Is Reality a concept?

[Maarten]

I've been giving some thought about this question. I haven't gone back to my books yet to check what Miss Rand had to say about this, because I like to figure some things out on my own once in a while

Anyway, the way I see it is this: A concept is formed in two steps, one step where you differentiate certain concretes from other concretes, and then you integrate it into one new mental unit. I just don't see how the differentiation step can happen with Reality. I mean, you can point to what concretes it subsumes (everything which exists), but I have absolutely no clue how you can differentiate something that subsumes everything which exists from other things. I mean, it already covers everything! There is no way to perform the first concept-forming step, because you can't exactly compare an existent with a non-existent.

It's not like when you originally form the concept of horse you use something that does not exist as a means of figuring out that a horse is different. To be different is to be different from something, and something that does not exist is a nothing.

The best way I see to describe reality is to say it's something like a proper name. Similarly as to how 'Maarten' refers to me and all my attributes we could say that Reality is like a proper name and refers to all that exists. Does that make sense?

[ggdwill]

Why can't you differentiate an existent from a non-existent? You could say that the property of existents (or all existents in this case) that differentiates it from non-existents is that existents possess properties whereas as non-existents do not. Of course, while the "property" of not possessing any properties does not actually exist, it can serve as an abstract foil by which to perform the task of creating the concept "reality".

Another technique to consider is that reality is constantly changing. What constitutes reality *now* may not be reality *now*. In that two second interval perhaps a bug died or a piece of an ice berg broke away. While certainly you wouldn't include these details in an integrated, definitive concept of reality, they were part of it's identity and now they are not. The fact that you can remember how reality was (a non-existent) and also observe how reality now is (an existent) is another way to form the concept.

- Grant

[Maarten]

I don't think that is correct. Something that happened is still a fact. It doesn't just blink out of existence all of a sudden.

As far as I can tell it's not possible to form a concept by distinguishing something from nothing; you have to distinguish one something from another something. It doesn't help you very much, cognitively speaking, to talk about something in terms of what it is not.

I think it would create conceptual chaos if you were to go about thinking of horses as non-bears, and non-cats, and non-cows instead of thinking about what a horse actually is.

[ian]

You're right, there are no nothings to differentiate from, if there were, they would be somethings. But using language we can *refer* to things that are non-reality, we can speak of unicorns, gnomes, pure nothingness etc. And that gives us something to differentiate from. I guess the only way to see axiomatic concepts (which are omnipresent) is to imagine an alternative.

[ggdwill]

I don't think that is correct. Something that happened is still a fact. It doesn't just blink out of existence all of a sudden.

Certainly the past is objective and can be logically inferred. However, in a physical sense, it doesn't exist. Since the definition of "reality" is that which exists, you cannot include past events in a description of it. Reality is not a sum total of every previous arrangement of all that exists stretching infinitely into the past. The Civil War is certainly an indisputable fact of history, but it is no longer properly thought of as part of reality that can be brought back to life by taking it out of some cosmic filing cabinet. Metaphysically, history certainly affects the current conditions of existence but physically speaking it is irrelevant in a proper definition of reality since that which exists would not include that which existed.

- Grant

Edited September 3, 2006 by ggdwill

[DavidOdden]

In looking at a bunch of stuff, you have to be able to tell that two things are actually different and not just the same thing. I can do that in a room full of clocks, dogs and oranges -- I can tell that this clock is different from that clock, and this dog is different from that orange. So if I can distinguish various units, then I can mentally integrate them into a single concept. It's not that I have to first distinguish "these things which are examples of reality" from "those things that are examples of non-reality", I just need to be able to tell that they are different units.

(Also, w.r.t. Ian's point, gnomes and unicorns are part of reality: however, they are purely mental existents, and don't correspond to tangible mass-bearing objects).

[Maarten]

In looking at a bunch of stuff, you have to be able to tell that two things are actually different and not just the same thing. I can do that in a room full of clocks, dogs and oranges -- I can tell that this clock is different from that clock, and this dog is different from that orange. So if I can distinguish various units, then I can mentally integrate them into a single concept. It's not that I have to first distinguish "these things which are examples of reality" from "those things that are examples of non-reality", I just need to be able to tell that they are different units.

(Also, w.r.t. Ian's point, gnomes and unicorns are part of reality: however, they are purely mental existents, and don't correspond to tangible mass-bearing objects).

Well, but in your example you have units that fall outside of the boundary of the concept. You can form the concept of clock because there's things other than clocks there that make the clocks stand out. If all that existed were clocks you wouldn't really be able to make a seperate concept out of them (there would be no need to either).

With Reality you don't have anything outside of the units the concept subsumes, so what can you use to see the difference between the units in this concept and the concretes not in this concept?

If we are talking about the concept of Nut in a situation where only one species of nut existed, imagining a different kind of nut would not be a valid way of forming the concept (I mean in terms of the differntiating step, anyway). You'd be able to differentiate it from other things, though. But that is impossible here, because there are no other things...

Edited September 3, 2006 by Maarten

[DavidOdden]

Well, but in your example you have units that fall outside of the boundary of the concept. You can form the concept of clock because there's things other than clocks there that make the clocks stand out. If all that existed were clocks you wouldn't really be able to make a seperate concept out of them (there would be no need to either).

Actually, if all that existed were clocks, there would be no concepts because clocks aren't conceptual beings. Let's suppose bizarely that there is nothing in the universe except people (and that people are structurally like ball bearings): no planets, cats or clocks; but furthermore, there a number of people. I could still differentiate myself from you and from I could differentiate you from Darius, and so on. I could then form a concept which unites these units, although whether we call that concept "people" or "reality" is kind of beside the point. But if there is only one of some thing, like "Maarten Buitendijk", there can be no concept "Maarten Buitendijk": I don't have two differentiatable units that can be subsumed under an abstraction.

I think this is the essence of the concept "concept": the cognitive economy of integrating units as one mental thing. In order to have multiple units, you have to be able to distinguish this unit (which is an instance of the concept X) from that unit (which is also an instance of the concept X). If you want to distinguish all of the Xs from all of the Ys and the Zs, and subsume those concepts under a higher order concept, you might. But since reality is primary, of course there can be no higher concept that subsumes reality and non-reality. The relevance of differentiation, I'm saying, is that the concept must subsume different units -- not just one unit, but more than one where measurement can be omitted.

[Ifat Glassman]

I've been giving some thought about this question. I haven't gone back to my books yet to check what Miss Rand had to say about this, because I like to figure some things out on my own once in a while

Anyway, the way I see it is this: A concept is formed in two steps, one step where you differentiate certain concretes from other concretes, and then you integrate it into one new mental unit. I just don't see how the differentiation step can happen with Reality. I mean, you can point to what concretes it subsumes (everything which exists), but I have absolutely no clue how you can differentiate something that subsumes everything which exists from other things. I mean, it already covers everything! There is no way to perform the first concept-forming step, because you can't exactly compare an existent with a non-existent.

Hi Maarten. You are going to find it very funny, that I am going to answer your question by using OPAR...

Axiomatic concepts are unique in the way one forms their definition. They are not formed in the way other concepts are formed (by differentiation), and the only way to define them, and emotions, is ostensively.

One perceives that something exists, even without perceiving that there is an option for something not to exist. Any consciousness that receives data from the senses perceives that something exists.

You perceive that they exist, and you point to them and name them.

Once I have the book next to me I'll give another post with quotes and the exact pages (or you can look for "definition" in the index in the end of the book).

[Time_Maker]

Hi Maarten. You are going to find it very funny, that I am going to answer your question by using OPAR...

Axiomatic concepts are unique in the way one forms their definition. They are not formed in the way other concepts are formed (by differentiation), and the only way to define them, and emotions, is ostensively.

One perceives that something exists, even without perceiving that there is an option for something not to exist. Any consciousness that receives data from the senses perceives that something exists.

You perceive that they exist, and you point to them and name them.

Once I have the book next to me I'll give another post with quotes and the exact pages (or you can look for "definition" in the index in the end of the book).

Can we sum up this quote as being "reality is not a concept"?

[ian]

(Also, w.r.t. Ian's point, gnomes and unicorns are part of reality: however, they are purely mental existents, and don't correspond to tangible mass-bearing objects).

But if you just *refer* to something without picturing it, then it remains non-existent, non-real. In this way we can differentiate reality from nothingness. Language gives us that ability, which is why rationalism is so dangerous.

Edited September 3, 2006 by ian

[DavidOdden]

But if you just *refer* to something without picturing it, then it remains non-existent, non-real. In this way we can differentiate reality from nothingness. Language gives us that ability, which is why rationalism is so dangerous.

Well, I can speak of a clock or refer to a clock without there being a clock anywhere near me or without conjuring up a picture of one, and yet I would not be speaking of something unreal. The crucial thing is that you can mentally picture a gnome or a unicorn so there is a referent, even if at a particular moment when you talk about them you aren't actually picturing them. Whereas, it is not possible to mentally picture nonexistence (and of course you also can't point to it as you can with a clock).

[ian]

Well, I can speak of a clock or refer to a clock without there being a clock anywhere near me or without conjuring up a picture of one, and yet I would not be speaking of something unreal. The crucial thing is that you can mentally picture a gnome or a unicorn so there is a referent, even if at a particular moment when you talk about them you aren't actually picturing them. Whereas, it is not possible to mentally picture nonexistence (and of course you also can't point to it as you can with a clock).

I think we are taking two slightly different perspectives on the same fact. I am talking reality vs. unreality, so words such as "Titanian" (an inhabitant of Saturn's moon Titan) is an example of unreality. Whereas you are talking existence vs non-existence, so pure 0 is the only thing you will consider. But I would say that the Titanian, until you picture him, is in fact both unreality and non-existence. If you think he is not non-existence, because he can potentially be imagined, I would say that is confusing the potential with the actual.

[Ifat Glassman]

Well, I can speak of a clock or refer to a clock without there being a clock anywhere near me or without conjuring up a picture of one, and yet I would not be speaking of something unreal. The crucial thing is that you can mentally picture a gnome or a unicorn so there is a referent, even if at a particular moment when you talk about them you aren't actually picturing them. Whereas, it is not possible to mentally picture nonexistence (and of course you also can't point to it as you can with a clock).

How can a "gnome" be a concept in the first place? According to Leonard Peikoff every concept formation involves perceiving something in reality first.

In fact, how can everything that was invented by man be a concept, since before it was invented, it was impossible to observe it in the world?

[Olex]

According to Leonard Peikoff every concept formation involves perceiving something in reality first.

That is incorrect. Peikoff stated that a human mind must start from percepts, and then move on to build larger and more complex concepts. This does not mean that all concepts must be perceived in reality first.

[Olex]

Is Reality a concept?

Yes, but your approach misses an important point. Here is a quote from OPAR that should guide you. From OPAR, Chapter 3, pg. 96, openning paragraph of "Definition as the Final Step in Concept-Formation":

The final step in concept-formation is definition. This step is essential to every concept except axiomatic concepts and concepts denoting sensations.

[Maarten]

Yes, but your approach misses an important point. Here is a quote from OPAR that should guide you. From OPAR, Chapter 3, pg. 96, openning paragraph of "Definition as the Final Step in Concept-Formation":

It says that the final step (definition) does not apply for axiomatic concepts, but that implies that the first two (differentiation and integration) do apply, doesn't it? It's mainly for the differentiation part that I do not see how Reality can undergo this process, so to speak.

[IAmMetaphysical]

Since "reality" is a higher level concept that rests on lower level concepts, its relation to perception is less aparent and less dependant. Reality is a concept which is abstracted from other concepts, so: the CONCEPTS have to exist, not the actual "non entities"that the concepts refer to. When you arrive at the concept of "reality" you are differentiating reality from the "unreal" or that which does not actually exist, e.g. "gnomes" "gods" "unicorns" etc. You are integrating both all those things that don't exist and labeling them as a whole "the unreal", and all those things that actually do exist and labeling them as a whole "reality."

Edited September 3, 2006 by IAmMetaphysical

[DavidOdden]

It says that the final step (definition) does not apply for axiomatic concepts, but that implies that the first two (differentiation and integration) do apply, doesn't it? It's mainly for the differentiation part that I do not see how Reality can undergo this process, so to speak.

Why do you think that it must be necessary to differentiate all units subsumed by a concept from some other units? Does that follow from the nature of concepts? Even using a close reading of ITOE, I don't see any such requirement. Can you explain?

[Maarten]

I finally looked it up and you guys are right. It seems I was mistaken about that part.. Miss Rand just observes there that you need to see differences between the different concretes before you can integrate them, so what you say should work. I think we resolved the seeming contradiction

[Ifat Glassman]

That is incorrect. Peikoff stated that a human mind must start from percepts, and then move on to build larger and more complex concepts. This does not mean that all concepts must be perceived in reality first.

The perceptual level of consciousness is automatically related to reality: a sense perception is a direct awareness of a concrete existent.

Page, 96, OPAR

Percept relates to "perceptual".

Anyone else mind explaining how this is resolved?

Edited September 4, 2006 by ifatart

[Ifat Glassman]

Need to add something important:

This is the key, the entrance to the conceptual level of man's consciousness. The ability to regard entities as units is man's distinctive method of cognition

OPAR page 75

But this is what I base my question on:

We begin the formation of a concept by isolating a group of concretes. We do this on the basis of observed similarities that distinguish these concretes from the rest of our perceptual field.

OPAR, page 77 (bold emphasis is mine).

"A concept" means every concept (even though later on concepts of reality and sensations are stated to be essentially different from this, but I saw no mention for other types of concepts). And since we have to form it [a concept] based on perceptual data, then that dis-includes things that were invented and were not "perceived" since "perception" can only relate to something that already exists. Am I missing something?

[IAmMetaphysical]

The basis of conceptual chains must be based in percepts but every link not need be. For example: we can see horse, we can see horns, we can imagine a horse with a horn on its head. Those imaginary creatures are "unicorns".

[Ifat Glassman]

The basis of conceptual chains must be based in percepts but every link not need be. For example: we can see horse, we can see horns, we can imagine a horse with a horn on its head. Those imaginary creatures are "unicorns".

Where is that stated in OPAR?

[IAmMetaphysical]

I'm not sure if it is. I wasn't trying to speak for Peikoff. I was relaying my understanding of Objectivist epistemology.