21 hours ago, Eiuol said:
Isn’t a bigger issue what allows for a universally united notion of some concept?
That’s exactly the issue I’m addressing. “Rand believes we can form meaningful abstractions *without* such universals having a metaphysically basic existence in reality, which I believe is unjustifiable”. That’s exactly what you quoted.
21 hours ago, Eiuol said:
I am not sure what metaphysically basic universals are supposed to be, or why they are needed.
Why they are needed I answered in my last post, under “Why are these supposed “universals” even necessary?”.
21 hours ago, Eiuol said:
Why not a universal-making metaphysically basic fact of all that exists?
What does that mean?
21 hours ago, Eiuol said:
The way you propose a universal makes it sound like it is either an actual entity (you deny this) or a mental entity like a visualization.
Why does it sound that way?
21 hours ago, Eiuol said:
Rand seems to say identity and existence are metaphysically basic facts, and that by virtue of having identity, a number of entities can share features.
Sometimes she says this (she relies on it while denying it, so she’s inconsistent at different times), but she explicitly denies any intrinsic identity or metaphysical universality, and her justifications all eschew these principles, relying instead of subjective and/or pragmatic criteria, from which objective truth, knowledge, or success in induction cannot be justified.
21 hours ago, Eiuol said:
From there, one creates a mental entity - a concept - based on those features. As man-made, the concept is epistemic, but refers to some metaphysically basic truth (identity) and the metaphysically given features of an entity.
No, that’s intrinsicism. You can’t go around explicitly *denying* metaphysical essences or universals, denying that such a thing as “manness” or “roseness” exists, justifying your definitions on such grounds as utility, brevity, and differentiation within one’s particular context of knowledge at a given time, etc., and then try to tell me that the epistemology *does* refers to metaphysically basic universal identities.
21 hours ago, Eiuol said:
You seem to begin with a universal as a mental entity, pre-formed, before explaining how one may sense such an entity.
You’re contradicting what I just said above, “Don’t metaphysical essences imply that we acquire concepts “by no means”?” I said in that section, “I don’t have any general problem with the empirical practice of observation, differentiation and integration, measurement omission, or the process of concept formation in general… in general, this is the normal way humans form concepts”.
21 hours ago, Eiuol said:
You haven’t addressed how Rand thinks meaning comes from an entity.
Well as I’ve said, Rand inconsistently maintains both an intrinsicist view, when she says things about how concepts are abstract and there is a real *kind* of thing in reality to which they refer, while also maintaining a nominalist view - which is what all of her justifications depend on, as I’ve described here: http://forum.objectivismonline.com/index.php?/topic/30636-subjectivity-and-pragmatism-in-objectivist-epistemology/
Universal meaning (as in conceptual knowledge or general propositions) is based on the definitions of the concepts, which are defined according to subjective and pragmatic criteria in her epistemology as opposed to being grounded in metaphysical essences / natural kinds / some metaphysically basic universal, and thus don’t have any real meaning or any real truth, outside of the observations of the particular concretes which have been previously observed and the nominalistic categories and descriptions derived from there.