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Why Objectivists Should Embrace Nietzsche

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Gabriel

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I dont recall Rand mentioning this in IOE; do you have a page cite handy?
The fact that truth is not "out there" is all over the Objectivist literature but it is covered explicitly in IOE on page 48:

Truth is the product of the recognition (i.e., identification) of the facts of reality.
"Identification" is the essence of Ayn Rand's view of consciousness and it is this relationship between a mind and reality that constitutes truth. Dr. Peikoff expands on this in OPAR (p. 165):

The concept of "truth" identifies a type of relationship between a proposition and the facts of reality. "Truth," in Ayn Rand's definition, is "the recognition of reality."(8) In essence, this is the traditional correspondence theory of truth: there is a reality independent of man, and there are certain conceptual products, propositions, formulated by human consciousness. When one of these products corresponds to reality, when it constitutes a recognition of fact, then it is true. Conversely, when the mental content does not thus correspond, when it constitutes not a recognition of reality but a contradiction of it, then it is false.

Anyway, I assume this is just a variant on the "knowledge = justified true beilef" claim in contemporary philosophy?
Dr. Peikoff ties in the Objectivist view of truth to the traditional correspondence theory of truth but I would be very careful about futher relating it to "justified true belief" as found in contemporary philosophy. You cannot have a correct theory of truth without a correct theory of concepts and it is here that contemporary philosophy is most out of touch with the truth. Observe how one of the better philosophers in this regard, Keith Lehrer, spends almost two-hundred pages developing his theory with no reference to a theory of concepts. Once you understand how concepts are formed and why they are objective, then you don't even need a "theory" of truth. It just naturally falls out of the process of concept-formation.
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I dont recall Rand mentioning this in IOE; do you have a page cite handy?

"Truth is the product of the recognition (i.e., identification) of the facts of reality." [iTOE, p. 28]

Ayn Rand used slightly different wordings to characterize truth in other writings, but I particularly like this definition because it highlights the epistemological part of truth. There is a metaphysical part of truth -- "the facts of reality" -- and an epistemological part of truth -- the "product of the recognition."

Anyway, I assume this is just a variant on the "knowledge = justified true beilef" claim in contemporary philosophy?
Not really. Knowledge is "a mental grasp of a fact(s) of reality, reached either by perceptual observation or by a process of reason based on perceptual observation." [iTOE, p. 35]

I recall hearing a story about how the structure of the benzene ring came to its discoverer after he had a dream about a serpent eating its tail; not sure if this is actually true.

I cannot help but ask: If you are "not sure if this is actually true," then why did you speak with such authority to Ash, claiming what he said as being "nonsense."

Anyway, your example is one of the standard ones offered by those who seek to justify a non-rational and non-objective approach to science. To the man, those who offer such arguments are ignorant of history, ignorant of science, and ignorant of fact. You are here referring to Friedrich August von Kekule, whose 1865 paper (Annalen der Chemie, V. 137: pp. 129 – 196, 1865) announced to the world that he had discovered the ring structure of benzene.

Kekule, of course, was immersed in this problem for a long period of time. His subconcscious dream was simply an integration of all the thinking he had already done.

"I turned my chair to the fire [after having worked on the problem for some time] and dozed. Again the atoms were gamboling before my eyes. This time the smaller groups kept modestly to the background. My mental eye, rendered more acute by repeated vision of this kind, could not distinguish larger structures, of manifold conformation; long rows, sometimes more closely fitted together; all twining and twisting in snakelike motion."

Kekule was smart enough to know not even to accept his subconscious insight without the scrutiny and rigor of conscious thought and logic. Those who wish to make the event appear as a mystical insight, are fond of quoting part of the words that Kekule used when he later related his experience. His oft quoted sentence:

"Let us learn to dream, gentlemen, then perhaps we shall find the truth..."

is rarely followed by his next statement:

"...but let us beware of publishing our dreams before they have been put to the proof by the waking understanding."

I will not waste my time with your other examples. Please learn the facts -- the history and the science -- before you call other people's ideas "nonsense."

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I'll reply to the above post later since I'm going out just now, but I feel I should point out that I edited 'like nonsense' to 'wrong' just before stephen posted his initial reply. I didn't notice that he had quoted it (or even read it) until a few minutes ago, and I went back just now to edit it back in so that the above exchange would make more sense , but the forum doesnt seem to be letting me change my post.

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I do not want to speak for Ash, but I take him to be expressing, in his own words, the Objectivist notion of truth as being objective, i.e., as that which corresponds to facts, as grasped by the rational mind. So, should a theory arrive at a fact, but the theory itself not contain the proper reasoning leading to that fact, then the theory does not actually represent a truth... To arrive at a truth requires a proper reasoning process, not simply an arbitrary or lucky stumbling over a fact.

This is not a uniquely Objectivist point. Non-Objectivist epistemologists often give examples of people arriving at a belief that corresponds to the facts by incorrect means to show that it does not represent knowledge in their minds (thus, the qualifier "justified" attached to "true belief" in the common definition of knowledge).

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This is not a uniquely Objectivist point.  Non-Objectivist epistemologists often give examples of people arriving at a belief that corresponds to the facts by incorrect means to show that it does not represent knowledge in their minds (thus, the qualifier "justified" attached to "true belief" in the common definition of knowledge).

Except that "belief" is not rational conviction, "true" is not the same as fact, and "justified" is not necessarily the same as a process of reason.

Ayn Rand defined knowledge as "a mental grasp of a fact(s) of reality, reached either by perceptual observation or by a process of reason based on perceptual observation." [iTOE, p. 35]

Show me a philosopher's epistemological statement regarding "justified true belief" that corresponds to the essence of Ayn Rand's definition of knowledge. I will be delighted to see such a philosopher, assuming he was not already influenced by Ayn Rand.

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This is somewhat outside of this thread, but you should read some of the recent posts by Dr. Binswanger on HBL, Ash. He addressed the subject of what the proper definition of knowledge should be, and why today's popular "justified true belief" is wholly inadequate. And I know you're on HBL, 'cause I saw you post there, unless you cancelled your membership recently.

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"but I believe she admired his sense-of-life. " -Evangelical Capitalist

Nope.  His sense-of-life was very dark, pessimistic, and all in all nihilistic.

In Ayn Rand's earlier days, late 1920s to early 1930s, she admired what she saw as Nietzsche's portrayal of an heroic sense of life. See Journals of Ayn Rand, p. 21.

"All of the above confusions reflect the influence on the early AR of Friedrich Nietzsche, whom she had read and admired, especially for his eloquent expression of a heroic sense of life."

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I was not speaking about that in particular, but about her comment in the 25th. Aniv. Introduction, which I thought that I should add,

"Philosophically, Nietzsche is a mystic and an irrationalist. His metaphysics consists of a somewhat "Byronic" and mystically "malevolent" universe..." Introduction, The Fountainhead-pg. x

However, she did admire, "...he projects at times (not consistently) a magnificent feeling for man's greatness, expressed in emotional, not intellectual terms." Introduction, The Fountainhead-pg. x

When EC said, "...admired his sense of life...", I took it to mean a sum of Nietzsche's sense of life, which is as I said-dark, pessimistic, and nihilistic. I drew a difference between her admiration of his emotion in regards to mankinds greatness and between his sense of life.

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Actually Stephen I've decided that you're correct and I don't currently know enough about the history of science to pursue this further at present.

I am glad to see that you are being honest about this.

It is terribly unfortunate that there are professionals who mischaracterize facts in order to suit their purpose. The time I have invested in learning the history of physics was primarily for the purpose of understanding ideas in action. But I have also had to spend an inordinate amount of time researching facts in order to just counter spurious arguments. I say this because I completely understand how easy it is for someone only casually interested in the subject to pick up and repeat very wrong ideas and approaches. As much as I love the internet I'm afraid that its development has made it all that more easy for dis-information to disseminate.

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Except that "belief" is not rational conviction, "true" is not the same as fact, and "justified" is not necessarily the same as a process of reason.

Ayn Rand defined knowledge as "a mental grasp of a fact(s) of reality, reached either by perceptual observation or by a process of reason based on perceptual observation." [iTOE, p. 35]

Show me a philosopher's epistemological statement regarding "justified true belief" that corresponds to the essence of Ayn Rand's definition of knowledge. I will be delighted to see such a philosopher, assuming he was not already influenced by Ayn Rand.

I'm well aware of all of that, and was assuming much of it. My post was only intended in the very delimited context of answering Spearmint's question about whether something is genuine knowledge as long as it corresponds to the facts, even if arrived at by non-objective means. Many, if not most, contemporary epistemologists at least implicitly recognize this, and my post was not meant as agreement with anything beyond this one little point. I obviously disagree with the "justified true belief" definition of knowledge. I had originally heavily qualified my previous post to this effect, but then deleted the qualifications before posting it because I did not think they were necessary. But now I see that they were, and am having to provide them now.

Free Capitalist--I haven't been on HBL since some time in May. I wasn't sure that I would have the time or computer access this summer to continue my subscription. I will definitely renew it by this fall. Maybe if the relevant posts are still in the archives by then I can go back and look at them.

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  • 4 years later...

Nietzsche is sometimes and with some justification considered anti-reason, but I think this ignores the passages where he talks about reason as a control and subjugation of the emotions. These are the passages where he's criticizing Luther and Kant.

I would draw people's attention to this passage, from On the Genealogy of Morals, Third Essay, section 12:

Assuming that such an incorporate will to contradiction and counter-nature can be made to philosophize: on what will it vent its inner arbitrariness? On that which is experienced most certainly to be true and real: it will look for error precisely where the actual instinct of life most unconditionally judges there to be truth. For example, it will demote physicality to the status of illusion like, the ascetics of the Vedanta philosophy did, similarly pain, plurality, the whole conceptual antithesis 'subject' and 'object' -- errors, nothing but errors! To renounce fatih in one's own ego, to deny one's own 'reality' to oneself -- what a triumph! -- and not just over the senses, over the appearance, a much higher kind of triumph, an act of violation and cruelty inflicted on reason: a voluptuousness which reaches its peak when the ascetic self-contempt and self-ridicule of reason decrees: 'there is a realm of truth and being, but reason is firmly excluded from it!'... (By the way: even in the Kantian concept of 'the intelligible character' means, in Kant, a sort of quality of things about which all that the intellect can comprehend is that it is, for the intellect -- completely incomprehensible.) -- Finally, as knowers, let us not be ungrateful towards such resolute reversals of familiar perspectives and valuations with which the mind has raged against itself for far too long, apparently to wicked and useless effect: to see differently, and to want to see differently to that degree, is no small discipline and preparation of the intellect for its future 'objectivity' -- the latter understood not as 'contemplation without interest' (which is, as such, a non-concept and an absurdity), but as having in our power our 'pros' and 'cons': so as to be able to engage and disengage and them so that we can use the difference in perspectives and affective interpretations for knowledge. From now on, my philosophical collegues, let us be more wary of the dangerous old conceptual fairy-tale which has set up a 'pure, will-less, painless, timeless, subject of knowledge', let us be wary of the tentacles of such contradictory concepts as 'pure reason', 'absolute spirituality', knowledge as such': -- here we are asked to think an eye which cannot be thought at all, an eye turned in no direction at all, an eye where the active and interpretative powers are to be suppressed, absent, but through which seeing still becomes a seeing-something, so it is an absurdity and non-concept of eye that is demanded. There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective 'knowing'; the more affects we allow to speak about a thing, the more eyes, various eyes we are able to use for the same thing, the more complete will be our 'concept' of the thing, our 'objectivity'. But to eliminate the will completely and turn off all the emotions without exception, assuming we could: well? would that not mean to castrate the intellect?... (Italics his, bold mine)

This sounds like Rand speaking with a German accent. These are the exact same criticisms--albeit made with more relish for the enemy than spit--that Rand and other Objectivists make when they criticize Kant for setting up reason to fail: For constructing a "pure" reason which is free from all means of knowledge. This is the same condemnation of the thought that man should have to neuter his own humanity in order to engage intellectual projects, and that he must divorce his wants and his emotions from his reason. It is the same assertion that embraces the fact that we are limited creatures, and ridicules the standard of knowledge that should make us omniscient gods before we could claim anything at all. Nietzsche's recommendation, made sloppier in his youth than in his mature life, is to consume human life whole and not shy away from it. Accept that we are living, corpulent creatures, that we have emotions, that they figure into our reasoning. We pursue art because it makes our lives lighter and better; we pursue food and sex because we have an "interest" in them, they are deeply personal and a part of our perspective, none of which denies their rationality.

I wouldn't dream of saying that Nietzsche was perfectly rational, or that his ethics were flawless--but I think even people who have here talked about taking in Nietzsche's context haven't fully appreciated it.

[Edit for style tags, no content change.]

Edited by aleph_0
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Aleph, by your standard, Kant was a pretty swell guy. I don't mean to be facetious, sorry. It's just that, people point out passages where Kant said good things too, for example, he said that it is ridiculous to ask for a proof of reality, because reality is the standard of proof. Cool, eh? Of course this ignores the context that he was writing in, that this 'proof' is ultimately meaningless anyway, because all it proves is the phenomenal world. It says nothing about the perfect, noumenal world.

Similarly, I'm not going to sit here and discredit Nietzsche on every point here, but simply point out that Nietzsche had some great quotes, when read out of context, but when you read them in context, they are part of an orchestrated attack on the mind. I highly recommend you get ahold of the lecture, if it has been recorded yet, 'Ayn Rand Contra Nietzsche'.

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I just gave a huge amount of context, but if you need more, it's all in the Third Essay in On the Genealogy of Morals--or, better still, the whole of the same book. In context, this is exactly what Nietzsche is saying. Marshall some text and prove me wrong. I'll obviate his attack on truth, which though misguided, says nothing about this rejection of Kant in exactly the way that Objectivists do.

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First, the book seems pretty obscure and inaccessible. Second, passages can sometimes make Nietzsche look like a racist, and at times he probably was. He seems to have repudiated most (or all) of it by the Third Essay. He explicitly rails against the anti-Semites with disdain; here, talk about blood seems more like talk about national culture and, at most, some kind of obscure notion of a physiological basis for morality.

I maintain that passages where people point out Nietzsche's anti-reason often or always refer to passages in which he takes reason to be a control and subjugation of the emtions, and not to be the identification of reality. Thus, when he scoffs at reason, he is referring to something other than what Objectivists talk about.

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In another thread I posted this quote that I'd been trying for years to find again:

But, as a poet, he projects at times (not consistently) a magnificent feeling for man’s greatness, expressed in emotional, not intellectual, terms.
from the “Introduction to The Fountainhead,” The Objectivist March 1968, 6.

Andrew Berstein mentions a similar statement in his The Fountainhead Cliff's Notes, too:

But Nietzsche does, at times, project an exalted view of the human potential, expressed in emotional, not intellectual terms.

I think that my favorite book of his is Thus Spoke Zarathustra for his use of figurative language, which speaks emotionally and personally to me, and at times, for me.

"I overcame myself, the sufferer; I carried my own ashes to the mountains; I invented a brighter flame for myself."

"You shall build over and beyond yourself, but first you must be built perpendicular in body and soul. You shall not only reproduce yourself, but produce something higher. May the garden of marriage help you in that!"

"He who has a goal and an heir will want death to come at the right time for his goal and heir."

"The will cannot will backwards; and that he cannot break time and time's covetousness, that is the will's lonliest melancholy."

"Whence come the highest mountains? I once asked. Then I learned that they came out of the sea. The evidence is written in thier rocks and in the walls of their peaks. It is out of the deepest depth that the highest must come to its height."

"Whoever writes in blood and aphorisms does not want to be read but to be learned by heart. In the mountains the shortest way is from peak to peak: but for that one must have long legs. Aphorisms should be peaks - and those adressed tall and lofty."

Those are all quotes from a Walter Kaufmann translation I have of TSZ. Also, besides this, I really enjoy many of Nietzsche's musical compositions, especially one titled Eine Sylversternaght.

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I maintain that passages where people point out Nietzsche's anti-reason often or always refer to passages in which he takes reason to be a control and subjugation of the emtions, and not to be the identification of reality. Thus, when he scoffs at reason, he is referring to something other than what Objectivists talk about.

This back and forth claim of out of contextness is not where the better analyses I've seen start. Ridpath has done the most work on the differences between Rand and Neitchze, and while admitting that he himself first thought neitchze could be compatible with Rand, he has since determined that he is her antithesis. He has 2 other lectures on Neitchze besides the one mentioned.

As to the obscurity of the Objectivist Forum, you want me to send you the passages?

The better attempts I've seen that discredit him are actually in an attempt to integrate what he says about one concept with what he says about another. THat is, I believe that he practices the stolen concept a lot. He uses the will in one section as backdrop for discussion of tsomething else, making it seem plausible, until you understand, from another section what he actually means by the use of will (as in will to power). This is not context dropping, but exposing him at the level of integration.

I'm not a Neitchziean so arguing finer philosophical points with me or anyone here is probalby not going to go far, but that doesn't mean the arguments have not been made by those who have taken the time to do so.

Rand contra Neitchze was a very good lecture. I'd be interested to see what anyone who knows more Neitchze than I do has to say about it.

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First, the book seems pretty obscure and inaccessible. Second, passages can sometimes make Nietzsche look like a racist, and at times he probably was. He seems to have repudiated most (or all) of it by the Third Essay. He explicitly rails against the anti-Semites with disdain; here, talk about blood seems more like talk about national culture and, at most, some kind of obscure notion of a physiological basis for morality.

I maintain that passages where people point out Nietzsche's anti-reason often or always refer to passages in which he takes reason to be a control and subjugation of the emtions, and not to be the identification of reality. Thus, when he scoffs at reason, he is referring to something other than what Objectivists talk about.

Wow, with this defence, who needs enemies? I was actually about to look into this litlle book, now you've completely turned me off of it.

Did he write anything less "obscure" and convoluted I can check out, to see if I get a taste for it?

[edit] Sorry, I think you are saying the Objectivist Forum is obscure, but not the book. In that case, never mind. (obscure is relative, but I haven't found it inaccessible, as far as I've checked it out)

Edited by Jake_Ellison
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This back and forth claim of out of contextness is not where the better analyses I've seen start. Ridpath has done the most work on the differences between Rand and Neitchze, and while admitting that he himself first thought neitchze could be compatible with Rand, he has since determined that he is her antithesis. He has 2 other lectures on Neitchze besides the one mentioned.

That sounds somewhat promising. Though I strongly doubt, from my readings, that Nietzsche is either compatible with or antithetical to Rand.

As to the obscurity of the Objectivist Forum, you want me to send you the passages?

On two conditions: They're not terribly long (longer than 15 pages?), and they're not copyrighted. If so, I'll read them over Christmas break.

The better attempts I've seen that discredit him are actually in an attempt to integrate what he says about one concept with what he says about another. THat is, I believe that he practices the stolen concept a lot. He uses the will in one section as backdrop for discussion of tsomething else, making it seem plausible, until you understand, from another section what he actually means by the use of will (as in will to power). This is not context dropping, but exposing him at the level of integration.

That's interesting, but something that I suspect might require a reading in the original German, which I couldn't do. He does use "will" quite a lot and in a very distinct way--I could imagine equivocation or something tantamount to stolen concept, but I wouldn't buy it just yet.

Wow, with this defence, who needs enemies? I was actually about to look into this litlle book, now you've completely turned me off of it.

Did he write anything less "obscure" and convoluted I can check out, to see if I get a taste for it?

[edit] Sorry, I think you are saying the Objectivist Forum is obscure, but not the book. In that case, never mind. (obscure is relative, but I haven't found it inaccessible, as far as I've checked it out)

I've never met a writer who was flawless, and I have my criticisms of Nietzsche--much less than I have praise, though, and much less criticism than I have for the uninspired or plainly wrong.

He wrote obscure passages. It's sometimes part of his charm, and it certainly fits with his idea that all language is metaphore. But if this much has put you off from Nietzsche, I'm not sure anything he wrote will turn you on.

... Oh yes, the "book" to which I referred was the Objectivist Forum thing. But I also mentioned the "obscure" concept of physiology in Nietzsche's writing, which confused me. No, not all of Nietzsche is obscure. Hopefully the above quote, with commentary, was fairly clear. It's about as clear as he ever writes.

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On two conditions: They're not terribly long (longer than 15 pages?), and they're not copyrighted. If so, I'll read them over Christmas break.

That's a good point. If the first, I'll consider whether it's a case of "fair use" regarding the 2nd. (which I'm sure someone will have something to say about here. :lol:)

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