The mental disposition toward fighting for the moral high ground is the recognition that morality is the recognition of man’s proper relationship to reality. The common misconception is that it can be circumvented without adverse consequences.
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The mental disposition toward fighting for the moral high ground is the recognition that morality is the recognition of man’s proper relationship to reality. The common misconception is that it can be circumvented without adverse consequences.
This is well trod ground that is litered with martyrs, innocent victims, and record of failure with only a smattering of qualified success. It doesn’t strike me as a very rational choice.
This is well trod ground that is litered with martyrs, innocent victims, and record of failure with only a smattering of qualified success. It doesn’t strike me as a very rational choice.
Presuming, of course, that the martyrs, innocent victims, and record of failure is dealing with a those adhering to a very rational choosen morality.
I recommend that you start a new thread, probably in politics, to explore the approach you recommend. Obviously I remain most skeptical on a number of levels.
Now this does bring us back to the question I raised here and especially in the ethics thread Can there be honor among thieves?. Operating in an underground economy requires, at a minimum, being dishonest toward the government.
Is it dishonest to lie to the robber about where the jewelry is hidden? Or to tell the SS that you are hiding practitioners of the Judaic religion in your attic or basement?
Operating in an underground economy limits the economy of scale. This, too, has been discussed elsewhere on this forum.
If you are trying to state that appealing to an underground economy to escape government oppression (such as the black market in your other thread) establishes a case of ‘honor among thieves’, what you are missing is that it may be moral to do so. This does not make you a thief in principle, only a thief in the eyes of prescribed, immoral law.
Is it dishonest to lie to the robber about where the jewelry is hidden? Or to tell the SS that you are hiding practitioners of the Judaic religion in your attic or basement?
Well, it’s an interesting question whether that is justifiably dishonest or not dishonest at all. But certainly they both entail being untruthful and this may lead to other untruthfulness. For example, is it dishonest to lie to somone you suspect to be a robber/SS or to anyone who might unwittingly help said robbber/SS? The tangled web of deceit.
Operating in an underground economy limits the economy of scale. This, too, has been discussed elsewhere on this forum.
If you are trying to state that appealing to an underground economy to escape government oppression (such as the black market in your other thread) establishes a case of ‘honor among thieves’, what you are missing is that it may be moral to do so. This does not make you a thief in principle, only a thief in the eyes of prescribed, immoral law.
It does, though, entail making distinctions about who you are honest with. In the extreme case (e.g. under totalitarianism) you become quite paranoid, not even trusting your own children. I had intentionally avoided giving a hard definition of “thief” exactly so that we might explore the various interpretations. But you describe it well here: thief in law vs. thief in principle. And this is, of course, exactly the sort of consquence that one would expect when law and principle conflict.
I’m trying to resist drawing a conclusion here in order to explore the various consequences.
Being honest means not faking any aspect of reality. If one lies to those perceived to be a threat to his values it would be a moral action. In the extreme case of living under a totalitarian regime an honest man may indeed conclude his family could pose a threat to his values and lying to them would be protecting himself. The recognition of values and the acts of obtaining and keeping them are moral actions.
Being honest means not faking any aspect of reality. If one lies to those perceived to be a threat to his values it would be a moral action. In the extreme case of living under a totalitarian regime an honest man may indeed conclude his family could pose a threat to his values and lying to them would be protecting himself. The recognition of values and the acts of obtaining and keeping them are moral actions.
Your response is amgibuous on the key point: there is the question of what is honesty (e.g. your defintion) and whether dishonest is ever justifiable (your example). I can’t quite tell if you are suggesting that if it is not immoral then it is not dishonest. But your first sentence does not define dishonesty in terms of the justifiablness of faking reality.
You might take a look at the Ayn Rand Lexicon in regard to how honesty is couched as a virtue.
This is one of the reasons that a thief, in principle, has difficulty with trust. The thief may think that everyone else is dishonest, but that he is at least honest enough to admit it, even if just to himself.
He puts himself at war with reality. Instead of grasping the requirements needed for productivity in any endevour, he relies on others to produce the goods he seizes by force. The thief cannot exist without the victim, while rational men can easily get by without thieves in their midst, and prefer to do so, by the establishment of govenments to deal with those who would initiate force against them. It is when the thieves discover how to seize the reigns of govenment that you seem to be interested in. This theme is present in both this and your thread imploring how Ojbectivism adresses socialism.
You might take a look at the Ayn Rand Lexicon in regard to how honesty is couched as a virtue.
This is one of the reasons that a thief, in principle, has difficulty with trust. The thief may think that everyone else is dishonest, but that he is at least honest enough to admit it, even if just to himself.
He puts himself at war with reality. Instead of grasping the requirements needed for productivity in any endevour, he relies on others to produce the goods he seizes by force. The thief cannot exist without the victim, while rational men can easily get by without thieves in their midst, and prefer to do so, by the establishment of govenments to deal with those who would initiate force against them. It is when the thieves discover how to seize the reigns of govenment that you seem to be interested in. This theme is present in both this and your thread imploring how Ojbectivism adresses socialism.
Here Rand is using a specific test: that of dependence. I’m not especially fond of that test since we are all dependent on each other in a complex economy. But I get her meaning anyway. And, yes, I am intersted in it as you describe though I think it’s safe and more general to simply observe that law and principle can, and often do, conflict which is nicely illustrated by theives in government.
You introduced a great linguistic distinction before: legal thief vs. princple thief. Perhaps that will be useful here.
Do you think the distinction between ‘dependent’ and ‘interdependent’ could help to clarify the relationships between the thief and the producer contrasted against the relationships between the various producers within a complex economy?
Do you think the distinction between ‘dependent’ and ‘interdependent’ could help to clarify the relationships between the thief and the producer contrasted against the relationships between the various producers within a complex economy?
I understand the distinction you are making but the whole direction of the argument is suspicious because it entails determining the worth of an individual by his contribution to others, i.e. to society as a whole. I don’t need manicurists therefore manicurists are thieves. Joe thinks stock traders are parasites, etc. Now to determine whether someone is a thief, to decide if it’s rational to deceive them, we have to answer grand economic questions about people’s contributions to society? You might as well say, ask God.
My claim is that whether or not it is morally correct to deceive someone should depend on facts readily available to a reasonable person, allowing for reasonable error.
I understand the distinction you are making but the whole direction of the argument is suspicious because it entails determining the worth of an individual by his contribution to others, i.e. to society as a whole. I don’t need manicurists therefore manicurists are thieves. Joe thinks stock traders are parasites, etc. Now to determine whether someone is a thief, to decide if it’s rational to deceive them, we have to answer grand economic questions about people’s contributions to society? You might as well say, ask God.
My claim is that whether or not it is morally correct to deceive someone should depend on facts readily available to a reasonable person, allowing for reasonable error.
Two cases were mentioned in #45, Objectivism holds it morally correct to deceive someone under such circumstances.
Deal honestly with those you deem to be honest (to the degree of honestly required in the dealing),
All relationships are based on value or worth to the two (or more) parties involved. If manicurist are not needed, don’t visit them. This does not make them a thief. Joe does not have to trade stocks, this does not make stoke brokers parasites. To make that determination, however, Joe needs to understand how a bit how markets work.
Even friendships are based on the mutual value each is to the other.
Some of the questions asked belie a direct or reveal an indirect familiarity with Objectivism
Two cases were mentioned in #45, Objectivism holds it morally correct to deceive someone under such circumstances.
We could deal in examples all day but to make progress we need to reach a more general understanding. Examples are useful for mapping out the territory (e.g. refuting the claim that one must always be truthful) but they are not a general solution.
Deal honestly with those you deem to be honest (to the degree of honestly required in the dealing),
Surely, but this is the path that leads to factional honor, at best, or, at worst, bilateral or even unilateral honor. That’s a very realistic view but something of a dog-eat-dog world.
All relationships are based on value or worth to the two (or more) parties involved. If manicurist are not needed, don’t visit them. This does not make them a thief. Joe does not have to trade stocks, this does not make stoke brokers parasites. To make that determination, however, Joe needs to understand how a bit how markets work. Even friendships are based on the mutual value each is to the other.
This is a shift in criteria, from theft to need, which is more consistent with Objetivism but, as noted above, a rather bleak outlook.
Let’s explore this further by asking how we might enlarge our “circle of trust.” First, can we trust Objectivists? Well, in another thread, the question was posed wether it was moral to work for the government. I would presume that there are Objectivist government employees. Can you trust them? Can you trust your family? We discussed above the case where that was not possible but usually it is. Can you trust your spouse? This seems the best place to start building trust but who is totally honest even with their spouse?
Another approach is to ask who has a right to know what? If someone asks for information that they don’t have a right to then they have no right to expect a truthful answer. But this may be another case of replacing one hard problem with another.
There is, I suspect, something of a continental divide on this issue. Step in one direction, conditional trust, and the logic leads to factional honor and human judgement. Step in the other, universal honesty, and the logic leads to pacifism and martyrdom.
I didn’t mean to entirely dismiss your reference to learning how markets work, or more generally, learning how the world works, this is certainly an important element of judgement and it may be that if one chooses not to be a pacifist and martyr then one must do one’s best to improve one’s judgement. The better the judgement the better the decisions about who to trust and when to misrepresent the truth.
How do we enlarge our “circle of trust”?
How can we learn to identify the principles that others have adopted for themselves?
You start by learning how to evaluate their answers to the questions you ask, or evaluating the questions they ask and how they respond to the answers provided.
Start by identifying the underlying principles at stake, and what those principles lead to.
I for one, do not go around seeking to be trusted. Those that trust me, do so because the principles I engender myself to resonate with (a) value(s) that they are seeking in life. Ask yourself why you are participating in this forum? Is it because you truly believe that Objectivism is pacifistic and leans toward martyrdom, or the values that you have discovered we do hold, have an allure to them you have not found in other idealogical systematic approaches for living?
Dog eat dog world. Ha. It’s people who hold ideas like that to which the socialistic policy peddlers appeal to and count upon.
How do we enlarge our “circle of trust”? How can we learn to identify the principles that others have adopted for themselves? You start by learning how to evaluate their answers to the questions you ask, or evaluating the questions they ask and how they respond to the answers provided. Start by identifying the underlying principles at stake, and what those principles lead to. I for one, do not go around seeking to be trusted. Those that trust me, do so because the principles I engender myself to resonate with (a) value(s) that they are seeking in life.
Well, that’s one approach, but it is a rather self-limiting one. Essentially that suggests that you are unable to form bonds of trust with non-Objectivists.
Ask yourself why you are participating in this forum? Is it because you truly believe that Objectivism is pacifistic and leans toward martyrdom, or the values that you have discovered we do hold, have an allure to them you have not found in other idealogical systematic approaches for living?
While I do not consider myself an Objectivist it is one touchstone that I go to in dealing with challenging philosophical questions. No, I don’t think that Objectivists are, by and large, pacifists, though as I noted in the other thread, the language of Objectivism creates a bias in that direction.
Dog eat dog world. Ha. It’s people who hold ideas like that to which the socialistic policy peddlers appeal to and count upon.
And, yet, that seems to be the realistic alternative to pacifism.
And, yet, that seems to be the realistic alternative to pacifism.
It is the impracticable alternative to individualism.