I’ll pick this up and run with it.
I’d say that yes, there are, objectively, many different things in this Universe. There are, in fact, as many different things in this Universe as their are particles - each particle is unique in that it can be said that “this” particle is not “that” particle - even if they are of the same type (example, photon-A is not photon-B ) .
But the perceptual forms, including boundaries , that they assume in Man’s mind are unique to Man’s specific cognitive nature - but this does not make them un-objective. A different type of consciousness/mind will perceive “things” differently, including their boundaries, but they too, will be objective.
I’ve been waiting to respond to other posts till I get access to my research CD. Ill answer this now.
You and Louie are making exactly the same error. There is nothing epistemological about what makes entities particular things . There is a reason why you keep putting the words that affirm this in scare quotes. Popper did the same thing because he had no valid claim to “Objective Knowledge”. Given his Kantian premises on perception, he could never have a non contradictory claim to know anything. The same is true of this notion of boundaries, that which is fundamental to entities/particulars, as epistemological.
There is one simple test for this rationalistic confusion. Ms. Rand made a very clear statement about how to tell what makes something epistemological:
…to say it is epistemological rather than metaphysical is to say it exists only in relation to your grasp of it, or it requires your grasp of it in order to acquire existence…
For there to be more than one thing , things have to be bounded / particular. If you don’t believe that multiplicity “requires your grasp of it in order to acquire existence” then you must mean something completely different than me by boundary …
Now, there is an equivocation going on here between the material causation-process of our sensory apparatus and that of conceptual processing. There is NOTHING epistemological about the form of perception. Entities are _ perceptual _ concretes. They are presented in perception directly. The metaphysical and man made distinction, is an ontological distinction. The primacy of existence over consciousness is an ontological distinction. “Primacy” here, in this context, is a term that has no meaning otherwise.
The first concepts man forms are concepts of entities—since entities are the only primary existents…
If you speak in the primary sense, “entity” has to be defined ostensively—that is to say, by pointing…
An entity means a self-sufficient form of existence—as against a quality, an action, a relationship, etc., which are simply aspects of an entity that we separate out by specialized focus. An entity is a thing….
An entity, in the primary sense, is a solid thing with a definite boundary…
An entity is perceptual in scale , in size. In other words it is a “this” which you can point to and grasp by human perception. In an extended sense you can call molecules—or the universe as a whole—“entities,” because they are self-sufficient things. But in the primary sense when we say that entities are what is given in sense perception, we mean solid things which we can directly perceive.
Can one point to a cognitive isolation or measurement? One can only point to primary existents, “there is nothing else to perceive”. Why would the differentiation between cognitive isolation of aspects be contrasted from entities as "self sufficient, that is, independent, definitely bounded, primar y particulars given in perception, be made otherwise?
First-level concepts are all metaphysical primaries.
This has to be wrestled with when trying to make sense of what it means for hierarchy to be epistemological.
I repeat, there is NO sense in which entities-bounded, in the primary sense, is epistemological. They are metaphysical primaries!
Louie’s statement:
Still, entities are epistemological to the extent that a mental process is used to allow you to see anything as an entity in the first place.
Is an incredible error that makes ALL cognition conceptual. This is the Kantian equivocation of the form of perception with conceptual-abstraction. This makes “things in themselves” unknowable and the perception-conception distinction meaningless.