3 hours ago, Easy Truth said:
I see that using the logic of the sentence above, one could come up with that conclusion.
I assume there is a more elegant counter to this than I will make. Nevertheless, I will try. We have to define our terms. What does “man exists” mean? Does that mean “the abstraction man” exists? Or does it mean “there are any instances of what this abstraction refers to that exist”.
If it means “the abstraction man” exists, then the conclusion you propose would be right.
But it does not mean that.
To prove that men exist, one would have to show some men, somewhere or at some time in the universe. If they never ever existed, no consciousness could have generated that abstraction.
The abstraction man can’t exist if it is not referring to anything.
The second part of the sentence, “man is an abstraction” is not complete. It implies that man is ONLY an abstraction. That is one of many contexts and perspectives. That aspect of man that is abstract, does not exist metaphysically speaking. The aspect of anything that is abstract, does not exist in the metaphysical world.
I will go with this for now.
That’s an interesting argument, but it is flawed.
The statements:
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“Humans (its easier to talk about humans rather than men to avoid confusion) exist,” and
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“Humanity exists”
do not have the exact same meaning, (even though I agree with you that the method of proving each is the same).
Formally, I believe the distinction is as follows:
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There exists at least one x which is an instance of Humanity.
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There exists at least one x which is Humanity.
I believe that your (and I think Rand’s) mistake is that you are literally identifying Humanity with its instances. That’s nonsensical because you are treating a noun and a predicate as though they were identical.
The reason you are making this error is because you are failing to differentiate between a relation of identity and a relation of definition.
I think it is correct (and I think you would agree) to say that
- An abstraction x exists if and only if there exists at least one particular y such that y is an instance of x.
This statement is a definition of the existence of abstractions. Thus, there is a material equivalence between 1) and 2) but no logical equivalence. It is important to make this distinction.
Another way of explaining this error is like this.
First, if two things A and B are identical, then the existence of one necessarily entails the existence of the other.
However, one cannot flip this statement and say that because the existence of A necessarily implies the existence of B and vice versa, that therefore A is B.
An obvious counterexample here is that the existence of the number 1 necessarily entails the existence of the number 2, and vice versa, but that does not mean that 1 is 2.
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The second part of the sentence, “man is an abstraction” is not complete. It implies that man is ONLY an abstraction. That is one of many contexts and perspectives. That aspect of man that is abstract, does not exist metaphysically speaking. The aspect of anything that is abstract, does not exist in the metaphysical world.
I think you are jumping to conclusions. Saying that man is an abstraction no more implies that he is only an abstraction than saying that John is tall implies that John is characterized only by tallness.