I recognize the difference between “identifiable likenesses” and, say, a Jackson Pollock. But as these conversations have progressed (taking all of our aesthetic interactions together), I’ve wondered more and more about the idea of “re-creating reality.” As I look at an image of the Mona Lisa on my computer screen, I don’t know that reality has been re-created, exactly. Women tend not to be so small. Or segmented (most women that I’ve known have had legs, for instance). And they are usually three-dimensional. And alive. And etc.
It has occurred to me that even the Mona Lisa presents certain aspects of reality (in this case, various aspects of the image of a woman) which have been… well… abstracted, for our consideration. If other, more “modern” artists have chosen to abstract different aspects of reality for similar consideration, such as line, shape, and color, do I have any good reason for dismissing that out of hand?
If “concretizations that artists produce can belong to the class existents rather than entities,” as explained above, then doesn’t that allow for “line, shape, and color” as the subject of artistic consideration?
Good point. I touched on the same issue here when I wrote,
“So, your theory is that visual art must mimic the “value”, “color” and “shape” of objects in reality, and therefore abstract paintings are not art because, although they may mimic the color, motion or other attributes of objects in reality, they generally don’t directly mimic objects’ shapes? If that’s your theory, then it would also logically follow that realistic, representational black and white drawings and monochromatic paintings don’t qualify as art, since they also eliminate one of your prerequisites for visual art: color.”
And herewhen I wrote,
“Now, if anyone is Platonic in their views on visual art, I would say that it is you (and those who share your opinions), what with your view that the single attribute of shape is the “essential characteristic” of any object, where any other attribute, or even all of the other attributes combined, are “divorced” from the object if shown without mimetic shape. If anything should be “dismissed” as being “arbitrary,” it’s your arbitrary, Platonic selection of shape as the only essential attribute of everything.”
An additional issue which I think is relevant to this discussion and bears repeating is the fact that one cannot know for certain, just by looking at a painting, that it is what is commonly referred to as “abstract,” “non-figurative,” “non-objective” or “non-representational.” As I demonstrated here, what may at first appear to be an abstract painting may in fact be a realistic painting. What might appear to be a random splatter of paint might actually be a romantically stylized symbol of heroism which easily qualifies as art by Objectivist standards:
In the past, here on OO, and elsewhere, I’ve posted this example of a work of art:
After looking at it, many Objectivists have told me that it does not qualify as art by Objectivist criteria, because, they say, it does not include identifiable likenesses of objects from reality. Some have said that it looks like kitchen floor tiles, that it has no meaning, and cannot possibly have meaning.
Well, what if the image is a realistic painting based on actual stone tiles that the artist had selectively cut and arranged like this:
Does it now suddenly qualify as art? Simply because of a technicality, Objectivists can now appreciate its compositional beauty and expressiveness, and can deem it to be no less valid as a work of art than any other still life which realistically depicts actual objects from reality?
Or, conversely, would you take the absurd position that certain things, like [paintings of] arrangements of flat, colorful, stone tiles, somehow don’t count as being representations of things from reality?
Here’s another image, one that I painted, that I’ve posted in O-forums:
Does it quality art?
As I’ve explained when I’ve posted it in the past:
J