I’m not sure if this deserves a new thread, but thinking further on this question: what is an enemy?
As I noted above, I think it is a mistake to dump the taxman and a extortionist/kidnapper/blackmailer into the same bucket for the simple reason that one can be fairly confident that the taxman can be bought off at the demanded ransom, not so the typical extortionist/kidnapper/blackmailer.
I don’t understand why you think that they are different, in the relevant sense. Sure, pay your taxes (“the taxman can be bought off at the demanded ransom”) or comply with the extortionist/kidnapper/blackmailer (the extortionist/kidnapper/blackmailer can be bought off at their demanded price).
What’s the relevant difference? Why not “dump the taxman and a extortionist/kidnapper/blackmailer into the same bucket”?
An enemy is someone who is actively out to destroy one’s life or values, including one’s pursuit of one’s values.
I don’t understand why you think that they are different, in the relevant sense. Sure, pay your taxes (“the taxman can be bought off at the demanded ransom”) or comply with the extortionist/kidnapper/blackmailer (the extortionist/kidnapper/blackmailer can be bought off at their demanded price).
That is precisely the difference I had in mind. Knowing that person A can be bought off but person B might come back for more as soon as he is paid is a very important piece of information. Person A is a trustworthy extortionist and person B is not. That ought to impact any rational response.
What’s the relevant difference? Why not “dump the taxman and a extortionist/kidnapper/blackmailer into the same bucket”?
An enemy is someone who is actively out to destroy one’s life or values, including one’s pursuit of one’s values.
“Out to destroy” is a very poorly worded definition. The taxman and the extortionist are, broadly speaking, out to make an easy buck at your expense. The destruction of your live or values is incidental to this objective. (Of course, there are more extreme instances in history but let’s stick with the typical.)
There is a related question: is it ethical to treat someone as an enemy without telling them? Of course I don’t mean that anyone who qualifies as an enemy deserves the time of day, much less a formal declaration of war, but if you are in the habit of keeping your enemy list secret then how do your friends know they are not on it?
“Trustworthy extortionist”? Isn’t that an oxymoron?
“[O]ut to make an easy buck at your expense” is a form of destruction of your life and values, incidental or not. The taxman, the extortionist/kidnapper/blackmailer are acting by choice, not by accident, against your life and values. The man who claims a right to take anything from you by initiating force, in principles claims the right to take everything from you.
Is it ethical to treat someone as a enemy without telling them? Why do you ask? The answer, in my view, would depend on the context.
“Trustworthy extortionist”? Isn’t that an oxymoron?
Do you disagree that the difference I cited previously exists? It is a fact of reality that one can (generally) trust the taxman to go away after he is paid what he demands but that a criminal extortionist cannot be so trusted. (Perhaps organized crime would fall somewhere in between.)
“[O]ut to make an easy buck at your expense” is a form of destruction of your life and values, incidental or not. The taxman, the extortionist/kidnapper/blackmailer are acting by choice, not by accident, against your life and values. The man who claims a right to take anything from you by initiating force, in principles claims the right to take everything from you.
Well, sure, but you generally cannot control that. The only question is how to respond to it. And whether the two situations deserve the same response.
My claim is that one can make a calculated decision in the case of the taxman to pay the ransom and avoid the threatened harm.
Is it ethical to treat someone as a enemy without telling them? Why do you ask? The answer, in my view, would depend on the context.
What are the criteria for deciding? I cited one such, the risk that friends would question your fidelity and integrity to them.
Do you disagree that the difference I cited previously exists? It is a fact of reality that one can (generally) trust the taxman to go away after he is paid what he demands but that a criminal extortionist cannot be so trusted. (Perhaps organized crime would fall somewhere in between.)
The issue is one of principle. One can trust the taxman (or the extortionist/kidnapper/blackmailer) only to the extent they do what they say they will do. With the taxman, sure, he is controlled by law, but in principle, and in time if the principle is not rejected, what he demands by force will grow, legally. It’s the issue about a mixed economy breeding more and more controls as it is not a stable economy, because of the principles that have been accepted and rejected. Individual rights have been rejected in lieu of some other primary, and although there may still remain areas of de facto respect for and protection of rights, those areas do not exist on the basis of the principle of individual rights, but rather, perhaps, on the basis of majority rule, the common good, the whim of the dictator, etc. Nothing that one can hang one’s hat one in the hope of respect for rights.
Well, sure, but you generally cannot control that. The only question is how to respond to it. And whether the two situations deserve the same response.
Principles guide you in determining what to do in different contexts, sure, and in different contexts, you’ll have to do different things. The important thing is to know that you, as an individual, do in fact have rights, by your nature, not by permission of anyone else. This doesn’t mean that in every case in which one is confronted by a mugger, for example, one should rush him in attack and hope that one can disarm him simply because you know that he is wrong and you are right. In some cases one might judge that one could easily do so, and then do so, but in other cases, one may judge the risk to be too great. Still, even if one complies with the mugger’s demands, one knows that he is wrong. If one can’t do anything immediately, knowing that he is wrong means that one will be motivated to do what one can, when and if one can. So, one complies and later calls the police, etc.
I saw a TV talk show once in which the guest was an ex-policeman discussing various strategies in dealing with bad guys. One case sticks out as relevant (if I understand your questions). His advice to any woman confronted by a man with a gun telling her to get into his car was: Never ever do it! The reason they want you to get into their car is so that they can take you to a place where you’ll have less of a chance of survival. His advice was to flee or fight, but do not get into the car, and he pointed out that even though the man has a gun and even if he fires it, the odds are that you can escape with your life, even if you are wounded. The odds are not in your favor if you get into his car. His advice makes sense, but even then there’s room for judgement by the woman.
My claim is that one can make a calculated decision in the case of the taxman to pay the ransom and avoid the threatened harm.
I agree. And one can make a calculated decision in the case of the extortionist/kidnapper/blackmailer as well.
The important thing is to understand where rights are, that individual rights are inalienable, not gifts or grants from the state, God, society, etc. The fact that you may have to obey bad laws does not make them good. Knowing they are bad is important to challenging them or deciding to escape a country, etc. If, however, one has accepted the idea that one’s rights are but privileges, one may well give up hope for either a better government or escape. (Socrates chose to drink the hemlock. I think it was Aristotle who said that he would not let men sin against philosophy twice.)
What are the criteria for deciding? I cited one such, the risk that friends would question your fidelity and integrity to them.
To me, it all depends on the context. I could imagine situations in which you wouldn’t even want to reveal who your enemies are to your friends, and situations in which you would want their understanding and perhaps help in dealing with an enemy. Regardless, it’s good to know just who is a friend and who is an enemy, and by what standard, meaning just who are the good guys and who are the bad guys. (Bad guys have enemies too, but that’s good.)
What is the point you are trying to make? It seems that we’re just going back and forth without direction, so I thought I’d ask.
The issue is one of principle. One can trust the taxman (or the extortionist/kidnapper/blackmailer) only to the extent they do what they say they will do. With the taxman, sure, he is controlled by law, but in principle, and in time if the principle is not rejected, what he demands by force will grow, legally. It’s the issue about a mixed economy breeding more and more controls as it is not a stable economy, because of the principles that have been accepted and rejected. Individual rights have been rejected in lieu of some other primary, and although there may still remain areas of de facto respect for and protection of rights, those areas do not exist on the basis of the principle of individual rights, but rather, perhaps, on the basis of majority rule, the common good, the whim of the dictator, etc. Nothing that one can hang one’s hat one in the hope of respect for rights.
It may well be the case that, as you say, tax rates will increase over time, there is no, express or implied promise that the tax rates will remain stable, but, nevertheless, it is still a point of differentiation that implies a different response. Quite obviously, the taxman, the organized crime syndicate, and the freelance extortionist have no concern for individual rights as Objectivists understand it. Nevertheless, it is still the case that the rational response to each is different according to their trustworthiness. You can pay off the tax man for the year at the current demanded rate. You can’t (reliably) pay off a freelance extortionist at any point.
Principles guide you in determining what to do in different contexts, sure, and in different contexts, you’ll have to do different things. The important thing is to know that you, as an individual, do in fact have rights, by your nature, not by permission of anyone else. This doesn’t mean that in every case in which one is confronted by a mugger, for example, one should rush him in attack and hope that one can disarm him simply because you know that he is wrong and you are right. In some cases one might judge that one could easily do so, and then do so, but in other cases, one may judge the risk to be too great. Still, even if one complies with the mugger’s demands, one knows that he is wrong. If one can’t do anything immediately, knowing that he is wrong means that one will be motivated to do what one can, when and if one can. So, one complies and later calls the police, etc.
[Emphasis mine.] I am, in fact, questioning the importance of that knowledge. What i the value of knowing that a mugger is wrong? What does that even mean, Objectively speaking?
I saw a TV talk show once in which the guest was an ex-policeman discussing various strategies in dealing with bad guys. One case sticks out as relevant (if I understand your questions). His advice to any woman confronted by a man with a gun telling her to get into his car was: Never ever do it! The reason they want you to get into their car is so that they can take you to a place where you’ll have less of a chance of survival. His advice was to flee or fight, but do not get into the car, and he pointed out that even though the man has a gun and even if he fires it, the odds are that you can escape with your life, even if you are wounded. The odds are not in your favor if you get into his car. His advice makes sense, but even then there’s room for judgement by the woman.
Yes, that’s exactly the comparison I am aiming at. If it helps, we can shift the discussion to a comparison of organized crime to freelance crime. Imagine you own a shop and the don’s boys come by and ask for “protection” money. (Assume, for the purpose of this discussion, that the police are indifferent or corrupted so that is not an option.) My argument is that the rational choice, generally speaking, is to pay. Another option would be to move out though, to carry the metaphor forward, we might imagine that other place have the same problem differing only in the rate demanded for “protection”. You might even call on the don to protect you from a freelance extortionist.
I agree. And one can make a calculated decision in the case of the extortionist/kidnapper/blackmailer as well. The important thing is to understand where rights are, that individual rights are inalienable, not gifts or grants from the state, God, society, etc. The fact that you may have to obey bad laws does not make them good. Knowing they are bad is important to challenging them or deciding to escape a country, etc. If, however, one has accepted the idea that one’s rights are but privileges, one may well give up hope for either a better government or escape. (Socrates chose to drink the hemlock. I think it was Aristotle who said that he would not let men sin against philosophy twice.)
See above. Of course, martyrdom is always an option.
To me, it all depends on the context. I could imagine situations in which you wouldn’t even want to reveal who your enemies are to your friends, and situations in which you would want their understanding and perhaps help in dealing with an enemy. Regardless, it’s good to know just who is a friend and who is an enemy, and by what standard, meaning just who are the good guys and who are the bad guys. (Bad guys have enemies too, but that’s good.)
What is the point you are trying to make? It seems that we’re just going back and forth without direction, so I thought I’d ask.
I guess the bottom line claim is that knowledge of rights is of no value in this analysis.
(Obviously we can imagine situations that might provide the opportunity to organize against the organized crime boss but, of course, they are already organized and hold the advantage; your attempts to organize would likely be detected and dealt with.)
It may well be the case that, as you say, tax rates will increase over time, there is no, express or implied promise that the tax rates will remain stable, but, nevertheless, it is still a point of differentiation that implies a different response. Quite obviously, the taxman, the organized crime syndicate, and the freelance extortionist have no concern for individual rights as Objectivists understand it. Nevertheless, it is still the case that the rational response to each is different according to their trustworthiness. You can pay off the tax man for the year at the current demanded rate. You can’t (reliably) pay off a freelance extortionist at any point.
A differentiation in details, but not in principle.
I am, in fact, questioning the importance of that knowledge. What i the value of knowing that a mugger is wrong? What does that even mean, Objectively speaking?
What does (right and) wrong even mean, Objectively speaking? I’m curious, are you very familiar with Objectivism? Is it your view that morality is irrelevant? (I don’t get the point of your question.)
Yes, that’s exactly the comparison I am aiming at. If it helps, we can shift the discussion to a comparison of organized crime to freelance crime. Imagine you own a shop and the don’s boys come by and ask for “protection” money. (Assume, for the purpose of this discussion, that the police are indifferent or corrupted so that is not an option.) My argument is that the rational choice, generally speaking, is to pay. Another option would be to move out though, to carry the metaphor forward, we might imagine that other place have the same problem differing only in the rate demanded for “protection”. You might even call on the don to protect you from a freelance extortionist.
This all started with your question, I believe, as to whether or not it is moral to lie to an enemy. By saying that one has the moral right to lie, in self-defense, to someone who is acting to violate one’s rights, that does not mean that one’s only moral option is to lie, nor that one is morally obligated to lie. It just means that one would be in the right, moral, if one decided to lie in such a context. Maybe this is where there is some confusion?
See above. Of course, martyrdom is always an option.
I guess it depends upon what you mean by martyrdom. Risking your life and dying in an effort to save someone you love dearly is not what I would call martyrdom. Risking your life to flee Nazi Germany and yet dying in the attempt to escape is not what I would call martyrdom. Would you? For a fictional example, in the movie Braveheart, before Wallace was tortured, the Queen (?), who he had fallen in love with, not wanting to see him suffer, asked him to drink some potion to ease the coming pain. He humored her and “drank” the potion, but then spit it out when she left. While being tortured, asked if he wanted to say something (which might quicken his death and stop the torture), he cried, “Freedom!” and his head was cut off. Martyrdom?
I guess the bottom line claim is that knowledge of rights is of no value in this analysis.
This, I do not understand at all. Knowing one’s rights can make a life and death difference in one’s life as well as in the kind of nation one will have.
If it is truly your view that morality is irrelevant and impractical (my words), then I guess we’re simply going to have to disagree. But then, why ask questions about morality if you think morality is irrelevant?
Baffled
A differentiation in details, but not in principle.
Your distinction between details and principle is a false one. If a principle leads to wrong choices it is not a reliable principle. If you mean that the principle is usually true but that I am differentiating on exceptions I would suggest you are mistaken.
What does (right and) wrong even mean, Objectively speaking? I’m curious, are you very familiar with Objectivism? Is it your view that morality is irrelevant? (I don’t get the point of your question.)
My understanding of Objectivism, and I do not claim to be an expert in any sense, is that a moral choice is one that facilitates one’s own survival and flourishing. In this situation differentiating between trustworthy and untrustworthy extortionists is the key to survival and a critical point of differentiation for choosing an appropriate response. I fail to see what use knowledge of your rights is here.
This all started with your question, I believe, as to whether or not it is moral to lie to an enemy. By saying that one has the moral right to lie, in self-defense, to someone who is acting to violate one’s rights, that does not mean that one’s only moral option is to lie, nor that one is morally obligated to lie. It just means that one would be in the right, moral, if one decided to lie in such a context. Maybe this is where there is some confusion?
Well, we have jumped around many related questions. But I didn’t ask if one has a moral right to lie, I asked if it is moral to lie. My claim is that morality of lying depends on factors that you are dismissing as details and not on factors that you are focusing on as principles.
I guess it depends upon what you mean by martyrdom. Risking your life and dying in an effort to save someone you love dearly is not what I would call martyrdom. Risking your life to flee Nazi Germany and yet dying in the attempt to escape is not what I would call martyrdom. Would you? For a fictional example, in the movie Braveheart, before Wallace was tortured, the Queen (?), who he had fallen in love with, not wanting to see him suffer, asked him to drink some potion to ease the coming pain. He humored her and “drank” the potion, but then spit it out when she left. While being tortured, asked if he wanted to say something (which might quicken his death and stop the torture), he cried, “Freedom!” and his head was cut off. Martyrdom?
Let’s just say, generally, that if you derive value from risking or giving up your life for those you love (and I’m sure we could invent plausible scenarios for that) then you will certainly have opportunities here. I would call that martyrdom.
This, I do not understand at all. Knowing one’s rights can make a life and death difference in one’s life as well as in the kind of nation one will have. If it is truly your view that morality is irrelevant and impractical (my words), then I guess we’re simply going to have to disagree. But then, why ask questions about morality if you think morality is irrelevant? Baffled
I think the problem stems from your equation of morality and rights. I am not questioning morality (see above), only the the value of knowledge of rights. Please explain how your knowledge of rights is going to aid you in any way in dealing with extortionists (whether freelance, organized crime, or government).
Your distinction between details and principle is a false one. If a principle leads to wrong choices it is not a reliable principle. If you mean that the principle is usually true but that I am differentiating on exceptions I would suggest you are mistaken.
The distinction is valid. The principle is not that lying to an enemy is always good or right or what one should do, nor is the principle that one should never lie to an enemy, that it is always bad or wrong to do so.
The principle at issue is honesty , not whether or not one should or should not lie in particular instances. One should, on principle, always be honest, but honesty is not a matter of always telling the truth. The principle of honesty is that one should always be true to reality, or, put negatively, one should never evade relevant facts.
When confronted by an enemy, depending on the situation, it may or may not be wise to lie, but one has the moral right to lie to protect oneself, just as one has the right of physical self-defense, such as the use of deadly force in self-defense. Depending on the context, if one thinks it wise to do so, one is acting morally in self-defense if one lies or if one pulls the trigger.
How one goes about defending oneself depends on the context, on the particulars, but the principle of honesty is not merely "ususally" true, it is always true (valid).
My understanding of Objectivism, and I do not claim to be an expert in any sense, is that a moral choice is one that facilitates one’s own survival and flourishing. In this situation differentiating between trustworthy and untrustworthy extortionists is the key to survival and a critical point of differentiation for choosing an appropriate response. I fail to see what use knowledge of your rights is here.
I reject the distinction between trustworthy and untrustworthy extortionists. On principle an extortionist is untrustworthy, untrustworthy to recognize and respect one’s rights. Sure, there are differences between one extortionist and another, but the differences are a matter of degree, not principle.
Well, we have jumped around many related questions. But I didn’t ask if one has a moral right to lie, I asked if it is moral to lie. My claim is that morality of lying depends on factors that you are dismissing as details and not on factors that you are focusing on as principles.
One’s right to lie to an enemy is a moral right to lie. But again, the principle, the moral principle at issue is the principle of honesty, not lying versus telling the truth. There’s no moral principle, no rational moral principle, that holds that lying is always wrong or always right.
Let’s just say, generally, that if you derive value from risking or giving up your life for those you love (and I’m sure we could invent plausible scenarios for that) then you will certainly have opportunities here. I would call that martyrdom.
Okay, I wouldn’t, but I don’t see that it’s really important with respect to the main issue.
I think the problem stems from your equation of morality and rights. I am not questioning morality (see above), only the the value of knowledge of rights. Please explain how your knowledge of rights is going to aid you in any way in dealing with extortionists (whether freelance, organized crime, or government).
I’m not equating morality with political rights.
When you ask, “I am not questioning morality (see above), only the value of knowledge of rights,” are you referring to moral rights (what is morally right or proper), or to political rights?
If you mean what is morally right, then the whole point of knowing what is morally right is to enable you to live. If you don’t know what’s right or wrong, if you have no moral principles to guide you, how do you decide what would be right or wrong to do in any particular situation?
If you mean what is legally recognized to be your rights (whether those rights are objective or not), political rights, then it seems obvious why it’s important to know what your legally recognized, respected and protected rights are (objective or not). It can mean the difference between freedom or imprisonment.
The distinction is valid. The principle is not that lying to an enemy is always good or right or what one should do, nor is the principle that one should never lie to an enemy, that it is always bad or wrong to do so. The principle at issue is honesty , not whether or not one should or should not lie in particular instances. One should, on principle, always be honest, but honesty is not a matter of always telling the truth. The principle of honesty is that one should always be true to reality, or, put negatively, one should never evade relevant facts.
On this much, at least, we are agreed: one ought to be as clear as practical in one’s own mind about what is true and what is false. But honesty, as it is usually understood, implies being true to others. The question then became whether or not one should be true to enemies and we drifted into a discussion of extortionists as an exemplary enemy.
If we are discussing honesty as being true to others and if we regard extortion in its various forms a the act of an enemy and if we understand the extent of extortion then the most obvious conclusion is that honesty, in this sense, is not a useful principle, even in general.
Being honest to friends clearly has advantages. I don’t think that is in dispute here either.
Now one might attack that argument at several points but that is my argument.
When confronted by an enemy, depending on the situation, it may or may not be wise to lie, but one has the moral right to lie to protect oneself, just as one has the right of physical self-defense, such as the use of deadly force in self-defense. Depending on the context, if one thinks it wise to do so, one is acting morally in self-defense if one lies or if one pulls the trigger.
Quite apart from the above, this is the point that now interests me. You are seeking a distinction between what is wise (or prudent) and what is one’s moral right. You claim a right to do something which is unwise but then to decline to do it for being unwise. What is the point of that digression? Why not stick with the simpler formulation that what is moral is that which facilitates survival and flourishing and skip the entire discussion of moral rights? What does that analysis contribute but to distract from what is important?
How one goes about defending oneself depends on the context, on the particulars, but the principle of honesty is not merely "ususally" true, it is always true (valid).
(If by “honest” we mean being true to oneself, not necessarily to others.)
I reject the distinction between trustworthy and untrustworthy extortionists. On principle an extortionist is untrustworthy, untrustworthy to recognize and respect one’s rights. Sure, there are differences between one extortionist and another, but the differences are a matter of degree, not principle.
This is your clearest statement on this point yet and so I can’t think but that you are denying reality here; you are being dishonest with yourself. You try to justify this self-deception by a retreat into “principle” and a disregard for “details” but the fact remains that you are rejecting a very useful distinction that, in this scenarios we are discussing, mean the difference between life and death.
One’s right to lie to an enemy is a moral right to lie. But again, the principle, the moral principle at issue is the principle of honesty, not lying versus telling the truth. There’s no moral principle, no rational moral principle, that holds that lying is always wrong or always right.
I’m not arguing that lying is always wrong. I’m arguing that moral rights are a useless concept (here, at least).
Okay, I wouldn’t, but I don’t see that it’s really important with respect to the main issue.
It’s a side issue just to be fair that there are alternatives to submission to extortion. (And as an aside to the aside, one tactic that extortionists use is to destroy not just the rebel but his entire family. That tends to cut down on martyrs.)
I’m not equating morality with political rights.
Never mind political rights, help me understand the point of your concept of moral rights.
When you ask, “I am not questioning morality (see above), only the value of knowledge of rights,” are you referring to moral rights (what is morally right or proper), or to political rights?
I guess moral right since I did not have political rights in mind.
If you mean what is morally right, then the whole point of knowing what is morally right is to enable you to live. If you don’t know what’s right or wrong, if you have no moral principles to guide you, how do you decide what would be right or wrong to do in any particular situation?
Right. And if distinguishing between trustworthy and untrustworthy extortionists is crucial to your life then it is a moral issue, not an irrelevant detail. It strike me as anything but morally right to ignore a distinction that may mean the difference between life and death. On the other hand, I don’t see the point in digressions that have no impact on the outcome, such as moral rights that are unwise.
If you mean what is legally recognized to be your rights (whether those rights are objective or not), political rights, then it seems obvious why it’s important to know what your legally recognized, respected and protected rights are (objective or not). It can mean the difference between freedom or imprisonment.
(Let’s forget political rights.)
On this much, at least, we are agreed: one ought to be as clear as practical in one’s own mind about what is true and what is false. But honesty, as it is usually understood, implies being true to others. The question then became whether or not one should be true to enemies and we drifted into a discussion of extortionists as an exemplary enemy.
If we are discussing honesty as being true to others and if we regard extortion in its various forms a the act of an enemy and if we understand the extent of extortion then the most obvious conclusion is that honesty, in this sense, is not a useful principle, even in general.
No, we are not discussing honesty as being true to others, and since you insist on equivocating between honesty and telling the truth, evading the distinction, I don’t think there’s much point in continuing the discussion.
This is your clearest statement on this point yet and so I can’t think but that you are denying reality here; you are being dishonest with yourself. You try to justify this self-deception by a retreat into “principle” and a disregard for “details” but the fact remains that you are rejecting a very useful distinction that, in this scenarios we are discussing, mean the difference between life and death.
Since you think that I am being dishonest, engaged in self-deception, why in the world would you want to continue any discussion at all with me anyway?
Regardless, even if you do see such a reason, I do not.
No, we are not discussing honesty as being true to others, and since you insist on equivocating between honesty and telling the truth, evading the distinction, I don’t think there’s much point in continuing the discussion.
See the thread title question.
Since you think that I am being dishonest, engaged in self-deception, why in the world would you want to continue any discussion at all with me anyway? Regardless, even if you do see such a reason, I do not.
Well, one of us is mistaken and I’m curious which. I’m sorry that you’ve lost interest in figuring that out..