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Some aspects of reality unknowable in principle?

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Building on something I said in another thread:

I cannot know what it is like to be a bat. However, there is an experience out there we can call "what it's like to be a bat." I know that that experience is an objective part of reality, it exists. However, I can never know that experience itself. My capacity to know has that limit.

Do people agree with those statements?

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I cannot know what it is like to be a bat. However, there is an experience out there we can call "what it's like to be a bat." I know that that experience is an objective part of reality, it exists. However, I can never know that experience itself. My capacity to know has that limit.

First, I disagree that "there is an experience out there ..." What is "out there" is a bat, not an experience.

Second, the bat is not unknowable. The experience of actually being a bat is un-experiencable (if such a word exists). Personally, I have no problem with that. I also will never directly experience what it is like to be a rock, but I stumble along in life anyway. :D

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Stephen, I disagree.

There is a "something it's like to be a bat", and it's very much "out there." The bat exists. The bat is experiencing. That experience has identity, it is the sum of its attributes. Therefore, "what it's like to be a bat" is every bit as real as "the way that red looks."

The experience of being a bat would be unknowable to anyone who is not a bat. You might be able to get a good idea of what it's like to be a chimp by increasing or decreasing the degree of the things that we know about what its like to be human. Of course, it would only be speculation, but you could probably make a pretty good guess. I can imagine what i'ts like to be a super-strong hairy badly behaved retarded 2 year old with great climbing skills. The very fact that we can even formulate meaningful words for it is a good exposition of the fact that it is at least conceivable.

However, bats have a sensory aparatus that we do not. Perhaps a man with sight can imagine being blind, but a man who has always been completely blind could not begin to know sight.

As concepts are formed from sensory/perceptual experience, and our words are developed as part of concept formation, it is impossible to truly have a grasp of a concept that cannot in any way shape or form be reduced to perceptual reality. Having a bat's sonar ability would be akin to having another, radically different, set of eyes. You can't truly imagine what it's like without experiencing it.

Of course the analogy breaks down when you stop to consider that in some cases, people who are blind actually HAVE been able to develop a very rudimentary sonar ability, by clicking their tongues and training themselves to hear and interpret the echo. Perhaps they can know something of what it's like to be a bat, but I certainly can't. And there aren't words to explain it to me.

So, before you can say that something is "unknowable in principle," you must specify, "unknowable to whom?" What it's like to be a bat is unknowable to me. But bats certainly know it, on some level. (I doubt they're very self-conscious, and they probably don't have words for it! :D ) Perhaps some humans have a bit of a clue what it's like. But I never will.

Lastly, there is no "what it's like to be a rock." Rocks do not "experience." You could only properly say that there's a "what it's like to be" entities that are conscious on some level.

Isaac Z. Schlueter

http://isaac.beigetower.org

[EDIT]

By the way, this is a reference to Thomas Nagel's essay, What is it like to be a bat? I suggest reading that article to get a good understanding of the problem that we're discussing.

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[EDIT]By the way, this is a reference to Thomas Nagel's essay, What is it like to be a bat? I suggest reading that article to get a good understanding of the problem that we're discussing.

And if you you're really intrigued . . .

there is no "what it's like to be a rock." Rocks do not "experience." You could only properly say that there's a "what it's like to be" entities that are conscious on some level.

As has been said: "There is no proposition so absurd that some philosopher hasn't actually entertained. . ."

http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~axs/misc/rock/rock/

WHAT IS IT LIKE TO BE A ROCK?

Aaron Sloman

School of Computer Science,

The University of Birmingham

Birmingham B15 2TT

England, UK

[email protected]

Abstract

This paper aims to replace deep sounding unanswerable, time-wasting pseudo-questions which are often posed in the context of attacking some version of the strong AI thesis, with deep, discovery-driving, real questions about the nature and content of internal states of intelligent agents of various kinds. In particular the question `What is it like to be an X?' is often thought to identify a type of phenomenon for which no physical conditions can be sufficient, and which cannot be replicated in computer-based agents. This paper tries to separate out (a) aspects of the question that are important and provide part of the objective characterisation of the states, or capabilities of an agent, and which help to define the ontology that is to be implemented in modelling such an agent, from (:D aspects that are incoherent.

The paper supports a philosophical position that is anti-reductionist without being dualist or mystical.

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In the most absolute sense of things the only thing we can be sure is our own conscious mind, everything else is secondary; ie. filtered through the senses. Schopenhauer talks about how our own personel universe is made up of Will & Representation, ie. that that comes through our senses to mind, whether via emotions, body or perception, it is the input. Will is our ability to define how we process this information and react to it.

We know from experience how to change the input to our senses by acting in certain ways, and we do this by using a working model of what is percieved, which we call reality. The Objective Reality from which these perceptions come can never be known asbolutely, as to do this you must percieve from that view point. As such our 'selves' do not even include our own body beyond the fact that it obey the rules of the model. If we stab a knife in our chest - we assume we die. We can not technically know this, but it is because of this very fact that it suits us a working model for LIFE; it is this unknown, and the possibility that it might be unknowable that prerequisites a changing model, life.

Am I being nihilist? Not exactly; science is a working model - adapting to suit new data. Life is a working model - adapting to suit new experience. As soon as you tie either down to 'absolutes' they become dogmatic, increasingly fail to lie closer to the reality we will ever try get close to.

So try to experience as much as you can, and work it into an ordered framework with aims for a place and a time. Such is life; Such is capitalism.

The closest thing we have to experience, from which we can create the greatest working model is our body - get to know it and understand its relation to your mind and you will want to preserve it. Reason starts here :D!

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To summarize Charles:

Because we have a MEANS of perceiving reality, we can never truly 'know' reality 'as it is'. Of course this means the only way, in the 'absolute sense', to 'know' something is to have NO means of perception. Only THEN would something 'truly' be 'knowable'.

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It is perfectly possible to grasp any and every fact of reality on the conceptual level. What you're asking for is to grasp it on the sense-perceptual level, knowing full well that your sense-perceptual apparatus isn't equipped for the job.

V,

I suggest that you read Nagel's Essay. His point is that, when the topic of discussion is phenomenology, i.e. "what it's like to be X", then the subjective nature of the experience is relevant, and our language itself is ill-equipped to express anything about it in a fundamentally objective manner. I.e., the physicalist account of the mind, at least at this point in the history of philosophy, is quite lacking, even if it is in fact true.

For example, take "what it's like to be angry." I think it's safe to say that, at some point in all of our lives, we've been angry. Thus, if someone says, "I'm angry!", you know what he means. You can grasp the concept (virtually) perfectly. Sure, his anger might differ from yours in some ways, but it's safe to assume that your anger and his are pretty similar, since you're the same sort of being. You are thus able to discuss and describe the experience.

But imagine meeting an alien species that has no concept of anger. They don't experience it, period. They lack the internal neurological hardware that allows us to have such an experience. If you were to say to him, "I'm angry!" he simply wouldn't be able to fully understand. He could grasp that anger inspires a person to violence, and he could understand that it stems from being wronged in some way, and he could understand that the blood pressure and whatnot change...

But anyone who's ever been angry knows that there's a big difference between "rising blood pressure and a tendency towards violence as a result of being wronged" and the actual experience of being angry.

Nagel's point is that, when we're talking about experience itself, the subjective first-person nature of the experience is fundametnally important.

Isaac

http://isaac.beigetower.org

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"it is impossible to truly have a grasp of a concept that cannot in any way shape or form be reduced to perceptual reality."

Hmm - I thought that was exactly what man did - grasp the concept, say of a bat's sonar, by reducing it to perceptual reality - ie putting it into a form which the five human senses can perceive.

I cannot think of anything which "cannot in any way shape or form be reduced to perceptual reality."

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Stephen, I disagree.

There is a "something it's like to be a bat", and it's very much "out there."  The bat exists.  The bat is experiencing. 

The bat functions on the perceptual level, and in that sense one can say that the bat "experiences" reality. But the bat does not know "what it is like to be a bat." There is no "experience out there" which we can somehow pluck off an experience tree.

"what it's like to be a bat" is every bit as real as "the way that red looks."

First, "real" and "out there" are two different statements. Mental existents are quite real, but they are certainly not "out there."

Second, "the way that red looks" is also real, but it too is not "out there." Color perception is the form in which we experience some aspect of external reality, namely a complex combination of wavelengths of light. The color red is not "out there."

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Because we have a MEANS of perceiving reality, we can never truly 'know' reality 'as it is'.

Im just saying everyones perception of reality is tainted, BUT it is still better to be flexible and adapt in the face of experience rather than keep a rigid world view. The latter makes the mistake of assuming we can get it absolutely right.

We do this by refining our interpretation of sensory data; i.e. updating the model.

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Im just saying everyones perception of reality is tainted, ...

Then RadCap's comment was appropriate in that you are saying, in effect, that our means of perceiving -- our senses -- stand in the way of some sort of direct contact with reality. I see from an earlier post that you express this explictly when you say that everything but your own mind is "filtered through our senses."

BUT it is still better to be flexible and adapt in the face of experience rather than keep a rigid world view. The latter makes the mistake of assuming we can get it absolutely right.

But our senses unerringly report the evidence of reality; how could it be otherwise? It is the inferences we draw from that evidence that are subject to error, but not the evidence itself.

Even so, why would the fact that we are not omniscient mean that we could not get things "absolutely right?" Is there really nothing that you know which is "absolutely right?"

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But our senses unerringly report the evidence of reality; how could it be otherwise? It is the inferences we draw from that evidence that are subject to error, but not the evidence itself.
I agree with that, Stephen. Not that it's valid (and I'll show why) but I'd like to bring up the most common objection to that statement before someone else does.

When I take off my glasses, my eyes do a whole lot of erring. Things move oddly when I turn my head, straight lines bend a little, and everything that's not 6" in front of my nose is badly out of focus.

Clearly, when Stephen says "our senses," he's talking about normal human senses, not damaged or altered vision. Therefore, any discussion of myopic eyes is a non sequitur.

Also, it should be noted that ANY form of observation has limits. There is no such thing as an "infinite eye" that can detect all light without any limits. Everything that exists has identity.

The point is, the information that we gain from our senses is accurate to within an acceptable margin of error. And, that margin of error is generally much smaller than it really needs to be. And look at the machines that we've built to see for us! Some of them can detect differences smaller than a human eye can, between wavelenghts that we can't even see. Until someone invents the infinite eye, however, there will always be limits to what any device or organ is capable of.

Isaac

http://isaac.beigetower.org

[Added:]

Also, in cases where our eyes misbehave, it is important to note that our conscious minds can correct some of the errors. For example, if my glasses fall off, I don't conclude that the world has gone fuzzy. Instead, I can explain why my vision is untrustworthy, and can seek to use what information I AM getting to return my glasses to my face.

I doubt that any skeptics would really live according to the grim view of man's abilities of sense and cognition. The thought of a responsible adult so utterly helpless makes me a tad ill.

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When I take off my glasses, my eyes do a whole lot of erring. Things move oddly when I turn my head, straight lines bend a little, and everything that's not 6" in front of my nose is badly out of focus.

This is not your eyes erring... every bit of information your eyes send your brain is correct, you merely get less of it, have to use more care in analysing it, or get glasses to correct it.

There is no margin of error for your senses, only in your interpretation thereof.

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When I take off my glasses, my eyes do a whole lot of erring.  Things move oddly when I turn my head, straight lines bend a little, and everything that's not 6" in front of my nose is badly out of focus.

But straight lines "bend a little" when a normal-visioned person looks at a straight stick placed in water. Just as we learn that the stick is not really bent, but rather the light refracts as it passes from a less dense to a more dense medium, so corrective glasses are fit to your eyes to account for what else you learn through other means. Nevertheless, your unaided vision provides evidence of reality just like someone else's 'normal' vision does. The perception is an interaction between the external world and the perceptual hardware that you have. There is no distortion of reality; the sense organ does what it does, and reality remains what it is.

The point is, the information that we gain from our senses is accurate to within an acceptable margin of error.

No! The point is ... the senses are accurate. Period. There is no "margin of error."

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When a stick is placed in water and appears bent, your eyes are accurately reporting the facts of what the light is doing.

When I take off my glasses, and my astigmatism kicks in, and straight lines appear bent, the effect is due to the fact that my eyes are messed up. My retinae are accurately reporting the light that hits them. But eyes are more than retinae. And my eyes are correctibly defective.

The point is, even with this defect, I'm able to easily determine what is a property of reality and what is a result of defective eyes. I'm trying to point out that this is not an objection to Stephen's statement that senses are trustworthy. However, sensory organs, like everything else in reality, have limits.

If you put two very thin lines very close to one another, and have a human look at them from across the room, he's not going to be able to tell that there's two lines. He'll just see one. If he gets much closer, then he'll be able to tell that there's two lines. There is a limit to the degree to which we can discern features of reality with our eyes.

Perhaps calling this a "margin of error" is misleading. Really, it's simply a limit to the capability of human vision. But our senses do not have to be infinitely capable of discerning everything in order to be trustworthy. That would be the Kantian argument. "Our eyes have limits. Therefore, we're not seeing reality, but just reality 'filtered' through our senses." It's an invalid argument, because it demands infinite precision and accuracy in order to grant trustworthiness. And that's ridiculous.

Isaac

http://isaac.beigetower.org

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Richard,

That's a great way to put it.

Somewhat by definition, our senses are infallible. It doesn't make sense to say that my car is "fallible" if it won't start - that's a categorical fallacy. The proper term is "broken" or "defective," not "fallible."

Isaac

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"I cannot know what it is like to be a bat. However, there is an experience out there we can call "what it's like to be a bat." I know that that experience is an objective part of reality, it exists. However, I can never know that experience itself. My capacity to know has that limit."

Do people agree with those statements?

Absolutely not. What he is describing is not an "objective part of reality," but by definition a "subjective" experience! If my goal is to know objective reality, then what bearing does my inability to experience the world from a bat's (or another human beings, for that matter!) perspective have on that goal? None whatsoever.

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Reason's Ember, that question has been abused to the extreme by philosophers. It has led to a number of nasty and philosophically-loaded terms like "phenomenology," "qualia," "what it is like to be like," etc. It has its roots in Kant's noumenal/phenomenal distinction and it attempts to invalidate all forms of consciousness.

Ayn Rand writes:

Awareness is awareness of something. A content-less state of consciousness is a contradiction in terms.
What is the question, "what is it like to be a bat?" asking us to be aware of? An impossibility; a contentless state of consciousness. Awareness is a causal relationship between some fact of reality and a mind (sense organs to be exact). There can be no causal interaction between two forms of perception. This does not negate our ability to know that bats have a form of awareness.

More importantly, this does not mean that some things in reality are inherently unknowable. On the contrary, to even speak of such a thing a contradiction (to speak of them you must at least first know of them).

In one sense (the most important one), you can know what it's like to be a bat. If you live in an area where they are flying about (mid/late evening), you can go outside and watch them dive for insects. If you see the insects as the bats are locating them for food, you know what it is like to be a bat, i.e., you both have awareness of the same aspect of reality (just in different forms). That is all that you can validly ask in comparing your awareness to a bat's. Of course, philosophers aren't interested in affirmations of the efficacy of mans's mind so they will deny that what I have said is a respone to their "question."

If you would like to learn more about Objectivism's validation of the forms of awareness, I highly recommend reading (or re-reading) Chapter 2 of OPAR.

AshRyan, I knew what you meant but strictly speaking, a bat's awareness is neither "subjective" nor "objective." Those terms are only applicable to a volitional consciousness. Think of a bat's awareness as the metaphysically-given.

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