"How do I know I'm not in the matrix?"

Questions about Objectivism
41

I don’t really see the need to use a word such as “arbitrary” in the context of describing the “possible.” As I said, “possible” already excludes hypotheticals which confict with known facts or reality. Peikoff’s definition of “arbitrary” seems add nothing to what we want to capture by defining the possible with the added problem of complexity and a fuzzy redefinition of a word to a new context.

That’s because you’ve mis-defined “possible.” The addition of “arbitrary” adds the distinction that David outlined nicely. It is an actual distinction, and it is one that matters.

For something to be “possible” it doesn’t require ANY evidence to suggest it is true. Possibility only requires no evidence that it is false.

Basically, that’s incorrect; and this disagreement is the source of why Peikoff makes the distinction he does.

42

I had a long reply talking about the assertion made about the use of possibility in the law, but the forum died and it was lost. To sum it up, the law doesn’t require possibility to be disproved. It only requires the elements of the offense or cause of action to be proved to the legal standard (beyond a reasonable doubt/preponderance of the evidence) any possible alternative explanations posited by the defense are relevant only to the extent they tend to show the offense was not committed and are important to the extent they are believed by the jury.

Inspector, I don’t see how I have mis-defined “possible.” Here are several relevant definitions entirely consistant with mine from several different dictionaries:

  1. That may or can be, exist, happen, be done, be used, etc.

  2. That may be true or may be the case, as something concerning which one has no knowledge to the contrary

  3. Capable of happening, existing, or being true without contradicting proven facts, laws, or circumstances.

I have yet to find a definition of “possible” which states that something needs positive evidence of its probability to be “possible.” Perhaps that is another new definition of Peikoff’s?

43

Perhaps that is another new definition of Peikoff’s?

It is, and that is precisely the point: that philosophy was wanting for the lack of this definition. It is a very important epistemological distinction that he is making, and resolves problems like this BIV thing.

44

To sum it up, the law doesn’t require possibility to be disproved.

And that is relevant how?

There is a fundamental difference between law and science. When a man is accused of stealing another man’s goods, you can’t say “I dunno, let me see more evidence”. With the law, you must find guilty (running the risk of violating an innocent man’s rights) or not guilty (running the risk of perpetuating the violation of the victim’s rights). And this is a good thing: with a scientific hypothesis, you can keep trying to prove the hypothesis, experimenting over and over. It’s true that the legal system is moving in the direction of allowing repeated trials until a conviction can be secured, but this is not a good thing, IMO, and for the forseeable future, it is unimaginable that the accused could be dragged through a trial for the same offense 20-100 times in his life.

45

And that is relevant how?

I was responding to KendallJ’s post on the previous page.

46

I was responding to KendallJ’s post on the previous page.

I understand that, but principles regarding evidence in law are irrelevant to epistemology and especially science, for the reason that I explained.

47

Saying something is possible is making a positive assertion, and all positive assertions need evidence.

I think most people use “possible” to mean even if there is no evidence, a thing is not impossible in logic. But that is an instance of the analytic/synthetic dichotomy which is another thing Objectivists reject.

48

Saying something is possible is making a positive assertion, and all positive assertions need evidence.

That is the fundamental observation here, that Vladimir doesn’t take into consideration. A statement of possibility is a positive assertion, because all statements of fact are positive assertions. And all positive assertions must have some fact or piece of evidence to tip the balance to their side (otherwise it couldn’t be a positive assertion).

An arbitrary statement is outside right or wrong statements; it simply is outside of reality altogether and has no basis on which to even be evaluated. That is the case with the “matrix” scenario – it is not possible (if it is, show how), but is arbitrary (there is no basis for determining its truth or falsehood, and as such it must be thrown out together with all other infinitely many arbitrary statements). It should be stressed again, that the “matrix” scenario is not wrong, but arbitrary, which are two different things. There is basis on which to consider and evaluate wrong statements; there is none for arbitrary ones.

1 Like
49

Odden, in regards to the law, I don’t think we are in disagreement at all. I agree that what we are talking about in this thread has nothing to do with the law. That was why I made the original response to KendallJ.

In regards to “possibility” being a positive assertion which needs evidence, this is half true. When you make a statement saying something is possible you are only need to prove the proposition of possibility, not the truth of the underlying assertion. For example, if I state “It is possible it is raining outside right now” I only need to show that it is not impossible that it is raining outside, and this simply means that I need to show that if the underlying proposition were true it would not be internally conflicting or violate known laws or facts. This is different from proving the underlying assertion that it IS actually raining.

To require positive evidence of the underlying assertion to make statements of possibility you essentially turn possibility into probablity.

50

When you make a statement saying something is possible you are only need to prove the proposition of possibility, not the truth of the underlying assertion.

I understand that you’re taking a particular position, but this adamant denial of yours is non-productive. All you’re doing is repeating a long-standing standard error in epistemology, that of not distinguishing the arbitrary from the possible. Your position boils down to saying that there is no difference at all between a claim that has some degree of support, and a random claim that lacks any support, which has no relationship to man’s cognition, and need not even be a claim made by a sentient being.

Use of “possible” in philosophy shows that it really means something like “formally imaginable”, otherwise there would be no discussion of possible worlds where a cow can jump over the moon. If one were to rigorously restrict the use of “possible” to that which is known to conform to all existing knowledge, then one might on occasion say “It is possible” in answer to someone’s question “Is it raining right now?”. But it is intellectually dishonest to make an initial offer of that claim, since failure to explicitly recognize the equal opposite possibility “It is possible that it is not raining right now” is an Gricean attempt to imply that the claim “It is raining” is not actually arbitrary, which it is.

As far as the BIV issue goes, clearly that is not a “possible” claim. If you have some real candidates for “possible” claims which we identify as arbitrary (assuming you understand the concept now) and think that you can prove that there is a good reason to fail to distinguish arbitrary claims from possible claims, I’m willing to invest the effort into demolishing that “proof”.

51

I understand that you’re taking a particular position, but this adamant denial of yours is non-productive. All you’re doing is repeating a long-standing standard error in epistemology, that of not distinguishing the arbitrary from the possible. Your position boils down to saying that there is no difference at all between a claim that has some degree of support, and a random claim that lacks any support, which has no relationship to man’s cognition, and need not even be a claim made by a sentient being.

That is not my position at all. My position is simply that:

1.) I don’t understand how the objectivist definition of “arbitrary” captures anything meaningful since it requires the underlying claim to never be able to be proven. The only such claims I can think of are ones which include the element of unprovability in their definition. (IE "An invisible, unprovable monster on the far side of Saturn.) Claims with a possiblily of proof, no matter how slim, don’t seem to be included in the definition yet those are the main type we will be dealing with as philosophers.

2.) In this thread numerous people have mis-defined the word “possible” as to require any statement of possibility to be backed up with positive evidence of the underlying assertion. This is in direct contradiction to the accepted definitions of the word, both in everyday English and in philosophy. Coupled with the uselessness and ambiguity of the term “arbitrary” this mis-definition only increases the complexity and confusion of the issue.

3.) I don’t see how using the accepted definition of “possible” in any way contradicts the goals of objectivist philosophy or philosophy in general. There seems to be a general confusion in this thread in equating the acceptance of claims of possibility with the acceptance of the underlying assertion. Odden apparently has grasped this partially be recognizing that you can often make the opposite underlying assertion in a statement of possibilty without changing the truth value of the statement. This is because a statement of possibility is not a statement that the underlying assertion is true.

4.) In short, I see this thread as yet another example of objectivist philosophy gone awry. After spending four years in the philosophy department of a major university, the most common resistance I found to objectivist philosophy being taken seriously was its redefinition of already well-accepted terms with a known meaning to philosophers. The second most common was in glossing over potential philosophic quagmires in order to reach a conclusion consistant with the writings of Ayn Rand.

I would honestly like to see objectivism be a major school of thought at the academic level, but to do so it needs to be able to critically examine its own philosophic foundation as well as stick to accepted definitions in philosophy where possible.

52

That is not my position at all. My position is simply that:

1.) I don’t understand how the objectivist definition of “arbitrary” captures anything meaningful since it requires the underlying claim to never be able to be proven. The only such claims I can think of are ones which include the element of unprovability in their definition. (IE "An invisible, unprovable monster on the far side of Saturn.) Claims with a possiblily of proof, no matter how slim, don’t seem to be included in the definition yet those are the main type we will be dealing with as philosophers.

Fine then, why don’t you prove how you would know whether you were in a matrix or not? The element of unprovability is right there. You have the onus of proof on you to show that it’s possible, and that it’s somehow possible to prove or disprove it. If it’s by definition not provable (as you conceded yourself, it’s “outside” human reasoning), then it is by definition arbitrary, and not any less arbitrary than a pink elephant or the spaghetti monster.

4.) In short, I see this thread as yet another example of objectivist philosophy gone awry. After spending four years in the philosophy department of a major university, the most common resistance I found to objectivist philosophy being taken seriously was its redefinition of already well-accepted terms with a known meaning to philosophers.

And how much were these philosophers able to solve in the last 700 years? Almost nothing. In fact, it’s getting worse and worse, and philosophy is now practically a mockery (I know personally). Perhaps you should reflect on the fact that maybe the philosophers are the ones at fault here, and that a redefinition is in order.

53

That is not my position at all. My position is simply that:

1.) I don’t understand how the objectivist definition of “arbitrary” captures anything meaningful since it requires the underlying claim to never be able to be proven.

As I understand, it is not that an arbitrary claim can never be proven, but rather that no evidence exists or has been provided to support it. Such is the case with the matrix. Nothing I am aware of would make that circumstance physically impossible, but because no evidence exists which suggests that we are in a computer, it is an arbitrary claim which doesn’t warrant much consideration.

54

That is not my position at all. My position is simply that:

1.) I don’t understand how the objectivist definition of “arbitrary” captures anything meaningful since it requires the underlying claim to never be able to be proven.

The distinction has been made several times and it appears your resistance to the definition is more than a mere lack of understanding, it’s disagreement.

As Ian pointed out, and Free Capitalist expounded upon, a statement that something is possible requires some evidence. I’ll try my attempt at explaining why by using an example.

“It’s possible we are actually in the matrix.”

“How do you know it’s possible?”

Think about what is necessary to answer that question. The claim is a claim of knowledge which has no foundation. How does one claim to know something for which there exists no evidence?

At best one can claim, “Well I can imagine that it’s possible, but I don’t actually know that it’s possible.” Imagination does not necessarily make possibility exist.

55

Fine then, why don’t you prove how you would know whether you were in a matrix or not? The element of unprovability is right there. You have the onus of proof on you to show that it’s possible, and that it’s somehow possible to prove or disprove it. If it’s by definition not provable (as you conceded yourself, it’s “outside” human reasoning), then it is by definition arbitrary, and not any less arbitrary than a pink elephant or the spaghetti monster.

I have no interest in trying to prove the existance of a Matrix. I certainly don’t have evidence that one exists, nor do I have evidence that one does not exist. The main point about the Matrix scenario is that it really doesn’t matter to us whether a Matrix exists or not. We have to live with how we experience reality in whatever form it presents itself to us. That is why the Matrix scenario is largely a thought experiment. We have to live our lives in the exact same way regardless of whether a Matrix exists or not.

And how much were these philosophers able to solve in the last 700 years? Almost nothing. In fact, it’s getting worse and worse, and philosophy is now practically a mockery (I know personally). Perhaps you should reflect on the fact that maybe the philosophers are the ones at fault here, and that a redefinition is in order.

Again, saying that the methods a major academic branch work with are a mockery is not a good way to get them to accept your philosophy. Not all philosophers in academia are useless. The department at my university contained Tara Smith, perhaps the most well known objectivist academic philosopher, as well as a highly-respected classics and classical philosophy section. These are people who have respect for what philosophy is supposed to be, and if you work within the accepted definitions then you have a chance of influencing these people and having them respect objectivism as a valid philosophy rather than a “cult” or the personal diatribe of a novelist as many seem to think.

As I understand, it is not that an arbitrary claim can never be proven, but rather that no evidence exists or has been provided to support it. Such is the case with the matrix. Nothing I am aware of would make that circumstance physically impossible, but because no evidence exists which suggests that we are in a computer, it is an arbitrary claim which doesn’t warrant much consideration.

Read Inspector’s post earlier where he defines “arbitrary” as that which cannot be proven false. What you just decribed is actually just the “possible,” specifically the “nomological possible,” which are things which might exist within physical laws and known reality but for which no positive evidence is required. As you can see, this whole “arbitrary” terminology serves only to muddy the waters and adds little to the understanding of the problem.

56

The distinction has been made several times and it appears your resistance to the definition is more than a mere lack of understanding, it’s disagreement.

As Ian pointed out, and Free Capitalist expounded upon, a statement that something is possible requires some evidence. I’ll try my attempt at explaining why by using an example.

“It’s possible we are actually in the matrix.”

“How do you know it’s possible?”

Think about what is necessary to answer that question. The claim is a claim of knowledge which has no foundation. How does one claim to know something for which there exists no evidence?

Saying “It’s possible we are actually in the matrix” isn’t making a claim that we are in the matrix. The question of how I know it is possible is a good one however. The way you know whether something is possible is by checking whether if true, the underlying statement conflicts with physical reality or known facts. In this case, would it be logically inconsistent were the Matrix to actually exist? Is a Matrix incompatible with the laws of physics/reality? If the answers to these kinds of questions are “no” then it is possible that we are actually in the Matrix.

You seem to think the imaginatory aspect of possibility statements is somehow bad, yet that is exactly part of the purpose of such statements. Making a statement saying something is possible is essentially imagining a set of circumstances which might occur/exist in the world but which you do not yet have direct evidence of.

I am still struggling to figure out why this is such a hard concept for many here to grasp, as not only is this the accepted philosophic use of the term “possible” but it is also exactly the manner the term is used in the English language. I stated three such dictionary definitions above, in fact.

57

Saying “It’s possible we are actually in the matrix” isn’t making a claim that we are in the matrix.

I didn’t say that it was. I said it was a claim to know that it was possible. “The matrix” was only the example, but insert any unevidenced claim in there you want, flying spaghetti monsters, whatever. That’s the distinction you are missing.

How do you know it’s possible? A lack of evidence to indicate conflict with known physics or facts is not sufficient for the positive claim of knowledge of the possibility. That only leads to a proper claim of “I don’t know why it is not possible, nor do I know that it is.” That proper claim represents no knowledge at all, it represents the arbitrary.

I am still struggling to figure out why this is such a hard concept for many here to grasp,

Because it’s not hard, it’s wrong.

You seem to think the imaginatory aspect of possibility statements is somehow bad,

That is not evidenced by anything I said. What I said was, imagination (alone) is insufficient to support the knowledge of possibility.

58

I think part of the problem here is that many seem to want the idea of possible/arbitrary to do all the work in evaluating claims. Possibility is just one element in determining the validity of any given proposition. Probability, or “likelyhood” is the logical second step and does the work many of you here seem to want possibility to do by inserting this new evidence requirement into it.

Possibility is like the first, low, hurdle on the track. A claim doesn’t have to have much to it to get past the hurdle of possibility. It simply cannot contradict known facts, the laws of physical reality, or be internally logically inconsistent. Because of this, the fact that something is possible doesn’t tell you the kinds of things about it we as humans like to know. Primarily, we want to know not just if it is possible but if is is and failing that, at least what are the odds that it is.

Probability is like the second, higher hurdle. When we want to determine if something is probable we of course need to know if it is possible, because if it is impossible it is not going to be probable. But once we know something is possible we want to know what is the likelyhood that it is or that it is not. This is where evidence comes into play and is important because evidence (facts) and also reasoning (inferences) are what is going to tell you how likely or probably the claim is of being true or false. This is where the vast majority of “possible” statements die because in the absence of evidence or logical inferences one way or the other, it is impossible to tell if they are probable.

For instance, the existance of a pink elephant is possible. Nothing in the nature of pinkness or elephantness, biology, physics, etc. seems to prohibit such a combination from existing. But such a creature is not probable. We have no evidence of ever finding a pink elephant, and we don’t have any likely inferences or trail of reasoning as to how such a thing will come into being anytime soon. Thus because it is not probable we are going to discard any assertions about there being pink elephants as being entirely speculative and irrelevant to our daily lives.

59

None of that helped. It’s not a conceptual issue about where possiblity is in relation to probability, etc. It’s an issue of a claim to knowledge without sufficient basis to make such a claim.

It’s possible I’m going to extract myself from this thread as I see it’s going nowhere. But to vary what you said before, I don’t understand why you cannot understand the simple yet meaningful distinction between arbitrary and possible. What’s “well accepted” is immaterial in this case.

60

I have no interest in trying to prove the existance of a Matrix. I certainly don’t have evidence that one exists, nor do I have evidence that one does not exist.

I think you’re missing the epistemological point here, a crucial one. You don’t need evidence that it doesn’t exist. This is a logical fallacy, the proof of a negative. It is impossible. Only positive statements need proof, and only positive statements can be proven. So I don’t need to tear myself between whether I can or cannot prove this imaginary Matrix. I trust my eyes, by default. If someone has a positive statement for the existence of a Matrix or that my brain is in a vat, then let them come forth and present their arguments. That is the proper epistemological stance to take here. This thought experiment only works if you’re willing to expect proofs of a negative.

Again, saying that the methods a major academic branch work with are a mockery is not a good way to get them to accept your philosophy. Not all philosophers in academia are useless. The department at my university contained Tara Smith, perhaps the most well known objectivist academic philosopher, as well as a highly-respected classics and classical philosophy section. These are people who have respect for what philosophy is supposed to be

Well then we disagree not only on our means but our goals. It is not my intention to convince these people; I have met enough of them to know that they are lost beyond all hope. And I don’t believe they “have respect for what philosophy is supposed to be”. They like their imaginary mind games and thought experiments, all the while they neglect to prove the most elementary facts that men require to live, and in fact frequently work to undermine them and to poison human existence. It is these people that you will find convincing everyone that free will doesn’t exist, that Marxism (or some form of state control) is the moral ideal, that reason is “limited”, and that who can know whether we exist anyway. No thank you. With friends like these, who needs enemies?

On the other hand, I would not rush to lump the classics into the same category; classics as a profession is also rotten, but not nearly as much, and it is still largely weighed down by having to be anchored in fixed texts which will never change, and that limits how much damage can be done to the field. Still, even with this anchorage the Classics now outputs articles such as “Gay Homer” and “Concordia Discors in Aristophanes’ Clouds” – in other words, mindless gibberish that not only teaches the current generation nothing about the classics, but actively serves to neglect and undermine that education (by not wanting to prioritize traditional Western values as anything important, or worth keeping up and teaching to the next generation).

As you can see from my (very early) posts here and also on The Forum, I have a very avid and long-standing passion both for classics and philosophy (I have a BA in Philosophy). But I hold out no hope for lunatics who would rather live in their cocoon and poison the lives of everyone around them. Bitter but true! I’d rather live my life in pursuit of my values :alien:

Possibility is like the first, low, hurdle on the track. A claim doesn’t have to have much to it to get past the hurdle of possibility. It simply cannot contradict known facts, the laws of physical reality, or be internally logically inconsistent.

No, you’re taking the metaphor of a ladder too far, so much so that the first rung is not even above the ground! That is all we are asking, that if you see this as a ladder, then even the first step must be above the ground, and be a positive argument. Even if it is a very low first step, no matter how little it is above the ground, it still is above ground, and it still needs some positive statement in favor of it, no matter how inconsequential. This is a foundation for logic, that you cannot disprove a negative, and this principle is approximately 2,300 years old. Surely they have taught this idea in all of the hallowed academic philosophy courses you’ve been telling me about?