WHAT ARE METAPHYSICS?

[Hazmatac]

...what are metaphysics?

[aequalsa]

...what are metaphysics?

Are you looking for a general definition or do you wish to know specifically what objectivist metaphysics are?

[LaszloWalrus]

Metaphysics as such (without reference to Objectivist metaphysics specifically is) according to my computer dictionary:

"the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being, knowing [i would call "knowing" part of epistemology], substance, cause, identity, time, and space"

[Bold Standard]

Here are some definitions of metaphysics from Ayn Rand and Dr. Peikoff.

Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that studies the nature of the universe as a whole.

Metaphysics—the science that deals with the fundamental nature of reality...

[M]etaphysics—the study of existence as such or, in Aristotle's words, of "being qua being"—the basic branch of philosophy.

And here is a list of some of the types of questions that metaphysics deals with:

Are you in a universe which is ruled by natural laws and, therefore, is stable, firm, absolute—and knowable? Or are you in an incomprehensible chaos, a realm of inexplicable miracles, an unpredictable, unknowable flux, which your mind is impotent to grasp? Are the things you see around you real—or are they only an illusion? Do they exist independent of any observer—or are they created by the observer? Are they the object or the subject of man's consciousness? Are they what they are—or can they be changed by a mere act of your consciousness, such as a wish?

Edited August 19, 2006 by Bold Standard

[Hazmatac]

I was on another board and the answer I recieved was basically metaphysics deals with: existents, consciousness, and identity. Then comes physics which measure the particular aspects of the existent.

[Bold Standard]

I was on another board and the answer I received was basically metaphysics deals with: existents, consciousness, and identity. Then comes physics which measure the particular aspects of the existent.

There are different variations on the idea of metaphysics, depending on what theory of reality you subscribe to.. But in general it deals with the most fundamental nature of the universe as a whole.

Existence is fundamental to metaphysics. It asks "IS there an existence"? That's really the proper starting place of metaphysics (that's where Ayn Rand starts it-- with the axiom "Existence exists.")

The question of identity is also fundamental to any theory of metaphysics-- it essentially asks: "Are things what they are? Or not." And then proceeds based on the answer you get from that. If they are what they are (if they have "identity"), can they change, or are they eternal. If they can change, is that change a causal or inexplicable process? Etc. If things are not what they are, then what does that mean? Are they an illusion? Is reality riddled with contradictions? Is it possible for some things to be what they are, and other things to be what they're not? Is it possible for a thing to be what it is at one time, or in one respect, but to be what it's not at a different time, or in a different respect?

All those are metaphysical questions. Physics, biology, chemistry, psychology, paleontology, and all such sciences are concrete applications of some accepted form of metaphysics (although some philosophers have attempted to divorce science from metaphysics and to make it dependent solely on epistemology, and these people talk about "metaphysics" as if it meant "superstition" ...but don't let them confuse you, they're confused-- or worse).

And the question of consciousness could be put-- does a faculty for perceiving existence exist? Or-- do I exist, depending on how you approach it.

Edited August 24, 2006 by Bold Standard

[DavidOdden]

I was on another board and the answer I recieved was basically metaphysics deals with: existents, consciousness, and identity. Then comes physics which measure the particular aspects of the existent.

There is widespread confusion on this point, and I myself was misled by the status of physics. Metaphysics is an aspect of philosophy, and physics is a specific science. It's true that what we see as (old) physics used to be called "natural philosophy", but first, historical naming traditions can be misleading and, second, physics used to be philosophy and not science. The fundamental distinction has to do with specialization, that is, the results of physics are not at all accessible to ordinary people using their senses, rather, you need extensive specialized training and very specialised equipment. Philosophy, on the other hand, uses ordinary senses and knowledge. Philosophy will not tell you anything about quarks or gravity, but it will tell you what it means to "exist", or to "cause" something, or that there is no such thing as "pure existence, with no identity". Any technical discussion in physics presupposes many metaphysical concepts (such as "causation"), which are understood via the philosophical discipline of metaphysics.

[orangesiscool]

When the writings of Aristoltle were being collected a few decades after his death, the stuff he wrote on being etc. wasn't titled. It was simply put after his writings on physics. Meta(after)physics.

[Shading Inc.]

...what are metaphysics?

To take the word literally; metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that busies itself with those things that are beyond (= meta-) the scope of physics. What then, is physics? Well, you probably know that, but I find it helpful to define physics as the branch of philosophy (in this case 'science' is the more word you're probably used to) that busies itself with the observable. So metaphysics is about things we don't have sense data of. You know, metaphysics literally mean 'supernatural'...

Jan.

[softwareNerd]

So metaphysics is about things we don't have sense data of. You know, metaphysics literally mean 'supernatural'...

While this may be your view, it is not the Objectivist view.

A science that studies the super-natural is a contradiction and therefore cannot exist.

[Shading Inc.]

While this may be your view, it is not the Objectivist view.

A science that studies the super-natural is a contradiction and therefore cannot exist.

It is not just my view; it is a quite common ethymological interpretation.

It is my point of view though, that if objectivism really is about real things (which I'm sure you don't want to contest), it would be more proper for it to speak of physics, rather than of metaphysics.

Jan.

Edited October 13, 2006 by Shading Inc.

[KendallJ]

It is not just my view; it is a quite common ethymological interpretation.

It is my point of view though, that if objectivism really is about real things (which I'm sure you don't want to contest), it would be more proper for it to speak of physics, rather than of metaphysics.

Jan.

ummm, it is a common meaning, but more recent only. The etymology (as opposed to ethymology) you refer to is incorrect. The original reference regards "first philosophy" which is what the academic meaning of the term still refers to. If you would like to change the etymology and then suggest that academics change their usage of the term to match yours, well then you've got quite a bit of work in front of you.

<h3 id="siteSub">From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia</h3><h3 id="siteSub">Aristotle is regarded as the "father" of metaphysics.</h3> Metaphysics (from Greek: μετά (meta) = "after", φύσις (phúsis) = "nature") is the branch of philosophy concerned with explaining the nature of the world. It is the study of being or reality.[1] It addresses questions such as: What is the nature of reality? Is there a God? What is man's place in the universe?

A central branch of metaphysics is ontology, the investigation into what categories of things are in the world and what relations these things bear to one another. The metaphysician also attempts to clarify the notions by which people understand the world, including existence, objecthood, property, space, time, causality, and possibility.

More recently, the term "metaphysics" has also been used to refer to "subjects which are beyond the physical world". A "metaphysical bookstore," for instance, is not one that sells books on ontology, but rather one that sells books on spirits, faith healing, crystal power, occultism, and other such topics.

History of metaphysics

The word "metaphysics" is generally held to have come from the title given to one of <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aristotle" title="Aristotle">Aristotle's works by the editor of his works Andronicus of Rhodes: Metaphysics, or in Greek, τα μετα τα φυσικά (i.e. the books after the books on physics).

Aristotle himself referred to the subject as "first philosophy". Among Aristotle's other works was Physics. The editor of Aristotle's works, Andronicus, placed the books on first philosophy right after Physics. So those books were called τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά βιβλια, ta meta ta physika biblia, which means "the books that come after the (books about) physics." The name was first given to the work by Andronicus of Rhodes in c.70 B.C., referring to the customary organization of the Aristotlean corpus, but was misread by Latin scholiasts and became "the science of what is beyond the physical."

Edited October 13, 2006 by KendallJ

[softwareNerd]

It is not just my view; it is a quite common ethymological interpretation.

No, it is not; not unless you assume -- as a primary -- that the study of metaphysics will surely lead you to conclude that the supernatural exists. To say that metaphysics is the study of the supernatural is to beg the question. Metaphysics is supposed to answer questions like: is there a supernatural?

[Shading Inc.]

ummm, it is a common meaning, but more recent only. The etymology (as opposed to ethymology) you refer to is incorrect. The original reference regards "first philosophy" which is what the academic meaning of the term still refers to. If you would like to change the etymology and then suggest that academics change their usage of the term to match yours, well then you've got quite a bit of work in front of you.

First, I would like to humbly excuse myself for not being a native speaker.

Then, Wikipedia isn't exactly the authority on the subject of metaphysics, is it?

And yes, we all know the tale about Andronicus and his ordering of Aristotle's works. He didn't know what category to put these particular texts in, but he thought it best they were read after the Physics, so he put them μετα τα φυσικά, etc.

But if that's how things went, we are left with a name that doesn't directly refer to what it is (like calling a cow 'in the meadow'). It would have been convenient if 'metaphysics' just meant what it's constituent components mean taken together, but if it doesn't, we're left to see if we can work out a definition.

Well then, what is it that endeavors that claim to be, or are said to be metaphysical have in common? It is that none of them is about any physically observable thing; they concern τα μετα τα φυσικά, those things trans physicam, the supernatural, the things beyond nature.

The scholastics were right after all - or can you show me an unmoved mover, free will, God, the good, an ίδεά, a cause, a natural right; the way I can show you my face?

Of course, metaphysics as a word refers to prima philosophia, but there are a lot more philosophies called metaphysical than those of Aristotle and Descartes: I repeat, the scholastics that read metaphysics to mean "the science of what is beyond the physical" were not so mistaken as one might think, regardless of whether the tale about Andronicus is true or not.

Jan.

[Shading Inc.]

Metaphysics is supposed to answer questions like: is there a supernatural?

That is exactly the question most authors in metaphysics answer, be it explicit or implicit, with a big 'yes'. I can't imagine Plotinus, Augustine or Spinoza writing the things they did if they thought there were only 'those things contemporary physics is about'.

I'm saying 'those things contemporary physics is about', instead of natural things, because these pre-modern (Spinoza is a borderline case of course, but fits the pattern) thinkers had very different notions of nature than we do. If we were to clear that up, things would get very complicating.

Jan.

[softwareNerd]

The thing is, one can say "yes, the supernatural exists" or one can say "no it doesn't". Either of those is a statement of metaphysics. Of course, if one answers "yes", one can also go on to fill up volumes with anything that one can dream of, since nobody can disprove it one way or the other. It is ridiculous to have a "science" of the unknowable and unobservable that extends beyond a statement like, "a supernatural exists".

[Bold Standard]

That is exactly the question most authors in metaphysics answer, be it explicit or implicit, with a big 'yes'.

You can't go by majority rule in philosophy.. Most authors in epistemology have ended up in skepticism or mysticism of some sort. Should we do away with epistemology too, then? Most philosophers, in general, have ended up with false conclusions of practically every kind imaginable, and many impractical and unimaginable kinds, too. Should we abandon philosophy altogether?

Yet Ayn Rand is a perfect example of a metaphysician who rejected the supernatural, and there are others who did to varying degrees also. Why should metaphysics suffer this guilt by association you attribute to it? Is that just?

[Shading Inc.]

The thing is, one can say "yes, the supernatural exists" or one can say "no it doesn't". Either of those is a statement of metaphysics. Of course, if one answers "yes", one can also go on to fill up volumes with anything that one can dream of, since nobody can disprove it one way or the other. It is ridiculous to have a "science" of the unknowable and unobservable that extends beyond a statement like, "a supernatural exists".

Of course, a "nay" is a metaphysical claim just the same as is a "yeah". And of course it's rather ridiculous to have a science of the unknowable and unobservable. Well then, if we think objectivist metaphysics is actually about something real, shouldn't it be called physics (in the broader meaning of the word), or something like that? I don't know how much metaphysical writings you're familiar with, but if you think of objectivist metaphysics as a viable science, you probably don't want it to be associated with what metaphysics usually means. By the way, even statements like "a supernatural exists" or "a supernatural does not exist" aren't scientific, because how will you prove you're right, or how would anyone prove you're wrong?

You can't go by majority rule in philosophy.. Most authors in epistemology have ended up in skepticism or mysticism of some sort. Should we do away with epistemology too, then? Most philosophers, in general, have ended up with false conclusions of practically every kind imaginable, and many impractical and unimaginable kinds, too. Should we abandon philosophy altogether?

If, as you say, we can't go by the majority, then there's no reason to follow "most authors in epistemology, [who] have ended up in skepticism or mysticism of some sort," is there? Same goes for following philosophers who were wrong. This does not mean that we are to abandon philosophy altogether; it only means that if we allow our common sense to be guided by contemporary facts, we will end up with a kind of philosophy radically different from classical and enlightenment ones.

Yet Ayn Rand is a perfect example of a metaphysician who rejected the supernatural, and there are others who did to varying degrees also. Why should metaphysics suffer this guilt by association you attribute to it? Is that just?

As pointed out, even a rejection of metaphysics is a metaphysical claim, and if viewed as such, quite a silly one actually. I think the only scientifically correct way of dealing with things metaphysical is a "Who knows? Not I..." kind of attitude. Here I will probably find a lot of opposition..?

Jan.

[Bold Standard]

If, as you say, we can't go by the majority, then there's no reason to follow "most authors in epistemology, [who] have ended up in skepticism or mysticism of some sort," is there?

Sorry, my statement wasn't very clear. What I meant when I said, "You can't go by majority rule in philosophy," is that philosophical terms or ideas should not be defined by whatever the majority of philosophers assumes that they mean. In other words, we should not define "metaphysics" by simply taking a survey of the way that most philosophers have used the term, complete with all of the premises that they base that usage on, and all the conclusions that they reach from it. If you did that, you would have to abandon philosophy as such, because philosophy, historically speaking, usually includes false premises and false conclusions (with a few non sequiturs and logical fallacies in between).

To state it a different way, the same procedure by which you have rejected metaphysics could be used to reject anything about which most people have been wrong--which is nearly everything.

Same goes for following philosophers who were wrong. This does not mean that we are to abandon philosophy altogether; it only means that if we allow our common sense to be guided by contemporary facts, we will end up with a kind of philosophy radically different from classical and enlightenment ones.

Likewise, if we allow our common sense (reason) to be guided by [universal] facts, we will end up with a kind of metaphysics which is radically different from the popular ones. Why do you allow this to work for philosophy in general, but not for metaphysics?

Well then, what is it that endeavors that claim to be, or are said to be metaphysical have in common? It is that none of them is about any physically observable thing; they concern τα μετα τα φυσικά, those things trans physicam, the supernatural, the things beyond nature.

Unfortunately, I can't read Greek, so I don't know what those characters mean (there is a phrase in English for when something is unintelligible, which comes to mind-- "It's Greek to me!"). But based on the part that I do understand, I think you have set up a straw man as your definition for Metaphysics. You have chosen a specific species of Metaphysics (supernaturalism) to stand for the whole concept. But I think the essential definition of Metaphysics is simply that it is a theory to describe the nature of the universe as a whole. In this definition, "physics" would be merely a subset, or application, of the broader concept "metaphysics." I believe my definition is more consistent with the original meaning of the term, because Aristotle himself was not a supernaturalist, in any significant way--there were still remnants of his mentor Plato's (supernaturalistic) philosophy in his metaphysics, but he was for the most part an empiricist (of a much different kind than the post-Humean nominalist/sensualist variety, since he did believe in universals, but thought that they existed in particulars) and an advocate of the reality and exclusivity of this world, as opposed to a supernatural one.

I think the only scientifically correct way of dealing with things metaphysical is a "Who knows? Not I..." kind of attitude.

I think agnosticism evades the issue, because: just because you don't know something doesn't answer the question of whether you accept the proposition or reject it.

[Shading Inc.]

Sorry, my statement wasn't very clear. What I meant when I said, "You can't go by majority rule in philosophy," is that philosophical terms or ideas should not be defined by whatever the majority of philosophers assumes that they mean. In other words, we should not define "metaphysics" by simply taking a survey of the way that most philosophers have used the term, complete with all of the premises that they base that usage on, and all the conclusions that they reach from it. If you did that, you would have to abandon philosophy as such, because philosophy, historically speaking, usually includes false premises and false conclusions (with a few non sequiturs and logical fallacies in between).

To state it a different way, the same procedure by which you have rejected metaphysics could be used to reject anything about which most people have been wrong--which is nearly everything.

It seems that this is coming down to just a quarrel on the correct definition of the word 'metaphysics', which really wasn't exactly the thing I was after; but then, who am I to try to swim upstream the current of the conversation? I'll float along.

Let me try to elucidate with an example why I think that if objectivist metaphysics is actually about real things, it should be called physics instead: Not doing so, would be like Big Bang-theorists calling their theory creationism, because it is about the same thing creationists try to explain with their theory. That would be silly wouldn't it? I think you'll think so, and that's why I think 'objectivist metaphysics' sounds silly.

Likewise, if we allow our common sense (reason) to be guided by [universal] facts, we will end up with a kind of metaphysics which is radically different from the popular ones. Why do you allow this to work for philosophy in general, but not for metaphysics?

Compare philosophy to religion, metaphysics to christianity and physics to wicca. Now, I don't think wiccans or christians would have serious problems with calling each other's ideas a religion; there can be multiple kinds op religion. The same goes for there being different kinds of philosophy; we can call both physics and metaphysics philosphical views. However, would wiccans want to be called christians? I think not, and don't think that scientists should want to be called metaphysicians either. That's one reason why I allow this to work for philosophy in general, but not for metaphysics.

Another reason I will give in reply to your last paragraph.

Unfortunately, I can't read Greek, so I don't know what those characters mean (there is a phrase in English for when something is unintelligible, which comes to mind-- "It's Greek to me!"). But based on the part that I do understand, I think you have set up a straw man as your definition for Metaphysics. You have chosen a specific species of Metaphysics (supernaturalism) to stand for the whole concept. But I think the essential definition of Metaphysics is simply that it is a theory to describe the nature of the universe as a whole. In this definition, "physics" would be merely a subset, or application, of the broader concept "metaphysics." I believe my definition is more consistent with the original meaning of the term, because Aristotle himself was not a supernaturalist, in any significant way--there were still remnants of his mentor Plato's (supernaturalistic) philosophy in his metaphysics, but he was for the most part an empiricist (of a much different kind than the post-Humean nominalist/sensualist variety, since he did believe in universals, but thought that they existed in particulars) and an advocate of the reality and exclusivity of this world, as opposed to a supernatural one.

I'm sorry, I thought it was you who quoted Wikipedia, but it wasn't; τα μετα τα φυσικά means "that/those beyond/after the physics". It's highly ambiguous.

And well, of course Aristotle thought his metaphysics was what we would call physical. I don't think any philosopher ever thought his metaphysical theories were not about something; of course they all thought their theories were about the universe as a whole. That's exactly the problem. That's why I say that if objectivist metaphysics is about something real, it should be called physics: You don't want to go about making claims about things you can't know something about, not even whether they're real - do you? Assuming then, for the sake of the argument, that you do; what difference would there be between a science of being qua being (for as far as we know it; for as far as it's real to us) and physics?

I think agnosticism evades the issue, because: just because you don't know something doesn't answer the question of whether you accept the proposition or reject it.

Am I supposed to accept or reject a proposition when I don't know the answer to it? Am I to guess? Because I will never know whether there exists more than I what know exists. If we allow ourselves to be guided by contemporary facts (although I can't see how these wouldn't in fact be eternal facts), I claim we will end up with no metaphysics at all, or, if you like, an agnostic one. I do realize there is a problem here, but I will wait and see if that is how far you would take it.

Cheers,

Jan.

Edited October 19, 2006 by Shading Inc.

[Bold Standard]

It seems that this is coming down to just a quarrel on the correct definition of the word 'metaphysics', which really wasn't exactly the thing I was after; but then, who am I to try to swim upstream the current of the conversation? I'll float along.

Well, I don't know if it's a quarrel, but the name of the thread is "WHAT ARE METAPHYSICS," so I thought that the point was to provide a proper definition.

Let me try to elucidate with an example why I think that if objectivist metaphysics is actually about real things, it should be called physics instead: Not doing so, would be like Big Bang-theorists calling their theory creationism, because it is about the same thing creationists try to explain with their theory. That would be silly wouldn't it? I think you'll think so, and that's why I think 'objectivist metaphysics' sounds silly.

I'm not sure I follow this analogy. In what respect would these sets be similar? The Big Bang theory and Creationism are both specific attempts to explain the origin of the universe. There are striking similarities between the two--for example, they both hold that the universe appeared ex nihilo. But, as far as I know, Creationism has always been a theological position, in which a Supreme Consciousness "creates" the universe; whereas the Big Bang theory is a supposedly secular explanation of how the universe exploded into existence, using the laws of mechanics on a cosmological scale.

The relationship between metaphysics and physics is different. Metaphysics has traditionally been merely a theory of the nature of the universe--supernatural or not. Originally, in fact, it was not supernatural (with Aristotle). But then people applied the term to religious views as well, so that we had Plato's metaphysics, and Pythagoras' metaphysics, and later Augustine's metaphysics, and so on.

Physics, however, does not mean metaphysics minus the supernatural. Physics is not a theory of the nature of the universe. It is a scientific attempt to explain one delimited portion of the universe--but not the universe as a whole. It only explains the dynamics between physical objects. It says nothing on, for instance, ideas, or the mind (as apart from the physical mechanisms of the brain) and so on. And besides that, the study of physics (as the word is normally used--dictionary.com says "the science that deals with matter, energy, motion, and force" which seems okay to me) is a science which relies on the answers to questions about the nature of the universe that are more fundamental. For example, physics deals with questions like: "how fast will a weight or a feather fall when dropped?" But it doesn't deal directly with questions like: "Are weights and feathers real? Are laws of nature immutable, or can they be molded by human consciousness? Are there any necessary connections between events?"

Compare philosophy to religion, metaphysics to christianity and physics to wicca.

Okay--religion is a type of philosophy. Christianity is a type of religion, which holds positions in metaphysics (different positions depending on which Christian philosopher you mean). Physics and Wicca have no explicit relationship that I'm aware of.

Now, I don't think wiccans or christians would have serious problems with calling each other's ideas a religion; there can be multiple kinds op religion.

Right--religion is the genus, and Wiccans and Christians are both species.

The same goes for there being different kinds of philosophy; we can call both physics and metaphysics philosphical views.

Personally, I think that would be acceptable in a certain sense (if you wanted to consider physics to be a species of metaphysics)--but I have seen people present arguments that an applied science such as physics or paleontology or whatever should not be referred to as "philosophy," on the grounds that philosophy should deal with general principles and should not require specialized knowledge that is not available to everyone (any adult human with a working consciousness, I mean). So it might be more clear to distinguish between what is "science" and what is "philosophy," even though science is necessarily dependent on philosophy. In that case, a physicist (qua physicist) would be a scientist, and a metaphysician (qua metaphysician) would be a philosopher. Inasmuch as physics as a science is dependent on and presupposes philosophical positions, I would argue that it is most dependent on metaphysics and epistemology.

However, would wiccans want to be called christians?

No, because Wiccans and Christians are different species of religion.

I think not, and don't think that scientists should want to be called metaphysicians either. That's one reason why I allow this to work for philosophy in general, but not for metaphysics.

I don't think that they necessarily should, qua scientists. But a specific scientist, if he is also interested in philosophy, could be a metaphysician qua philosopher.

Another reason I will give in reply to your last paragraph.

I'm sorry, I thought it was you who quoted Wikipedia, but it wasn't; τα μετα τα φυσικά means "that/those beyond/after the physics". It's highly ambiguous.

So you dispute the claim that it was called this because it was the section that came "after the physics" when Aristotle's works were compiled? It might be ambiguous if you attempt to derive meaning from the root words without that historical insight in mind, but with it it seems to make sense to me (assuming that it is an accurate historical fact).

And well, of course Aristotle thought his metaphysics was what we would call physical. I don't think any philosopher ever thought his metaphysical theories were not about something; of course they all thought their theories were about the universe as a whole. That's exactly the problem. That's why I say that if objectivist metaphysics is about something real, it should be called physics: You don't want to go about making claims about things you can't know something about, not even whether they're real - do you?

No, but that's an epistemological issue. Metaphysics doesn't (necessarily) attempt to explain things that are unknowable. Aristotle was an empiricist--he didn't believe in innate ideas. He thought that all knowledge was derived from experience, including knowledge of metaphysical principles.

Assuming then, for the sake of the argument, that you do; what difference would there be between a science of being qua being (for as far as we know it; for as far as it's real to us) and physics?

For one thing, physics is a science which requires specialized knowledge of the physical world, whereas metaphysics should be derivable from the knowledge possessed by every adult human. Also, if you are okay with the definition of physics as "the science that deals with matter, energy, motion, and force," that is insufficient for a complete theory of being qua being, since knowledge of more than matter, energy, motion, and force is possible (for instance, knowledge of psychology; or of law as it pertains to government, is also possible, and those are not exclusively dependent on nor are they derivable from knowledge of matter, energy, motion, and force).

Am I supposed to accept or reject a proposition when I don't know the answer to it? Am I to guess? Because I will never know whether there exists more than I what know exists.

A person who accepts the onus of proof principle ("the burden of proof is on he who asserts the positive") would reject any proposition which lacks sufficient evidence (although he would likely employ a gradation from impossible, to possible, to probable, to true, etc). A person who accepts some form of faith would have no problem accepting a proposition without any evidence at all (although he would likely require an appeal to emotion or authority before accepting it, etc).

To accept that a proposition is at least possible, without sufficient evidence, would, I think, require a certain amount of faith. To reject a proposition in spite of sufficient evidence is skepticism. The approach I advocate is to reject a proposition until there is sufficient evidence (I don't think there might be a Santa Claus, only it's impossible to say for sure--I say there is no Santa Claus).

But a person can suspend judgment on a proposition, and at the same time employ any of these principles--faith, skepticism, or onus of proof.

[Shading Inc.]

I'm not sure I follow this analogy. In what respect would these sets be similar? The Big Bang theory and Creationism are both specific attempts to explain the origin of the universe. There are striking similarities between the two--for example, they both hold that the universe appeared ex nihilo. But, as far as I know, Creationism has always been a theological position, in which a Supreme Consciousness "creates" the universe; whereas the Big Bang theory is a supposedly secular explanation of how the universe exploded into existence, using the laws of mechanics on a cosmological scale.

The relationship between metaphysics and physics is different. Metaphysics has traditionally been merely a theory of the nature of the universe--supernatural or not. Originally, in fact, it was not supernatural (with Aristotle). But then people applied the term to religious views as well, so that we had Plato's metaphysics, and Pythagoras' metaphysics, and later Augustine's metaphysics, and so on.

Are you saying that Aristotle's metaphysics wasn't theological?

Physics, however, does not mean metaphysics minus the supernatural. Physics is not a theory of the nature of the universe. It is a scientific attempt to explain one delimited portion of the universe--but not the universe as a whole. It only explains the dynamics between physical objects. It says nothing on, for instance, ideas, or the mind (as apart from the physical mechanisms of the brain) and so on. And besides that, the study of physics (as the word is normally used--dictionary.com says "the science that deals with matter, energy, motion, and force" which seems okay to me) is a science which relies on the answers to questions about the nature of the universe that are more fundamental. For example, physics deals with questions like: "how fast will a weight or a feather fall when dropped?" But it doesn't deal directly with questions like: "Are weights and feathers real? Are laws of nature immutable, or can they be molded by human consciousness? Are there any necessary connections between events?"

It is my belief that in principle every observable phenomenon is reducable to physics. Do not that I'm not saying that we can do so now, or that it will ever be worthwhile to do so. In the end, I would say, everything we can sensibly talk about is physics. And personally, I don't think it very sensible to talk about whether feathers are real, whether the laws of nature are immutable, or whether necessary connections between events exist. There're facts, and there's speculation, and when we want to objective, I think we shouldn't make claims within the domain of the latter.

Okay--religion is a type of philosophy. Christianity is a type of religion, which holds positions in metaphysics (different positions depending on which Christian philosopher you mean). Physics and Wicca have no explicit relationship that I'm aware of.

Right--religion is the genus, and Wiccans and Christians are both species.

That was really the point: Philosophy as the genus for metaphysics and physics; religion as the genus for christianity and wicca. The different species would concede that they are the same sort of thing (that is, a philosophy or a religion), but not that they are exactly the same sort of thing (so wiccans don't consider themselves christians, and people claiming to objective should want to call their thing 'metaphysics').

Personally, I think that would be acceptable in a certain sense (if you wanted to consider physics to be a species of metaphysics)--but I have seen people present arguments that an applied science such as physics or paleontology or whatever should not be referred to as "philosophy," on the grounds that philosophy should deal with general principles and should not require specialized knowledge that is not available to everyone (any adult human with a working consciousness, I mean). So it might be more clear to distinguish between what is "science" and what is "philosophy," even though science is necessarily dependent on philosophy. In that case, a physicist (qua physicist) would be a scientist, and a metaphysician (qua metaphysician) would be a philosopher. Inasmuch as physics as a science is dependent on and presupposes philosophical positions, I would argue that it is most dependent on metaphysics and epistemology.

There is of course the problem with the things we call sciences nowadays, using to be called philosophies until at least well into modernity. Let's not embark upon that subject.

And whereas physicists may adhere to, or presuppose philosophical positions, I don't think physics does. Any metaphysical views a physicist may have determine his physics only in a negative way: His views on physics depend on his views on metaphysics and epistemology only insofar as he will allow them to - but there is no need to do so.

No, because Wiccans and Christians are different species of religion.

I don't think that they necessarily should, qua scientists. But a specific scientist, if he is also interested in philosophy, could be a metaphysician qua philosopher.

That is true. A person may do research in evolutionary biology yet attend church every sunday; there's no possibility therein. The point is rather, that evolutionary biology is not a religion.

So you dispute the claim that it was called this because it was the section that came "after the physics" when Aristotle's works were compiled? It might be ambiguous if you attempt to derive meaning from the root words without that historical insight in mind, but with it it seems to make sense to me (assuming that it is an accurate historical fact).

For as far as I know, the story about Andronicus editing Aristotle's work is not an accepted historical fact.

No, but that's an epistemological issue. Metaphysics doesn't (necessarily) attempt to explain things that are unknowable. Aristotle was an empiricist--he didn't believe in innate ideas. He thought that all knowledge was derived from experience, including knowledge of metaphysical principles.

If you ask the metaphysician, he will tell you that of course he is not explaining something unknowable, because if it was unknowable, how could he ever explain anything about it? My guess is that if we'd ask Aristotle whether his philosophy should be considered a physics or a metaphysics, he would choose the former. The question is not whether the metaphysician thinks whether the things his theory are about can be known or not; the question is whether they actually can be or can't be known.

For one thing, physics is a science which requires specialized knowledge of the physical world, whereas metaphysics should be derivable from the knowledge possessed by every adult human. Also, if you are okay with the definition of physics as "the science that deals with matter, energy, motion, and force," that is insufficient for a complete theory of being qua being, since knowledge of more than matter, energy, motion, and force is possible (for instance, knowledge of psychology; or of law as it pertains to government, is also possible, and those are not exclusively dependent on nor are they derivable from knowledge of matter, energy, motion, and force).

I don't understand the point you're trying to make with the first line of this section. As for the rest, I already expressed that my belief that in principle every observable phenomenon is reducable to physics. It may be useful to utilise a set of abstractions and pseudo-laws governing these, but that does not take away this belief of mine.

A person who accepts the onus of proof principle ("the burden of proof is on he who asserts the positive") would reject any proposition which lacks sufficient evidence (although he would likely employ a gradation from impossible, to possible, to probable, to true, etc). A person who accepts some form of faith would have no problem accepting a proposition without any evidence at all (although he would likely require an appeal to emotion or authority before accepting it, etc).

To accept that a proposition is at least possible, without sufficient evidence, would, I think, require a certain amount of faith. To reject a proposition in spite of sufficient evidence is skepticism. The approach I advocate is to reject a proposition until there is sufficient evidence (I don't think there might be a Santa Claus, only it's impossible to say for sure--I say there is no Santa Claus).

But a person can suspend judgment on a proposition, and at the same time employ any of these principles--faith, skepticism, or onus of proof.

It all depends on when you consider evidence 'sufficient'. I will not claim there is no Santa Claus, but I will let the facts speak for themselves.

Jan.

Edited October 24, 2006 by Shading Inc.

[Bold Standard]

Are you saying that Aristotle's metaphysics wasn't theological?

Yes--not in its essentials, anyway. As I said before, there were still remnants of (theological) Platonism--but theology in Aristotle is so weak and inessential to the rest of his system, that I think it is appropriate to consider Aristotle's metaphysics as primarily secular, and as the basis for subsequent (more consistently) secular systems.

It is my belief that in principle every observable phenomenon is reducable to physics. Do not that I'm not saying that we can do so now, or that it will ever be worthwhile to do so. In the end, I would say, everything we can sensibly talk about is physics.

Well.. the onus of proof is on you.

And whereas physicists may adhere to, or presuppose philosophical positions, I don't think physics does. Any metaphysical views a physicist may have determine his physics only in a negative way: His views on physics depend on his views on metaphysics and epistemology only insofar as he will allow them to - but there is no need to do so.

So, a physicist doesn't need to know whether or not A can equal non-A at the same time and in the same respect? He doesn't need to know whether physical objects obey natural laws, or whether all events are entirely random and unknowable? The conclusions he draws from observable phenomena (assuming that there is such a thing as observable phenomena--a metaphysical assumption!) would not vary greatly depending on his answers to these metaphysical questions? He doesn't need epistemology either? Proper methods of induction (i.e., "the scientific method") and deductive reasoning are not vital for his craft?

If you ask the metaphysician, he will tell you that of course he is not explaining something unknowable, because if it was unknowable, how could he ever explain anything about it?

This depends entirely on which metaphysician you ask. The majority of metaphysicians in history (especially prior to The Enlightenment) were not empiricists. If you asked a metaphysician in the middle ages how he could explain something unknowable, he would have a whole arsenal of answers ready for you--mystical revelation, innate knowledge, intuition, reading the stars, casting lots, came to him in a dream, etc, etc.

But that doesn't only apply to pre-enlightenment philosophers. Try asking a Kantian sometime how he can explain the unknowable. He will undoubtedly have given the issue a lot of thought, and will have a very complicated, highly technical, completely unintelligible answer for you.

I agree with you that one shouldn't try to explain the unknowable--but that's assuming certain principles in epistemology that not every metaphysician subscribes to.

The question is not whether the metaphysician thinks whether the things his theory are about can be known or not; the question is whether they actually can be or can't be known.

That's an epistemelogical question.

I will not claim there is no Santa Claus, but I will let the facts speak for themselves.

You consider it to be a possibility that there is a fat man who lives in the north pole, employing elves to make toys for all of the children of the world, which he will deliver all in one evening, by riding a sleigh drawn by flying reindeer, and squeezing up and down chimneys, with all the toys in a bag? (Just to be sure you know who Santa Clause is--I'm not sure if they have that fairy tale in the Netherlands or not!)

[Shading Inc.]

Yes--not in its essentials, anyway. As I said before, there were still remnants of (theological) Platonism--but theology in Aristotle is so weak and inessential to the rest of his system, that I think it is appropriate to consider Aristotle's metaphysics as primarily secular, and as the basis for subsequent (more consistently) secular systems.

I'm affraid you're wrong there. Aristotle's account of nature and the explanations he gives for the natural phenomena have explanatory force only if you accept his 'first philosophy', or 'theology' (this is the translation of a Greek word Aristotle himself employs; I can look up which word if you like). The goal-directedness, or teleology of nature he posits is theological through and through, and is essential to his account of nature / philosophy.

Well.. the onus of proof is on you.

I must admitt that I feel little urge to prove this to you. However, the idea that every observable phenomenon is reducable to physics has proven to be of significant instrumental value, and I do think that counts for something.

So, a physicist doesn't need to know whether or not A can equal non-A at the same time and in the same respect? He doesn't need to know whether physical objects obey natural laws, or whether all events are entirely random and unknowable? The conclusions he draws from observable phenomena (assuming that there is such a thing as observable phenomena--a metaphysical assumption!) would not vary greatly depending on his answers to these metaphysical questions? He doesn't need epistemology either? Proper methods of induction (i.e., "the scientific method") and deductive reasoning are not vital for his craft?

You're right; the physicist doesn't need to know. That (knowing stuff) isn't what science is all about; it's about being able to do things. If the supposition that the Earth is flat figures in your account of astronomy, yet this proves to be no problem to you (because all you need astronomy for is knowing when to sow and when to harvest), does it really matter that in fact the Earth is sphere-like? Well perhaps to some (perhaps even a lot of) people this would matter, but science is primarily instrumental, not some perfectionistic quest for Truth. Science justifies its right to exist pragmatically, just like everything else. You may think it a sad thing, but in the world as it is, Truth has no value in itself; it only has value in an economic kind of way.

This depends entirely on which metaphysician you ask. The majority of metaphysicians in history (especially prior to The Enlightenment) were not empiricists. If you asked a metaphysician in the middle ages how he could explain something unknowable, he would have a whole arsenal of answers ready for you--mystical revelation, innate knowledge, intuition, reading the stars, casting lots, came to him in a dream, etc, etc.

But that doesn't only apply to pre-enlightenment philosophers. Try asking a Kantian sometime how he can explain the unknowable. He will undoubtedly have given the issue a lot of thought, and will have a very complicated, highly technical, completely unintelligible answer for you.

I agree with you that one shouldn't try to explain the unknowable--but that's assuming certain principles in epistemology that not every metaphysician subscribes to.

Well if he (the medieval philosopher) could explain it, he couldn't claim the explanandum to be unknowable, could he? If it was, he wouldn't be able to explain it. Of course there're those really mystical thinkers like Eckhardt, but I don't think he (or any other distinguished metaphysician, for that matter) ever made the mistake of claiming to be able to know the unknowable. Either they said that their metaphysical ideas were perfectly knowable (the medieval rationalists), or they said that of course the unknowable can't be known or understood, but that it could be 'experienced' or something (the medieval mystics).

I distinguish between Kant and Kantians.

I'm no expert, but I don't think the former really claims to be able to explain the unknowable. Or is that not what you where getting at?

The question is not whether the metaphysician thinks whether the things his theory are about can be known or not; the question is whether they actually can be or can't be known.

That's an epistemelogical question.

Too easily interpreted as such, I'm sorry. Allow me to rephrase: "The question is not whether the metaphysician thinks whether the things his theory is about can be known or not; the question is whether we have observations of the explanandum so we can actually talk about it, or whether we don't have observations of the explanandum, so we can only speculate about it - to begin with its existence or non-existence for example."

You consider it to be a possibility that there is a fat man who lives in the north pole, employing elves to make toys for all of the children of the world, which he will deliver all in one evening, by riding a sleigh drawn by flying reindeer, and squeezing up and down chimneys, with all the toys in a bag? (Just to be sure you know who Santa Clause is--I'm not sure if they have that fairy tale in the Netherlands or not!)

Technically speaking, yes, I would consider that a possibility, since there is no evidence that there is no Santa Claus. However, at the same time there is no evidence that there is a Santa Claus, and one might say that if there had been one, there should have been clues implying his existence. Thus, if I have a belief about the existence of Santa Claus, it's probably that I think it highly unlikely that he exists.

(Wow, did you just trick me into a formal statement about Santa Claus's existence? )

Jan.

[Bold Standard]

I'm affraid you're wrong there. Aristotle's account of nature and the explanations he gives for the natural phenomena have explanatory force only if you accept his 'first philosophy', or 'theology' (this is the translation of a Greek word Aristotle himself employs; I can look up which word if you like). The goal-directedness, or teleology of nature he posits is theological through and through, and is essential to his account of nature / philosophy.

Aristotle's application of final causation (teleology) to the universe as a whole, including inanimate objects, was a mistake, and I would agree that it is the primary theological element in Aristotle. And it is a significant element in his metaphysics. But it is not the most essential element. I would say the most essential achievement in his metaphysics is in his claim that there is only one world, which *is* the world of perception, and that universals exist in particulars, rather than in a supernatural World of Forms. Also, since teleology does exist in (individual) living organisms, some of his observations about final causation were important for subsequent, secular, scientific inquiries.

Science justifies its right to exist pragmatically, just like everything else. You may think it a sad thing, but in the world as it is, Truth has no value in itself; it only has value in an economic kind of way.

If you wish to argue for Pragmatism, the debate forum would be the appropriate place to do so. Ayn Rand was quite radically opposed to the Pragmatist theories of truth and meaning, but it's out of the scope of this thread to name her objections.

Well if he (the medieval philosopher) could explain it, he couldn't claim the explanandum to be unknowable, could he?

Of course he could claim it--a person can claim anything he wants. People are quite capable of uttering contradictions, and medieval philosophy is a great place to look for examples (especially in characters like Eckhardt, who were apparently quite proud of it).

If it was, he wouldn't be able to explain it.

Exactly--it was usually the case that the unknowable would also turn out to be ineffable. But, if you do what the mystic tells you, then you can understand it, and approximate communication about it with analogies or bromides or something. This leads to what Ayn Rand called "the mystic formula": "For those who understand, no explanation is necessary; for those who don't, none is possible." Convenient, eh?

I distinguish between Kant and Kantians.

I'm no expert, but I don't think the former really claims to be able to explain the unknowable. Or is that not what you where getting at?

I'm not an expert either, but based on what I've read from Kant (CPR, Critique of Judgment, and various excerpts, essays and interpretations) it seems that he made quite a lot of claims about the Neumenal World, considering he held that it was entirely unknowable, and inconceivable. Indeed, I believe that was one of Hegel's major criticisms of Kant--if the Neumenal World is unknowble, how do you know there even is one? So Hegel did away with the Neumenal World altogether.

Too easily interpreted as such, I'm sorry. Allow me to rephrase: "The question is not whether the metaphysician thinks whether the things his theory is about can be known or not; the question is whether we have observations of the explanandum so we can actually talk about it, or whether we don't have observations of the explanandum, so we can only speculate about it - to begin with its existence or non-existence for example."

It's still epistemological, because the question is whether you can know something without experiencing a direct sensory observation of it.. Can you make inferences? Can you abstract away from particulars and form concepts? Is it possible to identify scientific principles, or is the best scientific explanation you can hope for along the lines of, "here, now--GREEN... there, now--MOVING," etc.

Technically speaking, yes, I would consider that a possibility, since there is no evidence that there is no Santa Claus.

There is never evidence for the nonexistence of something--nonexistent things don't leave evidence of their not existing.

(Wow, did you just trick me into a formal statement about Santa Claus's existence? )