From Integrity to Calculus
Part 4
“Reason is the faculty that perceives, identifies and integrates the material provided by [man’s] senses” (Rand 1957, 1016). Reason is man’s only tool of knowledge. Reason is the tool by which the individual achieves his specific choice of happiness (1018). “Reason is the source, the precondition of his productive work” (Rand 1961, 25). “Productive work is the central purpose of a rational man’s life, the central value that integrates and determines the hierarchy of all his other values” (ibid.).
All the fruit trees lend themselves to work of this kind. The gathering in of the almonds interests even the smallest children, who do a really useful bit of work, so diligent are they in seeking out the hidden almonds and gathering them into baskets. Hunting out the strawberries, lurking under the leaves is a work no less pleasing than of seeking for sweet violets. (Montessori 1906, 94)
It is by work that children organize their personalities. (Montessori quoted in Lillard 1996, 42)
In addition to ordering their environment and ordering themselves in their outward personalities, they have also ordered the inner world of their minds. / The didactic material, in fact, does not offer to the child the “content” of the mind, but the order for that “content.” It causes him to distinguish identities from differences, extreme differences from fine gradations, and to classify, under conceptions of quality and of quantity, the most varying sensations appertaining to surfaces, colors, dimensions, forms and sounds. The mind has formed itself by a special exercise of attention, observing, comparing, and classifying. . . . / Language now comes to fix by means of exact words the ideas which the mind has acquired. (Montessori 1914, 82–83)
All work is noble. The only ignoble thing is to live without working. It is essential to understand the value of work in all its forms, be they manual or intellectual. Practical experience will cause the adolescent to understand that the two forms are complementary and they are equally essential in a civilized existence. (Montessori 1948, 109)
The affinity between Maria Montessori’s educational methods and Rand’s view of reality, human nature, and theory of knowledge is several. Rand praised those methods for the way Montessori’s didactic material sets an appropriate place for the child to explore and find the natures of things by his or her own interest and effort, guided by the instructor, corrected by the reality of the material (Hessen 1970, 871). My third quotation above from Montessori is also quoted by Rand, who writes that in this passage “it is psycho-epistemological training that Dr. Montessori had in mind (though this is not her term)” (Rand 1970, 886). Recall that psycho-epistemology pertains to “cognitive processes from the aspect of the interaction between man’s conscious mind and the automatic functions of his subconscious” (883).
Cognitive integration is another grand concordance between Rand’s view of knowledge and Montessori’s culture for its growth from infancy to child to adolescent and adult. Montessori education provides meaningful contexts for learning. What is being learned is given connection to real-life endeavors, and it is given connection to the child’s existing knowledge (Lillard 2005, 224–56). A Montessori educator* who is an Objectivist observes: “One of the cornerstones of the Montessori method is the presentation of knowledge as an integrated whole, emphasizing conceptual relationships between different branches of learning and the placement of knowledge in its historical context.”*
The metaphor of the human mind as a blank slate on which experience must write in order for us to acquire knowledge is a favorite of Aristotelians and Lockeans. Rand concurred in that general picture, but she went on to add that to acquire knowledge one must acquire skills, not only content reached with those skills (Rand 1970, 883–86). The mind is no empty vessel into which knowledge is poured (Lillard 2005, 9–14, 225). Context matters for real learning in an actively integrating, living intelligence.
“The function of psychological integrations is to make certain connections automatic, so that they work as a unit and do not require a conscious process of thought every time they are evoked. (All learning consists of automatizing one’s knowledge in order to leave one’s mind free to pursue further knowledge.)” (Rand 1966, 34). One first acquires knowledge “by fully conscious, focused attention and observation,” one then establishes “mental connections which make the knowledge automatic (instantly available as a context)” (ITOE 65).
The process of automatization was discussed by William James in his Principles of Psychology in connection with the nature and functions of habits. He quotes from one author who speaks of human modes of movement and sense perception become automatic, but which first had to be acquired—they are not congenital—through nervous-system development in the course of self-education (James 1890, 111). He quotes another author who describes the attention upon the movement of his fingers required by the beginning piano player, which movements will later flow easily upon the slightest stimulus (112–13). James concluded that habits simplify “movements required to achieve a given result, makes them more accurate and diminishes fatigue” (112).
James quotes a third author:
If an act became no easier after being done several times, if the careful direction of consciousness were necessary to its accomplishment on each occasion, it is evident that the whole activity of a lifetime might be confined to one or two deeds—that no progress could take place in development. A man might be occupied all day in dressing and undressing himself . . . . Think of the pains necessary to teach a child to stand, of the many efforts which it must make, and of the ease with which it at last stands, unconscious of any effort. (Henry Maudsley quoted in James 1890, 113–114)
James concluded that habit “diminishes the conscious attention with which our acts are performed” (1890, 114).
The great difference between (i) James’ understanding of habit formation and habit utility and (ii) Rand’s understanding of automatization and its role in cognition is the salience of the concept integration for Rand and its absence for James. He was aware of Spencer’s pervasive use of the concept integration for understanding cognition, but he did not pick up this element for his own account of our powers (James 1890, 151–52).
Integration is today pervasive and salient in cognitive science. Consider the work Attention and Performance XVI, whose chapters dig into how a wide range of constraining influences
are integrated in perception, attention, language comprehension, and motor control. [The chapters] consider the mechanism of information integration in the brain; examine the status of the modularity hypothesis in light of efforts to understand how information integration can be successfully achieved; and discuss information integration from the viewpoints of psychophysics, physiology, and computational theory. (Inui and McClelland 1996, back cover)
Integration is today put to work as well in philosophies not Rand’s: “What I am getting at here is the question of how to integrate art into the practical, goal-driven pursuits that we take to be particularly important” (Stroud 2011, 2).
Recall that in Rand’s view acquisition of knowledge includes acquisition of the specific skills by which the content of knowledge is obtained. By age two, the human being is running around and speaking in two-word sentences. In his first two years, the little one has learned an amazing lot.
To focus his eyes (which is not innate, but an acquired skill),[*] to perceive the things around him by integrating his sensations into percepts (which is not innate, but an acquired skill), to coordinate his muscles for the task of crawling, then standing upright, then walking—and, ultimately, to grasp the process of concept-formation and learn to speak—these are some of an infant’s tasks and achievements . . . . (Rand 1970, 883)
The creation of art also requires the acquisition of specific skills. The art that is literature—literary fiction—deals in language and therefore concepts, but the skill required to write fiction is additional to the skills I had to acquire to be able to write this essay for you. The accomplished writer of drama, libretto, short story, or novel creates a story and its characters that illustrates, or concretizes, a theme, conveyed with a definite style (Rand 1968, 481). In the literary art, the concretization resides in imagination. Its concretes are told of and induced into the imagination of the audience.
The hoist swung like a pendulum above the city. It sped against the side of the building. It passed the line where the masonry ended behind her. There was nothing behind her now but steel ligaments and space. She felt the height pressing against her eardrums. The sun was in her eyes. The air beat against her raised chin. —Rand
Style is not told, but entered (cf. Peikoff 1991, 422–23; Rand 1958, 89–93, 123–25). A poem can have all the concretes, the imagined and the entered, as have the other genre of literature, but it need not. Its concretization of a theme may be attained without story or characterization (Rand 1968, 481). Poetry has style, of course, and it can utilize more focally than can the other literary forms the concrete sound and rhythm of language* (see also Branden c. 1968, 170, 466).
Not a whisper, not a thought,
Not a kiss nor look be lost. —Auden
The theme and style of a good poem must be worked together to unified result. In a good novel, the theme, plot, characterization, and style must likewise be worked together to “an individual sum” (Rand 1968, 481). The theme of the novel is about human existence. The theme serves as integrator of the novel, guiding the writer’s selections in plot, which is to express the theme in actions. Plot integrates the events of the story, making them entirely purposeful towards a resolving climax (but see Cox 2000, 323–24*). The logic of the plot is the logic of final causation in human action. The cardinal principle of a good novel is that “the theme and the plot must be integrated—as thoroughly integrated as mind and body or thought and action in a rational view of man. . . . / . . . The integration of an important theme with a complex plot-structure is the most difficult achievement possible to a writer, and the rarest” (Rand 1968, 485).
A character in a work of fiction should “be an abstraction, yet look like a concrete” (Rand 1968, 486). The good writer unfolds, mainly in action and dialogue, the motivations of a character, showing the character’s nature and actions intelligible (see also Minsaas 2005*). Characters enact the plot, and the events of the plot contribute to characterizations; and theme is required for a plot. “This is the kind of integration required by the nature of a novel” (Rand 1968, 500).
Literary style is a novelist’s distinctive or characteristic mode of execution. It includes what is selected to include in a passage as well as choice of words and sentences. In Rand’s view, a novel must tell a story, and style in a novel is only a means to that end. An accomplished style effecting moods is part of the craft of the novelist. But style and mood alone without a re-creation of reality by plot and characterization does not occasion for the reader existence and purpose as drivers of human consciousness.
Rand overextended those points by applying them beyond the art-form that is the novel. She says that literary mood studies, “little pieces conveying nothing but a certain mood, . . . are not an art-form” (1968, 503). Then, what about poetry without characterization or story? Rand took such poetry as literary art. On the face of it, she is in contradiction.
Rand conceived as art-forms only elaborate, highly developed forms. Consider dance. To attain what Rand takes as an art-form, dance must be a fully developed system, such as ballet, or at least it must have “the key elements on which a fully developed system could be built,” such being the case with tap dancing (Rand 1971, 1034; cf. Crowther 2007). The system test could be passed by some poetry that evidently would not also pass the test of Rand’s definition of art.
Rand was aiming for what has been called a “‘wrapper definition’ that attempts to cover the entire extension of a concept,” rather than only “an evaluative characterization of what the best forms of art aspire to be like” (Stroud 2011, 5). Rand took up the challenge of showing literary and nonliterary art-forms to be distinctive and explicable under a definition, her definition of art, which is, we recall: “a selective re-creation of reality according to an artist’s metaphysical value-judgments.” (On this definition, see Torres and Kamhi 2000; Hunt 2001, 261–62;* Enright 2001, 353–56*). In the course of her examinations of various art-forms, we learn more about what she means by re-creation of reality in the way of art. For poetry without story or characterization—say, Rossetti’s Silent Noon—Rand does not take up the challenge of articulating how such poetry differs from so-called mood studies, thence, with that difference, how such poetry is art.
Silent Noon has a scene and an event.* (The idea microcosm comes quickly to mind; see Bissell 1997;* 2004.*) In this poem, existence and human act are told of. They are re-creations of reality and the basic draw of the consciousness aroused in the readers. Imagined perceptions and induced feelings are aroused by what is said in the poem and how it is said, all well integrated. I don’t have an example of what Rand was calling literary mood studies, so I don’t know how it might differ from this sort of poem. Do such mood studies concretize a theme, but without re-creation of reality, without any showing of existence and purpose driving consciousness?
This much is clear by Rand and satisfactory by me: an artistic selective re-creation is a re-integration, and for all art, not only literary, there will be a theme. For arts not literary, the theme will not be so fully expressed in words as in the medium, but it is there and is the large integrator.
The form of a building that is a work of art has a theme that is integral with the building’s purpose and its site. (See the pertinent passages from The Fountainhead I quoted in “Soul, Structure, Struggle,”* also Enright 2001, 347–53.) “Literature starts with concepts [expressed by the words] and integrates them to percepts—painting, sculpture and architecture start with percepts and integrate them to concepts” (Rand 1971, 1010). How the integrations in artistic drawing, painting, sculpture, and music differ from the integrations of percepts into concepts into propositions into theories, that is, into the integrations of knowledge, will be the subject of the next, final installment.
(To be continued.)
References
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——. 2004. Art as Microcosm: The Real Meaning of the Objectivist Concept of Art. The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies (JARS) 5(2):307–63.
Branden, N. c. 1968. The Basic Principles of Objectivism. In The Vision of Ayn Rand. 2009. Cobden.
Cox, S. 2000. The Art of Fiction. JARS 1(2):313–31.
Crowther, P. 2007. Defining Art, Creating the Canon. Oxford.
Enright, J. 2001. Art – What a Concept? JARS 2(2):341–59.
Hessen, B. 1970. The Montessori Method III. The Objectivist 9(Jul):870–74.
Hunt, L. 2001. What Art Does. JARS 2(2):253–63.
Inui, T., and J. L. McClelland 1991. Attention and Performance XVI – Information Integration in Perception and Communication. MIT.
James, W. 1890 [1950]. The Principles of Psychology. Vol. 1. Dover.
Lillard, A. S. 2005. Montessori: The Science Behind the Genius. Oxford.
Lillard, P. P. 1996. Montessori Today. Shocken.
Minsaas, K. 2005. The Stylization of Mind in Ayn Rand’s Fiction. In The Literary Art of Ayn Rand. W. Thomas, editor. The Objectivist Center.
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——. 1914. Dr. Montessori’s Own Handbook. Frederick A. Stokes.
——. 1948 [1976]. From Childhood to Adolescence. Schocken.
Rand, A. 1943. The Fountainhead. Bobbs-Merrill.
——. 1958 [2000]. Lectures on Fiction Writing. In The Art of Fiction. T. Boeckmann, editor. Penguin.
——. 1966. Art and Sense of Life. The Objectivist (O) 5(Mar):33–40.
——. 1968. Basic Principles of Literature. O 7(Jul):481–88; 7(Aug):497–504.
——. 1970. The Comprachicos I. O 9(Aug):881–91.
——. 1971. Art and Cognition. O 10(Apr):1009–17; 10(May):1025–47.
Stroud, S. R. 2011. John Dewey and the Artful Life – Pragmatism, Aesthetics, and Morality. Penn State.
Torres, L., and M. M. Kamhi 2000. What Art Is: The Esthetic Theory of Ayn Rand. Open Court.