Life as an End in Itself, a Standard, and Ultimate End

[Seeker]

Let's say life for a human is AB where A is the physical existence (+ a working conciousness) and B are those extra features that make a human person alive.

See below ...

The problem in my understanding was of the concept "life", or "existence". The problem was back there in #1.

Or to say it in a way that relates to Dave Odden's words: Life DO mean "something fancy".

Now that raises a few new crucial questions: What is the relation between an animals "spiritual experience" and it's "life" (according to Rand's definition")? In what way is a spiritual experience part of a "process of self-sustaining action"?

The standard of value includes only those aspects of an organism which its survival entails. What is the essential versus the non-essential? The definition of life, i.e. "a process of self-sustaining and self-generated action" reduces the answer to those aspects necessary for that process to continue. Objectivism states that man needs his mind in order to survive. If he didn't - if his mind were superflouous, like his appendix - then its survival would no longer be entailed within man's standard of value. But in reality, man's mind is necessary for his survival in the long run, even if not in the immediate range of the moment.

So the question is what does the survival of man's mind require? What are its specific needs psychologically, spiritually, and so on? That is the connection between "something fancy" and "survival". That is why Roark needed to build the Stoddard Temple and not a shack. We need not explore the immutable features of man's psyche in every detail to see how this understanding fits within Rand's basis for ethics.

And still, what is "man's life"? Can anyone give a precise definition for this sub-abstraction, or to describe the concept (pithily as possible please). What is the relation between happiness and life? Is happiness part of "life" or a result of living, or "fulfilment of "life""?

"Man's life" is man's process of self-sustaining and self-generated action. That process requires his mind. His mind requires happiness.

Edited November 4, 2006 by Seeker

[Seeker]

Sorry, I got kicked out of the forum before I could finish my answer ...

Is happiness part of "life" or a result of living, or "fulfilment of "life""? Happiness results from a correct understanding of what one's life requires coupled with the achievement of the same. Thus, it is a part of "life" and a result of living and "fulfillment of "life"". In Objectivist terms, "unhappy life" is an oxymoron.

Edited November 4, 2006 by Seeker

[Freddy]

See below ...

The standard of value includes only those aspects of an organism which its survival entails. What is the essential versus the non-essential? The definition of life, i.e. "a process of self-sustaining and self-generated action" reduces the answer to those aspects necessary for that process to continue. Objectivism states that man needs his mind in order to survive. If he didn't - if his mind were superflouous, like his appendix - then its survival would no longer be entailed within man's standard of value. But in reality, man's mind is necessary for his survival in the long run, even if not in the immediate range of the moment.

But this is perfectly consistent with the life expectancy maximization standard, the mind is an instrument for living as long as possible. But you don't seem to accept life expectancy maximization as the ultimate goal for human beings.

[Seeker]

No, I do - but I also suggest the existence, within man's immutable nature, i.e. aspects of his being which he cannot control, of needs which require more than a life hooked up to machines. For example, once man's experiences grow to encompass more than just sitting in bed, a life of merely sitting in bed might become virtually impossible to him even though it might extend his life expectancy (I also think it necessary to challenge the idea that sitting in bed actually does, in fact, maximize one's life expectancy as one would be weak, stupid, and unable to deal with any problems that cropped up). I am referring back to the idea that ethics is required not only because of things about which man has choices, but things about which he has no choice. Ethics cannot apply to what is good or bad for man per se, but only to what is good or bad for man to the extent that he has a choice in the matter, i.e. what is ethical or unethical.

I see that this does present some nettlesome questions as to man's immutable nature. If it entailed an uncontrollable will to power, for instance, Objectivism would have to admit the reality, and thus the validity, of that concept. If Hitler's madness foreclosed his actions as a matter of personal choice, then his behavior would cease to be unethical for him. It would still be bad, but it wouldn't be unethical. Similarly, man is biologically mortal, and this is bad for him, but it is not unethical because he cannot help it. This raises a lot of questions about what the unchangeable aspects of man are in reality, but it doesn't negate the basis of the Objectivist ethics.

Edited November 4, 2006 by Seeker

[~Sophia~]

Sorry, I got kicked out of the forum before I could finish my answer ...

Is happiness part of "life" or a result of living, or "fulfilment of "life""? Happiness results from a correct understanding of what one's life requires coupled with the achievement of the same. Thus, it is a part of "life" and a result of living and "fulfillment of "life"". In Objectivist terms, "unhappy life" is an oxymoron.

Very good posts, Seeker!

[ian]

Is happiness part of "life" or a result of living, or "fulfilment of "life""? Happiness results from a correct understanding of what one's life requires coupled with the achievement of the same. Thus, it is a part of "life" and a result of living and "fulfillment of "life"". In Objectivist terms, "unhappy life" is an oxymoron.

You're right. I always thought it (happiness) was just a side effect of/psychological reward for being moral. But is it also a requirement of life because miserable people won't want to do any work, and may even end their own life.

I guess that's why Ayn Rand listed pride as a virtue alongside rationality, productivity etc. It's a recognition that there are physical *and* psychological needs that must be met.

Edited November 5, 2006 by ian

[Seeker]

So does this resolve the issue? Is everything wrapped up in a neat little package?

[Freddy]

No, I do - but I also suggest the existence, within man's immutable nature, i.e. aspects of his being which he cannot control, of needs which require more than a life hooked up to machines.

If a man could extend his life by supressing those needs you are talking about, then those needs would not be needs with respect to his literal survival and therefore their fullfillment would be unethical. I'm not sure what you mean with need here, need with respect to what?

I also think it necessary to challenge the idea that sitting in bed actually does, in fact, maximize one's life expectancy as one would be weak, stupid, and unable to deal with any problems that cropped up.

My impression is that most people get very old and finally die from "mechanical" failure of some sort. This would suggest that a prudent health nazi might have the best life expectancy prospects, and that is not exactly the hero from Rands novels. It also doesn't seem to far fetched to envision a machine that slows down the detoriation of the body, and for the sake of the argument we can assume that you must forfiet sex and food if you hook up to the machine. Now, if there really was such a machine, do you really think that it would be unethical not to hook up? Or to take another example, why would it ever be permissible to take a bullet for someone? That's certainly not an action that extends your life span.

In Objectivist terms, "unhappy life" is an oxymoron.

This would be a switch in the meaning of the term life that would yield inconsistencies. The fundamental alternative is phrased as life or death, existence or non existence. If we substitute the new meaning of life into this alternative, it follows that an unhappy person cannot be alive, thus he must be dead and therefore an unhappy person cannot exist.

[Seeker]

I was speaking solely in reference to the needs that man cannot suppress. If he could suppress them, they wouldn't strictly be needs. By "need" I mean a requirement for survival. Once again, you are positing ethical questions, which presupposes choice. I on the other hand am positing aspects of man in which there is no choice, hence no ethics.

The Objectivist view of psychology holds that happiness is necessary for the functioning of man's mind. Since he needs his mind to survive over the long term, an uphappy person cannot exist over the long term.

The answer is respect to taking a bullet for someone is that doing so could satisfy an immutable need for self-assertion/realization - i.e. of a desire that the person protected would not be dead. In regards to the machine, of course there is a choice as to whether to hook up, but if it meant unhappiness and thus suicide, hooking up would be unethical.

Ultimately we are debating the nature of man and of reality in regards to whether something is or is not open to choice - I say no, you insist yes - which is rather beside the point. Which it is doesn't alter the fundamental basis of the Objectivist ethics, i.e. the point at issue here - that when something is open to choice, there is a standard of value by which to measure it, which is survival - and that when something is not open to choice, it is beyond the realm of ethics.

Edited November 5, 2006 by Seeker

[Freddy]

Seeker, thank you for some very interesting posts, I find them illuminating even though I don't agree with your position.

I was speaking solely in reference to the needs that man cannot suppress. If he could suppress them, they wouldn't strictly be needs. By "need" I mean a requirement for survival. Once again, you are positing ethical questions, which presupposes choice. I on the other hand am positing aspects of man in which there is no choice, hence no ethics.

If I understand you correctly the standard of those needs are survival only in a derivative sense, that is, we die if do not fullfill those needs as a matter of our nature, but if we had a choice to supress them that could have extended our survival. So with respect to the life expectancymaximizer, it could be in our nature to just literally die from bordeom therefore we should not hook up to the machine, but if we could supress boredome and learn how to cope with it, then hooking up would be the ethical choice. Is that a correct understanding of your position? We might call those needs inherent (in our nature) needs then and they are obviously sometimes "whimsical" in the sense that they do not always contribute to our literal survival as is the case with bordeom and the life expectancy maximizer. I have no problem with this position per se, but it seems that you use those inherent needs to insulate the life span maximization standard from absurditeis and I don't think that will work. See more below.

The Objectivist view of psychology holds that happiness is necessary for the functioning of man's mind. Since he needs his mind to survive over the long term, an uphappy person cannot exist over the long term.

On the other hand, happiness is supposed to just follow from those actions that maximize our life expectancy. But I suppose that you would say that man also needs to fullfilll his inherent needs in order to be happy, and I certainly agree with that, the problem is of course to know what those needs are. And as we've seen, survival is not the critera for those needs since they sometimes stand in the way of our literal survival.

The answer is respect to taking a bullet for someone is that doing so could satisfy an immutable need for self-assertion/realization - i.e. of a desire that the person protected would not be dead.

Most people live very long lives, during the course of a lifetime people suffer losses of family and friends to whom they have an immutable desire not to be dead. But they just doesen't die from this. All the evidence suggest that if you suffer such a loss at 40, then you will be able to survive another 40 years. If the person taking a bullet is acting on impulse he might be forgiven, but he if he rationally thinks about his choice and really do believe that man ought to live as long as possible, then he would simply be immoral to take a bullet.

In regards to the machine, of course there is a choice as to whether to hook up, but if it meant unhappiness and thus suicide, hooking up would be unethical.

And this is where I belive you just posit an inehernt need (the need not to be bored or something like that) and use is it to avoid the question. I don't see how you from philosophical reasoning alone can know that this boredome would kill a man faster than the machine would extend his survival. That seems to be a scientific question, so I belive the question still stands. I also believe that the answer that it would be unethical not to hook up to the machine would be patently absurd.

[Ifat Glassman]

Still have 2 pages of posts to catch up on, but just to throw something into the discussion in the meanwhile:

When one is in a state of having no food and no source of food, and one knows that one will eventually starve, it would be moral to commit suicide. On the spiritual level of human life, enjoyment/pleasure is like food to the soul. If one knows that one cannot ever have it (like if one is in jail for life or in captivity going through tortures), one would be moral in committing suicide as well.

I don't know how to justify it yet, though. (and I don't mean the "Duh" explanation of "because you would be in pain so better kill yourself now").

For me, there are still a lot of big question unanswered.

I'm taking my time with this subject now, but in the words of Schwarzenegger: I will be back!

[Seeker]

So with respect to the life expectancymaximizer, it could be in our nature to just literally die from bordeom therefore we should not hook up to the machine, but if we could supress boredome and learn how to cope with it, then hooking up would be the ethical choice. Is that a correct understanding of your position?

In essence, yes.

On the other hand, happiness is supposed to just follow from those actions that maximize our life expectancy. But I suppose that you would say that man also needs to fullfilll his inherent needs in order to be happy, and I certainly agree with that, the problem is of course to know what those needs are. And as we've seen, survival is not the critera for those needs since they sometimes stand in the way of our literal survival.

My favorite example is the biological need to eat which requires taking risks that might stand in the way of literal survival. The need to eat is immutable, hence it does not properly belong in the realm of ethics. Now, if you wish to posit a probabilistic question, i.e. given what I know, the odds are 25% that I'll die from starvation if I don't chase that rabbit, versus 75% I'll fall into the ravine if I do, then there is an ethical choice to be made, it seems to me. Sometimes knowledge is imperfect, as you suggest. Ethics does not require perfect knowledge, but only the best choice given what we know at the time.

Most people live very long lives, during the course of a lifetime people suffer losses of family and friends to whom they have an immutable desire not to be dead. But they just doesen't die from this. All the evidence suggest that if you suffer such a loss at 40, then you will be able to survive another 40 years. If the person taking a bullet is acting on impulse he might be forgiven, but he if he rationally thinks about his choice and really do believe that man ought to live as long as possible, then he would simply be immoral to take a bullet.

... unless you knew you couldn't live with yourself otherwise - an extreme hypothetical to be sure, but we are here dealing with hypotheticals. Also, I am not suggesting that taking the bullet is always the correct choice.

And this is where I belive you just posit an inehernt need (the need not to be bored or something like that) and use is it to avoid the question. I don't see how you from philosophical reasoning alone can know that this boredome would kill a man faster than the machine would extend his survival. That seems to be a scientific question, so I belive the question still stands. I also believe that the answer that it would be unethical not to hook up to the machine would be patently absurd.

I was attempting to avoid the question only because it didn't seem to fit the topic of the thread, which is the Objectivist standard of value for man's life and whether it entails more than just a physical or biological dimension. I'll go so far as to say that if the nature of man and reality did not stand in the way of the existence-by-machine such that the question was only one of, "do I live 150 years or do I live 75?", then the machine would indeed be the correct choice.

When one is in a state of having no food and no source of food, and one knows that one will eventually starve, it would be moral to commit suicide. On the spiritual level of human life, enjoyment/pleasure is like food to the soul. If one knows that one cannot ever have it (like if one is in jail for life or in captivity going through tortures), one would be moral in committing suicide as well.

I don't know how to justify it yet, though. (and I don't mean the "Duh" explanation of "because you would be in pain so better kill yourself now").

Given the probabilistic nature of most knowledge, in most instances the question isn't "is it so?" but "what is the probability that it is so?" It is practically impossible that you would know with 100% certainty that you would never again get the food you needed. Even if you estimated your odds of being rescued from captivity at 1% that's still greater than the 0% chance of your surviving if you committed suicide. In that example, suicide would not be a moral choice.

But let's take the hypothetical as given: that there is a 100% chance of dying and you know it. Given that the standard is survival, you should still continue living as long as possible. Given the standard, it would be immoral to elect to not live, so long as you still had a choice in the matter. Suicide would thus be amoral: only after your deprivation of food really forced you to kill yourself would the matter be removed from the realm of ethics such that killing yourself would neither be ethical nor unethical, but simply a given.

Edited November 6, 2006 by Seeker

[Seeker]

I can see in re-reading my last post that I misstated the case of taking a bullet. Taking the bullet would be an immoral choice, but if it weren't rationally chosen, i.e. a "flash of the moment" type scenario acting upon an uncontrollable impulse, then it would be an amoral non-choice. But it would not be a moral choice under the Objectivist ethics as I understand them.

I also believe that the answer that it would be unethical not to hook up to the machine would be patently absurd.

By what standard?

Edited November 6, 2006 by Seeker

[Seeker]

By the way, I don't intend to intimate that these issues are easy or that I wasn't initially perplexed by the implications of Rand's basis for ethics. I'm trying to understand them just as you are - and I want correction if needed. When people state that Rand's standard isn't "morgue avoidance", I look at the existence vs. non-existence question she uses as the fundamental basis of "The Objectivist Ethics" and conclude that it actually is, and that only man's immutable survival need for "something more" can get you from a long life in bed to a short life building empires. I'm not trying to escape any questions by framing it that way - I just don't see how else you can base a standard of value in the fundamental question of existence or non-existence (as a living being) as Rand does, and not draw that conclusion. Life is "a process of self-sustaining and self-generated action" - a definition that entails something ongoing. Ongoing existence means just that. It doesn't in itself tell us what sort of ongoing existence, so given alternatives, we must relate those choices back to the first.

Happiness is good, if it promotes ongoing existence. Building empires is good, if it promotes ongoing existence. Using a perpetual-life machine is good, if it promotes ongoing existence. The best choice is the one that promotes ongoing existence more than the others. You may say that this is absurd, but then I think it is incumbent on you to explain how your interpretation of Rand differs. If anyone thinks that Rand meant something else, for instance if by Man's Life she was attempting, without reference to what man needs to survive, to entail elements that we would regard as glory, grandeur, beauty, etc., other than the objective basis of existence she explicitly defined, then I would appreciate a clarification. I of course agree that man's life entails much more than "avoiding the morgue" - but that the only way to ethically justify his pursuing that "something more" is that his need to do so be firmly rooted in his unchosen nature such that, without meeting it, his lifespan would ultimately be shorter. To me, that seems like the sensible approach that explains both Rand's basis for ethics as well as the "something more" that we all know life entails.

Edited November 7, 2006 by Seeker

[Freddy]

By what standard?

I would in this case simply point to enjoyment as an end in itself, if I've come to recognize that I would prefer 75 years of building an empire to 150 years in bed then thats enough justification for me to rationally decide in this case. And what is my ultimate standard for attaining enjoyment? I don't know, but I don't think it's my literal survival. As you can see I'm not an Objectivist and I don't yet accept Rands meta-ethical argument, I'm here to find out if this is because I don't understand it. My own outlook is more along the lines if intuitionism.

I very much liked your last post, it did sum up the discussion nicely. However, in the end I don't think that you will be able to make everything instrumental to life span maximization. Do we die from bordeom? Well, maybe bordedom is a signal to the mind to activate the body so if you don't act on this signal your body will be underactivated and will therefore detoriate. But the signal in itself might not be poisnous and detoriate the body. If this is true, feeling bordeome lying hooked up to a life span maximizer would be a "false" signal, your physical needs are taken care of by the machine better than you would ever be able to do if you acted on the boredome signal. Whether this is true or not is a scientific question, but we cannot from philosophical reasoning exclude those obvious absurdities and that is enough for me not to accept the approach. I also like to point out the fact that most people get very old and they fall far short of being Objectivists and this fact makes it hard to make the case (among others) that Objectivist happiness is an absolute requirement for long term survival. The point is that in the end I'm quite sympathetic to Rands conclusion, but I don't see how they follow from her argument.

There are basically three things with Rands meta ethical argument that I cannot understand:

1) What does Rand mean with survival? It boils down to whether "qua man" is a method for literal survival or if "qua man" is an end in itself. If the latter then Rands meta-ethical argument becomes non-responsive, she did not in my opinion establish a criteria for what "qua man" is, and the reference to existence or non-existence does no longer seem to apply. The former approach leads us to strange conclusions and this points to the next question.

2) Is the argument begging the question? If the alternative existence or non-existence is fundamental in the sense that you have to be alive in order to value things, then I agree with that, but the fact that you have to be alive in order to value things doesn't entail that staying alive should be your ultimate goal. If the alternative is fundamental in the sense that the most important thing for every human being should be to stay alive, how is that not just begging the question?

3) The choice to live. If the ultimate goal is life span maximization then the choice to live is the choice of this particular goal. The chocie not to live is then the choice to not maximize ones life expectancy, but this is not equivalent to minimize ones life expectancy, that is, to commit suicide. This implies that Objectivism is only applicable to those who explicity choose to live as long as possible, and this seems quite narrow. Also, it seems to imply subjectivism.

[Seeker]

One possible solution is to recall that "man" is an abstraction, whereas individual men and women are the concretes. So for me, "survival" means life-span maximization as me in particular, according to some essential deriving from my nature. In this view, I would strive to build a skyscraper not solely because doing so would engender generic happiness without which my mind would perish as any man's mind would, but that building skyscrapers is my identity. It's who I am on a fundamental level. If I didn't do it, I would cease being me in particular. The mistake in reasoning here is the failure to go from the abstract level of survival as man qua man to the concrete level of a particular man as who he is. The key is to ask, in regards to "survival": survival as what? Not just as an organism, not just as an animal, not just as man - but as me particularly, in my essence. This retains the lifespan maximization element while applying an identity constraint that explains the "something fancy" without attempting to do so indirectly solely through meeting general psychological needs.

An implication of this is that it significantly narrows the range of states constituting "survival". If you can't live as you, does that mean that you're already dead, although still living as a man, animal, and organism? Would that fact sever ethics at its root, rendering suicide amoral? I suspect that it would, and that a telling sign would be your own unhappiness in that situation. Once again, "unhappy life" is an oxymoron if by "life" we mean "your life as you in particular, in your essential nature". A searching self-examination to objectively discover one's own "essential" nature and what it objectively requires, would be necessary.

Edited November 7, 2006 by Seeker

[Freddy]

One possible solution is to recall that "man" is an abstraction, whereas individual men and women are the concretes. So for me, "survival" means life-span maximization as me in particular, according to some essential deriving from my nature.

This division between the abstract and the concrete is present in the literal lifespan maximization standrad also, "qua man" is the general frame for the lifespan maximization-method applicable to all men, but the maximand is the individual life and this means taking into account parameters about the individual, but this is done within the "qua man"-frame.

In this view, I would strive to build a skyscraper not solely because doing so would engender generic happiness without which my mind would perish as any man's mind would, but that building skyscrapers is my identity. It's who I am on a fundamental level. If I didn't do it, I would cease being me in particular. The mistake in reasoning here is the failure to go from the abstract level of survival as man qua man to the concrete level of a particular man as who he is. The key is to ask, in regards to "survival": survival as what? Not just as an organism, not just as an animal, not just as man - but as me particularly, in my essence. This retains the lifespan maximization element while applying an identity constraint that explains the "something fancy" without attempting to do so indirectly solely through meeting general psychological needs.

If we take this approach, then Rands meta-ethical argument amounts to nothing but a redefinition of words. The ethics still have to be worked out by answering philosophical question that are just as difficult as the ones we started with.

The question of existence or non-existence now means either to live or not live according to ones nature, but this does nothing to advance our understanding of ethics because it doesn't tell us what living according to our nature is, and this question is more or less equivalent to the question we started out with. Morality is the proper way to behave, and I suppose that is in a sense living according to ones nature. Unless you state an objective method for determining when something is in accordance with our nature we are still on square one.

[Seeker]

I wouldn't be so quick to discount the utility of Rand's argument in "The Objectivist Ethics" - even if knowing what it means to live qua man (in the general and abstract, as distinguished from qua self, in the concrete and particular) is not sufficient to fully define one's code of values, it does apply useful constraints: first, by telling us the ways in which the prevailing ethical systems of mankind (e.g. religion, collectivism) are fundamentally incorrect; and second, by giving the requirements to which our own particular code of values must conform, including that it be objectively based. I do agree that an objective method for discovering one's own essentials is necessary to complete the process.

Edited November 10, 2006 by Seeker

[Ifat Glassman]

I still haven't read the last 2 pages here, so I might be asking something that has already been answered.

But I want to put down some of my thoughts/questions:

a ) Why is life qua an organism's nature it's standard of good/evil?

[is it because physically, it is an "ultimate value"? Is it because organism's pain/pleasure mechanism supports it? Is it because to exist is standard of good as an axiom of some sort?]

b ) What makes sex a value? Sex does not contribute anything to our physical survival, nor does it contribute to our mental abilities. If someone is born asexual, are they any less "alive qua man"? How so?

c ) How is conceptual ability (which is a part of man's spiritual existence) a part of a "self-generating process"? I can see very easily how the blood circulation is a self-generated process, and how metabolism is self-generated, but not how conceptual thinking is so.

d ) Why does the definition of life identify "life" as a single process? why not as a combination of processes? And what would be a more precise description of that process?

Edited November 13, 2006 by ifatart

[softwareNerd]

Ifat, I'd suggest that before one answers these, one must first ask: why do I even want to figure out an ethics? i.e. why do I want to form a conception of "good" and "bad"? Why not simply do ... whatever?

[Ifat Glassman]

Ifat, I'd suggest that before one answers these, one must first ask: why do I even want to figure out an ethics? i.e. why do I want to form a conception of "good" and "bad"? Why not simply do ... whatever?

Okay, so to that I answer: I want to figure out some ethics to help me live. Does that mean that the standard of good is furthering my life because that is what I happen to want? My wants, or anyone's wants have got nothing to do with Ayn Rand's arguments as to why life is the standard of good. She simply starts with the statement "to exist is the good" (regardless of whether or not the organism wants it, or even has a choice or consciousness).

For plants: water, sun, air, are good, because they further it's life. The standard of good does not depend on man's will.

Perhaps it would be easier to answer for a plant: why is the standard of good for a plant to exist?

(And what about my other questions?)

[IAmMetaphysical]

Ifat: the concept of good rests the fact of there being an alternative for some existent. The fundamental alternative in the universe is existence and non-existence. Inanimate matter does not face this alternative, its existence is unconditional, it can not cease to exist. There is only one class of existents which can cease to exist, which does face the alternative of existence vs non-existence: living organisms. The alternative of existence vs non-existence for living beings is manifested as: life or death.

The concept of good is also tied to the concept of value. A value is "that which one acts to gain/keep," in the context of the alternative: existence vs non-existence. Thus the standard of value is this alternative which can be thought of as a continuum where on one end there is existence(life) and the other: non-existence(death). This continuum does not mean that one end is automatically the good or the bad, only that any morality can be judged by these standards, the standard of whether or not it leads one to life, or to death. That is why the formulation of an objective ethics goes thusly: One must do x if one wants to achieve y. One must jump off a building if one wants to die. One must use one's mind if one is a man and wants to live successfully. One must choose to live, or to die, but once one makes that choice, they are bound by the objective facts of their nature in determining the actions they must take to achieve their stated goals.

[aequalsa]

Okay, so to that I answer: I want to figure out some ethics to help me live. Does that mean that the standard of good is furthering my life because that is what I happen to want? My wants, or anyone's wants have got nothing to do with Ayn Rand's arguments as to why life is the standard of good. She simply starts with the statement "to exist is the good" (regardless of whether or not the organism wants it, or even has a choice or consciousness).

For plants: water, sun, air, are good, because they further it's life. The standard of good does not depend on man's will.

Perhaps it would be easier to answer for a plant: why is the standard of good for a plant to exist?

(And what about my other questions?)

I think that since ethics applies only to men's actions, preferring death means that ethics is not relevent to you.(well, short of knowing which way you need to point the gun). Something being good or bad presupposes that it is good or bad for something. Some inanimate object cannot have values and has no need for ethics(ie how to behave in order to gain or keep values). "to exist is the good" for those who wish to have other values. It is a necessary requirement. It could probably be argued that to exist is also the good for those who do not wish to exist. They just do not realize it because of bad philosophy.

[Seeker]

a ) Why is life qua an organism's nature it's standard of good/evil?

[is it because physically, it is an "ultimate value"? Is it because organism's pain/pleasure mechanism supports it? Is it because to exist is standard of good as an axiom of some sort?]

To have a standard of value depends upon a definite context. In the context of the fundamental alternative for a living organism - to live or die, i.e. to exist as a living organism or not - existence (life) is the standard of value because it is presupposed that its ultimate goal is to go on existing. Values cannot exist independently, but only in relation to a living entity faced with the alternative of existence or non-existence. Living beings act in order to remain alive. To go outside this context would be to reject reality. The realm of non-existence is nothing; only existence exists. To accept reality, for a living organism, means taking goal-directed action to remain a part of reality. Existence is primary to philosophy; to venture into the realm of non-existence is to go beyond that which philosophy is capable of answering. "Why choose reality?", that is, "why choose to exist?" is a question that philosophy cannot answer. Similarly, the question "why choose to mentally focus?" is a primary, the equivalent of accepting reality, for man. Since that is volitional, it must be willed continuously (see Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, p. 59). So in that sense, the standard of value does depend upon man's will. The will to live is a primary upon which everything else depends.

I think it's worth settling this point with absolute clarity before going on to the others - so for now I'll limit my answer to that one.

Edited November 14, 2006 by Seeker

[Freddy]

I wouldn't be so quick to discount the utility of Rand's argument in "The Objectivist Ethics" - even if knowing what it means to live qua man (in the general and abstract, as distinguished from qua self, in the concrete and particular) is not sufficient to fully define one's code of values, it does apply useful constraints: first, by telling us the ways in which the prevailing ethical systems of mankind (e.g. religion, collectivism) are fundamentally incorrect;

If you let Rands meta ethical argument amount the redefinition of the word exist to just mean "exist qua man", then you've left "qua man" to be determined. A collectivist would just say that since man is a social animal "qua man" is to live in accordance to this particular is. Also, remeber where Rand is coming from, she thought she could improve on Aristotle, but how would Aristotle be helped by an argument that concluded that if we redefine exist to mean "exist qua man" (where the ethics is contained in the "qua man" part), then ethics can be phrased as a question of existence or non-existence?

To have a standard of value depends upon a definite context. In the context of the fundamental alternative for a living organism - to live or die, i.e. to exist as a living organism or not - existence (life) is the standard of value because it is presupposed that its ultimate goal is to go on existing. Values cannot exist independently, but only in relation to a living entity faced with the alternative of existence or non-existence. Living beings act in order to remain alive. To go outside this context would be to reject reality. The realm of non-existence is nothing; only existence exists.

If you take existence to mean "exist qua man" as you did in your previous arguments, then non-existence is a viable alternative. If you mean existence literally then it is easy to point to the fact that men can have plenty of reasons for choosing non-existence over existence, the life expectancy maximizer is an example. The fact that we are perfectly able to understand those reasons suggests that our literal existence isn't fundamental from a value perspective. Also, how do you conclude that "Living beings act in order to remain alive"? It's doesn't seem to be supported by biology, altruism is routine in nature.

You also have to be clear about what goal is implied by the choice to live. Is it to live as long as possible? If a person wants to live because he wants to fullfill his wish to be a dictator, then how is Objectivism (respecting rights in particular) implied by his choice to live? His choice is obviously not to live as long as possible, but to sustain his existence in order to fullfill a particular goal.

[...]I'd suggest that before one answers these, one must first ask: why do I even want to figure out an ethics? i.e. why do I want to form a conception of "good" and "bad"? Why not simply do ... whatever?

Man is faced with the fact that he has values, when we are able to ask the question why we "need" values the answer is given by the fact that we already have values. We just cannot be indifferent to pain for example, and this fact is all we need to get started, we have the capacity to experience values, we have desires, wants, the capacity to expirience that some things are better or worse, we have have drives shaped by evolution (which selects on the capacity to pass on genes, not the capacity for individual survival), and this provides reasons for action. If we really were indifferent, the fact that we have to act in order to attain any goal (be it life span maximization or any other goal) wouldn't by itself create a reason for action. The "need" for values presupposes values, if we were indifferent there would be no needs.