Is there ever a case where we should help another

[marotta]

I know that we are free to help others if we desire because of our values.

Is there ever a case where we *should* (moral ought, not legal must) help

another person regardless of the benefit to ourselves.

As an example, if a situation presents itself such that we (and we alone) can

make a huge impact on someone's life someone through a small cost or

inconvience to ourselves. Is there a moral *ought* that says we should

help them or just a premissive may if we want to.

Thanks!

[JRoberts]

There is no moral "ought" to help another person, period. If you desire to help that person then you are free to do so.

[stephen_speicher]

I know that we are free to help others if we desire because of our values. Is there ever a case where we *should* (moral ought, not legal must) help another person regardless of the benefit to ourselves.

Well, sure. If you saw a stranger drowning, and from the vantage point of complete safety you could save his life by throwing him a preserver, it would be immoral to arbitrarily not do so. Life has an inherent value. But, fortunately, we do not build our morality on cases such as these.

[Richard_Halley]

Life has an inherent value.

This is a misleading way to put it...

Rather, I would say that one would be immoral if life did not have some value to him. Therefore, it would be immoral for him to leave the drowing stranger so long as the cost is less than the value.

Is there ever a case where we *should* (moral ought, not legal must) help

another person regardless of the benefit to ourselves.

There is never a moral anything regardless of the benefit (or cost) to ourselves.

[stephen_speicher]

This is a misleading way to put it...

Knowing nothing at all about a stranger, what is "misleading" about assuming human life has an inherent value?

Rather, I would say that one would be immoral if life did not have some value to him.  Therefore, it would be immoral for him to leave the drowing stranger so long as the cost is less than the value.

Please note how I set up the scenario in response to the original poster's question. In regard to saving the stranger's life by throwing a preserver, I said "it would be immoral to ARBITRARILY not do so." [Emphasis added.] The inaction was arbitrary, costing the person nothing.

[Richard_Halley]

Yes, Stephen, I said your statment was misleading, not incorrect.

The word "inherent" suggusts "intrinsic" to someone not familiar with Objectivism, that is why it is misleading.

[stephen_speicher]

Yes, Stephen, I said your statment was misleading, not incorrect.

The word "inherent" suggusts "intrinsic" to someone not familiar with Objectivism, that is why it is misleading.

I said "Life has an inherent value." I could just as easily have said "Life has an intrinsic value." What exactly are you objecting to?

Afterall, life is the standard of all value, is it not? How much more inherent or intrinsic can you get?

The word "intrinsic" is not a bad word in and of itself. Intrincism is bad (or, at least, mistaken) as a philosophical doctrine, but that does not negate the proper use of the word "intrinsic."

[JRoberts]

Stephen, I am confused about your answer. You are saying then that one should, if they analyze the situation at hand and see it is safe-help the person?

If this is so-then where is the stopping point? For example-somebody is hanging off the edge of a cliff...and there it is a pretty stable cliff ledge-however, you will have to bend over to help them, which has a risk of you falling-should you then as well?

[stephen_speicher]

Stephen, I am confused about your answer.  You are saying then that one should, if they analyze the situation at hand and see it is safe-help the person? 

There are three crucial points in the scenario I related in response to the original poster's question.

(1) The person drowning was a complete stranger.

(2) There was absolutely no risk at all to you.

(3) You arbitrarily refused to throw the life preserver.

You chose to watch a complete stranger die -- one for which you had absolutely no reason to wish dead -- by arbitraily refusing to throw a life preserver even though there was absolutely no risk to your own safety at all. So, yes, in this particular circumstance, I can say, unequivocally and with complete confidence, that what you did was immoral. You should have thrown the drowning man the life preserver.

(When I say "you," I do not, of course, mean you, JRoberts, personally.)

If this is so-then where is the stopping point?  For example-somebody is hanging off the edge of a cliff...and there it is a pretty stable cliff ledge-however, you will have to bend over to help them, which has a risk of you falling-should you then as well?

This is a different circumstance. Once the assessment of risk becomes a factor, then the judgment must be made to balance the risk you are willing to take against the value to you of the person. If it were Adolph Hitler hanging on the cliff, I would walk away with a smile on my face. If it was the love of my life, I would risk my life, whatever it took.

[JRoberts]

I now understand, and agree with, your first point.

As to the second-are you saying that the moment risk is involved, it is not immoral?

[dondigitalia]

I think he's saying that if you assess the risk to be greater than the value the person is to you and choose to help them anyway, it is immoral.

I will add:

If you assess the risk as less than their value to you and choose not to help them, that is immoral as well.

[stephen_speicher]

I now understand, and agree with, your first point.

As to the second-are you saying that the momeny risk is involved, it is not immoral?

I am saying that once the situation is no longer arbitrary, then the criteria of judgment rules. It would not be immoral for me to walk away from Hitler hanging on the cliff, and it would be moral for me to greatly risk my life if the person was my great love.

[JRoberts]

I understand now. Thank you

[stephen_speicher]

I understand now.  Thank you

You're welcome.

[Richard_Halley]

I said "Life has an inherent value." I could just as easily have said "Life has an intrinsic value." What exactly are you objecting to?

But the two are not interchangable. "Intrinsic," as it relates to value, refers to value as seperate from any valuer. Intrinsic value is an invalid concept.

[stephen_speicher]

But the two are not interchangable. "Intrinsic," as it relates to value, refers to value as seperate from any valuer. Intrinsic value is an invalid concept.

"Since I regard all values as contextual and hierarchical, I would ultimately regard only one good as "intrinsic," in your sense of the term, namely: life.

-- Ayn Rand, "Letters of Ayn Rand," p. 561

[Richard_Halley]

in your sense of the term

In who's sense of the term?

Their sense is not the common sense, obviously, as Rand differentiates it from the usual sense.

[marotta]

Thanks for the answers and the dialog. I'd like to post my summary of the thread in my own words to see if I have understood it correctly. According to Objectivism:

There is no moral "ought" for me to help another person, period.

If I desire to help someone then I am free to do so.

I am also free not to help someone if I desire not to help them.

The rational basis by which I would choose to help or not to help would be that I would choose to help if the value to me of helping the person is greater than the cost or risk to me of helping them.

Even if the person is a total stranger, another person's life often has some value to us that is greater than the small cost of time or effort required to rescue someone in peril.

If the cost or risk to us is anything that is non-trivial, and the person is a total stranger then we should think twice about jeopardizing our own self-interests.

If the person is beloved and of great value to us we may be risk our very lives.

If the person is disliked, evil, or even just a rival in business allowing them to perish could be in our rational self-interest.

But the only principle to determine when to help and when not to help is our rational self-interest

Did I understand it correctly!?

Thanks!

[stephen_speicher]

In who's sense of the term?

Their sense is not the common sense, obviously, as Rand differentiates it from the usual sense.

Obviously?

Richard, have you read the full context of the letter? That is the way to determine the sense and meaning. Now, it is possible that I have misunderstood that meaning -- it would not be the first time I have ever made a mistake -- so, after you read the full context of the letter feel free to point out my mistake to me. If you do indeed show me where I erred, I will thank you for that. But, at least, rather than just "obviously," your statement of sense and meaning will be based on the actual content of the letter.

[dondigitalia]

Did I understand it correctly!?

It all looks right to me.

[Richard_Halley]

No, Stephen, I have not read the full context of the letter, nor will I have the letter at hand any time in the next few weeks.

However, based on the fact that you are arguing that "inherent" and "intrinsic" are equal, I can guess that if the individual to whom the letter is addressed had presented a view contrary to that, you would have pointed it out. Also, in the quote you posted, Rand DOES differentiate the addressee's version of "intrinsic" from the regular version, she included an entire clause for the purpose of doing so. This indicates that the addressee had presented some specific sense of the term "intrinsic," and that Rand had believed that it required differentiation from some other form of the word.

It is of course possible that Rand included that clause by mistake, but this sort of thing would have been uncharacteristic for her, and I have my doubts that this is what happened.

If you can include another quote from that letter--or any information about the context (I will trust you to report facts accurately for now)--making it clear that this is not the case, than I would be happy to hear it. For the time being, and operating on the information I have, I suspect that the term "intrinsic" is used in an unusual sense in the letter which you quote.

[stephen_speicher]

If you can include another quote from that letter--or any information about the context ...

There is too much to quote from Letters, so you can read that at your leisure. Note, however, that in the whole fascinating interchange between Ayn Rand and philosopher John Hospers -- some sixty pages! -- aside from a few quotations we only get to see the words of Miss Rand. We can only surmise about what Hospers himself wrote, based on the context of Ayn Rand's letters and what we know of Hospers ourselves.

Which brings me to the finale of this little discussion. Forever curious about facts that I am, I looked to Hospers' book on ethics, the one which Mike Berliner mentions in his prefacing notes. Here is a quote from Hospers' book, Human Conduct, where he defines the two terms under discussion, "intrinsic good" and "instrumental good."

"The first kind of good is called instrumental good because the goodness or worthwhileness of these things lies in their being instruments toward the attainment of the other things which are considered good not merely as instruments. The second kind of good is called intrinsic good because we value these things (whatever they may turn out to be) not for what they lead to but for what they are."

-- John Hospers, Human Conduct, _Harcourt, Brace, & World, p. 105, 1961.

With this in mind, when I quoted Ayn Rand as saying ...

"Since I regard all values as contextual and hierarchical, I would ultimately regard only one good as 'intrinsic,' in your sense of the term, namely: life."

... I was accurately describing the facts, and, unequivocally, that she used the term in that quote just as I did in my original words.

[Richard_Halley]

You seem to be missing the point, Stephen.

The point is not that you misquoted Rand or misrepresented Hospers or anything of the sort. In fact, I never even tried to allude to such things.

The point is that Rand drew a distinction between Hospers' usage of the term "intrinsic" and some other form of the word. She says that only one value is 'intrinsic' (she puts it in quotes), "in your sense of the term."

Again, while it is possible that these quotations and this clause about Hospers' sense of the term were included by mistake, such a mistake would have been uncharicteristic of Rand's writings.

Hospers' "sense of the term," it is now clear, was that something is "intrinsically good" if it is not the object's effects, but the object itself, which is good.

It is clear to me (pending some evidence showing otherwise), that Rand at least recongnised some other useage of the term "intrinsic," and that if using this version she would not consider life to be "intrinsic value."

Usually, I have heard "intrinsic" used to signify that something is valueable as seperate from a valuer. Clearly rand would have rejected any such value.

[MisterSwig]

If you can include another quote from that letter--or any information about the context (I will trust you to report facts accurately for now)--making it clear that this is not the case, than I would be happy to hear it.  For the time being, and operating on the information I have, I suspect that the term "intrinsic" is used in an unusual sense in the letter which you quote.

The term "intrinsic" was indeed being used in an unusual sense by Ayn Rand, which is why she was careful to put it in quotes. The crucial lines of that paragraph are at the beginning:

"You ask whether I would agree with the distinction you make between "intrinsic good" and "instrumental good." I do not object to the concepts as you define them, but I would not use them, for the following reasons: A. The term "intrinsic" is extremely dangerous to use in ethics. It can be taken to mean "good of and by itself," regardless of context, standard, source, recipient and recipient's knowledge."

Letters of Ayn Rand, p. 561

She then goes on to flush out her argument and discuss values. The line previously quoted by Mr. Speicher is the last line of the paragraph, coming after Ayn Rand's initial disclaimer.

Ayn Rand argued strongly for objective values, not intrinsic or inherent values. She did not believe that life had value apart from those who would value it. This does not mean that values are subjective. It means that, to you, a particular individual's life is of real value or it is not. And you must consider reality in order to determine this.

A stranger drowning in a lake may be of value to you, because, living in a free society, you value human life in general. You see humans as potential producers, who will contribute to society and may potentially benefit your life through trade.

I think most people in America value human beings at a sense of life level. For the most part, they do not consciously think about why they value life, other than because God told them to.

However, if you lived in some hellhole like Iran, you may not feel the same way about human life. You may let a stranger drown, because if you saved him, he would likely be an Islamofascist, who would support the destruction of you and your freedom-fighting brothers.

[Old Geezer]

However, if you lived in some hellhole like Iran, you may not feel the same way about human life. You may let a stranger drown, because if you saved him, he would likely be an Islamofascist, who would support the destruction of you and your freedom-fighting brothers.

I would love to know which evidence you drew upon to come to the conclusion that most Iranian's are Islamofascists.

I am also curious as to why you would not assume that he could not be recruited/convinced to support your cause.