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It is with great fascination that I am listening to Dr.Peikoff's lecture series "The DIM Hypothesis," The Epistemological Mechanics by which Philosophy Shapes Society. This course, for a limited time, is available via the Ayn Rand Institute website.

I'm only up to lecture 6 of the series, but I have a preliminary assessment that differs from Dr. Peikoff's as to why there are five and only five divisions. His analysis of why trilogies tend to exist in the history of philosophy was fascinating, and he basically broke those down into three: Integration, Misintegration, and Disintegration. However, I begin to wonder why there were only three when a logic table analysis would indicate that there ought to be four (for any given proposition): the positive, the negative, the contra-positive, and the contra-negative. Later, he broke down two of his divisions into subdivisions giving five total designations; so, again, why five and not four? And then I began to understand that the logic table gives four designations, but then one could be ambivalent about those (or within those) -- or agnosticism with regard to principles as such -- and that would give five divisions.

The logic table analysis is:

1) positive

2) negative

3) contra-positive

4) contra-negative

[5) ambivalence regarding the above]

For example, let's take the axiom "Existence exists."

A logic table would generate:

1) existence exists (I)

2) existence does not exist (D2)

3) not-existence exists (M2)

4) not-existence does not exist (D1)

[5) (ambivalent) maybe not-existence exists (M1)]

For art, one would generate:

1) concretization of abstractions is necessary (I)

2) concretization of abstractions is not necessary (M2)

3) not-concretization of abstractions is necessary (D2)

4) not-concretization of abstractions is not necessary (D1)

[5) (ambivalent) maybe concretizations of abstractions is not necessary (M1)]

Since DIM focuses on integration, let's take that:

1) integration is necessary (I)

2) integration is not necessary (M2)

3) not-integration is necessary (D2)

4) not-integration is not necessary (D1)

[5) (ambivalent) maybe integration is not necessary (M1)]

I'm interested in discussing this lecture series, which is why I started this thread, and after having taken the full course (in a few weeks) I may post a more complete assessment on my own website in a longer article.

By the way, I tried to email the above as a question to Dr. Peikoff, but evidently his email box is full so it was returned to me. Maybe one day I will be able to ask him the question.

Edited by Thomas M. Miovas Jr.
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He does address this, although I don't remember specifically where. He adds several categories that simply don't fit into DIM. One of those was "eclectic" and another was "zero." (the meanings of which are self-explanatory; all of these other categories are not covered because they specifically do not affect any movement)

I thought of several such questions during the course, but in the end they were all answered. You'll probably want to finish the whole thing before emailing him.

Edited by Inspector
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I haven’t yet listened to all the DIM hypothesis lectures, so my comments should be taken in that context.

What I’ve learned from the lectures thus far is that Leonard Peikoff is making an extremely broad abstraction of the history of philosophy qua philosophy. Because this abstraction is so broad, I don’t think it can be subsumed under Aristotle’s categorical propositions. On the contrary, the DIM hypothesis subsumes the syllogism as a form of integration (I).

The reason why DIM is a trilogy is metaphysical, not epistemological. What DIM describes, in essence, is the relationship between reality and consciousness—the three abstractions (trilogy) are reality (1), consciousness (2) and their relationship (3).

In the first several lectures Leonard Peikoff makes the observation that in the history of western philosophy there have been three ways philosophers have approached these three broad abstractions.

Plato represents the first type of relationship, namely that of misintigrating two so-called realities: the world of Forms (or Ideas), which are not apprehended through sensation-percepts but somehow by the “mind’s eye”, and the world of sensory-perceptual experience which, per Plato, is illusionary. This, of course, is rationalism at its extreme (M2). Misintigration (M) therefore subsumes rationalism and a fallacious method of describing the relationship between consciousness and reality--there are two realities, one somehow apprehended by non-sensory-perceptual means and the other through sensory-perceptual experience.

Disintigration (D) probably first appeared with the sophists and skeptics of the ancient world and is the idea that there is no such thing as reality, and even if there were, man has no means of knowing it. In D there is no relationship between man’s consciousness and reality. In its milder form, D is a form of nominalism where concepts (man’s means of knowing reality) are literally disintegrated into particulars with no discernable relationship to one anther (D1).

Integration describes the proper relationship between man’s consciousness and reality, namely the supremacy of reality over consciousness and that of induction over deduction. As such, Aristotle’s syllogism is subsumed under proper integration (I), but is second to induction in that the propositions of the syllogism (the primary premises) are apprehended through induction. Aristotle says this in Posterior Analytics Book II 100a1-100b15.

So I think the reason why you cannot subsume the DIM hypothesis under categorical propositions is that you are trying to subsume a more abstract concept under one that is less abstract. Trying to subsume DIM under the categorical propositions is analogous to trying to subsume the concept automobile under tires and steering wheel. DIM subsumes the categorical propositions (I), not the other way around.

Hope this helps.

Richard Parker

Edited by RichardParker
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Somebody, maybe it was on the "Peikoff says vote democrat" forum, had mentioned a way to download and actually save these lectures for later... there was some program that did this. Is anybody familiar with it, and whether or not it works for Mac? Or does anybody have any idea how I could go about saving these lectures for later? I have no time to listen to them right now and I'm worried they will be gone by the time I get around to it.

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Somebody, maybe it was on the "Peikoff says vote democrat" forum, had mentioned a way to download and actually save these lectures for later... there was some program that did this. Is anybody familiar with it, and whether or not it works for Mac? Or does anybody have any idea how I could go about saving these lectures for later? I have no time to listen to them right now and I'm worried they will be gone by the time I get around to it.

That was me, and I think we figured out that this is a violation of copyright. That means I'm planning on destroying my copies once the lectures are no longer available online.

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Damnit, really? Do you have any idea how long those lectures will be up?

Nope. Someone said that past history has been about a month.

My approach is to only listen to them whenever I have time, and if I get a chance to return and take notes.

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What I've learned from the lectures thus far is that Leonard Peikoff is making an extremely broad abstraction of the history of philosophy qua philosophy. Because this abstraction is so broad, I don't think it can be subsumed under Aristotle’s categorical propositions. On the contrary, the DIM hypothesis subsumes the syllogism as a form of integration (I).

Actually, I'm not talking about a syllogism and I'm not talking about Aristotle's Categories, and I'm not saying that Dr. Peikoff should have deduced that there were five categories of DIM.

Dr. Peikoff arrived at his classifications via induction, not deduction, by studying philosophy and it's applications in culture (similar to what he did in The Ominous Parallels); only for DIM he is, in a sense, going into more details, and discovered several broad-based similarities regarding how the individual's mind operates (epistemology) and their view of existence (metaphysics). DIM is an integration of these observations; showing similarities between how an artist's mind works and how a scientist's (physicist's) mind works. In other words, he is seeing philosophy everywhere, and is showing how a philosophic view leads to certain epistemological methods, leading to the types of artists and scientists and others that we have available.

What he is showing, in essence, is that one cannot have a philosophy as a side issue, but rather that philosophy is the guide of human thinking. Once one accepts a certain philosophy, then one's mind begins to operate that way -- i.e. a Platonist will become rationalistic by accepting Plato's methodology as the right way to think. And a rationalist (at least in the extreme) will no longer be able to integrate sense perception into similarities, because his mind has ben "tuned" to operating without taking the perceptually self-evident into account.

Since DIM is being put together by an I philosopher, certainly there is a logic to it -- logic in the sense of non-contradictory identifications of the facts being investigated -- and that logic is what is behind DIM. Or perhaps I should say that the epistemological methodology is to identify and then to organize one's observations into similarities and then to conceptualize them.

What I'm getting at regarding a logic table, is that once one has identified a positive I statement-- i.e. independence is a virtue -- one can then put that into a logic table and come up with the only other alternatives possible for a rational mind.

1) independence is a virtue

2) independence is not a virtue

3) not independence is a virtue

4) not independence is not a virtue

These are the four ways one can think about independence. Primarily, it is either a virtue or it is not; but it is possible to come up with two other alternatives, 3) not independence is a virtue (dependence is a virtue), which only implies that independence is a vice; and 4) not independence is not a virtue (which says that dependence is not a virtue, but it doesn't come right out and says that it is a vice; it could be just a character trait or a personality type, rather than being a moral issue).

There is obviously an underlying logic to DIM, or it wouldn't be so well organized. At this point, at least in my listening up to lecture 6, the underlying logic is the classifications of I, M1, M2, D1, and D2 based on the integrated observations that Dr. Peikoff has made.

What I'm saying is that I can see the logic of the classifications based on a logic table of I propositions (in metaphysics and epistemology). I'm not saying that Dr.Peikoff should have started with a logic table and then deduced that there were five possibilities and then go searching for the evidence of those five (logic table plus one ambiguity). That would have been rationalistic. He is being inductive rather than rationalistic.

In my own mind, I am simply re-affirming that he hasn't left anything out. One of the "problems" of being inductive is that if one hasn't properly covered the field, then something might be left out inadvertently.

For example, let's say someone tried to do DIM before Kant's very strong D2 became available, then going by the evidence inductively, one may not have come up with D2 as a possibility because no one had been that explicit about destroying the individual's mind's grasp of both existence and consciousness. In fact, it may have even been very difficult, if not impossible to even conceive of such nihilistic hatred of the mind pre-Kant.

However, a logic table would have indicated that it would be a possibility, but no one had done it yet. At least not to the extent of Kant.

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Actually, I'm not talking about a syllogism and I'm not talking about Aristotle's Categories, and I'm not saying that Dr. Peikoff should have deduced that there were five categories of DIM.

This is somewhat of a side issue, but you actually are referring to Aristotle's categorical propositions (or syllogism) in the example of virtue and independence that you give. In essence, you are predicating "virtue" of "independence" with independence as the subject and virtue as the predicate:

What I'm getting at regarding a logic table, is that once one has identified a positive I statement-- i.e. independence is a virtue -- one can then put that into a logic table and come up with the only other alternatives possible for a rational mind.

1) independence is a virtue

2) independence is not a virtue

3) not independence is a virtue

4) not independence is not a virtue

I disagree with the forms of predication you are giving in your example. In my view, the proper forms should be:

All S is P (Independence is always a virtue);

Some S is P (Sometimes independence is a virtue);

All S is not P (Independence is never a virtue);

Some S is not P (Sometimes independence is not a virtue).

In my own mind, I am simply re-affirming that he hasn't left anything out. One of the "problems" of being inductive is that if one hasn't properly covered the field, then something might be left out inadvertently.

For example, let's say someone tried to do DIM before Kant's very strong D2 became available, then going by the evidence inductively, one may not have come up with D2 as a possibility because no one had been that explicit about destroying the individual's mind's grasp of both existence and consciousness. In fact, it may have even been very difficult, if not impossible to even conceive of such nihilistic hatred of the mind pre-Kant.

However, a logic table would have indicated that it would be a possibility, but no one had done it yet. At least not to the extent of Kant.

If I understand you correctly, you are suggesting that the categorical syllogism (or, to use your term, a logic table) might have predicted that a Kant (a complete D2) might have surfaced prior to his actual arrival? If so, then I think this is an interesting thesis, but I'm not sure how your example of independence and virtue ties into this.

Edited by RichardParker
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I disagree with the forms of predication you are giving in your example. In my view, the proper forms should be:

All S is P (Independence is always a virtue);

Some S is P (Sometimes independence is a virtue);

All S is not P (Independence is never a virtue);

Some S is not P (Sometimes independence is not a virtue).

That's very interesting, but I didn't realize that there was a connection to what you are presenting and the syllogism (in terms of predictiveness). And what I am referring to as a logic table does not involve a syllogism; I think it is more the application of the law of excluded middle -- I.e a thing is either A or not-A, there isn't anything in between.

Just to be clear, what I mean by a syllogism is the standard:

All S is P

All Q is S

therefore All Q is P

And what I am getting at is that Dr. Peikoff did not sit down one day and deduce that there must be these classifications of epistemological methodologies from some sort of All S is P beginning point.

Let's go back to my existence exists example. It's either existence or it is not-existence; and it either exists or it not-exists. That gives four possibilities.

Existence exists

Existence does not exist

Not-existence exists

Not-existence does not exist

Note that there is no "some" involved in this type of designation. It's all or nothing.

Where the "some" comes in, for this type of presentation, is that it is possible to be agnostic regarding these four and only four possibilities. As in, sometimes I think existence exists, and sometimes I don't. In other words, sometimes I use existence as my standard of what to think about, and sometimes I just make up something that sounds "reasonable" (to a rationalist mentality). So, sometimes he is fully rational, and at other times he is floating.

Regarding predictiveness, any theory gives one the capability of making predictions. For example, by the theory of evolution, currently living species did not always exist, so any given species had to come from something. Given the fact that birds exist, and the theory of evolution saying that they evolved, then there must have been some pre-bird something that probably had feather but couldn't fly. So, given this, it was rational to go out and look for the "missing link" between non-birds and birds, because it was known that birds didn't always exist.

And Dr. Peikoff is doing this within his DIM Hypothesis. He concluded broadly that there were these five types via induction and studying philosophy qua field. Now, if these philosophic types are taken seriously in all fields, then it is rational to go out and look for M1 in history, in math, in physics, in art, etc.

Let's try this from this perspective, the statement "integrate facts"

Using a logic table one would have

Integrate facts (I)

Integrate not-facts (M2)

Not-integrate facts (D2)

Not-integrate not-facts (D1)

M1 would be integrate facts sometimes, maybe a little bit, but not as a guiding principle for everything one is thinking about; which would lead to a concrete-bound approach with low-level integrations, but everything higher would be floating and have no connection to the perceptually self-evident.

Before Kant, I think it would have been possible to have predicted, in principle, that someone might come along and decide not to put anything together, basically following the ways of the die-hard skeptic, but I don't know that anyone would have been able to have conceived of someone being so virulent and destructive about tearing it all apart. "Not-integrate facts" would have been seen as the skeptic, rather than a persistent destroyer of the work done before him pre-Kant. But if one takes it to the logical extreme, then tearing it apart, or disintegration as a "principle," could have been predicted before Kant.

And in this sense, the D1 mentality would be someone who loves to tear apart rationalistic arguments, but not replace them with anything rational. In other words, the skeptic who is out to destroy any conception of the Forms of Plato, say, but not come up with the Aristotelian, fact-based reply.

I think it is important to realize that Dr. Peikoff is talking about epistemological methodologies, and not necessarily particular philosophers. In other words, it is possible for someone to be "thinking like Kant" without having read Kant, if he is destructive, but not destructive enough to have come up with, say, The Critique of Pure Reason.

Likewise there were rational men in history who may not have heard of Aristotle, but were not able to come up with his philosophy; but they used a rational methodology (at least for the most part).

However, having the explicit philosophy as a guide makes it possible for one to not have to start from scratch. And because it has been "systematized" in some sense, it makes it that much more potent when a similar mentality comes across the philosophy. He can then study the methodology and put it into practice.

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M1 would be integrate facts sometimes, maybe a little bit, but not as a guiding principle for everything one is thinking about; which would lead to a concrete-bound approach with low-level integrations, but everything higher would be floating and have no connection to the perceptually self-evident.

You've got this a little confused with D1. M1 isn't concrete-bound. If anything, being Rationalistic, they are less concerned with concretes than they ought to be. The are integrative and think in principles, but the trouble is that their principles are not based on perception or reality; they are rationalistic floating abstractions. As opposed to M2's, who completely separate their thinking from facts and reality, you will find that M1's are often capable of thinking quite correctly and lucidly in many areas. It's just that, in the end, they never... quite... get it all tied down right.

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Integrate facts (I)

Integrate not-facts (M2)

Not-integrate facts (D2)

Not-integrate not-facts (D1)

Now I'm beginning to understand what you are saying, but shouldn't D2 be a "Not-integrate not-facts"? A complete D2 such as Kant essentially holds the view that there is no reality (not-facts), and even if there were, man has no way of knowing it (Not-integrate).

Let's use art as an analogy. While I like some impressionists, there are some paintings from this period where the image is nearly completely decomposed into dots and you can barely grasp the underlying image(s) the artist had in mind. Using your logic table, it seems this would be a Not-integrate facts (D1)--there still is an underlying image that can barely be grasped (there actually are facts), but it is *nearly* completely decomposed (Not-integrate).

On the other hand, many examples of so-called modern art are merely splashes of ink or paint (or even worse) on a canvas (Not-integrate) and no attempt whatsoever is made to represent any sort of image (not-facts) which would be D2.

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You've got this a little confused with D1. M1 isn't concrete-bound. If anything, being Rationalistic, they are less concerned with concretes than they ought to be.

Actually, I think you are right; "concrete-bound" was the wrong term for what I had in mind. What I had in mind was someone who integrates facts up to a certain level of concepts, but past that level uses floating abstractions that have no tie to reality. So, in that sense, he does integrations sometimes, but not always; which, in a way, puts him in between I and M2. Still, for the law of excluded middle, one would have to say he integrates facts when he does and then goes to integrating not-facts (floating abstractions) when he does that.

This helps me to grasp how useful the M1 classification is. In a way, it accounts for the businessman who is also a Christian. In his business dealings, he's all for profit and is quite rational about doing the best business deals. However, if you start talking to him about something like morality and existence, he switches to giving the good Christian verbiage. He shows a definite concern for this world in his business dealings (unlike the M2), but anything more abstract becomes floating (like the M2).

I'm wondering if this applies to Rush Limbaugh's, "Talent on loan from God" statement. It's like he can be quite rational, and I enjoy listening to him, but then for some higher-level abstractions (such as the founding of this country) he switches almost to saying that God was on their side and that's why they gave thanks to God, because they were Christians, not secularists. The "Talent on loan from God" is him saying that he is following God's plan for him, which is like the M1 "history has a plan" historiography.

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Now I'm beginning to understand what you are saying, but shouldn't D2 be a "Not-integrate not-facts"? A complete D2 such as Kant essentially holds the view that there is no reality (not-facts), and even if there were, man has no way of knowing it (Not-integrate).

Not-integrate not-facts means: "You shouldn't integrate those things which are not facts."

Actually, I think you are right; "concrete-bound" was the wrong term for what I had in mind. What I had in mind was someone who integrates facts up to a certain level of concepts, but past that level uses floating abstractions that have no tie to reality. So, in that sense, he does integrations sometimes, but not always; which, in a way, puts him in between I and M2. Still, for the law of excluded middle, one would have to say he integrates facts when he does and then goes to integrating not-facts (floating abstractions) when he does that.

This helps me to grasp how useful the M1 classification is. In a way, it accounts for the businessman who is also a Christian...

Yes, that's a good way of looking at it.

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Now I'm beginning to understand what you are saying, but shouldn't D2 be a "Not-integrate not-facts"? A complete D2 such as Kant essentially holds the view that there is no reality (not-facts), and even if there were, man has no way of knowing it (Not-integrate).

I was trying to distinguish the type of mentality that tries to destroy (or disintegrate) real, fact-based knowledge (D2), from those who try to destroy rationalistic "castles in the air" (D1). If not-facts means something along the lines of floating abstractions, then it is not as destructive to go after those versus going after an integration of an actual science. In my understanding, the D1 type of mentality can't ground ideas in reality, so he is against system building; and in a sense he considers all types of systems (claimed to be based on reality or not) to not have any real meaning. His attitude would be that they are all floating abstractions, so why bother with them? Past a certain point of abstractness, he doesn't think it is real, so he is concrete-bound. In other words, I am translating "not-integrate not-facts" to mean "disintegrate floating abstractions."

The D2 mentality, on the other hand, doesn't believe there can be any connection to reality (or the facts) on any level on "principle". He has a total destruction of any possibility of a system based on the facts. It not that he doesn't think they are not meaningful, he claims they are utterly impossible, even near the perceptual level, because the perceptual level does not give us reality. In other words, there are no facts with which to even be concrete bound about. So I translate "not-integrate facts" to mean "disintegrate facts" -- all facts, everywhere. Which is definitely D2.

Let's use art as an analogy. While I like some impressionists, there are some paintings from this period where the image is nearly completely decomposed into dots and you can barely grasp the underlying image(s) the artist had in mind. Using your logic table, it seems this would be a Not-integrate facts (D1)--there still is an underlying image that can barely be grasped (there actually are facts), but it is *nearly* completely decomposed (Not-integrate).

On the other hand, many examples of so-called modern art are merely splashes of ink or paint (or even worse) on a canvas (Not-integrate) and no attempt whatsoever is made to represent any sort of image (not-facts) which would be D2.

Art is an interesting case, because the purpose of art is to concretize an abstraction, to make an idea real on the perceptual level. So, I wouldn't say it is an analogy, it is the epistemological methodology made real for all to see.

I agree with you that pointillism and impressionism are D1 art. But, in my understanding they are not disintegrating facts, but rather disintegrating the ideal. In other words, the ideal is not very real to them, which is why they depict it so hesitantly and non-concretely. They can only get an impression of the ideal, rather than grasping it as if it were a fact right in front of them. The style shows that they disdain concepts, but they are still painting (blurry) factual scenes, so they don't disdain facts per se. That's why I think "disintegrate floating abstractions" is more applicable to them (not-integrate not-facts). To them, the ideal is a not-fact, so they want to dispense with it.

So-called "abstract art" of smears on canvas have a complete disdain for facts, and is therefore D2 art. Not only is the ideal not real to them, perceptual reality is not real to them either. That's why they don't depict real things. The impressionists want to paint an impression of the ideal, but the "abstract artists" can't even paint an impression of any fact! That's why I think "not-integrate facts"is more applicable to them (disintegrate facts).

In a sense, one can say that pointillism and impressionism are an assault on consciousness (anti-conceptualization), but "abstract art" is an assault on existence (nihilism).

However, I'm not sure if that follows as a general difference between D1 and D2. That is, I'm not sure that D1 is always an attack on consciousness, whereas D2 is always an attack on existence. If the D1 type of mentality is always concrete-bound, anti-conceptualization, and anti-system building, then I would say it holds true across the board, and not just for art. The D2 mentality is definitely anti-reality across the board -- and without reality, one can't have a consciousness.

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  • 3 weeks later...

Having listened through half the DIM-course I think I am inclined to agree that there are four, not three options, and they are correctly related to the logical exhaustion of combinations. But rather than the positive, negative, contra-positive and contra-negative I think it is more illuminating to think of this as the combinatorics of TWO independent variables, A and B. There are four ways of combining them:

A and B

A and not B

not A and B

not-A and not-B

Let A and B correspond to Disintegration (D) and Misintegration (M) respectively. These are the two fundamental flaws of integration you can make. Then you have the following scheme:

not misintegration and not disintegration = Integration

misintegration and not disintegration = Misintegration

not misintegration and disintegration = Disintegration

This is Peikoffs trichotomy. The one combination that is missing is the synthesis of M and D:

misintegration and disintegration = !?

What on Earth kind of perverse philosophy combines both misintegration and disintegration? In my view, Peikoff fails to consider this possibility and therefore misclassifies certain philosophies. Before I spill the beans let me explain how such a monster can arise. What motivates an M? Why would anyone say that there is some need for mystical integration? Well, I think Peikoff correctly identifies this by saying that it is a reaction to the chaos of the world: the senses can't be trusted, we can't know the world, there is no reality, everything is chaos, so we need supernatural guidance, floating abstractions ==> M. Similarly D is a reaction to misintegration: look at all the fantasizing, people living in their heads, a panoply of contradictory religions etc. You can't trust the mind, all we can trust is what we see with our eyes, concrete facts.

Now, Peikoff sees both of these, but fails to see that it possible to integrate BOTH in one and the same philosophy. What is the primary example of D and M in philosophy? Why, Kant of course! First Kant makes an assault on all our faculties as the means of knowing the world: we can't trust our senses and we can't trust our mind. Then he creates floating abstractions to save a sense of sanity, divine intervention so to speak, appealing to faith.

In other words, first Kant disintegrates the world by severing the link to the external world. THEN he reintroduces order in the world using floating abstractions (M). Therefore I think Kant should be categorized as DM.

Another example of DM is from physics, namely TOE (Theory of everything) in response to QM (quantum mechanics.) Quantum mechanics shatters all causality and all identity, and this essentially shatters the possibility of any objective integrations of facts, and all that is left is the possibility of misintegration. So extreme D in QM leads to extreme M in TOE. Similarly, extreme D in Hume leads to extreme M in Kant.

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I have listened to the entire course since a few days ago, and I don't think there is any need to combine the classifications of DIM in order to explain where each of the classifications come from. M1 and D1 are like weaker versions of M2 and D2, weaker in the sense of not going all the way towards the extremes -- total floating abstractions (M2) or total nihilism (D2).

I think one has to take all of the examples in all of the different fields in order to be clear on how the classifications work. I think this course is one of Dr. Peikoff's best, because of the variety of the examples for each classification -- and he really drives the point home for each classification.

By the end of the course, I understood much more clearly why Dr. Peikoff would advocate voting for the Democrats against the Republicans, because as the Republicans venture closer and closer to M2 religious views, they become less and less connected to reality and would want to impose their views on us with force; because anyone who disagrees is an affront to God; which is a more powerful idealism than those who say we are an affront to the secular State (M2 non-religious stance, i.e. Communism or Socialism).

Though I am pretty sure the DIM classifications cover every philosophic stance that is culturally influential, I'll have to think about that some more. As far as the new trichotomy is concerned, I certainly can't think of any philosophic stance that is not either Disintegrated, Integrated, or Mis-integrated according to Dr. Peikoff's presentation.

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