I think this choice of term is ambiguous and muddies the definition of value, since value presupposes the questions To Whom? and For What?. I could see calling life the axiomatic standard of value or, the axiomatic end; that is to say, the final and ultimate end to which all other ends aim. Perhaps these terms are more clear?
I think this is the way to phrase it, so that it parallels the other axioms:
It is axiomatic that life is the standard of value.
And this is why it makes no sense to try to construct an argument that one should live because it is “good for you” or “the moral thing to do”.
Right, so now we’re back at the original question proposed in this thread. All you’ve effectively done is circle around the issue, but the issue is what we are trying to find an answer to. A restatement of the quandry may be appropriate: The fact is that we have a choice to live or die, but since to make choices we must refer to a standard of good and evil, which is life itself, we have no way to objectively validate the choice to live without becoming engaged in a circular argument.
It appears that the best way to answer this is to reject the entire quandry by saying that the choice to die is really an affirmation of life as the standard of value, anyway.
All you’ve effectively done is circle around the issue, but the issue is what we are trying to find an answer to.
I guess you still don’t get it. As I have pointed out from the beginning, there is an invalid presupposition in the question. There is no quandry, and the matter is extremely simple. Rand was very clear on this point in Galt’s speech. The question has to be rejected, not answered.
Rand was very clear on this point in Galt’s speech.
What part of the speech are you referring to?
What part of the speech are you referring to?
P. 933 onwards. I find that her method of presentation is particularly revealing of her philosophy. She starts with the most basic and axiomatic facts – starting with the fact that existence exists, adding the fact of grasping that statement which implies that a being with perceptual consciousness exists. See especially p. 936: “My morality, the morality of reason, is contained in a single axiom: existence exists—and in a single choice: to live. The rest proceeds from these.” The choice to live is not derived from something else.
P. 933 onwards. I find that her method of presentation is particularly revealing of her philosophy. She starts with the most basic and axiomatic facts – starting with the fact that existence exists, adding the fact of grasping that statement which implies that a being with perceptual consciousness exists. See especially p. 936: “My morality, the morality of reason, is contained in a single axiom: existence exists—and in a single choice: to live. The rest proceeds from these.” The choice to live is not derived from something else.
But how do you know existence exists? Just kidding of course. I think you’ve got it. I haven’t driven this point home well enough. Some things seem so basic that it is easy to gloss over them in conversation. Like taking it for granted that things exist.
Thanks for the help.
The choice to live is not derived from something else.
In better words: The choice to live is not derived.
The problem generally rotates around the non-existence of good and evil. That “good” in objectivism is pro-life and evil promotes death. He argues, essentially, that there are no objective grounds for choosing life as the standard of good and to designate life enhancing actions as “good” begs the question.
It sounds to me as if you first need to convince him that the concept “good” is objectively definable. That “the good” exists apart from human choice. That the very concept applies only to one class of entities and that it has no meaning apart from those entities. That inanimate matter faces no alternative in its existence, that is seeks no goals, that it cannot act for or against its existence and that therefore the concept doesn’t apply to it.
Once you show him the proof that “the good” is a concept that exists in nature it should be much easier to convince him that it applies to humans as well.