can provide many examples if desired. But I read here about Ayn Rand's "intentionally bizarre" hypothetical of atoms that are conscious, which she used to illustrate a point about epistemology. Peikoff himself, elsewhere, has used unlikely hypotheticals. So I'm wondering from whence and why are Objectivists so often repulsed by them.

Because they are so often misused. The reasons why are easily understandable. I'm sure you would agree that if you formulate a thought experiment that wipes out necessary details it is a lousy experiment. But how can you assess what is necessary and what is unncessary? This gives rise to the proper use of them.

1. They are great for instruction. ie. when someone who thoroughly understands a concept can formulate an hypothetical that will illustrate the key issue of the concept.

2. They are useless for self-instruction. If necessarily follows that if you don't understand a concept well, almost any attempt to formulate a thought experiment that is valid will fail, and one will have no way to determine if it is valid. You will almost inherently dispose of some essential or include some non-essential.

3. They are of limited use in debate. I almost always find them in debate, but because of #2, when used alone, in debate, they are usually highly circular. Someone arguing from false premises, who formulates a thought experimenet to either prove his side or disprove the other, and then points to ONLY that fact has made no case. Essentially, false premise A leads to false thought experiment B, therefore a true thought experiment B, says NOTHING about premise A. But it looks convincing. So if I see a debate which has gone off into the "rarified air" of a thought experiment with no attempt to integrate them back into reality, then I usually find that the defender has not detected the circular argument yet. They can be valid argumentation only when integrating them with other evidence in reality.

[KendallJ]

3) How does magic defy the law of identity? To me it does not seem like an internal contradiction, but simply bad induction--unless, of course, the magic in question proposes that it can create a contradiction. But otherwise, it simply takes the identity of a given thing to be other than its identity, which is a mistake but not a contradiction. For instance, if I were to say that my car (were I to have one) can go 500 miles per hour, I would not have contradicted myself. I would simply have taken the car's identity to be other than it is, perhaps because the car dealer had misled me. Likewise, if a shaman claims that his knotted stick can cause rain, it's not a contradiction, but a bad calculation. Maybe his great-great-grandfather picked up the stick and it started to rain and he, using bad induction, concluded that the stick caused the rain. And thus the stick was passed down from generation to generation. But that's not a contradiction. The shaman isn't claiming that the stick causes rain and it doesn't cause rain. He's claiming simply that it causes rain under the right circumstances (say, when the sky is happy, and he makes the further mistake that the sky can be happy).

Your talking about religious miracles rather than magic (which I consider illusion). The shaman, with few ideas about reason to help his is probably making a mistake. However, today's Catholic church which "investigates" claims of miracles is a different story. An objectivist would say that everything has some explanation, ie. some cause, even if I eliminate all known causes. A catholic investigator says when all known causes have been eliminated, then the explanation left is "it must be God". This comes not from non-reason, but from improper reason and is a claim of non-identity. Rand addressed miracles as an example of defiance of non-identity. A leaf falling from a tree and hitting a particular spot is not a miracle, it is highly improbably. A leaf turning into an orange is a miracle.

[KendallJ]

This comes not from non-reason, but from improper reason and is a claim of non-identity.

Woops. I think improper premise of identity is a better choice of words than improper reason. No proper reasoning will get you out of that loop until you change your premise. Being axiomatic, you cannot change it by reason.

[aleph_0]

I don't have much time for online discussion, but I'll jump in to say this. Of course the two words don't mean the same thing, but AR's point is that if something is, it has a specific nature. She is looking beyond the language and into the facts.

This is a basic error that critics of Rand's thought continually make. They are language-plus-logic-focused, whereas Rand is concepts-based-on-observation-plus-logic-focused. She wants to make new identifications, not tease out old connections. In a sense, she strives to rewire the human brain--if you can grasp what I am referring to.

Until you understand what is meant by "Existence is identity," and the thinking method behind that statement, I think you are not ready to have any other questions answered. It would only lead to a blizzard of further questions based on language plus logic only.

I don't have much time so I'll just reply to this for now and hopefully get to the rest some time next week.

So, in essence, what you're saying is that it's nit-picky but right. If you're going to be strict about how you speak, these two words are not the same. I think it's clear that I understand what is meant by "existence is identity", given that I've recognized one sense in which its true and a re-wording that would make it true ("a thing exists if and only if it has identity"), but still find that with the strictest of definitions it is not quite true.

Keep thinking! I mean this in a friendly way.

Good advise that's always appreciated.

[radn]

So, in essence, what you're saying is that it's nit-picky but right.

No, I'm saying there is no nit--and your thinking so makes you wrong. She is not saying "The word existence means the same thing as the word identity"--nor is she implying it. She is saying that the meaning of existence is always and only the existence of some specific thing with specific properties.

[aleph_0]

And now for the eternal return.

If you want to do nit-picky semantic points, one obvious question to raise is "What do you mean by "is"?". Existence is "that which is".

Actually, that's somewhat contested, to get really nit-picky about words. As Plato indicated in his discussion of death (And Greek has the same distinction in its language, at least roughly, between existence and being--or rather, using more philosophical/linguistic terms, it has the same distinction between being and predication. I think [though I could be wrong] that it also has the distinction between both of these and identity as well. If any of these distinctions are unfamiliar to some, I can explain further.). Plato noted a sentence like, "Socrates is dead." Socrates, who does not exist, is still something--namely, dead. So to be does not mean to exist. To be means to simply be as a predicate which may obtain. To say that Socrates is dead does not mean, contrary to the Medievals, to be in the realm of the dead necessarily. It may (and more likely) means simply, to be a concept which does not obtain in the world of existents.

As many philosophers post-Heidegger have recognized, "to be" as opposed to "to exist" does not mean to obtain but to have "logical space" (That is to say, the idea of being a particular thing does not contradict itself. There is no, nor could there exist, a round square. It has no being, nor existence. Socrates, however, has being but no existence. Plato's writings about Socrates have both. But nothing has existence without being.).

But that's if we're to get really technical with words.

Identity, on the other hand, is "the nature" of a thing that is. The concepts are related, ...

Fair enough, I'm just pointing out that, "to be related" does not mean "to be the same thing".

Mohammad Ali is a name for a particular existent, but specifically referring to a period of his life after 1964, and Cassius Clay refers to a different period of his life.

Well neither really refers to any period of life, does it? They only refer to a man. Mohammad Ali is 65-years-old, right? Not 31, which is 65 - 34 (the age at which he changed his name). Now you're right about emphasis and relationship. 'Ali' now refers to Ali--particularly in relation to his life after the name-change; and 'Cassius' to Ali--particularly in relation to his life before. But both names refer to the same thing.

Do you mean in the sense "it is perceptually self evident -- that is the only proof needed"? No other proof is needed.

Actually, I mean proof in the proper sense of the term, as in arguing from axioms. In this case, one needs establish that there are different forms of identity before saying that everything which exists has identity since, were everything to have the same identity there would be no particular way of existing distinct from another which would obliterate the meaning of having identity. A quite simple and quick proof is the observation that there is red and green (or, for those with sensory disabilities, the near and the far). Again, nit-picking details.

What do you mean by "objective reality" -- how is is different from "reality". Are you...

We seem to agree on everything you pointed out from there on.

One fundamental reason is that usually they are not relevant and do not actually demonstrate what they set out to demonstrate, and they typically contain contradictions like a round square or polite Frenchmen.

Quite, but I'm speaking of all other such instances of thought experiments.

Though experiments, though, are usually useless because they impose surreal perversions of reality.

Would you take the thought experiment of a sun 100,000 times as large as ours to be a perversion of reality since no evidence (that I know of) has ever even supposed their existence? Because, to think in terms of it is actually quite illustrative of certain astrophysical laws.

Mixed terms here. Objectivism takes reality to be axiomatic. By definition this cannot be induced, since induction is a form of reasoning from prior knowledge.

But certainly different kinds and aspects of reality can be induced, such as the kind of thing that is a concept and the kind of thing that is a rock. What of objectivity?

Because they are so often misused.

I addressed this with David and will simply refer you back to that part of my post in response to this.

Your talking about religious miracles rather than magic (which I consider illusion).

Well, perhaps. There are those who believe in "majic" which is supposed to be the same basic thing but consider to be real supernatural power rather than illusion. It's a Wicca thing. I wouldn't claim to understand it.

The shaman, with few ideas about reason to help his is probably making a mistake. However, today's Catholic church which "investigates" claims of miracles is a different story...

Fair enough. Good point.

No, I'm saying there is no nit--and your thinking so makes you wrong. She is not saying "The word existence means the same thing as the word identity"--nor is she implying it.

Well, first of all there's no she: it's Mr. P to whom I'm writing in regards. But anyway, to say "[noun] is (a/n) [noun]", in my understanding of the English language, is to say that they are the same thing--that they share the same identity--that the two words refer to the same thing. Now if you say, "[noun] is [predicate]" that doesn't mean identity at all. It means predication. And if you say "[noun] is" that is not identity but being. But whenever you have, "Mohammad Ali is Cassius Clay," or "The man who shot the maid IS the butler," or "The word[/concept] 'existence' IS the word[/concept] 'identity'," I always read it to mean that the one thing shares its identity with the other.

[aleph_0]

Okay, I [we?] have made enough progress, and quite quickly too--I'm rather pleased. So I'd like to bring up more critiques and reviews of OPAR:

#6 (pp. 28) P. says that omnipotence is at odds with the law of identity, a thesis which I find difficult to prove. Now, if you mean the Christian (what I call, "naive") sense of 'omnipotence', then I agree it's contradictory but not by the argument given. In that sense, god should have the power to cause a contradiction which is a contradiction and so you find an absurdity all too quickly. Yet, in the Jewish sense of "omnipotence" g-d has many restrictions that make him better because he has them. In Judaism, g-d is taken to have a very certain identity since it's absurd to think of a being without one, but that identity is beyond the human mind to grasp in its entirety (in a similar way, I suppose, to the way in which a single man cannot grasp all of the truths of mathematics at the same time but must concentrate on one aspect at a time). And while god can make anything sensible become true (such as destroying a city or creating sounds in the ears of men, but not creating round squares), the range of what is sensible is quite large: the realm of the non-contradictory. In this case, then, I take the Jewish version of omnipotence to be valid but untrue.

#7 (pp. 75) P. tells us, in essence, that one may grasp that a given thing is a distinct entity without necessarily grasping different types of objects. How does a cat (since cats, it seems to P., have at least this level of awareness) grasp that a chair is an entity apart from its surroundings without understanding chairs?

Furthermore, how does Rand or P. know what animals can do at the perceptual level? How do they know anything about animal perception, except for the crow example which I find quite nice?

Also, on this page, P. tells us that a unit is an existent. To again nit-pick--but Objectivists do tend to be quite chauvinistic about the use of language, so it's only fair play to do so right back--a unit is not a member of a group. The measurement of a foot is not any foot-long object. A foot-long hotdog is not what it is to be a foot (identity), but rather the hotdog is a foot (predication). If I asked a person holding a ruler, "What is a foot?" he should properly tell me, "A unit of measurement" and should not tell me "This" while holding up the ruler. Because he's not holding up a foot--he hasn't told me or shown me what a foot is--he's shown me a ruler. The ruler is not a foot (identity), but rather the ruler is one-foot-long (predication).

# 8 (pp. 90) Lastly, and I think this may be a subject that will explode, how on god's green earth could mathematics be inductive? It's all true by definition. You need learn nothing about the things which exist to understand math. You may need to learn language to understand people talking about math, but even Kant said that the a priori analytical does not cease to be a priori analytical simply because you learn to talk about it. That's learning language, not learning the a priori analytical subject matter.

[Editted for precisification on #8 (didn’t change content)]

Edited August 13, 2006 by aleph_0

[DavidOdden]

In this case, one needs establish that there are different forms of identity before saying that everything which exists has identity since, were everything to have the same identity there would be no particular way of existing distinct from another which would obliterate the meaning of having identity.

I understand why you would think of saying that, but you're turning Objectivism into yet another variant of primacy of consciousness philosophy. You argument is based not on reality, but on our knowledge of reality. What you're saying is that you'd never be able to learn that all existents have their own identity if you did not first learn how to differentiate existents. Suppose there were no consciousness's in the universe (like in the first million years or so after the kaboom). Existents existed and they each had their identity, even though no consciousness grasped that fact.

A quite simple and quick proof is the observation that there is red and green (or, for those with sensory disabilities, the near and the far).

What is that a proof of? If there are no men, there are no inherently green things (green is a manmade concept, refering to a perception arising under certain circumstances -- which have much but not everything to do do with the identity of the existent).

Would you take the thought experiment of a sun 100,000 times as large as ours to be a perversion of reality since no evidence (that I know of) has ever even supposed their existence? Because, to think in terms of it is actually quite illustrative of certain astrophysical laws.

As a scientific method such an experiment may be valid -- you can trot out the hypothetical, and I promise to weakly grasp what you're saying. You need to supply enough context to say how perverse it would be to presume such a star. If you had said 150 million times as large then I'd assume you were pointing to something about black holes. Anyhow, hypothetical cases where you apply certain laws in new contexts are useful in telling you what the results should be if you make the measurement, and thus knowing whether your physical law is valid in a particularly expanded context.

What of objectivity?

Objectivity is the practice of deriving conclusions from logic and facts of reality (and not anything else). You can induce a conclusion about reality, but you cannot induce reality itself. (Of? or Is?)

[aleph_0]

"I understand why you would think of saying that, but you're turning Objectivism into yet another variant of primacy of consciousness philosophy. You argument is based not on reality, but on our knowledge of reality."

I don't see how I could have an argument about reality not based on my knowledge of reality. So I fail to see how I'm asserting the Primacy of Consciousness.

"What you're saying is that you'd never be able to learn that all existents have their own identity if you did not first learn how to differentiate existents. Suppose there were no consciousness's in the universe (like in the first million years or so after the kaboom). Existents existed and they each had their identity, even though no consciousness grasped that fact."

I'm with you, but I'm not seeing the point. How does this relate to what I wrote?

"What is that a proof of? If there are no men, there are no inherently green things (green is a manmade concept, refering to a perception arising under certain circumstances -- which have much but not everything to do do with the identity of the existent)."

We agree that consciousness exists, correct? And as such, we agree that perception is real, correct? And so, the perception of green things is a real thing, correct (even if not real in the same way that a rock is real)? And so green is a thing with an identity distinct from red, no?

"Objectivity is the practice of deriving conclusions from logic and facts of reality (and not anything else)."

Right, I'm speaking of objectivity as that property of being not of consciousness, rather than objectivity as a thinking process. I know, P. says there's no other objectivity than the later, but I take that to be a kind of inexcusable linguistic chauvinism. We have a word for that which is not of consciousness, and it is quite a useful and sensible word, even if one may argue that objective reality subsumes consciousness. So I'm just going to use the word sometimes in the traditional way and sometimes in the Objectivist way, always being sure to let others know in which way I mean it.

[Editted for style and typos]

Edited August 13, 2006 by aleph_0