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The Prudent Predator argument

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Gary Brenner

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Again, ethics is a set of principles of right conduct. A preference is a choice of one thing over another. I have not used the concepts interchangeably.

Sure you have, albeit in a sleight of hand:

Thank you for demonstrating your understanding of ethics as being purely subjective and not expressing any universals. Now we can finally dispense with the pretense of an objective set of ethics that applies to the general case of man, his nature and his requirements. As you have expressed it, a given ethics need not apply to all men to be valid, but only to a given individual.

Not at all. I have not dispensed with the ethical universal regarding what determines an organism’s values. I’m sure I need not remind you that Rand said that an organism’s life (not the life of other organisms) is its standard of values.

Now, is it true that what is good for X must also good for Y? What if X is gay and Y is hetero?

There is a clear implication there that you are questioning the universality of ethics by bringing in what is clearly a post-ethical preference. Please to explain.

As to your other comment, Rand's ethics neither apply to a given individual, or to "other men", but to man generally. There is a huge difference. The ethical question is not whether a given man can avoid destruction by doing X, but whether X generally leads to destruction for man, based on his nature as a rational being.

I do think that on a very fundamental level we can form certain ethical principles. However, I do not see how such an axiom as “one’s life is the standard of one’s values” leads without exception to a shunning of looting.

Please provide examples of a fundamental ethical principle you would advocate beyond the meta-ethical "do whatever furthers your life".

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Hm. Let's see how many times one has to repeat the same statements before one is understood.

Whereas health is essential to life and whereas the life of the organism is the standard of its values and goals, hygiene is beneficial. But that principle does not inexorably lead us to the iron-clad rule promulgated by the Mum in your story: “You must always wash your hands.” As Freddy and I have pointed out, in some circumstances hand-washing is extremely hazardous. Therefore, just as the principle of hygiene does not necessarily lead one to wash his hands with no possible exceptions, so the principle of one\\\\\\\'s life being the standard of one’s values does not lead one to refrain from looting in every single case...

Because I regard life as a value and because health is essential to life, I reject the boy’s argument against hygiene. If suicide were the goal, the boy’s argument might be valid.

...

Then why did you include the principle extolled by the little boy’s mother, i.e. “You must always wash your hands”? If you had wished strictly to discuss the principle of hygiene, then other principles such as hand-washing should never have been introduced into the conversation.

For now we'll ignore the fact that you've freely changed the mother's rule in my story from "you must always wash your hands AFTER using the toilet" to "you must always wash your hands" (and applied it in different contexts that have nothing to do with the toilet specifically, while still referring to "the principle", thus demonstrating that you do understand how rules are universalised into principles). But let's just forget that for now and grant you even that. Let's accept that there are situations that require one to forget that handwashing rule, in which case, according to your logic, it is an invalid (universal) princple.

So there: the handwashing principle is REJECTED (qua universal principle) by the exceptions, right? Exceptions like the Indian emergency you described, and so on. Right? Right.

Good.

Now, I want to know why the (universal) principle of HYGIENE can not *also* be REJECTED by the same deductive process: rejected on the basis of exceptions. People who did not follow this principle (hygiene) and still survived should instantly invalidate the principle, in the same way that the hands washing principle is invalidated by India (and in the same way that Rand's principle is invalidated by the exceptions).

Really? Motivation has no role in deciding whether to practice hygiene? If X’s motivation (his preference for health and life over sickness and death) has no role to play, why should he care about hygiene at all?

[i don’t understand what you gain by doing that. I did not say motivations are not important for hygiene; I clearly said they are not important for me to establish my purpose for this example, that’s all; just like the colour of the boy’s hair is not important FOR my particular example to work. But anyway, I put this in parenthesis to show that I do not want it to distract from my main point. Above.]

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So there: the handwashing principle is REJECTED (qua universal principle) by the exceptions, right? Exceptions like the Indian emergency you described, and so on. Right? Right.

That depends on whether you look at principle as rules of thumb or laws of nature. What you seem to say is that when a principle is in place (and it's context defined, and I remind you that the context cannot be defined as "the context where the principle is optimal") there is no alternate method that can ever be expected to generate better results vis-a-vis the goal that prompted the chioce of the principle, no matter how much extra information we have about a particular state of affairs. The hand-washing example clearly shows how new information invalidate the principle when this is what you mean by a principle. If you mean a principle to be a rule of thumb that we from time to time can expect to be suboptimal in some circumstances, then some counterexamples will not invalidate it because the claim is weaker.

The question is never the less, when we have enough information to rationally expect adherence to the principle to be suboptimal, what ought we do? Break the principle or adhere to the principle?

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If you want to live and be healthy, then certainly practicing good hygiene would be a principal that would help you achieve that goal. Washing your hands with contaminated water, however, would generally be considered bad hygiene. Seems pretty simple to me.

It is simple. If the goal is to be healthy and looting could buy you healthinsurance, then it would be all right to loot if your rational expectation taken all your knowledge in to account is that this act of looting will be beneficial.

The point is, ethics must be contextual.

Which is to say that when you rationally expect the priniples to be suboptimal, then you ought not adhere to them. Well, then it is perfectly all right to loot if you expect a benefit, because the moral goal is to benefit yourself.

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As to your other comment, Rand's ethics neither apply to a given individual, or to "other men", but to man generally. There is a huge difference. The ethical question is not whether a given man can avoid destruction by doing X, but whether X generally leads to destruction for man, based on his nature as a rational being.

This is not compatible with Objectivism. What you seem to suggest is that a person ought to refrain from benefitting himself if his actions cannot be universilized. That is totally contrary to the startingpoint of Rands ethics, which starts with a fundamental alternative as it pertains to specific individuals. Furthermore, each individual has his own life as his ultimate value. Ultimate value is defined as that which everything else is a means. That is, there is no inherent value in adhering to a principle because it is universal, the only thing that counts is wheter it is beneficial for my life. That follows straight from the definition of ultimate value. You cannot have both egoism and universal principle adherence, unless you show that the latter is always compatible with the former.

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Which is to say that when you rationally expect the priniples to be suboptimal, then you ought not adhere to them. Well, then it is perfectly all right to loot if you expect a benefit, because the moral goal is to benefit yourself.

Read this, and then tell me if you think a single counterexample can still be used to invalidate Ayn Rand's principle.

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Read this, and then tell me if you think a single counterexample can still be used to invalidate Ayn Rand's principle.

In the article Rands just narrows the applicabilitiy of a principle, a principle A is only true in a non-emergency situation. I think that's fine as long as you specify the context beforehand. I claim you use principles as follows:

A principle + a context of applicability defined beforehand (and not defined in a circular manner like "the prinple is applicable where it is optimal") is the standard of conduct for which we rationally expect optimal outcome vis-a-vis the goal that promts us to choose the principle.

This means that the principle is invalidated if we rationally expect it perform suboptimally compared to some other way of conduct within the context originally defined. The question is what we ought to do in this situation? Go for the best deal, or suboptimally adhere to the principle. Egoism gives the answer, go for the best deal.

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A principle + a context of applicability defined beforehand (and not defined in a circular manner like "the prinple is applicable where it is optimal") is the standard of conduct for which we rationally expect optimal outcome vis-a-vis the goal that promts us to choose the principle.

Do you still believe, then, that you need only point out some extraordinary circumstance to prove the principle wrong? Even if you are within the context, then how does one extraordinary instance disprove a principle? You don't have to speculate about Mao - you can give the example of a man who is struck by a meteor the very instant after looting. There is a looter who did not suffer from his looting.

That aside, I still maintain that you should actually read and become familiar with the Objectivist argument against looting. It is far more extensive than pointing out the immense impracticality of it. I've given at least a partial explanation about how the looter becomes psychologically alienated from everyone else. Another aspect of the Objectivist argument that I haven't seen mentioned here is the reliance of self-esteem on productivity, as an affirmation of one's worthiness to exist. A looter constantly engaged in looting is a looter looking to get caught. Finally, there is man's need to think and act in principles, which is addressed nicely in Dr. Peikoff's Why Should One Act on Principle? (available on the ARI's website)

The presentation of the argument as consisting of that single quotation is a vast oversimplification. If you really want to know the Objectivist stance, then you shouldn't hang around here.

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Do you still believe, then, that you need only point out some extraordinary circumstance to prove the principle wrong? Even if you are within the context, then how does one extraordinary instance disprove a principle? You don't have to speculate about Mao - you can give the example of a man who is struck by a meteor the very instant after looting. There is a looter who did not suffer from his looting.

Again, that depends on what you mean by a principle. Concider the difference between a rule of thumb and a law of nature, they are both general predictive claims about reality but the first can be cut some slack and still be true while the latter is absolute and is invalidated by a single counterexample. In order to know if a principle is invalidated by a counterexample we first have to know:

A ) The strength of the claim, is a principle to be concidered a rule of thumb or law if nature?

B ) When a principle is said to be true, exactly what is true? Is the standard of truth that we rationally expect adherence to the priniple to generate optimal results vis-a-vis the goal the principle was selected for, or is the standard of truth something else? (and please, be specific here, answers like "the principle is true if it corresponds to reality" is utterly uninformative).

C ) What ought we do when we rationally expect the principle to be suboptimal.

That aside, I still maintain that you should actually read and become familiar with the Objectivist argument against looting. It is far more extensive than pointing out the immense impracticality of it. I've given at least a partial explanation about how the looter becomes psychologically alienated from everyone else.

Which is true in some cases and false in other cases. The examples of filesharing or the example of agents operating within the framework of the welfarestate should be interesting reality checks in this regard.

Another aspect of the Objectivist argument that I haven't seen mentioned here is the reliance of self-esteem on productivity, as an affirmation of one's worthiness to exist.

Looting can very well be a productive endevour from the point of view of the individual, including hard work, heavy use of the brain, purpose, goal orientation and so forth. It's only from a global persepctive it is contraproductive.

A looter constantly engaged in looting is a looter looking to get caught. Finally, there is man's need to think and act in principles, which is addressed nicely in Dr. Peikoff's Why Should One Act on Principle? (available on the ARI's website)

I've actually listened to this on the ARI website and didn't find it very informative. The standard objections given here still stands.

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Again, that depends on what you mean by a principle.

To see what is meant by this principle, the optimal course would be to read the full Objectivist argument.

Which is true in some cases and false in other cases. The examples of filesharing or the example of agents operating within the framework of the welfarestate should be interesting reality checks in this regard.

Those are really neither here nor there. Consider that the optimal society is a full, Objectivist one. It's utterly anti-human-life to advocate lesser societies. To be such an agent is to work for the destruction of civilization, both literally and by the advocacy of the principles of the welfare state. The destruction is quite evident there.

As for file "sharing," how are such crooks looked at by the members of this optimal society which a "rational looter" would advocate? What does he really have in common with them? Would he find a fellow crook to be his partner? Again, not an option, since that person would be a thief who he would constantly have to be on the watch for, trying to steal his values and "get away with" some scheme or another.

Unless you think that someone can just loot a little bit, never going to "extremes." If so, you really don't know how the mind works. How principles work.

Looting can very well be a productive endevour from the point of view of the individual, including hard work, heavy use of the brain, purpose, goal orientation and so forth. It's only from a global persepctive it is contraproductive.

Did I say obtaining stuff? No, I said production.

I've actually listened to this on the ARI website and didn't find it very informative. The standard objections given here still stands.

Well, obviously you hear more in the epistemology section of OPAR.

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To see what is meant by this principle, the optimal course would be to read the full Objectivist argument.

I did go to the source and listend to the Peikoff presentation, and again, the answer was quite unintelligble. It would help if you answered my questions (which I suppose you will have a hard time doing, because after I listened to the Peikoff lecture I have no idea how those questions would be answered with the information he provided).

Those are really neither here nor there. Consider that the optimal society is a full, Objectivist one. It's utterly anti-human-life to advocate lesser societies. To be such an agent is to work for the destruction of civilization, both literally and by the advocacy of the principles of the welfare state. The destruction is quite evident there.

The destruction is quite inevident. The inhabitants of many welfare states are living longer and is reporting greater overall satisfaction with their lifes than the inhabitants of the US for example. You can make what you want of those statistics, but those aren't parameters that are usually realted to anti-human life, nor destruction of civilization.

As for file "sharing," how are such crooks looked at by the members of this optimal society which a "rational looter" would advocate

They would look at them with awe and saying that if they were smart enough to be able to benefit themselfs from filesharing then they would do it to, since the moral end is for everyone to benefit thier own life. Then they might realize that to advocate egoism is to commit themselfs to contradictions, so they might abondon this and replace it with a more teneable ethical theory.

What does he really have in common with them?

His life as his ultimate value (to the extent they are consistent egoists).

Unless you think that someone can just loot a little bit, never going to "extremes." If so, you really don't know how the mind works. How principles work.

What planet do you live on? If you download an mp3 then reality is going crash down on you and destroy you, your mind will disintegrate and all you will know is how to live for the range of the moment like a kangaroo? This is why I think the survival reality check is so telling, if we were to take your therory even remotely seriously then we would expect most people to die before the age of 30, while reality tells us that most people quite effortlessly outperform Ayn Rand in the quest for remaining alive. You seem to lack a sense of proportions, your predictions are obviously way off which might suggest that your theory of how principles and the mind works are not exactly corresponding to reality.

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They would look at them with awe and saying that if they were smart enough to be able to benefit themselfs from filesharing . . .

You will refrain from using the term "file sharing" to mean the illegal duplication and transmission of copyrighted materials. You will instead call it "file stealing" or some other term that accurately reflects the act.

Furthermore, you will reign in your attitude. Everyone here, including me, is a guest of the forum owner. You especially are subject to heightened scrutiny because you are advocating positions which are openly hostile to Objectivism. While that is permitted in this subforum only, a certain degree of decorum is still required.

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You especially are subject to heightened scrutiny because you are advocating positions which are openly hostile to Objectivism.

Worse than this is that he keeps misrepresenting what Objectivism says. In this case it's far more corrupt and damaging to claim something is what it isn't than it is to be openly hostile against it.

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exaltron wrote:

Sure you have, albeit in a sleight of hand:

There is a clear implication there that you are questioning the universality of ethics by bringing in what is clearly a post-ethical preference. Please to explain.

You are not completely off-base in thinking that I question the universality of many ethical precepts. Once we move beyond the primary need of a human to survive, it becomes quite difficult to form hard and fast “shalt nots” that have no real world exceptions.

Since ethics is a set of principles of right conduct, it is entirely legitimate to form ethical rules on an individual level. If it is an ethical “good” to promote one’s happiness, then pursuing activities that lead one to be happy are ethically good. If sleeping with men makes X happier then sleeping with women, gay sex is an ethically good preference.

As to your other comment, Rand’s ethics neither apply to a given individual, or to “other men”, but to man generally. There is a huge difference. The ethical question is not whether a given man can avoid destruction by doing X, but whether X generally leads to destruction for man, based on his nature as a rational being.

Let us suppose that activity “X generally leads to destruction for man.” I interpret that to mean that of the men who have attempted X, most of them have been destroyed. It is then fair to conclude that X is a very hazardous activity, one that rational men should avoid.

Now let us suppose that Smith and his gang of brave hearts come up with a way to perform X repeatedly with no or very minimal loss of life or injury. If Smith and Company can do X over the long term (and reap a net benefit from it), they have not violated the general rule (“X generally leads to destruction for man”), but by the same token they have established that under certain circumstances X is non-hazardous.

For this reason I say, again, if Rand’s claim (that the destruction of the looter is the price of looting) is supposed to apply to 100% of the population, then the claim is false. If the claim applies only to most of the population, we cannot conclude that looting is necessarily irrational behavior.

Please provide examples of a fundamental ethical principle you would advocate beyond the meta-ethical “do whatever furthers your life”.

To begin with, “do whatever furthers your life” is an ethical command, period. It is a principle of right conduct – which is precisely what ethics is concerned with. Secondly, I have already stated that I favor a free society and that the establishment of such a society would benefit the vast majority of people. However, I do not doubt that certain elements are far better off under the status quo; they thrive by force rather than production. Thus I would never claim that non-coercion is a universal principle of self-interest. I have little confidence in forming ethical principles beyond the most basic level, as the individuality of our species undermines the possibility of forming detailed oughts for every human on earth.

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That depends on whether you look at principle as rules of thumb or laws of nature. What you seem to say is that when a principle is in place (and it's context defined, and I remind you that the context cannot be defined as "the context where the principle is optimal") there is no alternate method that can ever be expected to generate better results vis-a-vis the goal that prompted the chioce of the principle, no matter how much extra information we have about a particular state of affairs. The hand-washing example clearly shows how new information invalidate the principle when this is what you mean by a principle. If you mean a principle to be a rule of thumb that we from time to time can expect to be suboptimal in some circumstances, then some counterexamples will not invalidate it because the claim is weaker.

The question is never the less, when we have enough information to rationally expect adherence to the principle to be suboptimal, what ought we do? Break the principle or adhere to the principle?

Aha. I will ignore the fact that you have introduced a false dichotomy (for now - until I begin my argument FOR, rather than AGAINST), and simply point out a new development in this debate for you.

Since you have stated a fundamental distinction between a rule of thumb and a law of nature, and since you say that the latter can be invalidated by citing a single exception whereas the former can not, I take it you believe Rand’s principle against looting falls under the latter: she presented it as a law (otherwise you would not be trying to invalidate it by citing an exception).

Let me now just remind you that I did explicitly tell Brenner that he was looking at Rand’s statement as a law, and he did explicitly deny this.

Should I assume you are in disagreement with Mr. Brenner? And if you are in disagreement with him on that critical point, do you recognize that you are in disagreement with the essence of his argument against Rand’s quoted statement?

[And if you are in disagreement, could you stop replying to me when I reply to him on this particular issue?]

If Brenner changes his mind now – which would itself be a miracle of almost religious significance – and admit his humongous strawman against Miss Rand, he will save himself from the contradictions he is now failing to absolve himself from (with respect to the hygiene discussion). If not, I will be interested to see how he resolves the impossible.

Carry on.

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To Gary Brenner, Freddy, and anyone else who does not agree with the ethics of Objectivism and wishes to continue arguing here:

This thread is now at 34 pages and over 600 posts. You have received many lengthy, on point responses to your inquiries. If after reading the pertinent Objectivist materials and dissecting them here in such detail, you still disagree with the ethics of Objectivism, then it is clear you are not finding what you seek here. If you wish to continue having active participants in your investigation of these issues that trouble you, you should seek them elsewhere.

To everyone else:

There is plenty of fodder in this thread for any discussion you wish to continue in the regular forums. It should be a greater benefit to you to resolve issues with people who agree on certain fundamentals and will discuss their application constructively. In light of that, I am closing this thread. Enough is enough. If any of you would rather the thread remain open, please PM me and I will address your concerns with the moderating team. If any of you moderators disagree with my decision, please let me know and we'll talk.

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  • 2 months later...

*** Mod's note: Merged with an existing thread. -sN ***

BEYOND THE VALLEY OF THE PRUDENT PREDATOR: The "Prudent Predator Problem" is a basic question that comes up again and again in criticisms of Objectivism. Here's the setup: Rand derives her ethics from self-interest rightly understood. (I'll get into what "self-interest" actually means--survival? happiness? some combination of the two?--later.) From self-interest, she derives a list of moral rules that look strangely familiar: Don't steal, don't murder, don't lie, and so on. The PPP typically addresses only the issue of theft.

In most cases, stealing stuff is against my rational self-interest: I really want that copy of Atlas Shrugged, but if I steal it, the alarm will go off, I'll get caught, and my utils (happiness points) will plummet. I'll go to jail, where both my happiness and my survival will be in doubt. So in general, stealing stuff sucks.

But sometimes it doesn't. Sometimes the bookseller leaves the Rand shelf completely unwatched; sometimes I'm smart enough to figure out nifty ways of stealing so that no one can find me. At that point, if the thing I'm stealing would genuinely benefit me, why should I not steal it?

Objectivist responses typically fall into a few main categories: 1) There's no such thing as the perfect crime. You could get caught no matter how careful you are. But that argument is an argument against all risk-taking. Don't get on that plane--it could be hijacked! Don't get a drink with that intriguing architect--he might roofie you! In order to make the no-perfect-crime argument so strong that it would actually prohibit all (or even almost all) theft, you need a belief in a magical universe where certain acts are always punished. Doesn't happen. Sometimes the thieves flourish like the green bay tree.

2) You'll feel really bad about it. This is based on a dubious psychological theory (doing the right thing always feels good, and doing the wrong thing always feels bad), but more importantly, it misses the point, and it's not very Objectivist (sez me). Misses the point: Even if I'd always feel guilty after doing something wrong, we're still trying to determine whether prudent theft is wrong. The only way the guilt claim could ever be relevant to this argument would be if we could show that people who steal always feel guilty, therefore theft is wrong. Clearly this is false. Not Objectivist: I don't think Rand would accept an account of ethics that bases itself in guilt (tricked out as "psychic cost" to make it sound less Freudian/Christian).

3) If you do wrong things, you build up habits which ultimately make you unproductive and hideous--steal a Rand novel one day, and years later you'll be a twisted combination of Darth Vader and Ellsworth Toohey. (OK, so I exaggerate a bit...) This objection suffers from the same problem as the previous one: We're trying to figure out whether prudent theft is wrong. Unless everyone/most people who steal when the benefits of the theft outweigh the risks turn into second-handers and jerks, this argument doesn't go anywhere. Even if prudent predators do turn lousy once they steal enough, all this would suggest is that they weren't prudent enough--they should have stopped stealing after the first time.

This argument also runs into trouble because it places such enormous weight on perfect Objectivist integrity. It's fairly obvious that no one outside Rand's novels perfectly fulfills the Objectivist ethics. All Objectivists (like all people) break the rules pretty regularly--say, once a month, minimum. This doesn't turn them into Toohey clones.

Objectivists may respond, "Yes, but I regret these lapses--I don't think I was right. That's the PP's mistake." To which the PP replies, "First of all, you just don't regret all of them. You probably can't even remember most of them. Some of them you would do again if you got the chance. Some of them you don't yet realize were infractions--just as I'm not yet convinced that my Atlas-theft was an infraction. Second, and more importantly, I believe that my thieving ways are right because they benefited me. For you to prove that they don't benefit me, you need to show me that rule-infractions in the service of Objectivist principles are corrupting." The obvious example here is lying to Nazis--ordinarily, you can make the case that honesty is in your self-interest, but in some cases lies clearly uphold self-interest. Why can't theft sometimes do the same?

2a) You will feel bad if you treat other people as if they were things. That's the argument made here (scroll down to where the words "Prudent Predator" appear), and it's a more-persuasive variant of the psychic-cost argument. However, there's no evidence that treating someone as a means to my ends under certain limited circumstances would scar my psyche. Moreover, there's no reason, on an Objectivist model (=actions are justified if they are rational; rationality is the faculty that promotes survival and long-term happiness), that it's wrong to treat someone as a means to my end, as long as I make a token acknowledgment of his humanity. (If I actually believed a person was a thing, that would be falsifying reality, a big Objectivist no-no.)

3) If you steal, society will fall apart. Maximal productivity requires that people trust one another, and that people have incentives to produce--for example, they must have a reasonable chance of profiting from their labors. By stealing, the PP chips away at the trust and work-incentives a society needs. But this objection only comes into play when prudent theft is widespread. The PP needs to weigh the benefits to himself (copy of Atlas Shrugged; let's say he wants to introduce his niece to Objectivism, thinks Galt's story will thrill her more than his own dry recitations of Objectivist principles, but can't yet afford the book) against the costs (if lots of people are doing this, shopkeepers will spend more time watching the goods and less time in other, more productive tasks). However, I see no reason why this calculation should never favor theft. A society can sustain some minimal level of theft (like lying, or gossip, or cruelty) without falling apart and without leading to declines in general trust or productivity.

4) People just have rights, end of story. That's what Nathaniel Branden says here [link on website posted below]. But this is confused. From certain basic principles, Rand derived a theory of rights (rights serve man's life, meaning sometimes his survival, sometimes his happiness, and sometimes something she called "rational" flourishing--but again, those distinctions aren't important here). But this theory of rights isn't--or shouldn't be--a naming of metaphysical truths. I don't walk around in a numinous cloud of rights. "Rights" is a description of a relationship that you should have with me because it serves your survival/happiness/rational flourishing. Both Branden and Rand try to sneak metaphysical, inviolable, first-principle-y "rights" in under the "rational flourishing" heading, but I don't see why that's justified. Rand justifies reason because it promotes our survival and our happiness; she can't then smuggle non-survival-promoting and non-happiness-promoting elements into reason just because it makes her sound more like an Enlightenment Lockean type.

// posted by Eve @ 9:18 AM - http://randquestions.blogspot.com/2002_03_...ns_archive.html

How accurate is the author's summary and what (simple) responses would people say against his arguments?

Edited by softwareNerd
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Moderator's Note:

Because we have already had numerous threads and discussions on the "prudent predator", I'm moving this thread to the Debate section in the event that it's supporters would like to chime in.

As such, mb121 is free to set any ground rules for the debate as he sees fit.

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Objectivist responses typically fall into a few main categories: 1) There's no such thing as the perfect crime.

I have never heard Rand or Peikoff or any serious Objectivist state that they didn't commit crime because they couldn't be sure that they could get away with it. This first statement is a blatant lie.

2) You'll feel really bad about it.

Feeling bad and guilt are two different things. In the long term, someone who believes they can live their life by cutting corners and cheating others, will only end up cheating themselves. They'll feel bad because they'll never really achieve any happiness. They can steal all the loot they want, but it won't make them happy, because it'll have no real worth to them. The happiness was short term, and it was focused on the goal of gaining the money, not on what the money itself actually meant.

Guilt, on the other hand... well, if you're a Kleptomaniac, you may not feel guilty about your crimes. You may never see what is wrong. Just because you don't feel guilty about something, however, doesn't mean you weren't wrong. It just means you were willfully avoiding the reality of your actions, and that's a sin against yourself in itself.

3) If you steal, society will fall apart.

This must be the most ridiculous one of them all, not because he's wrong, but because he's right - and yet he misses the entire point. He goes onto the fallacy that 'society can tolerate a minimal amount of stealing'. Oh great, so, can society put up with a minimal amount of rape, murder and pedophilia too? Is a crime alright, so long as only a few people are doing it? Who gets to decide who that small group is, that gets to wave their morality and just go out on a whim.

4) People just have rights, end of story.

I don't even know how to respond to this - I just don't understand what he's talking about. Yes, he's right, " "Rights" is a description of a relationship that you should have with me because it serves your survival/happiness/rational flourishing." He seems to think that Rand just throws in metaphysics there for the hell of it. Rights are derived from the metaphysical truths of existence, of the nature of existents within the universe, and finally, from the nature of man as an existent in the universe.

I think the main problem with this guy, is that he is mistaking rational self interest, for prudent self interest. Actually, his main problem is he doesn't know what the hell he's talking about. Objectivism isn't about protecting any desire you have and pursuing it with no mind for the consequences or the way in which you'll get there. Objectivism is very specifically about acting within your nature as a human being, about recognising that you can't survive and can't be happy without rationally approaching life as the human you are.

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I have never heard Rand or Peikoff or any serious Objectivist state that they didn't commit crime because they couldn't be sure that they could get away with it. This first statement is a blatant lie.

Actually, it's not. There is an eloquent argument presented in the final chapter of The Voice of Reason. I quoted it in one of the recent gigantathreads.

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How accurate is the author's summary and what (simple) responses would people say against his arguments?

Simple response. The answer is:

5) All of the above. Together.

He can (try to) shoot them down one by one, but not together - as an integrated principle.

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Ok, I rescind that statement. It's still not the basis of why one shouldn't commit a crime though.

Well, the statement in VOR isn't that kind of statement as such. It leads into a much more complex discussion of the issue, including the need for thinking in principles. Check it out...

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The reason why the PP argument is wrong isn't fundamentally to be found in ethics or politics - it's to be found in epistemology.

In order to reach the Objectivist ethics, one must first learn what a principle is and why one must act on principle. Prior to that, one must've learned the importance of integration - of keeping all of one's knowledge as an integrated whole, of being dedicated to following every conclusion to discover its implications in all the rest of one's knowledge (particularly in philosophy).

Accepting the PP argument requires rejecting the concept of principle, and that in turn requires rejecting all the concepts in Objectivism that logically precede and logically follow from it - if you want to keep your knowledge integrated. If you don't want to keep your knowledge integrated, or don't care to, then you have removed yourself from the debate, and there is no longer any reason to listen to you or care what you think.

Leonard Peikoff's "Why One Should Act On Principle" lecture is a very good place to get an antidote to the PP nonsense.

Mark Peters

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Well, the statement in VOR isn't that kind of statement as such. It leads into a much more complex discussion of the issue, including the need for thinking in principles. Check it out...

Oh sure, it's all about principles, but one doesn't refrain from committing a crime just because one can't get away with it!

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