Choosing to Live, Choosing to Die

2 hours ago, KyaryPamyu said:

To me, the choice to live is the choice to pursue pleasure and well-being, i.e. to act on your desire for happiness (which is the psychological concomitant of proper self-preservation).

This may represent my last contribution to this thread – for a while, at least. No promises to stay away entirely (which is always difficult for me), but I feel I’m about at my limit to explain myself fully, and usually when I feel this way it’s best to take a step back and recharge. So let me try to explain what I believe is actually going on with the “choice to live,” at this point in the conversation, as clearly as I can. (And I think it might be close to some of your own beliefs, at this point, though perhaps that’s not correct.)

I think that this is the general situation man finds himself in: man has choices to make, of his nature. (And this is as an adult, volitional, etc.) Some of these choices produce outcomes we’d roundly describe as preferable, and some that we would not want at all. We’d earlier considered “life” and “milk” and decided (or I decided, at least, though I suspect you concur) that what we want is “life and milk” or even more accurately “a life full of milk.”

So the question becomes: how does one achieve this in reality? And ethics is the attempt to answer that question. It is the blueprint to achieve “a life full of milk,” in reality, given the fact that we have choices to make where some choices will help us to achieve that “life full of milk,” and some will not.

Okay. So. Given this perspective, a person could ask of himself of any given proposed action/choice – “will this lead me closer to a life full of milk? Or farther away?” But this “takes for granted” that a man wants “a life full of milk.”

And so philosophers, being who and what they are, have challenged this ethical perspective by asking, “Well, what if a man doesn’t want a life full of milk? What then? Does the whole thing collapse?”

I believe that “the choice to live” is an attempt to respond to this question, in asserting that men have an initial (“primary”) choice to pursue a life full of milk (which is “the choice to live,” where “live” is understood in the more robust “flourishing” sense, rather than mere survival), which is itself amoral. Absent this choice, sure, a man does not need this ethics; but then such a man would need no ethics at all, because what is possibly worth pursuing except for a life full of milk?

Here’s the (central) problem with this “choice to live”: a “choice” is an actual concept, an actual thing, in reality. We talk of “choice,” we know “choice,” because we (volitional adults) make choices. And I do not believe that actual people, in reality, make this “choice to live” which is, again, an attempt to answer the question of “what if a man doesn’t want a life full of milk?” I believe that no such “choice” exists in reality.

There are problems which then radiate outward from this central error, which Peikoff in various writings and lectures has attempted to address; but because there is no “choice to live,” he can never manage to do so with complete consistency. Some of these problems include the supposedly arbitrary nature of a “choice to live,” and the applicability (or lack thereof) of this doctrine to actual, human suicide. Defending this “choice to live” doctrine sews great confusion, to the extent that a person attempts to apply it consistently or even understand it. Some of that confusion results in the Craig Biddle video I’d responded to in the OP, where he attempts to say that it cannot be answered on the one hand, but that everyone “who has a context” can answer it on the other, or others attempting to assert that newborn babies somehow manage to “choose to live,” despite a lack of understanding of what “life” even is. “The choice to live” is, in many respects, an ethical “god of the gaps.”

Yet just as the “god of the gaps,” none of it is necessary.

“What if a man doesn’t want a life full of milk?” I don’t know to what extent I’m able to defend this position, at present, but here’s what I’ve come to believe the actual answer is: not that men make an amoral choice, outside of space and time, but that no such man exists or is able to exist. (Men may believe themselves to not want a life full of milk – and hold an “explicit philosophy” stating as much – but they are unable to make this true about themselves, or their nature, just as they cannot will themselves to fly to Mars by flapping their arms, even if they believe that they can.)

Insofar as we have accurately identified the “good” in life (e.g. “a life full of milk”), it is what men want, according to the nature of man. Those things that comprise the good – that comprise “a life full of milk” – being survival, pleasure and happiness – we do not “choose” to desire, or value. We value them because that is part of our identity, part of our design, just as an actual baby does not “choose” to value the pleasure of his mother’s actual milk, but simply does. There is no answer as to “why men value happiness,” for instance, except that this is what happiness is. And pleasure (which I believe stands at the root of happiness, though this is also a position I am working on fleshing out–especially in this thread) is good, of its nature; it is, indeed, the root and source of our very conception of the good.

(I know you’re bound to have objections related to “intrinsicism”; perhaps in the future we can examine those objections.)

2 hours ago, KyaryPamyu said:

The standard of ethics is ‘the good life’, in the context of a healthy existence being possible.

“A life full of milk,” yes?

Yes.

But this is all within the context of “what’s possible.” And indeed, there is no particular or necessary measure of “how much life” or “how much milk” is possible to any given man, at any given time. We wish as much milk over as much life as possible, in any given context. Or as Rand said: “Life is the purpose of life. You should enjoy your life. You should be happy in it. Your proper moral obligation is to pursue the highest form of happiness possible to you – and can explain/prove your choice to yourself, in rational, logical terms.”

I think this is the most succinct explication of ethics possible. (Possible to me, at least).

If one’s proper moral obligation is to pursue the highest form of happiness possible to himself, given his context, then it doesn’t matter if it’s someone sixteen years old and at the beginning of his life, or one hundred and sixteen and at the very end. It is still his proper moral obligation to pursue the highest form of happiness possible to himself, given his particular circumstances.

2 hours ago, KyaryPamyu said:

Suicide is calculated by the standard of ‘painless death’. If the standard was life, then life would be the result of the moral action.

When considering suicide, I think it is necessary to acknowledge the existence of vinegar. Just as we should like “a life full of milk,” we wish to avoid “a life full of vinegar.”

The idea of “justified suicide” is enough to establish that the standard you suggest (where “life would be the result of moral action”) is flawed, and in need of improvement (here, that “life” is misunderstood in context). For even in “tragic circumstances,” man still encounters the same basic situation which gives rise to ethics in the first place: man has choices to make, of his nature. Some of these choices produce outcomes we’d roundly describe as preferable, and some that we would not want at all.

When a man finds himself in a position such that milk is unavailable (or in exceedingly short supply), and all there is to drink is vinegar, there are still certain outcomes which are preferable to others, due to the nature of both milk and vinegar (and man).

Ethics remains our tool to assess among these various outcomes, to select the best possible option. Sometimes suicide is the best possible option, given a dire context, which is the sense in which it is both “justified” and moral.

2 hours ago, KyaryPamyu said:

A dying patient would not need some third party, or code of ethics, to tell him that he should seek a painless death, or a painless last month of life. Suppose you tell him: “it’s very ethical what you’re doing, to kill yourself painlessly. And it’s good that you’re using reason to discover the best suicide method.” That would be unimaginable.

A code of ethics is not fundamentally a “third party” affair. And absolutely a man needs a rational code of ethics to avoid pain (whether by “painless death” or “painless last month of life,” which might represent the very same decision) – because man’s choices (including seeking relief from pain in various circumstances) are instrumental in determining whether he will or will not experience that pain.

For instance, I can direct you to arguments made on this very forum that it is good to experience pain, as such (because all experience is accounted good). That is an ethical argument, but it is deeply, woefully mistaken. Someone taught that by his parents should hope to discover some code of ethics (even via third party) which will allow him to cast it off, lest he suffer more pain than necessary or warranted.

And by the way, you should aspire to be in the position to tell someone that what they’re doing in committing suicide (in select circumstances) is ethical. Presumably you wouldn’t be so wooden in your communication, in context, but if someone asked you (valuing your rationality) whether you thought it was “right” of them to take their own life, given their exceedingly tragic circumstances (perhaps against some moral doctrine they were raised to believe, such as many religions present, where all suicide is considered evil), the proper answer is: yes.

2 hours ago, KyaryPamyu said:

Ethics is for the long run. Even if it _was _immoral for a man to kill himself painfully, he will neither go to hell for it, nor be around after the suicide to say “Drats, now I feel guilty. I know it was my very last moment of life, but did I have to experience that pain?”.

There is a central misunderstanding reflected here, one which has the potential to corrupt all ethical understanding. Though I do not expect to participate in further conversation for a while, when I return (rested, rejuvenated), this might be a good place to resume.

Ethics can be thought of as being “for the long run” in certain valid senses, but it cannot rightly be thought of as “for the future.” Life is nothing but a series of “nows,” and each now is an end in itself. What that means is, we do not validate our decisions wholly from the perspective of some future self who looks back and says, “Yes, I picked right” or “No, I did not.” If that were the case, then all of this would be moot, because in the long long long run, we will all be dead, and unable to evaluate our earlier choices.

Just as someone will not survive his suicide to judge whether he was right or wrong to have experienced some particular measure of pain, none of us will survive our deaths to pass judgement over our earlier choices, even those that may have led to our deaths. What matters is what we experience in the moment that we experience it. The suffering of needless pain is evil, and that evil is not obviated by the fact that – at some point in the future (near or long-term) – the agent suffering that needless pain will no longer have the capacity to regret the fact. It is wrong in the moment it is experienced.

The happiness that a man feels while alive is not rendered valueless or meaningless accounting to the cessation of death either, not even if his happiness was in his very last moment of life (as the monk who eats the strawberry). His happiness, in each moment it is experienced (including the last), stands eternally as its own justification, an end in itself.

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