To the Dogs,
Sure.
Everything in my post was aimed at the link I had found and which I assumed was the deleted link, as well as at the claim that Ayn Rand had denied having an affair.
I meant no more than to point out that in Rand’s context (and the context of Objectivism) word’s like “affair” and “love.” have a hierarchy which precludes their being used in the context of what Rand came to consider a fabrication on Branden’s part, and therefore meaningless.
My reference to OPAR was precisely to avoid running through a demonstration that Peikoff had already made. I was counting on his ability to “point to the facts of reality” for anyone who cared to pursue the subject further. (In fact, if the written work of others is a signpost to the facts of reality, why are you skeptical about using them to that end?)
As to Valliant’s integration of the facts with Objectivism, I think the entire book is a series of such integrations, least of all in ethics and most of all in epistemology and psycho-epistemology.
To give an example, the passage starting on pg. 243, first full paragraph, begins with an explanation of the relationship between the passage from the Journals that has gone just before and Objectivism’s rejection of the “theory-practice” dichotomy. In the next paragraph, Valliant goes on to point out that Rand is focused on assessing what Branden’s “mental drift” means about the mind (the psycho-epistemology) and character of Branden rather than on moral anger.
At the bottom of the same page, he goes on to integrate the fact that Branden seems to be able to “tolerate extreme cognitive dissonance in his own life” with what that means in terms of the identification of contradictions which must be resolved (a principle of psychology) and further with Rand’s method of mental functioning (in contrast with Branden’s).
Over and over Valliant points to Rand’s commitment to reason over whatever emotions she may be feeling (all the time acknowledging that she has them).
The whole of Part Two is a demonstration of what it means to “forgive errors of knowledge but not errors of morality.” Valliant integrates the facts given in the Journal with this principle of Objectivism, as well as with Branden’s claim that Rand is “moralistic.”
The whole of Part Two is a demonstration of hierarchy and context. Rand eventually comes to the conclusion that whatever their relationship was, it was not love and it was not an affair in any sense with which she would want to participate knowing the full context. Valliant consistently points to this, leading to his biggest wallop of an integration, the argument for which begins on pg 382 and which I will not spoil for those who have not read the book.
And all of this is the context for judging the content of the “evidence” presented on the page provided by the excised link.
That content demonstrates, if such a demonstration remains necessary, that Rand never rejected her insistence that reason, not emotion, be her guide; that she was a person of almost unbelievable benevolence on an individual by individual basis; and that she held the full context of her established hierarchy of knowledge to the very end.
Tom