Is Reality a concept?

[DavidOdden]

You do not perceive concepts in reality, ever: you perceive concretes, and grasp that they are units to be subsumed under one concept. You always have to perceive any concretes which are the basis of a higher-order abstract concept, i.e. unicorns don't come from nothing. You may, for example, perceive a drawing of a unicorn or a plastic statue, which is the perceptual basis -- or, it could be a verbal description. The refined and final concept "unicorn" is thus based on these concretes, but it depends on numerous concepts in order to correctly define the concept (for example, a unicorn isn't the various verbal descriptions of the appearance of a unicorn, it is anything that would have that appearance, so you have to understand various concepts of "description" and "representation" to get from a description of a unicorn to the concept "unicorn"). You have a concept "hundred", but you have no direct perceptual experience of "hundred" (that's beyond what you can actually perceive -- you simply perceive "a whole lot" and then you have to count them in smaller batches in order to "see" that there are 100 pennies). This is because you can abstract build "hundred" from what you can perceive (10, for example) plus the recursive concept of addition.

[IAmMetaphysical]

Is the above directed at me? Because I did not ever say that you can percieve concepts, and note that I said "you can IMAGINE a horse with a horn on its head."

[DavidOdden]

Is the above directed at me?

Sorry, the quote got deleted: that was regarding the last sentence of Olex's #15, and the subsequent "based on" discussion.

[Olex]

"A concept" means every concept (even though later on concepts of reality and sensations are stated to be essentially different from this, but I saw no mention for other types of concepts).

What do you mean by essentially different? Peikoff states that those are different in the way how they are defined. They are still concepts.

And since we have to form it [a concept]based on perceptual data, then that dis-includes things that were invented and were not "perceived" since "perception" can only relate to something that already exists. Am I missing something?

I don't see how invention breaks anything.

Invention is in the field of man-made. Let's say we have an object that helps a man perform a certain action better. This means an inventor already had a given action in mind as a concept, and simply created something that improved man's ability to perform that action. Thus, he understood what he was working on. There is no break between concepts and reality here.

[Ifat Glassman]

You do not perceive concepts in reality, ever: you perceive concretes, and grasp that they are units to be subsumed under one concept.

Concepts are an abstraction, so I agree that they are not perceived in reality.

You always have to perceive any concretes which are the basis of a higher-order abstract concept, i.e. unicorns don't come from nothing.

I never said that the pieces of what creates a unicorn didn't come from reality, but that a unicorn, as a whole, as one entity, as one concrete, was not observed in reality when a person first thought of it.

You may, for example, perceive a drawing of a unicorn or a plastic statue, which is the perceptual basis -- or, it could be a verbal description. The refined and final concept "unicorn" is thus based on these concretes, but it depends on numerous concepts in order to correctly define the concept (for example, a unicorn isn't the various verbal descriptions of the appearance of a unicorn, it is anything that would have that appearance, so you have to understand various concepts of "description" and "representation" to get from a description of a unicorn to the concept "unicorn").

I was talking about the first person who invented "unicorn".

As for using other concepts to build another concept - that goes without saying. No need to point it out.

To bring some order into this, allow me to ask some leading questions:

1) Do you think that all concepts have to be formed by first perceiving concretes, when "perceiving" means getting external data from the senses?

2) Do you agree that a concrete is a whole entity, and not an entity that is a mixture of other concretes that are perceived separately (separate concretes)?

If the answer to both is yes, then:

3) Do you agree that a unicorn did not exist as a whole concrete before someone first invented it (by drawing a sketch, describing it's appearance, creating a statue etc')?

If you agree to #3 then that contradicts #1, since this would be a concept that was formed in a different way than #1 describes. It was invented by putting together several different concretes, and not perceiving many concretes of the same "type" (with similar characteristics).

All I want to find out here, is whether or not Peikoff does not mention how ALL concepts are formed, but just how SOME of them are formed?

Hope I am more clear now. If not, please ask questions so I can clarify further.

[DavidOdden]

1) Do you think that all concepts have to be formed by first perceiving concretes, when "perceiving" means getting external data from the senses?

If you mean "the concretes which the concept subsumes", then no. High-order concepts of mathematical method are not typically perceived that way.

2) Do you agree that a concrete is a whole entity, and not an entity that is a mixture of other concretes that are perceived separately (separate concretes)?

No. Many concretes are made up of individually perceivable concretes. A bowl full of nuts and bolts would be an example.

All I want to find out here, is whether or not Peikoff does not mention how ALL concepts are formed, but just how SOME of them are formed?

The later, I think; that is, the "basic ideas" are all there, but there are specific refinements that are not explained in full detail, such as the nature of definition, or higher-order concepts of method as are essential to mathematics (for example, how those methods give rise to the concept of an "irrational" number).

[Ifat Glassman]

Many concretes are made up of individually perceivable concretes. A bowl full of nuts and bolts would be an example.

Yeah, you are right: I didn't phrase my question well. I meant that a concrete that would be composed of several other concretes that are perceived at different times/places, in the way that all the pieces that compose a unicorn are perceived in different places/times (the body is taken from a horse, the horn is taken from some other animal, and then changed to a white color, and other magical powers are added from some legends...).

The later, I think; that is, the "basic ideas" are all there, but there are specific refinements that are not explained in full detail, such as the nature of definition

What about the nature of definitions is missing in your view?

[DavidOdden]

What about the nature of definitions is missing in your view?

The nature and importance of ostensive definition, for one, since they play an essential role in forming many lower level concepts. Part of the problem is, of course, that investigation of the nature of ostensive defintions cannot be very thorough if done philosophically as opposed to being done as a scientific study. Unfortunately, the standard example of distinguishing "man" from "animal" does not easily extend to other cases of differentiation, thus the problem of defining "dog" as opposed to "wolf", and deciding whether "dingo" is included in the concept "dog". In fact, most people either just live with an ostensive definition of "dog", or they evade the issue by learning a Latin term without coming to grips with the definition of the Latin.

Another issue which is not developed extensively is sameness of concepts. This relates to the ostensive definition problem in that A may include certain concretes from a concept, but may discover that B excludes those concretes. Does that mean A is in error or that B is in error: or, that they simply have distinct concepts (with their distinct definitions) attached to the same word? This topic essentially remains unexplored.

[Ifat Glassman]

The nature and importance of ostensive definition, for one, since they play an essential role in forming many lower level concepts. Part of the problem is, of course, that investigation of the nature of ostensive definitions cannot be very thorough if done philosophically as opposed to being done as a scientific study. Unfortunately, the standard example of distinguishing "man" from "animal" does not easily extend to other cases of differentiation, thus the problem of defining "dog" as opposed to "wolf", and deciding whether "dingo" is included in the concept "dog".

Would you consider the definition of a dog to be ostensive?

If "ostensive" includes pointing out to abstractions as well (mental symbols), then all definitions are created ostensively. If it only includes pointing out to some concrete, then an ostensive definition would be pointing out to a certain location on the street and saying to my friend: "meeting place", Or pointing out to a certain puppy and saying "lucky". However, those two examples seem to me more like naming than defining, because they don't include a genus, or unite several concretes.

You also raised an interesting question about the difficulty of trying to classify "dingo" as a wolf or a dog, based on common definitions (instead of scientific definitions that include more detailed characteristics of a dog and a wolf). This also relates to your next statement:

Another issue which is not developed extensively is sameness of concepts. This relates to the ostensive definition problem in that A may include certain concretes from a concept, but may discover that B excludes those concretes. Does that mean A is in error or that B is in error: or, that they simply have distinct concepts (with their distinct definitions) attached to the same word? This topic essentially remains unexplored.

I would appreciate an example of this A and B business. Not sure if I understood what you're trying to say... Did you mean that both A and B are (supposedly) definitions of the same concept?

If so then this would be the same problem when considering the common definition of a dog, and a scientific definition of a dog. If definitions are statements of truth, which definition is right and which one is wrong?

I have a long answer for this, but I'll wait for your reply first. (I think they are distinct concepts with the same name, for starters)

[DavidOdden]

Would you consider the definition of a dog to be ostensive?

Usually. I don't know how to form an accurate formal definition of "dog", and I think most people are in the same boat. Most if not all definitions start out as ostensive ones. You may procede to a formal definition, for example defining man as "rational animal" or "bicycle" as "two-wheeled vehicle powered by pushing down on a pedal with the legs", but that step is often not taken, and also may often not be adequate for a concept.

The other point, though, is that the actual content of an ostensive definition is (scientifically) not understood. Thus an ostensive definition of "dog" isn't just the act of pointing to a half dozen dogs and saying "like that", it is something else -- having one entails the ability to point to a dog and say "That's a dog" (or "That's not a dog, it's a wolf").

The A and B business is about different people (Smith and Jones, or whoever you want to be talking about). An example of that is the concept "crow", which can enter into statements like "all crows are black". There is a concept "crow" which does indeed only refer to an all-black bird (corvus caurinus), which was in fact the only kind of crow that I was aware of existing for many years (in North America). There is another concept "crow" which includes the species corvus albus, which is black and white. When a person learns about this new species, does that contradict their previous concept, or does it expand their concept -- by creating a new concept that includes the broader category of crows? My previous concept remans valid, but it turns out that it was misnamed. I later learned that my concept of "crow" actually refers to what's known by ornithologists as the "Northwestern Crow". So my concept "crow" was different from Ahmad's concept, because I thought crows were all black and he thought they were black-and-white.

[Olex]

When a person learns about this new species, does that contradict their previous concept, or does it expand their concept -- by creating a new concept that includes the broader category of crows?

These questions are answered in OPAR and Objectivist articles that discuss concept-formation.

The short answer is 'It does not contradict, it extends'.

[DavidOdden]

The short answer is 'It does not contradict, it extends'.

If you don't believe in the primacy of words (I don't), then gaining new knowledge about these bird species results in the creation of a new concept (via differentiation), and in this case a realignment of the relationship between word and concept, so that "crow" is now assigned to the broader category. The consequence of this is that concepts held by different people may be merely similar, not the same.

[Ifat Glassman]

a realignment of the relationship between word and concept

If definitions are statements of truth - how can they be "realigned"? How it is true to use the same word for a modified concept? How is it true at all to use a word to denote a concept in the first place?

What is a statement of truth, and how is a definition a statement of truth?

I think I'm going to start a new thread about definitions (Or look for an existing one).

[DavidOdden]

If definitions are statements of truth - how can they be "realigned"?

I wouldn't know: I said that the relationship between the concept and the word is realigned, which has little to do with definitions. I think it would help to understand the relationship between various ideas, for example, what "truth" is, how it relates to "fact"; what things are true, etc.

[y_feldblum]

Anyway, the way I see it is this: A concept is formed in two steps, one step where you differentiate certain concretes from other concretes, and then you integrate it into one new mental unit. I just don't see how the differentiation step can happen with Reality.

There is also the method of forming new, broader concepts from prior concepts - in this case, forming the concept reality from all the other concepts you know.

Reality as a concept is not self-evident. This exists is. There is a vast difference between the two.

[Shading Inc.]

Anyway, the way I see it is this: A concept is formed in two steps, one step where you differentiate certain concretes from other concretes, and then you integrate it into one new mental unit. I just don't see how the differentiation step can happen with Reality. I mean, you can point to what concretes it subsumes (everything which exists), but I have absolutely no clue how you can differentiate something that subsumes everything which exists from other things. I mean, it already covers everything! There is no way to perform the first concept-forming step, because you can't exactly compare an existent with a non-existent.

It's not like when you originally form the concept of horse you use something that does not exist as a means of figuring out that a horse is different. To be different is to be different from something, and something that does not exist is a nothing.

The best way I see to describe reality is to say it's something like a proper name. Similarly as to how 'Maarten' refers to me and all my attributes we could say that Reality is like a proper name and refers to all that exists. Does that make sense?

Makes a lot of sense. I don't really see the problem, actually. Isn't 'reality' the crystal clear example of a concept? Why can't we differentiate reality from non-reality? Isn't that roughly the same as taking 'reality' as being the common denominator for all things that are?

On a side note: Isn't concept a very platonic concept?

Or perhaps I should ask what exactly you take 'concept' to mean.

Jan.

Edited October 13, 2006 by Shading Inc.