Morality of using a Nuclear Weapon

Political Philosophy
41

If I hire a security guard, he is charged with protecting MY rights. He does not stalk the night streets wearing a cape and fighting crime. It is the same with governments. A proper government is established with the purpose of protecting the rights OF ITS CITIZENS. If a dictator uses force to make my government choose between saving the lives of its own citizens or saving the lives of foreign citizens, it should properly save the lives of its own. The responsibility for the loss of the lives of the foreign citizens lies with those who INITIATED force, in any case, and NOT with my government.

I see. My rights are the only rights to be considered? My hired security guards may violate the rights of others in order to secure my rights? My guards may mow down citizens in a crowd to eliminate any potential threat to me? And the responsibility for any persons killed by my security guard lies not with me or my hired guns, but with those who are perceived by me or my guards to be a threat? In this scheme, any hired gun is above reproach, and any dead or injured bystanders must take up their case with the “enemy” perceived by the hired gun to be the threat.

42

DavidOdden:

“Since it can’t be the case that dropping an atomic bomb on him is the only way to stop the robber, then the question doesn’t arise […]”

That is missing the point of hypothetical testing. Okay, so it’s not an atomic bomb. It’s some other situation in which the field commander determines there is no way to ensure capture except by killing the suspect but with loss of life to many bystanders. The atomic bomb hypothetical is used since it frames this question in its starkest terms. Such hypotheticals are valid means of probing the consequences of principles. Atomic bombs were used in 1945 with the justification that they were the only way to end the war without greater loss of life.

Here’s a long list of hypotheticals:

What if the projected loss of life from a land invasion had been much less? What if Japan had not attacked Pearl Harbor but we had taken action against Japan to prevent any more aggression than it had already perpetrated? What if we had to destroy ten more Japanese cities with atomic bombs to get a surrender? What if Japan weren’t a totalitarian state but nevertheless a military enemy of the United States? What if Japan’s people were in revolt against the dictatorship, but still only atomic bombings would cause a military surrender? What if, hypothetically, we keep gradually reducing the threat to the United States and increase the loss of non-combatants. Eventually we get to the bank robber and the atomic bomb hypothetical.

These are valid hypothetical probes and if one wants to seriously face one’s moral system, then one should not shy from grappling with such probes, either to answer them, to keep looking for answers, or to admit that there are intractable moral dilemmas.

Notice, none of the hypotheticals are so outlandish that they change the very metaphysics we must suppose for a moral theory based on the world we actually live in. Specifically, no one is asking for answers to hypotheticals of immortality. Objecting to hypotheticals because they could be stretched to even negate the basic metaphysical givens is a strawman.

Also, wouldn’t an objective moral theory require, at least in principle, that if rational evaluators have the same information, then they would give the same answers? So, if the people who had the bomb dropped on them had a correct moral system and all the factual information we have, then they’d agree that it was moral for a bomb to be dropped on them?

"First, let’s change the escapee from a bank-robber to a mass murderer, just to be sure that the argument isn’t grounded on bad assumptions about banks (i.e. the false dichotomy “no amount of money is worth a life”). "

What false dichotomy? No one said that the answer to the question depends on accepting or denying the principle that no amount of money is worth a life. You’re introducing that as a strawman and a red herring.

“[…] I would say it is not morally permissible for me to do so, because I am reasonably certain (empirically) that I am not a good shot, and that there is little change that I would hit the killer. So it would be pointless for me to shoot at him, and the chances of hitting an innocent bystander are vastly higher than the chances of me hitting the killer. If you replace me with, say, Vern (who I presume can hit the narrow side of a barn, inter alia) then it is permissible. I am not certain that he would make the shot; I am virtually certain that I would not.”

Okay, so if there is a good chance of a bystander getting hit, then you think it is not morally permissible to fire the shots. So I don’t understand why you questioned my own assertion saying exactly that.

43

I see.  My rights are the only rights to be considered?  My hired security guards may violate the rights of others in order to secure my rights?  My guards may mow down citizens in a crowd to eliminate any potential threat to me?  And the responsibility for any persons killed by my security guard lies not with me or my hired guns, but with those who are perceived by me or my guards to be a threat?  In this scheme, any hired gun is above reproach, and any dead or injured bystanders must take up their case with the “enemy” perceived by the hired gun to be the threat.

As far as I can tell, Inspector’s comparison between the government and security guards was only to demonstrate that both have a specific duty towards specific people. You have now stretched that comparison and, amazingly, applied the same principles used by government against aggressor nations to private security guards against aggressor citizens. This is remarkable considering that I already addressed this ridiculous comparison.

So let’s restate what I said in a basic equation: foreign != domestic. Our government has a moral right (and obligation) to protect its citizens, implying (a.) it must end a foreign threat as quickly as possible, and (b.) that it must end domestic threats with a minimum civilian loss of life. Two different situations, same goal.

44

As far as I can tell, Inspector’s comparison between the government and security guards was only to demonstrate that both have a specific duty towards specific people.

And I would add that both have the same ethical responsibility: not to initiate force.

You have now stretched that comparison and, amazingly, applied the same principles used by government against aggressor nations to private security guards against aggressor citizens. This is remarkable considering that I already addressed this ridiculous comparison.

I didn’t propose the analogy of armies to private security guards, Inspector did. If the analogy is flawed, then perhaps Inspector should come up with another.

So let’s restate what I said in a basic equation: foreign != domestic. Our government has a moral right (and obligation) to protect its citizens, implying (a.) it must end a foreign threat as quickly as possible, and (b.) that it must end domestic threats with a minimum civilian loss of life. Two different situations, same goal.

As far as I can tell, Objectivist ethical principles do not end at the U.S. border. If they did, then they would not be universal principles and would not qualify as ethics.

45

I didn’t propose the analogy of armies to private security guards, Inspector did. If the analogy is flawed, then perhaps Inspector should come up with another.

Are you even reading my posts? As far as I can tell, Inspector’s comparison between the government and security guards was only to demonstrate that both have a specific duty towards specific people. Take the analogy for what it is, and don’t skew it.

As far as I can tell, Objectivist ethical principles do not end at the U.S. border. If they did, then they would not be universal principles and would not qualify as ethics.

The principles don’t change; the context does. When you analyze situations like this in a vacuum, the context is what gets lost.

46

Is a security guard authorized to kill bystanders if it is necessary to protect the client?

47

Are you even reading my posts? As far as I can tell, Inspector’s comparison between the government and security guards was only to demonstrate that both have a specific duty towards specific people. Take the analogy for what it is, and don’t skew it.

And, my reply, if you have a moment to read it, is that both private guards and national armies have moral responsibilities, including the non-initiation of force. Now either the previous sentence is true or it is false. If you think I’d committed an error, you are welcome to point it out.

The principles don’t change; the context does. When you analyze situations like this in a vacuum, the context is what gets lost.

If principles do not change according to situation, then armies must follow the same moral code as private security guards or anyone else.

48

That is missing the point of hypothetical testing. Okay, so it’s not an atomic bomb. It’s some other situation in which the field commander determines there is no way to ensure capture except by killing the suspect  but with loss of life to many bystanders.

That is fine: but you seem to be missing the point about denying unlimited hypotheticals. Any possible but unrealised hypothetical can be validly considered. I simply reject impossible hypotheticals. Let’s try to bring this closer to reality. For example, if you’re talking about field commanders, you are not talking about bank robbers, and you are talking about war. So let’s get to your specifics. (I will insert numbers in the quote for eas of reference)

(1)What if the projected loss of life from a land invasion had been much less? (2)What if Japan had not attacked Pearl Harbor but we had taken action against Japan to prevent any more aggression than it had already perpetrated? (3)What if we had to destroy ten more Japanese cities with atomic bombs to get a surrender? (4)What if Japan weren’t a totalitarian state but nevertheless a military enemy of the United States? (5)What if Japan’s people were in revolt against the dictatorship, but still only atomic bombings would cause a military surrender? (6)What if, hypothetically, we keep gradually reducing the threat to the United States and increase the loss of non-combatants.

In case (1), that would not be relevant, unless you mean “negligible”. If there were good reason to have thought that a projected land invasion would have led to negligible loss of life and property, then the use of nukes would have been immoral. (2) That would depend on whether it was aggression against the US. If so, if would not matter whether it was an attack specifically against Hawaii. OTOH if it had just been an attack against China, US involvement would be altruistic and not self-defensive, and you know that altruism is immoral. (3) If the attack had been insufficient to get them to terminate their aggression, that would have made an even more compelling argument for building and using bigger and better bombs. (4) Not a lot of difference. (5) Hard to say: strategically, it would seem to be pointless destruction in such a case, i.e. it would be knowingly ineffective. However, if the targets had great military importance (and their destruction would have ended that government) then it would have been moral. (6) Sorry, I can’t make any sense out of that case: what do you mean? What are we doing? How?

Eventually we get to the bank robber and the atomic bomb hypothetical.

You say, but I don’t see how. It is never the case that the only way to stop a bank robber is by setting off a nuke. I have no problem grappling with hypotheticals, but they have to be possible (I hope you understood the reason why – “Now suppose you were immortal and always guaranteed of success. Then would it be moral to…”).

Also, wouldn’t an objective moral theory require, at least in principle, that if rational evaluators have the same information, then they would give the same answers? So, if the people who had the bomb dropped on them had a correct moral system and all the factual information we have, then they’d agree that it was moral for a bomb to be dropped on them?

Yes, if that were the case, which it manifestly was not.

Okay, so if there is a good chance of a bystander getting hit, then you think it is not morally permissible to fire the shots. So I don’t understand why you questioned my own assertion saying exactly that.

I said something stronger: that there is little chance that the criminal would be stopped, and that it was virtually guaranteed that innocents would be harmed. I assume you recall what I said about pointless destruction. You were incorrectly focusing on the possibility of collateral damage with no consideration for whether the purpose of the action could be satisfied. Only a pacifist takes the protection of the lives of enemy non-combatants to be a moral absolute.

49

And, my reply, if you have a moment to read it, is that both private guards and national armies have moral responsibilities, including the non-initiation of force. Now either the previous sentence is true or it is false.  If you think I’d committed an error, you are welcome to point it out.

If principles do not change according to situation, then armies must follow the same moral code as private security guards or anyone else.

In the context of Hiroshima, America was not initiating force. The American government had to choose between doing its duty (protecting Americans), and fulfilling the obligation of not harming innocents. Such an unreconcilable dilemma was created by the Japanese government. Thus in that context, they were the initiators, and we were the retaliators.

In the context of government police in a domestic situation, everyone falls under its jurisdiction, thus the way to protect its citizens is not to end the threat quickest, but to end it with fewest casualties.

In the context of private security (or private individuals in general), they may only retaliate against immediate emergencies, and leave the rest to the government. Thus private security may not shoot into a crowd in response to a perceived threat, because that is not an immediate emergency.

50

“[…] but you seem to be missing the point about denying unlimited hypotheticals.” [DavidOdden]

No I’m not. I grant that hypotheticals that alter the very metaphysical conditions of ethical situations are unreasonable for testing ethical propositions.

“I simply reject impossible hypotheticals.”

No hypothetical in front of us is impossible simply for being hypothetical.

Do you believe we can meaningfully talk about the ethics of fictional characters and fictional situations, such as in novels? If so, then we can meaningfully talk about fictional situations such as those that have been mentioned.

“[…] if you’re talking about field commanders, you are not talking about bank robbers, and you are talking about war.”

Not necessarily. It could be a field commander of a SWAT or of any domestic police.

“In case (1), that would not be relevant, unless you mean “negligible”. If there were good reason to have thought that a projected land invasion would have led to negligible loss of life and property, then the use of nukes would have been immoral.”

What is negligible? How many losses? On the other hand, if there were Allied losses of, say, a thousand men, but civilian losses of say, a million from dropping atomic bombs, what would your answer be? Where do you draw your line? Or no line? One Allied loss as opposed to the entire civilian population of a nation?

(“2) That would depend on whether it was aggression against the US. If so, if would not matter whether it was an attack specifically against Hawaii.”

Of course I didn’t mean to confine to Hawaii specifically. Anyway, the general question can be reset: What if Japan had not attacked the U.S. but instead the U.S., in the interest of thwarting further Japanese agression that was likely to endanger the U.S., had first attacked Japanese forces in the Pacific?

“(3) If the attack had been insufficient to get them to terminate their aggression, that would have made an even more compelling argument for building and using bigger and better bombs.”

So there’s no limit to how many civilians you can morally kill?

“(6) Sorry, I can’t make any sense out of that case: what do you mean? What are we doing? How?”

What doesn’t make sense? We can consider cases that have less and less damage to ourselves but have greater and greater damage to bystanders. The point is to get a sense of how great a damage to ourselves is required to justify how much damage to bystanders? If the formula is absolute, then any damage or threat of damage to ourselves, no matter how tiny, would justify any damage, no matter how great, to bystanders, in case we couldn’t avoid that damage to bystanders to protect ourselves from further damage or threat of damage. If the formula is not absolute, then we need to know where on the continuum lies the particular incidents in 1945.

“You say, but I don’t see how.”

Anyway we want by gradually decreasing (or increasing) hypothetical damage to ourselves and increasing (decreasing) hypothetical damage to bystanders.

“It is never the case that the only way to stop a bank robber is by setting off a nuke. I have no problem grappling with hypotheticals, but they have to be possible (I hope you understood the reason why – “Now suppose you were immortal and always guaranteed of success. Then would it be moral to…”).”

First, I already answered your objection about metaphysical contrafactuals.

Second, that in our present circumstances a nuke is never needed for a robber doesn’t detract from the point of the hypothetical. If you like, take the situation as fictional…but I’m not asking you to take the situation as metaphysically fictional!

"[…] if that were the case, which it manifestly was not.?

You mean in your ethical theory two people who are both rational and have the same information can disagree about the moral permissibilty of an act?

"I said something stronger: that there is little chance that the criminal would be stopped, and that it was virtually guaranteed that innocents would be harmed. I assume you recall what I said about pointless destruction. You were incorrectly focusing on the possibility of collateral damage with no consideration for whether the purpose of the action could be satisfied. "

Fine. Then the original question is not answered: What if the only way to stop the robber were to fire shots that had a good chance of striking bystanders (you may add to this that firing enough shots will have a very very good chance of stopping the robber)? Whatever quibbles you may have with how much of a chance of stopping the robber, etc., the basic point of the original assertion was clear enough: There is no unlimited moral right to endanger bystanders just to apprehend an initiator of force.

“Only a pacifist takes the protection of the lives of enemy non-combatants to be a moral absolute.”

Did someone say anything about protection (actually not protection, but restraint from force that includes force against) civilians as an absolute?

51

“In the context of Hiroshima, America was not initiating force. The American government had to choose between doing its duty (protecting Americans), and fulfilling the obligation of not harming innocents. Such an unreconcilable dilemma was created by the Japanese government. Thus in that context, they were the initiators, and we were the retaliators.” [Oakes]

That glosses right over the question of how much damage to bystanders is morally permissible to counter aggression.

First, the argument is made (by some) that a goverment wages war in defense of its citizens. So the government is a kind of proxy. If there are only individual rights, then the government is a proxy for individuals. If governments have a moral right to act in defense of its citizens as an extension of the rights of its citizens, then the principle of domestic as opposed to international is not an essential difference in that framework.

Question: If someone is shooting at you from inside a crowd of a hundred bystanders but your only weapon left (you’re out of bullets) is a hand launched bomb powerful enough that it will kill all of the bystanders, then is it morally permissible to throw the bomb?

52

If governments have a moral right to act in defense of its citizens as an extension of the rights of its citizens, then the principle of domestic as opposed to international is not an essential differentiator in that framework.

What do you mean it isn’t essential? In foreign wars, the bystanders are civilians of a negligent government; in domestic situations, the bystanders are your own citizens. That difference has important implications.

Question: If someone is shooting at you from inside a crowd of a hundred bystanders but your only weapon left (you’re out of bullets) is a hand launched bomb powerful enough that it will kill all of the bystanders, then is it morally permissible to throw the bomb?

Morality does not apply to this situation, and the fact that you brought up such an awkward hypothetical shows just how much altruism has perverted the field of morality. You are essentially asking, if you were on a deserted island with one other person, and the only food you could find was in his hands, would it be moral to steal it from him and eat it, or should you let yourself starve? Morality can only apply to situations where life as a human being is possible.

53

In the context of Hiroshima, America was not initiating force. The American government had to choose between doing its duty (protecting Americans), and fulfilling the obligation of not harming innocents. Such an unreconcilable dilemma was created by the Japanese government. Thus in that context, they were the initiators, and we were the retaliators.

“Retaliate” means to “to return like for like.” Thus the killing of children at Hiroshima can be called “retaliation” only if it can be shown that they initiated force.

54

“What do you mean it isn’t essential? In foreign wars, the bystanders are civilians of a negligent government; in domestic situations, the bystanders are your own citizens. That difference has important implications.” [Oakes]

What implications negate the rights of citizens of bad governments? Force across borders is a political matter much more than an ethical one. If there are only individual rights, then the analogy is correct in its structure and is not invalidated by the inessential condition that one situation is carried across national borders and by governmental proxies rather than private proxies.

“Morality does not apply to this situation […]”

I should think that a good moral theory would account for all situations in which rights, force (especially of life and death, especially of the lives and deaths of hundreds of thousands of people, especially of those among the hundreds of thousands who cannot reaonably be held accountable for the actions of a totalitarian government). How deep is a moral theory that is mute about rights, force, and life on such a huge scale?

“[…] awkward hypothetical […]”

There’s nothing awkward about the hypothetical I just gave. It’s very straightforward and the situtation is of the kind faced often in our violent world.

“[…] shows just how much altruism has perverted the field of morality. […]”

Non sequitur.

“You are essentially asking, if you were on a deserted island with one other person, and the only food you could find was in his hands, would it be moral to steal it from him and eat it, or should you let yourself starve?”

Not really. But now that you mention it, that’s a fair question to ask.

“Morality can only apply to situations where life as a human being is possible.”

A moral theory cannot presume that situations are ideal. A moral theory cannot presume that situations are even close to what we wish they were. Of course, in a perfect universe in which force were never used, there would not be difficult moral questions! And of course if the world were a place in which rights were only thwarted to a neglibible degree, then there would be no great moral problems.

A moral theory tells what is morally obligatory, morally prohibited, and morally permissible, right?. But that includes what is morally obligatory, prohibited, and permissible even in situations in which others violate the morality. You’re not of the woods morally - no longer subject to moral evaluation - just because someone violated your rights!

55

Do you believe we can meaningfully talk about the ethics of fictional characters and fictional situations, such as in novels?

Sure. I think I was prety clear that I reject impossible hypotheticals, not plausible ones, but if that wasn’t clear, I repeat. I accept that “field commanders” could be SWAT team leaders – my head wasn’t there at the the time.

What is negligible? How many losses?

I don’t know. Since I smell the “arbitrary number” argument, I’ll just say that it’s some number that needs to be determined by military experts. The principled answer is that saving one American life would be sufficient grounds. In the context of US military history, I had in mind for WWII the range 10,000, but I would be willing to just say “1”, if that would help your understanding. Part of the problem is that the bomb wasn’t available from the start of the war.

What if Japan had not attacked the U.S. but instead the U.S., in the interest of thwarting further Japanese agression that was likely to endanger the U.S., had first attacked Japanese forces in the Pacific?

The distinction between an actual attack and a credible threat is not worth making, so if Japan had just threatened to attack the US, we would have been justified to retaliate militarily.

So there’s no limit to how many civilians you can morally kill?

Sure there is. I’ve said this many times: the smallest number necessary. If it is necessary to kill 200 civilians to stop their aggression, then that is the number. If it is necessary to kill 200 civilians to stop the aggression, then it is not necessary to kill 2,000 civilians, and that tells you which action you should undertake. If on the other hand it is necessary to kill 100,000 civilians, then that’s the number. You didn’t name the specific cities that had to be destroyed in your “bomb 10 cities” scenario, so I cannot tell you what the number is. If you give me a list of cities, I will try to find out the number (it would depend on whether I can get population figures for that time).

What doesn’t make sense?

The hypothetical. I cannot comprehend the words. Just restate the hypothetical, and forget whatever hidden point you had: I literally cannot make sense of the example.

Anyway we want by gradually decreasing (or increasing) hypothetical damage to ourselves and increasing (decreasing) hypothetical damage to bystanders.

I’m totally puzzled. Are you saying that in the hypothetical, I start out by not hurting myself and that slowly start to beat myself, and at the same time beat a bystander less severely? Why am I beating anyone at all? I just don’t get the example.

First, I already answered your objection about metaphysical contrafactuals.

Second, that in our present circumstances a nuke is never needed for a robber doesn’t detract from the point of the hypothetical. If you like, take the situation as fictional…but I’m not asking you to take the situation as metaphysically fictional!

Whether or not you ask me to take it as impossible, it is. If you can prove otherwise, go for the gusto. BTW, I assume you have read OPAR, the chapter “Reason”. If not, please tell me since that’s important background that I’ve assumed.

Fine. Then the original question is not answered: What if the only way to stop the robber were to fire shots that had a good chance of striking bystanders (you may add to this that firing enough shots will have a very very good chance of stopping the robber)?

Okay, so this is Vern shooting: then it is morally permissible. Though he himself might have an objection to pulling the trigger, which is his right.

Did someone say anything about protection (actually not protection, but restraint from force that includes force against) civilians as an absolute?

Someone did – the Quakers, in general, to name one; I’m glad to see that you didn’t, and that you are willing to allow the lives of innocent bystanders to be destroyed to protect the rights of others. How many innocent bystanders?

56

“Retaliate” means to “to return like for like.” Thus the killing of children at Hiroshima can be called “retaliation” only if it can be shown that they initiated force.

Again you are looking at it in a vacuum, and ignoring the circumstances. Governments are fundamentally different from individuals in that they have a positive obligation (to protect their citizens). If an enemy government forces the alternative between neglecting its duty and killing enemy civilians, one cannot properly call the latter an initiation of force.

Since this isn’t the first time I’ve stated this, I’ll make this the last time. There are only so many ways you can repeat yourself.

What implications negate the rights of citizens of bad governments? Force across borders is a political matter much more than an ethical one. If there are only individual rights, then the analogy is correct in its structure and is not invalidated by the inessential condition that one situation is carried across national borders and by governmental proxies rather than private proxies.

The analogy is not correct in its structure, because (as I say above) governments have a positive obligation, while private citizens only have negative ones.

I should think that a good moral theory would account for all situations in which rights, force (especially of life and death, especially of the lives and deaths of hundreds of thousands of people, especially of those among the hundreds of thousands who cannot reaonably be held accountable for the actions of a totalitarian government). How deep is a moral theory that is mute about rights, force, and life on such a huge scale?

The reason morality cannot account for it is not because of its scale; it is because it is a zero-sum situation between individuals. If in reality the only choices are an individual’s death or the death of another innocent person(s), morality can say nothing.

There is, however, a clear moral answer to whether or not a government can perform such an action in an enemy nation. The moral answer is that it has a positive obligation to protect its citizens.

A moral theory cannot presume that situations are ideal. A moral theory cannot presume that situations are even close to what we wish they were. Of course, in a perfect universe in which force were never used, there would not be difficult moral questions! And of course if the world were a place in which rights were only thwarted to a neglibible degree, then there would be no great moral problems.

You misread me. I said that morality can only apply to situations where life as a human being is possible. When your choices are initiating force or death, life as a human being becomes impossible. I never said morality requires a perfect world, only a world where moral choices are possible.

57

“[…] I smell the “arbitrary number” argument […]” [DavidOdden]

I’m not inclined to such an argument. Though, if one does does draw markers (such as that the age of majority is eighteen) then one should at least admit the marker is arbitrary or that even if it is not completely arbitrary then it has at least some arbitrariness to it.

“The principled answer is that saving one American life would be sufficient grounds. In the context of US military history, I had in mind for WWII the range 10,000, but I would be willing to just say “1”, if that would help your understanding.”

So your principle is that saving one American (what about Allied, by the way?) life justifies killing any number, with no upper limit, of civilians? But you have another sense of about 10,000 lives. Is there a schism betwen your sense of principle and some other sense that settles at around 10,000? (By the way, I’m not objecting to arbitrariness.)

“So there’s no limit to how many civilians you can morally kill?” [LauricAcid]

“Sure there is. I’ve said this many times: the smallest number necessary.”

I thought it was clear enough from context that I meant how many you can morally kill if it is required to kill them to save U.S. (Allied?) casualties. Anyway, your answer seems to be that there is no limit to how many Japanese civilians we could morally kill if it were necessary to kill them to save the life of a single U.S. soldier.

“I literally cannot make sense of the example.”

My fault for not clarifying when you asked that it’s not an example, but rather a general statement that we can make hypotheticals along a range from the most extreme to the most balanced.

“Are you saying that in the hypothetical, I start out by not hurting myself and that slowly start to beat myself, and at the same time beat a bystander less severely? Why am I beating anyone at all? I just don’t get the example.”

Sorry, ‘wants’ in my sentence was a typo. I meant that we get a gradual range of hypotheticals by simultaneously, in each individual hypothetical, decreasing the amount of aggression that is against us us and increase the amount of damage to bystanders. In other words: Let each of these undesirables be on an axis (damage to us on the x axis and damage to bystanders on the y axis). Now move both of them in opposite directions on their respective axes. Each intersection is a different hypothetical.

“[…] it is […]”

Okay, we’re not getting anywhere with this difference we have about possibility. But this might help: As I understand your view, before the invention of the atomic bomb, hypotheticals about some bomb imagined of the strenght of an atomic would be meaningless. But I think we can see that is not true. As to the book you mentioned, I’ve have not read that book, but I have read most of Rand’s own major books, but claim no special expertise about them.

“[…] this is Vern shooting: then it is morally permissible […]”

No, you claimed that his shooting is so good that there is virtually no chance of striking civilians. I’m not setting the degree of marksmanship any more specific than that there’s a good chance bystanders would be struck. It’s fair if you feel your own answer depends on distinguishing gradations of marksmanship in the range of ‘good chance could be struck’, but my original assertion was just that it is not morally permissible to fire if there’s a good chance bystanders could be struck.

“[…] the Quakers, in general, to name one; I’m glad to see that you didn’t, and that you are willing to allow the lives of innocent bystanders to be destroyed to protect the rights of others.”

I think one would be pretty unreasonable to expect to fight a war of self-defense in such a way as to ensure that no civilians were harmed. But questions about intentional targetting of civilians and entire cities of them, though, are not settled by mere renunciation of utterly unrealistic pacifism.

“How many innocent bystanders?”

In the case of the robber, just one is enough to make taking the shots morally impermissible.

58

“The analogy is not correct in its structure, because (as I say above) governments have a positive obligation, while private citizens only have negative ones.” [Oakes]

That’s well put. But overlooks that governments also have negative obligations, and that is what’s tested in the analogy. Also, a security guard, who has taken pay to protect, has a positive obligation too.

“The moral answer is that [a government has a] positive obligation to protect its citizens.”

And, in this frame, a negative obligation not to violate the rights of any citizen of any government.

“I said that morality can only apply to situations where life as a human being is possible. When your choices are initiating force or death, life as a human being becomes impossible. I never said morality requires a perfect world, only a world where moral choices are possible […]”

RETRACTION : I regret having misstaken your position and for posting as if you had made claims you hadn’t. My only explanation for the error is that I have read others - not you I now know - use ‘life as human being’ and similar phrases to encompass protection of all rights of a person, not just the right not to be murdered.

Returning to the questions here, I still don’t think the atomic bombings are covered by the escape clause that morality does not apply where one’s life is threatened. First, the Allies still had to quash the enemy, but the U.S. nor the world were as imperiled by Japan as before. Second, it is still a meaningful question whether it is morally permissible to kill others who are morally blameless and non-threatening in order to live in the face of attack. I don’t accept that threat to one’s life excepts one’s actions from the moral domain.

59

… the killing of children at Hiroshima can be called “retaliation” only if it can be shown that they initiated force…

Did someone contend that the U.S. dropped the bomb in order to kill the children of Hiroshima? If so, they’re mistaken.

60

Lauric Acid, please use the normal quoting style. Your posts are harder to read when you don’t. It is simple to do. You add

to the beginning of your quote and

to the end.

  • to mess up the code so the tags show up :wink:

I don’t really understand the argument against using the bombs. A lot of people died in Hiroshima, true, but more people died on Okinawa–the first and only invasion of a Japanese island-- than at Hiroshima. It is entirely probable that many civilian , not military, lives were saved by dropping the bombs. They decimated the populations of those two cities, but they did not kill 1/3 of the population of Japan. If we had invaded Japan, it would have turned into another drawn out bloody battle just like Okinawa. In the meantime, civilians would be left to try to survive, and many more than died at Hiroshima and Nagasaki would have failed.