Mr. Campbell’s piece may not provide a deeper explanation, but the first half provides what can seriously be considered as a thought provokingly deeper examination of Dr. Peikoff’s treatment of the arbitrary.
Oh, I meant Peikoff’s own account could use a deeper explanation by Peikoff himself. In any case, I intend to read the paper linked here when I have free time to read it all.
I wouldn’t let that stop you Plasmatic. The author disclaims in the paragraph you wrote that he is not endorsing Popper but simply pointing out that other philosophers have treated this subject in greater detail. I find it fascinating, especially since I find myself grasping certain subjects in greater depth when I can review it from multiple authors and the particular lens they use.
I haven’t stopped but nonetheless the points on Popper are useless to his other points.
Finished 1st read through for overview. Im now on the 2nd reading where I’m formulating my responses.Since Im working on like 4 projects as time permits ,I cant promise I’ll finish a whole review. What conclusions I do formulate and have time to conceptualize in any decent manner Ill post.
Just one more comment on the Popper thing. If you havent read Popper you wont understand that the whole subject of analysing a concept for coherence and meaning is rejected outright as unscientific "physchologism"and Campbell’s paper itself is not about a philosophy of science anyway.
Leonid,
My article is about the doctrine of the arbitrary assertion.
Generally, what’s asserted is a statement or a proposition, not a concept. Dr. Peikoff’s examples, when he does get around to providing some, are all statements or propositions.
Robert Campbell
The above is central to at least some of your mistakes in the article. For Oism arbitrary propositions presuppose an arbitrary concept.
Edit: I do realize you maintain the arbitrary, is in fact invalid.
For Oism arbitrary propositions presuppose an arbitrary concept.
Do you have anything to back that up? As it stands, your statement is nothing but a claim put forth in the absence of evidence of any sort.
J
Patience. I’m working on it.
Edit: incidentally please note my acknowledgement of Campbell’s claim that an arbitrary concept is in fact an “invalid concept”. My general point is that there is no such thing as an assertion without the subject that is predicated of. On the specific issue of invalid vs arbitrary, more is to come.
For Oism arbitrary propositions presuppose an arbitrary concept.
Two difficulties here.
(1) It’s not the doctrine of the arbitrary proposition—it’s the doctrine of the arbitrary assertion.
Arbitrariness is said to depend not merely on the proposition being asserted but on the person making the assertion.
According to Dr. Peikoff, if you or I, knowing what we do of mathematics, assert the proposition “2 + 2 = 4,” we assert it non-arbitrarily, and truly.
But if a “savage,” who, according to Dr. Peikoff, knows nothing whatsoever of mathematics, asserts what appears to be the exact same proposition, its assertion by him or her is arbitrary.
(2) Many of Leonard Peikoff’s examples of propositions asserted arbitrarily include concepts that he would consider arbitrary. For instance, any of his example assertions about gremlins doing one thing or another.
But not all. Think about an example of an arbitrary assertion that he used in his Objectivism through Induction lecture.
Where’s the arbitrary concept in the assertion that “Harry Binswanger’s bachelor party consisted of a 3-hour seminar on Hegel’s Logic, beginning at 4 in the morning and conducted in his apartment”?
Robert Campbell
Just one more comment on the Popper thing. If you havent read Popper you wont understand that the whole subject of analysing a concept for coherence and meaning is rejected outright as unscientific "physchologism"and Campbell’s paper itself is not about a philosophy of science anyway.
Very early in his career, Karl Popper tried to develop a theory of what we now call cognitive psychology. It was a failure—at least Popper quickly came to view it as such. (The last time I checked, his thesis on the subject had still not been translated into English. I don’t read or speak German, so I’m not in a position to evaluate it.)
That is the most plausible basis for his occasional polemics against “psychologism.”
What, precisely, is the connection between Popper’s anti-psychological views and his claim that a testable universal hypothesis need not be highly probable?
Robert Campbell
But Dr. Peikoff has never laid out much in the way of criteria of evidence, either in OPAR or elsehwere.
The basis of man’s knowledge is direct perception. That is what is meant by the word “evidence”: direct perception of reality.
If you are challenging that, you’re challenging a lot more than just Peikoff’s thoughts on the arbitrary. You’re challenging Objectivism as a whole, and, while we’re at it, science as a whole.
By evidence, Peikoff means the same thing Rand meant. What is unclear to you about what Objectivism means by evidence?
Earlier in this thread, I dissed Prof. Campell’s article on the basis of an ambivalence which was pointed out to me.
While not a review of the presentation of his arguments, it weighed in enough with me to put a short ode together on ‘arbitrary’. One of the things that came across as interesting is the etymology of “arbitrary”, which also references “arbiter”, which more or less guided the piece. To return to this thread and find the word “evidence” front and center is by no real means a surprise.
Mn,
Would you say that a self-contradiction is meaningless, yet false? Or would you say it is meaningful and simply false?
Mn, it is the former.
“Saying A is non-A is objectively meaningless and false. As I said in ‘Between False, Invalid, and Meaningless’,* the objectively meaningless always stems from falsehood. In the case of asserting a self-contradiction, the root falsehood is self-same with the meaningless statement.”* That would seem to run counter the view of many philosophers, including Rand and other Objectivist philosophers, that meaningless statements are not assessable for truth.
In elementary logic one learns that propositions are assertive statements, and such are assessable for truth. I would say further that in striving for truth, including true propositions, one is striving for objectively meaningful true propositions. Failure to attain entirely objectively meaningful propositions is failure to attain a square truth. Technically, a proposition defective in objective meaningfulness is false.
That falsity could be slight in comparison to truth that can be parsed within the proposition. But propositions empty of objective meaningfulness, such as in negative-way theology* (which is pervasive in religious thinking), are simply false, objectively and simply false. Similarly, with self-contradiction.
I will grant, however, that some objectively meaningless propositions warrant not a pause, only not.
“That falsity could be slight in comparison to truth that can be parsed within the proposition.” Consider the proposition A and not-A and B and C and D and . . . and Z, where C through Z are objectively meaningful true propositions. In contrast the proposition A and not-A of itself is not one in which the falsity is slight or even half. Though half of its subsidiary propositions is true, the whole is asserted as true, and that whole is objectively meaningless and false.
The basis of man’s knowledge is direct perception. That is what is meant by the word “evidence”: direct perception of reality.
If you are challenging that, you’re challenging a lot more than just Peikoff’s thoughts on the arbitrary. You’re challenging Objectivism as a whole, and, while we’re at it, science as a whole.
By evidence, Peikoff means the same thing Rand meant. What is unclear to you about what Objectivism means by evidence?
Ayn Rand had a name for this sort of thing.
It’s an argument from intimidation.
If you want to contribute to the present discussion, make an effort to produce a real argument.
Robert Campbell
Typo in #34: That should have been “B through Z,” not “C through Z.” No change in the point.
Yes, Nicky, on Rand’s definition of knowledge, evidence would be firstly observation. Definitely too, observations can become evidence. Rand’s conception of validity in concepts, definitions, and other propositions, including philosophical axioms, also points to observations as the most basic form of evidence in knowledge. The need for logical integration for knowledge, including integration of mathematics with observations and with conceptual understanding, however, suggests that in Rand’s view of knowledge more can be evidence than observations, at least if it is integral with observations and proper conceptualization from them. An example of such “more” (perfectly consistent with Rand’s metaphysics and epistemology) would be Tibor Machan’s essay “Evidence of Necessary Existence” (1992). He relies on the reader to have good enough sense about what is evidence. What is evidence and how something becomes evidence are good issues Machan does not take up. But as Nozick remarked, there are words on subjects worth saying besides last words.
David Kelley has a neat essay “Evidence and Justification” (1991), which is integral with Rand’s epistemology.
The difference between false and arbitrary propositions is that false proposition pertains to reality albeit in a negative way, while arbitrary is not. So proposition “A is not A " is false, but not arbitrary because it pertains to A. Proposition " There is no A” would be arbitrary, it pertains to nothing. False proposition could be proven wrong by referral to reality. However the concept of proof is not applicable to the arbitrary propositions because they don’t have any frame of reference. A proposition " The current king of France is bald" is not false, it’s arbitrary and cannot be proven wrong since there is no king of France.
Another example: a proposition " “It is impossible for the same thing to belong and not to belong at the same time to the same thing and in the same respect” (Metaph IV 3 1005b19–20) is true, it could be verified by reference to observation. Proposition " “It is possible for the same thing to belong and not to belong at the same time to the same thing and in the same respect” is false and its falsity could be proven by referral to reality. But proposition " “It is impossible for the same thing to belong and not to belong at the same time to the same non- existing thing and in the same respect " is arbitrary. It has no frame of reference and cannot be proven true or false because it pertains to nothing.
Leonid, have you read Mr. Campbell’s article? I’m just asking because, while we may come up with a coherent layout for our conception of arbitrary assertions, Robert is arguing against specific claims Dr. Peikoff has made for them.If you or anyone else hasnt read it but plan to, I recommend asking yourself clearly what you think an arbitrary assertion is. How does it differ from an invalid concept or faith? How often have you simply responded to someone as if nothing was said? My first read was quite too fast. The dissection of the claims is taking me a bit of time.
If you or anyone else hasnt read it but plan to, I recommend asking yourself clearly what you think an arbitrary assertion is. How does it differ from an invalid concept or faith? How often have you simply responded to someone as if nothing was said?
Right.
In Leonard Peikoff’s presentation, an arbitrary assertion is not the same as an assertion that includes an invalid concept.
It is also not the same as the assertion of a statement accepted on faith.
In Nathaniel Branden’s formulation (published in 1963, probably dating from the late 1950s), there was a tighter link between arbitrary assertions and appeals to faith. But Dr. Branden also thought that arbitrary assertions have a truth value (usually, they are false).
Robert Campbell