Would Roark Invite Tooheyites?

[blackdiamond]

Dr. Peikoff did not define what he ment by inherently dishonest ideas aside form giving examples of such.

Do you have an opinion on what he meant by inherently dishonest ideas?

[~Sophia~]

Do you have an opinion on what he meant by inherently dishonest ideas?

I think it means that if someone has all the necessary context (both observations and integrations), something which is expected from intellectual spokesmen/leaders, then there can be no question in one's mind that these ideas are fundamentally dishonest - clearly against reason and reality (and some ideas are more obvious in that respect than others).

Edited May 15, 2007 by ~Sophia~

[blackdiamond]

I think it means that if someone has all the necessary context (both observations and integrations), something which is expected from intellectual spokesmen/leaders, then there can be no question in one's mind that these ideas are fundamentally dishonest - clearly against reason and reality (and some ideas are more obvious in that respect than others).

I'm afraid that will lead you to some problems, Sophi.

Like Kendall, it will be difficult for you to explain how an honest person can hold an inherently dishonest idea while you maintain that definition (or interpretation) of the term (inherently dishonest).

Are you saying that an honest person can not hold an inherently dishonest idea? Or that when an honest person is holding such an idea it is not an inherently dishonest idea?

That would completely defeat the function of the English word "inherently," and would further make that article quite incoherent.

[~Sophia~]

I'm afraid that will lead you to some problems, Sophi.

Like Kendall, it will be difficult for you to explain how an honest person can hold an inherently dishonest idea while you maintain that definition (or interpretation) of the term (inherently dishonest).

Are you saying that an honest person can not hold an inherently dishonest idea? Or that when an honest person is holding such an idea it is not an inherently dishonest idea?

That would completely defeat the function of the English word "inherently," and would further make that article quite incoherent.

Please note that this is not my terminology. Maybe you should ask Dr. Peikoff what he ment. You have asked me to guess what he ment by this term and I think he was saying that those ideas are inherently dishonest but it is possible for a young person to not understand that at first.

[~Sophia~]

I've already said umpteen times that it is possible to morally condemn an idea without morally condemning the person advocating it.

I think this false statement is at the heart of our disagreement. I provided my reasoning in my post #45. I would like Mr. Miovas to adress specifically that post.

[blackdiamond]

Please note that this is not my terminology. Maybe you should ask Dr. Peikoff what he ment. You have asked me to guess what he ment by this term and I think he was saying that those ideas are inherently dishonest but it is possible for a young person to not understand that at first.

I actually think the word is correctly used and that the article is fully coherent. And the only meaning the word has is the meaning it always has: in and of itself. These ideas are dishonest in themselves and no matter who holds them, these ideas should be described as dishonest because that is their inherent nature. Which means you can pass moral judgment ("dishonest" is a moral description, not a "conceptual" evaluation) on an idea. If this requires the context of a particular holder of the idea, 'inherently' would be an absolutely wrong usage.

So, even when a young person becomes a communist or socialist, you can tell him "that's a dishonest idea" or "that's an evil idea (or ideology), darling". But you should not (normally) call that same young person "dishonest" or "evil" because, as you've correctly pointed out, evasion is not the only way to accept these ideas.

This is the only way the word "inherently" makes sense and it is the only way it remains consistent with its definition, and the rest of the article.

Respectfully,

Black.

[~Sophia~]

So, even when a young person becomes a communist or socialist, you can tell him "that's a dishonest idea" or "that's an evil idea (or ideology), darling". But you should not (normally) call that same young person "dishonest" or "evil" because, as you've correctly pointed out, evasion is not the only way to accept these ideas.

Interesting how you inserted 'darling' here as if that was to soften things up.

Ideas are not just floating abstractions in some academic or Platonic dimension. They are not separate from people who advocate them. That is why there are no excuses for someone like Kant or Marx. There is no difference between saying Kant's ideas are immoral and Kant was immoral.

Edited May 15, 2007 by ~Sophia~

[KendallJ]

So, even when a young person becomes a communist or socialist, you can tell him "that's a dishonest idea" or "that's an evil idea (or ideology), darling". But you should not (normally) call that same young person "dishonest" or "evil" because, as you've correctly pointed out, evasion is not the only way to accept these ideas.

I'm a bit confused. It would seem to me that you've just answered [see bold above] your own problem, as stated below. It seems as though you have just provided an example of how an person can be an honest person and can hold an "inherently" dishonest idea. Yet below you seem to demand a false alternative of us (but not of yourself, above)

It seems odd to me that you challenge us, when Peikoff himself gives example of the same.

I'm afraid that will lead you to some problems, Sophi.

Like Kendall, it will be difficult for you to explain how an honest person can hold an inherently dishonest idea while you maintain that definition (or interpretation) of the term (inherently dishonest).

Are you saying that an honest person can not hold an inherently dishonest idea? Or that when an honest person is holding such an idea it is not an inherently dishonest idea?

That would completely defeat the function of the English word "inherently," and would further make that article quite incoherent.

Edited May 15, 2007 by KendallJ

[KendallJ]

An idea subsumes all of the particulars under it. So, when one says "communism" it means: people volitionally violating individual rights; people considering the masses as the unit of society; people urging for the willful destruction of innocent Leo's and Kira's; people fully and consciously taking away peoples lives because they won't follow their orders from The State; people gleefully destroying anybody willing and able to stand out above the ignorant masses; etc., etc.

It's not just a floating abstraction. The term "Communism" has all of those people doing all of those things. And those actions and their motivations are grossly irrational and therefore evil.

That is what it means to say that communism is immoral and evil. Another way of phrasing this is to say that the idea of communism is evil. It means the same thing and has the same referents.

Well, if this truly is your viewpoint, then please address my question in post 59.

If I read you correctly, then you would say that position a) which is what Sophia is advocating actually is a moral condemnation of "an idea" (since it judges the context of an idea in the context of advocacy and practice). In which case, these charges of tolerationist and insinuations of Kelleyite have got to go, and we're just arguing semantics.

You're the one who has continually cast Sophia (and now myself it seems with your last) in that light without substantiation, and if you continue to do it, I'll ask the moderators to take action. It is inflammatory and unnecessary in the context of this discussion.

So, even when a young person becomes a communist or socialist, you can tell him "that's a dishonest idea" or "that's an evil idea (or ideology), darling". But you should not (normally) call that same young person "dishonest" or "evil" because, as you've correctly pointed out, evasion is not the only way to accept these ideas.

Please see my post #59. How does what you say above, differ from position a) which is what I (and I think, although unconfirmed) Sophia advocate. If position a) is what you mean by "that's an evil idea" then we're of similar minds.

[blackdiamond]

Ideas are not just floating abstractions in some academic or Platonic dimension.

I don't know why you and good Kendall keep saying this because no one is saying or suggesting otherwise, and treating them as existents does not necessarily imply platonism. The fact is ideas exist. Once formed, they exist INDEPENDENT of their founder or formulator. This is why a founder can discard the idea, but it will still continue existing, with or without him.

They are not separate from people who advocate them. That is why there are no excuses for someone like Kant or Marx. There is no difference between saying Kant's ideas are immoral and Kant was immoral.

There are no excuses for Kant or Marx simply because they were inevitably exposed to certain facts of reality which should have led them to discard their ideas if they had any integrity, that's all. Younger people are excused simply because they are not exposed to as many facts, logical counter-ideas, counter-examples, and so on. (I have been in a situation where I changed the mind of a young, passionate anti-capitalist, anti-"Western imperialist" within twenty minutes by just giving him some facts he didn't know and pointing out the contradictions in his position, and immediately he started preaching capitalism to his friends, with even greater passion!)

Kantianism will remain immoral even when Kant changes to a moral person. Kantianism exists. The story of Atlas Shrugged exists, and it can be judged as good or bad even without reference to the author or the book's fans.

Objectivism is a good philosophy, whether or not someone proved that its founder didn't mean a word of it and was a hypocrite, etc etc.

I don't believe I can be any clearer than this, so I will excuse myself from the debate at this stage.

Thanks for your responses.

[KendallJ]

I don't know why you and good Kendall keep saying this because no one is saying or suggesting otherwise, and treating them as existents does not necessarily imply platonism. The fact is ideas exist. Once formed, they exist INDEPENDENT of their founder or formulator. This is why a founder can discard the idea, but it will still continue existing, with or without him.

They do exist independant of their founder, but they never exist independant of someone holding them. I think this is the difference. I am trying to decide if we are simply arguing semantics or if there is a substantive difference in the actual actions we are advocating. If you would be so kind as to address the questions I've posed, that will help me make the assessment.

[blackdiamond]

I'm a bit confused. It would seem to me that you've just answered [see bold above] your own problem, as stated below. It seems as though you have just provided an example of how an person can be an honest person and can hold an "inherently" dishonest idea. Yet below you seem to demand a false alternative of us (but not of yourself, above)

It seems odd to me that you challenge us, when Peikoff himself gives example of the same.

Kendall, I have not just answered my problem because my position did not have a problem there. Since ideas can be morally judged independently of their holders, one can be honest while holding an inherently dishonest idea. But when i asked you what "inherently" means, you are the one who said it implies that massive evasion is required on the part of any holder of that idea because it is so far removed from reality. Which means, YOU have a problem explaining how someone can be described as innocent while holding an idea that can only be held by being dishonest.

Sophia departed from you (in order to justify the innocent holders) by saying massive evasion is not the only way to hold to inherently dishonest ideas. And the above response you quoted from me is addressing her position. The problem in her position, though, is that if "inherently dishonest" is a judgment of particular people (not ideas per se) for holding those ideas, and you can not judge those young people and other innocents as "dishonest", then you have to accept that those ideas are not inherently dishonest. Which means you have to say that the author of that article was wrong to refer to them as inherently dishonest ideas. You can't eat your cake and have it too.

Anyway, thanks.

[blackdiamond]

They do exist independant of their founder, but they never exist independant of someone holding them. I think this is the difference.

If by "holding them" you mean - as you can only sensibly mean in this discussion - someone advocating them or believing in them, then you are wrong. The philosophy of Objectivism, or the story of Atlas Shrugged, will continue existing even if EVERYONE stops advocating it or believing in it, as long as it can be identified. And someone will still be able to say whether it is a good philosophy or not, with or without the founder, with or without its advocates. Because this person will be able to judge the philosophy (as good) even without any Objectivists in the world, he will be able to pick it up himself. If he sees that it is evil, he will reject it. The point is that it can be judged without the holders.

I believe I've already said all this, which is why I thought I'll just be repeating myself if I continue with the discussion.

[~Sophia~]

Blackdiamond,

My point is not that one can not morally evaluate ideas in the abstract but rather that when evaluating particular man's ideas morally you can not pretend that you are evaluating abstract ideas separate from the person. Their ideas reflect on them - they know it and you know it.

There no such thing as calling THEIR idea immoral without it reflecting on them.

So what is the difference between saying to someone who is wrong "Listen, I think your idea is wrong and here is why....." and saying "I think your idea is immoral". Well in both cases your evaluation reflects on them (they are wrong - it is a fact - they went wrong somewhere) but in the first case you are allowing room for honest mistake - in the second you are stating a vice as the label of immorality implies NOT innocently mistaken.

What is immorality again:

a breach of morality is the conscious choice of an action you know to be evil, or a willful evasion of knowledge.

One can not be throwing such judgment lightly.

Note that I am not advocating moral toleration - there are cases where there is no room for honest errors - and one has to judge that on case by case bases. What I am advocating is performing moral judgment correctly - and this is not a trival matter - justice demands it. It is crucial to correctly judge the CAUSE.

Kant's ideas once acted upon (released to the world) reflect on him. "Kant's ideas are immoral" contains both a judgment about the effects of his ideas and about his mental process (massive dishonesty of a philosopher - acting against reason and reality) because that is what moral judgment of person's idea is (as explained by Dr. Peikoff in Fact and Value).

When it comes to this inherently dishonest ideas issue - inherently dishonest does not mean self evidently dishonest. That is why intelectually immature can honestly be mistaken about them. A philosopher can not be.

Edited May 15, 2007 by ~Sophia~

[blackdiamond]

Blackdiamond,

My point is not that one can not morally evaluate ideas in the abstract

.

Oh? I obviously misunderstood your statement here:

There is no such thing as morally evaluating an idea as an abstract concept removed from the person who originated it. One can determine if it is true or false but moral evaluation is something totally different.

[~Sophia~]

Oh? I obviously misunderstood your statement here:

QUOTE(~Sophia~ @ May 9 2007, 09:34 PM) There is no such thing as morally evaluating an idea as an abstract concept removed from the person who originated it. One can determine if it is true or false but moral evaluation is something totally different.

I have adressed this already and even in my post above.

Kant's ideas are immoral" contains both a judgment about the effects of his ideas and about his mental process (massive dishonesty of a philosopher - acting against reason and reality) because that is what moral judgment of person's idea is (as explained by Dr. Peikoff in Fact and Value).

When you say communism is immoral it is also a reflection on the faulty mental process that led to this idea, it is a reflection on the person who originated it and let it spread arround as true. There could also be instances when it is truly in the abstract (pondering about a possibility - considering possible mental process) and there is no actor or the actor is unknown. Sometimes an idea is so clearly against reality that - one ought to be evading to hold it - one could make this judgment without being actually faced with a real person holding it.

But this is a tangent to the real issue here - evaluation of particular man's ideas. When there IS an actor - you can not pretend that there is not one.

Edited May 15, 2007 by ~Sophia~

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Sophia, you need to explain this a little further, it is confusing]

[From Post #41 by Sophia]

However, immoral here is not an attribute of the concept "kill' in itself (an object such as a table can not be immoral as a table is not a volitional being facing two alternatives, same thing with an idea) instead it is an attribute of an abstract man (some person facing a choice) in an abstract scenario. There is no such thing as injustice against an abstract person.

While ideas only exist in someone's mind, it had to be created somehow (by some method) and it has to refer to something (it means something). These are the two aspects of the concept that Dr. Peikoff is referring to when he says that an idea can be morally evaluated. One has to look at the mental process (what I am calling morally evaluating the person) and one has to look at the referent (what I call morally evaluating the idea).

Looking at the process will tell you if the person forming the idea was rational (moral) or irrational (immoral); looking at the referent will tell you what would be expected of men if they were to follow it (i.e. they would be expected to massively violate individual rights across the board if they followed communism, which is evil). Because certain ideas, when accepted, would lead to violations of the nature of existence (i.e. God), or individual rights (i.e communism, fascism, etc.), then one has to judge those referentials in the abstract as being immoral or evil -- i.e irrationality and the violation of individual rights is immoral; thus the idea is immoral, because of what the referential man would be doing (being irrational) if he followed it.

Take the idea that Black Diamond mentioned of someone offering the suggestion that the company use bootleg software. This is an evil idea because it means that he and the company would have to violate individual rights in order to follow it. Hence the idea of using bootleg software is an immoral idea, because of what following it would require if put into practice. And someone making that suggestion would at least have to be held in suspicion of having a bad character, because he is advocating violating individual rights. If he just made a mistake, then he would have to show how he was able to remain rational, and yet still come up with the idea of using bootleg software. And a rationalization, such as "It would be cheaper," does not count as being rational (moral).

If one brings one's ideas down to earth instead of floating, then one can certainly judge whether following an idea violates rationality or not; thus one can morally evaluate an idea in both senses: the process that led to it and the consequences of following it.

Edited May 16, 2007 by Thomas M. Miovas Jr.

[blackdiamond]

Sometimes an idea is so clearly against reality that - one ought to be evading to hold it - one could make this judgment without being actually faced with a real person holding it.

So, when you DO meet a real person holding that idea - which is impossible to hold without evasion - why can't you just say the idea is immoral, no matter who the person is?

But this is a tangent to the real issue here - evaluation of particular man's ideas. When there IS an actor - you can not pretend that there is not one.

Sophia.

Your continuous use of the word 'pretend' is reducing your proposition to an "argument from intimidation". I can judge or evaluate a person's idea without morally evaluating that person and this is not pretence. I have failed to understand why this is impossible because i know i can do that.

Someone can call my idea silly without implying that I am a silly person. Someone can call my idea hopeless without implying that i am a hopeless person. Someone can call my idea meaningless without saying that my life has no meaning. The idea does have its own nature and therefore its own parameters of evaluation; otherwise it would have been *impossible* to morally evaluate an idea when its author is unknown as you yourself suggest. Someone can even call my idea good without implying that I am a good person. By simple induction, I see no reason why this rule should change when someone simply calls my idea bad. I can discover why my idea is bad or evil (not just wrong) by the person showing me its effects, etc. If it is shown to have destructive, anti-life, effects, then it is evil, and if it can be shown that I already knew that but took an anti-reality approach, then I am dishonest, which is the only reason why intellectual leaders are properly judged by their ideas.

To keep stating and restating that an idea reflects on the person is to drop context. Sometimes the idea reflects on the person (as in the case of the intellectual leader), sometimes it doesn't (as in the case of innocent errors of knowledge). In both cases, the idea has the same effects when put in practice: good effects or bad effects. And by calling it bad, you are simply stating its effects, irrespective of its source. To merely call it (conceptually) wrong is to deny the person of knowledge of its true effects; it is to remove the context of life (reality) from its existence or practice.

You can of course just say to a person "your idea is wrong, and when you put it into practice it will destroy your life and the lives of others." But wait! A thing that destroys life is called a bad thing or (if it's specifically man-made) an evil thing. That's just its name. So, why can't i say it's a bad thing if it's a bad thing?

[blackdiamond]

Ah. I've just noticed Mr. Movias' post above. Welcome back.

You can continue with the discussion as I take my break. Don't mess up my position!

And no calling anyone Kelleyite!

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

In answer to KendalJ, regarding me saying that Sophia or anyone else arguing against morally evaluating an idea in the sense of saying that the idea is immoral having gotten this from David Kelley:

I simply don't know of anyone else who advocated that one cannot judge an idea as being immoral, in the sense of saying that an idea doesn't have conscious choice and therefore can neither be moral or immoral, aside from David Kelley; and I have a BA degree in philosophy and have studied them all. I just don't remember ever coming across that sort of an argument; aside from Truth and Toleration.

I'm not trying to say that you agree with everything in that track, such as not morally judging a person because he might only be mistaken (which requires evidence); because you do seem to not want to do that, if you have clear evidence that the person's mind is operating in such a way as to show that they are not being rational. So, at least up to this point, I am not saying that they are Moral Tolerationists.

But nobody in this forum has been advocating that ideas have volition and therefore have to be held morally responsible for what they decide to do; and that this is what they mean by morally evaluating an idea.

Nobody has said that; least of all me.

In my opinion, a person would have to be a complete idiot to say that an idea, as a conscious Platonic Form-Space being, is morally responsible for its decisions.*

However, it is sometimes helpful for people in a discussion to state what they think somebody means so that the solution to the misunderstanding can be reached. I would have had no idea that this is what was being misunderstood about my position if KendalJ hadn't come right out and said it.

[*Actually, they wouldn't have to be complete idiots; they might just be die-hard rationalists. After all, there is a sense in which the pseudo-concept "angel" means "a conscious Platonic Form-Space being." But they are so pure in God's Grace that they could never even imagine doing anything immoral.]

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

And no calling anyone Kelleyite!

I'm not actually calling anyone a Kelleyite, strictly speaking. I'm saying I think they either got the idea from Kelley or possibly came up with it on their own.

People can pick up bad ideas and bad methodologies. All I'm suggesting at this point is that this may have been what happened.

[~Sophia~]

QUOTE(~Sophia~ @ May 15 2007, 04:00 PM) Sometimes an idea is so clearly against reality that - one ought to be evading to hold it - one could make this judgment without being actually faced with a real person holding it.

So, when you DO meet a real person holding that idea - which is impossible to hold without evasion - why can't you just say the idea is immoral, no matter who the person is?

If you encounter an adult, sane person holding such idea - then yes you can call it immoral as there is no room here for honest error. I am thinking of a scenario in which such idea is not a complex issue and the person is faced with contradictory to this idea facts often as a part of everyday life - yet is still holding on to it.

But one can not say this regardless of who the person is because, like in the case of a young child, he may not be able to comprehend even this simple idea yet. For example a young child maybe still unclear about the distinction between reality and fantasy (especially if his parents are doing good job bluring that line).

Your continuous use of the word 'pretend' is reducing your proposition to an "argument from intimidation".

It was not my intension.

I can judge or evaluate a person's idea without morally evaluating that person and this is not pretence. I have failed to understand why this is impossible because i know i can do that.

But this is not what I said. I agree - you can conceptually evaluate person's idea without morally evaluating that person.

But like I already mentioned there is a difference between the meaning of conceptual judgment and moral judgement of person's idea. Moral judgement of person's idea builds on conceptual evaluation of his idea but then it means more.

So, lets say this person is wrong. He is guilty of being incorrect. Label of immorality implies more than just being incorrect though - it implies vice. One can be wrong and innocent but one can not be immoral and innocent. The label of immorality does not leave room for this person possibly being wrong due to an honest error/lack of knowledge.

The possitive label of morality of an idea means more than this person being right - it means that this person is right not by accident, not because they accepted this true idea on faith - but they accepted it with understanding.

As per Dr. Peikoffs example - a person can be advocating right ideas and be immoral - if he accepted them on faith.

So, moral/immoral judgment means more than just right/wrong more than idea's effects.

To keep stating and restating that an idea reflects on the person is to drop context. Sometimes the idea reflects on the person (as in the case of the intellectual leader), sometimes it doesn't (as in the case of innocent errors of knowledge).

Ideas are the products of man's mind - they always reflect on him. If an idea is wrong - he is being wrong. Even if he is not immoral - he is still wrong.

The moral judgment of person's idea is in effect a moral judgment on this person because you can not perform moral judgment of HIS idea without evaluating HIS mental process (from Dr. Peikoffs essay).

To merely call it (conceptually) wrong is to deny the person of knowledge of its true effects; it is to remove the context of life (reality) from its existence or practice.

As you noticed, you can say, for example, "your idea is wrong because if implemented it has these... negative effects which perhaps you have not considered." (and btw (as a side not and more of a general comment) if your intension is to effectively communicate right ideas to people whom you suspect maybe simply mistaken then that is how you should approach them if you want them to consider/listen.)

This however is very different from moral condemnation. Moral condemnation implies vice (willful evasion of knowledge or conscious choice to embrace evil). In case of this person being honestly mistaken it is unjust.

[~Sophia~]

I simply don't know of anyone else who advocated that one cannot judge an idea as being immoral, in the sense of saying that an idea doesn't have conscious choice and therefore can neither be moral or immoral, aside from David Kelley; and I have a BA degree in philosophy and have studied them all. I just don't remember ever coming across that sort of an argument; aside from Truth and Toleration.

Or one might have read OPAR pg. 277 under the heading "Justice as Rationality in the Evaluation of Men"

The science that defines a criterion for evaluating volitional beings is morality.

and then connect that with many other discussions on this forum remembering that "morality implies a volitional being facing at least two alternative choices".

In my opinion, a person would have to be a complete idiot to say that an idea, as a conscious Platonic Form-Space being, is morally responsible for its decisions.

A strawman.

[~Sophia~]

While ideas only exist in someone's mind, it had to be created somehow (by some method) and it has to refer to something (it means something). These are the two aspects of the concept that Dr. Peikoff is referring to when he says that an idea can be morally evaluated. One has to look at the mental process (what I am calling morally evaluating the person) and one has to look at the referent (what I call morally evaluating the idea).

I am aware that you are making this split (what you are calling...) and that is where your mistake originates from. Dr. Peikoff is NOT separating the two (cause and effect). He calls them two essential components of moral evaluation of person's idea.

Looking at the process will tell you if the person forming the idea was rational (moral) or irrational (immoral); looking at the referent will tell you what would be expected of men if they were to follow it (i.e. they would be expected to massively violate individual rights across the board if they followed communism, which is evil).

You can not evaluate a mental process without looking at ideas/referent.

Because certain ideas, when accepted, would lead to violations of the nature of existence (i.e. God), or individual rights (i.e communism, fascism, etc.), then one has to judge those referentials in the abstract as being immoral or evil

I am very much aware that you want to blur the line between dealing with ideas in the abstract and dealing with particular person's ideas. This is incorrect and I have already explained why.

Mr. Burgess Laughlin said something which I liked on THE FORUM:

Holding a belief, as such, is neither virtuous nor vicious. How a person arrives at the idea, and why he continues to hold it, is what is subject to moral judgment.

Rationality is a virtue; irrationality is a vice. Even the most rational person can arrive at a wrong conclusion. To do so does not make him vicious. One can be rational and wrong on a particular issue.

Ideas are like guns. The mere possession of them does not indicate moral stature. How one acquires them and what one uses them for are subject to moral judgment.

Edited May 16, 2007 by ~Sophia~

[~Sophia~]

If one brings one's ideas down to earth instead of floating, then one can certainly judge whether following an idea violates rationality or not; thus one can morally evaluate an idea in both senses: the process that led to it and the consequences of following it.

When evaluating one's own ideas one has all the information/insight about one's own mental process. This discussion however has been about moral judgment of another's ideas and a proper method of doing so. Being wrong (an idea being false) is not necessarily an indication of irrationality as even the most rational person can arrive at a wrong conclusion on some issue. There is no "one fits all" when it comes to mental process thus wheather this person is a child or a math prof - is very significant.