Value Depends On Valuer = Subjectivism?

[MisterSwig]

Rand didn't define the concept of "value" as that which one acts to gain and/or keep but only if it is rational or objective.

Actually, she did.

"[T]o choose any value, other than one's own life, as the ultimate purpose of one's actions is to be guilty of a contradiction and of the fallacy of the 'stolen concept.'"

(Ayn Rand, "Letters of Ayn Rand", p. 562)

If you choose something other than life as your ultimate value, you are guilty of acting to gain and/or keep a fallacy. You are not pursuing value. You are pursuing something else, whatever you happen to call it.

Ayn Rand periodically used the term "objective" to modify the concept "values", but I seriously doubt she did this because she believed that "values" should be a broad term, validly modified by other terms such as "subjective" and "intrinsic". No. I think she did it out of sheer necessity. She needed to somehow distinguish her concept of value from all the false, "stolen" ones.

Ayn Rand also modified the concept "reality" with the term "objective". Was this because she believed that, in philosophy, the idea of reality has to be "broader" than objective reality? No. She was distinguishing the truth from falsehoods.

[stephen_speicher]

Actually, she did.

"[T]o choose any value, other than one's own life, as the ultimate purpose of one's actions is to be guilty of a contradiction and of the fallacy of the 'stolen concept.'"

(Ayn Rand, "Letters of Ayn Rand", p. 562)

Huh? Clearly here Ayn Rand is saying that my life is my purpose, which is an entirely different from jrshep's point which you quote above. In fact, if you read the overall context in which she made that remark, she was trying to explain to philosopher John Hospers the difference between a standard and a purpose in regard to "my life."

If you want reference Ayn Rand in attempting to refute the (in my view obviously correct) point in regard to "value" that jrshep made, you will have to provide a quote from Ayn Rand that actually addresses that issue.

[hippie]

"In order for something to be a value, there has to be a person who values it."

This whole topic is a very fair question, and this is precisely what Ayn was not saying--though it is a good attempt at understanding it. Ayn Rand was opposed to the Kantian idea that all things have a value in themselves, and that man must figure out what it is. It is not merely that there must be a person to understand the intrinsic value of a thing, but that the facts of reality dictate a rational value of a given thing, at a given time, for a given purpose, in a given context. For instance, a horse-drawn carriage has no intrinsic value. For a person in the 18th century, who has no car but wishes to transport goods to a market, for the purpose of getting money, in order to further his life, a wagon has a value. But for a person today, it has less of a value because the facts of reality today are different.

That is not to say that values are subjective, though. Facts dictate a particular, rational value, but facts change. Perhaps only in that sense is value subjective, but that is not what subjectivists propose. Subjectivists propose that values may be derived from non-facts or irrelevant facts. E.g., I value killing because I feel like it. Feeling like it is not a relevant fact of reality to determine value. Given the facts of existence--that man is a producer who will contribute to one's life more when alive than dead--it is objectively, rationally wrong to kill. It is much like an equation with variables. The variables are the facts, but the unchanging concept that directs life is the equation. And the answer that results is right or wrong, not subject to whims or irrational thought.

I must ask, Rocinante, have you been satisfied about the matter?

[Rocinante]

I must ask, Rocinante, have you been satisfied about the matter?

It's given me much food for thought, although I haven't completely resolved this matter in my own mind just yet. Some of the arguments are a bit circular (defining a concept with itself) and a lot of the responses miss the point completely and just muddle the issue (although even a few of those had some interesting tidbits to consider.) I'm going to save this thread as it is thus far to mull over and look into some of the materials that were referenced.

Maybe it would help to explain how I am approaching this. In my mind, "objective" means independent of consciousness, or existing outside of consciousness (as in, the material world/universe.) Obviously, the universe is indifferent to *us* - it doesn't care about (value) our existence, it doesn't care if our molecules are scattered to the winds. In my mind, "subjective" means, relating to the subject/perceiver. Ms. Speicher (whom I highly esteem!) defined subjective as being the primacy of consciousness (in essence). Maybe this is where my mistake is. I can assert that my life is a value, of course. Ms. Speicher stated that this is a personal value, as I understand her reply.

One of the reasons I want to know whether life is an objective value (or, a value in itself, which would make it an intrinsic value, wouldn't it? [which this last I don't think is true, because I recall that there are no intrinsic values; value depends on a valuer]) is because it is the basis for individual rights (along with the necessitating factor of our means of survival, Reason, etc.) This always leads me into arguments with other people where I cannot fully explain or defend my position, because it comes back to an argument of being a subjective (and therefore arbitrary) basis, which puts it in the same category as "rights come from god" or similar indefensible ideas. People who argue that everything is subjective and/or relative frustrate me

Just for the sake of clarity, I am talking about moral values, not physical (since some replies went into the differences there. )

I can assert that "life is a value in itself" and this appears self-evident to *us* (us being those who accept this idea and embrace life! People can, however, embrace life without necessarily accepting that idea) but is this idea axiomatic/objective (as Betsy stated "Objective" means in accordance with the facts of reality") ? Isn't saying that anything is a value in itself instrincism?

Erf... I'm digging my hole deeper.. I have a pretty good grasp of Objectivism, but as I stated initially, this part is a conundrum for me. Maybe I'm looking too deep?

Small bites...Baby steps..

[stephen_speicher]

One of the reasons I want to know whether life is an objective value (or, a value in itself, which would make it an intrinsic value, wouldn't it? [which this last I don't think is true, because I recall that there are no intrinsic values; value depends on a valuer])...

I discussed this very issue, with reference to Ayn Rand, in a series of posts starting at: http://forum.ObjectivismOnline.com/index.p...indpost&p=39801

My posts continue on into pages 2 and 3 of the thread.

[Edit: I should add that the points I made were considered controversial by several other posters.]

Edited June 9, 2004 by stephen_speicher

[hippie]

Ah, we are working on different definitions of “objective”, which may be the heart of any misunderstanding. I have heard several non-Objectivists use the term “objective” to describe intrinsic values, as Immanuel Kant argued. Ayn Rand went to great lengths to refute that idea as absurd, unfounded, and psychologically detrimental. What is meant by “objective” in Objectivist discussions is more like “rational” (I do not, however, think “objective” is the wrong term, since in the sciences it is used to mean a judgment based on facts which are drawn to a necessary conclusion.). As I’ve explained, rational is different from intrinsic—a proponent of intrinsic values would say that a wagon always has a value in any situation. An Objectivist denies this—a wagon only has a value to the right person at the right time, in the right context, for the right end.

Also, when we say that life is a value in itself, that does not just mean subsisting but a happy life. Happiness is simply an automatic value, like pleasure. Subjectivists simply refuse to believe that this value is automatic and ask us to prove that it is a good. But, as with any axiom, you cannot go underneath it. And automatic does not mean intrinsic. It simply means that we cannot rationally deny it as human beings, though we can deny it irrationally. “Intrinsic” means that it is true, regardless of any observer. It is like there are five dimensions to existence: length, width, depth, time, and value. A thing that is valuable in itself does not mean that there is a value necessarily present within the object alone, but rather that it is a necessary value because of the identity of the object and the identity of the valuer.

[MisterSwig]

The concept, "value," is morally neutral in the sense that it encompasses all values, not just rational values.

After listening to lecture 3 from Dr. Peikoff's "Unity in Epistemology and Ethics" course, I think I see the confusion here. In this lecture, Dr. Peikoff argues that the term "value" belongs to a special category of concepts which require two different definitions for the same concept. Both definitions are valid and "essential to the development and unity of knowledge," yet they are not equivalent in meaning. The first definition is a broad definition, which must serve as the base and "necessary precondition" for the narrower second definition.

The only difference is that the second definition is united with a certain use of free will.

Dr. Peikoff argues that the broad definition of "value" is "that which one acts to gain and/or keep," as Ayn Rand said. But, he argues, there is also a second, narrower definition of "value", which is derived from the first definition. In the second sense, the Objectivist sense, "value" means "that which one acts to gain and/or keep which furthers life."

"The first [definition], the general one, permits integration of data across a whole category, like living beings, man, whatever it is, regardless of how free will is used. And the second, which is a subcategory, gives you the normative guidance. And I would say, therefore, the second permits the integration of the same data that was in the first with an objective standard. And that permits you to differentiate and morally evaluate individual men according to the way they use their free will."

On one hand, he argues, you can say that someone is pursuing a value, any value, in the broad sense. But, on the other hand, you can also say that they are not really pursuing a value, in the narrower sense, because they have not chosen a life-sustaining value or standard.

He goes on to argue that though this seems like a paradox, it is not. The second definition is dependant upon discovery of the first. Also, he argues that the same term must be used for both definitions, because they refer to the same data, only in one case free will is taken into consideration.

It is a very important lecture. Anyone interested in understanding values better should listen to it. I won't attempt to explain more, because I am still trying to understand and digest the material myself.

[Guest jrshep]

He goes on to argue that though this seems like a paradox, it is not.

So some values are values, and some values are not values, and someone who is pursuing a value is not necessarily pursuing a value because not all values are values, and what they value is not necessarily a value, and if saying so is confusing, the confusion lies in the fact that a person has failed to grasp that the same term, "values," is being used for the same concept, "values" and "values," only that the seemingly two concepts are but one concept, not equivalent, but the same?

This certainly points to the value of using differing terms to denote differing concepts of "value."

Edited June 12, 2004 by jrshep

[Rocinante]

(stephen_speicher @ May 5 2004, 09:51 AM)

"Since I regard all values as contextual and hierarchical, I would ultimately regard only one good as "intrinsic," in your sense of the term, namely: life.

-- Ayn Rand, "Letters of Ayn Rand," p. 561

[Edit: copied my reply from the thread referred to by Stephen Speicher.]

Ahh, now this is one book I have not yet obtained. The only posthumous book of Ayn Rand that I have is the "Early Ayn Rand" (short stories/plays.) And yes this does answer my question! I had the gut feeling this had to be an "intrinsic" value but couldn't reconcile that with the other knowledge I have already about Objectivism.

Thanks again for the replies!

[Betsy]

So some values are values, and some values are not values, and someone who is pursuing a value is not necessarily pursuing a value because not all values are values, and what they value is not necessarily a value, and if saying so is confusing, the confusion lies in the fact that a person has failed to grasp that the same term, "values," is being used for the same concept, "values" and "values," only that the seemingly two concepts are but one concept, not equivalent, but the same?

This certainly points to the value of using differing terms to denote differing concepts of "value."

Actually, it is a matter of the same concept in different contexts.

The wider concept of value is a metaphysical concept which denotes what a value is in reality -- something a living thing acts to gain and/or keep.

The narrower concept of value is a normative concept which denotes what a person ought to gain and/or keep.

This is similar to the way that "force" in the context of physics and in the context of politics are related, but different.

[Guest jrshep]

Actually, it is a matter of the same concept in different contexts.

The wider concept of value is a metaphysical concept which denotes what a value is in reality -- something a living thing acts to gain and/or keep.

The narrower concept of value is a normative concept which denotes what a person ought to gain and/or keep.

This is similar to the way that "force" in the context of physics and in the context of politics are related, but different.

Betsy,

Thank you for your response. (And thank you, MisterSwig, for mentioning what you've learned from the Peikoff tape. I hope you'll add more as you continue to listen.)

I understand the distinction between metaphysical values and normative values, that the former is broader than the latter, but I do not understand why "value" is considered to be the same concept, when referring shorthand to "metaphysical values" and "normative values", but with two differing definitions due to differing contexts, when the units subsumed, although they overlap, are not the same.

This seems to fly in the face of the very function of a concept, the identification of the specific units it subsumes, exhaustively and exclusively.

I can understand using the same term, in different contexts, to stand for different concepts, but not the same term to stand for the same concept but with different units. How can the term, "value," be said to refer to the same concept but with different units (identified by differing definitions), even if there is some overlap?

With respect to your analogy with "force," were you saying that force as used in physics and politics is the same concept?

[Guest jrshep]

Betsy, I think I now understand this, and my previous post is perhaps only confusing.

The concept of "force" is the same concept (perhaps "power to affect or cause change") whether the context is physics or politics, but within the differing contexts, it refers to different things, and the context is implicitly understood. When a politician speaks of force, we understand that he is referring to political power or force, and when the physicist speaks of force, we understand that he is referring to physical power or force, for instance.

So too, broadly speaking, philosophically, value is a metaphysical concept. But in a normative context, it's a normative concept (at least implicitly understood), and the referents are delimited by the delimited context. In both cases "value" is that which one acts to gain and or keep, but the "that" differs with this change in the context. The concept "value" remains the same, but within a differing context, it points to different units, just like the concept of "force."

So, perhaps the only problem is that one has to specify the different contextual usages one is employing when one says, "…some values are values, and some values are not values, and someone who is pursuing a value is not necessarily pursuing a value because not all values are values, and what they value is not necessarily a value…," so as not to equivocate on the concept, "value." Or perhaps more correctly, so as not to equivocate on the context of the concept, "value."

[Betsy]

I can understand using the same term, in different contexts, to stand for different concepts, but not the same term to stand for the same concept but with different units. How can the term, "value," be said to refer to the same concept but with different units (identified by differing definitions), even if there is some overlap?

Actually, metaphysical value and normative value are two DIFFERENT -- but related -- concepts. Normative values are a subset of metaphysical values. You know WHICH concept you mean by the context, i.e. whether you are talking about what cats do vs. what people ought to do. If the context isn't clear you qualify it by, perhaps, adding the adjective "metaphysical" or the "normative" before the word "value."

With respect to your analogy with "force," were you saying that force as used in physics and politics is the same concept?

No. "Force" is like "value" in that you have two different, but related, concepts denoted by the same word and you judge the word's meaning from the context in which it is used.