Quantum Physics

If at the center of matter there is basically nothing but empty space.  What does that mean with relation to something existing out of essentially nothing.

Not a damn thing. The center of a very small particle is not the whole particle. Solid objects are still solid.

While more about particle structure may yet be discovered, none of it will change what we already know about the universe. It must be consistent with already established knowledge – the knowledge used to discover the information in the first place.

See my essay The Relationship between Philosophy and Science.

But your idea of “work” is advocating conventional QM, which is acausal and purports to link events “instantaneously” across, potentially, millions of light years via “quantum entanglement”?

If you find the non-locality implied by “quantum entanglement” so objectionable, why then would you advocate TEW? It too is non-local, as I explained in painstaking and exhaustive detail here. (By the way, TEW’s failure to account for the results of the EPR-Bell experiments locally, as its author claims it does, is not the only problem with it. The theory is incoherent or just wrong in a number of other ways. But it’s convenient to focus on the Bell issue since it is so cut and dried.)

But the bigger problem is this: if you object to non-locality, your problem is with nature, not with any particular theory. Bell’s theorem proves that no theory satisfying Bell Locality can be consistent with the reasonably-well-verified QM predictions. So if you think theories should agree with experimental data, you just can’t have a Bell Local theory. It just isn’t possible. Until you (and whatever other few advocates of TEW remain) grasp this – i.e., understand Bell’s Theorem – you will continue to bash your head against the wall of reality and make yourself look like a fool doing so. All I ask is that if you or anyone else insists on doing this, you not associate yourself with Objectivism while doing it. I don’t mean to be rude or insulting, and I don’t know you nearly well enough to know whether you’re deliberately distorting things here or just honestly confused. I’m certainly willing and inclined to assume it’s the latter. If so, you simply need to understand Bell’s Theorem better. Get Maudlin’s book and read it. Or read one of Bell’s relatively accessible articles such as “Bertlmann’s Socks and the Nature of Reality” (which is by the way completely brilliant and wonderful to read). But the theorem exists, and you really just can’t take the position you’re taking here unless you refute it (which I’ll bet my life isn’t going to happen). Understand and accept the theorem; understand and refute it; or don’t have a position either way on this issue. Those are really the only three honest options.

By the way, it is preposterous to call me an advocate of “conventional QM”. I am (with certain qualifications) an advocate of Bohmian Mechanics, a theory which has been repeatedly proved to be impossible by bogus proofs, systematically mis-understood, mis-characterized, and mis-represented by commentators, systematically ignored by physicists and in particular textbook writers, dismissed for reasons that are entirely bogus or inconsistent or which represent actual virtues of the theory. In short, my favored version of QM is *anything* but conventional. If you don’t know enough to know the difference between Bohm’s theory and Bohr’s theory, you have no business holding a position on TEW or any other aspect of this issue.

But your idea of “work” is advocating conventional QM, which is acausal and purports to link events “instantaneously” across, potentially, millions of light years via “quantum entanglement”?

One other question about this. It’s true that in Bohmian Mechanics (which as I explained is what I actually advocate) particles that are “potentially millions of light years” away from each other can be “linked”, i.e., can affect each other. Of course ultimately this is a question for experiment. It is impossible to speculate about what limits in terms of distance or propagation speed might exist for these effects. Maybe, for example, the effects aren’t “instantaneous” but “only” a billion times faster than light, and maybe they can only extend across a distance of 100,000 light years, not a million. All that experiments done so far tell us is that there is some kind of nonlocal causality involved that involves propagation of at least several times the speed of light and can extend over at least several kilometers. But anyway it is true that Bohm’s theory contains an instantaneous action at a distance between particles.

My question is: what precisely do you object to here? I’m guessing you wouldn’t want to say that you would have rejected Newtonian gravitation had you been alive 300 years ago. Yet that theory also asserts instantaneous action at a distance between particles. So what’s the difference exactly? Why the contempt for the former while the latter is properly held up as a shining example of rational physics?

Of course, Newton himself didn’t believe in literal action at a distance, and subsequent history has shown that one can understand Newton’s law as simply the limit of a field theory with a finite propagation speed. So the real question is: what in the world makes you think the same won’t be possible for the analogous laws in Bohm’s theory?

  But anyway it is true that Bohm’s theory contains an instantaneous action at a distance between particles.

Doesn’t an instantaneous action at a distance require an infinite speed?

Doesn’t an instantaneous action at a distance require an infinite speed?

If something propagates from one particle to the other, yes. But I think you missed the main point. You should take the instantaneousness of the action at a distance in Bohm’s theory exactly as seriously as you (would have) take(n) the instantaneousness of the action at a distance in Newton’s gravity law. That is to say: you shouldn’t take it seriously at all. Rather, you should take it as an approximation which can easily be modified in the future when there are some empirical grounds for believing in a particular speed. That’s what I was getting at before when I asked if anyone would seriously think it rational to have rejected Newton’s whole theory of gravitation on the grounds that, according to Newton’s equation, the action at a distance was instantaneous.

But there’s also an even mainer main point. Bohm’s theory has nothing to do with whether or not TEW is a viable theory. Even if one (erroneously) believes on some (rationalistic) philosophical grounds that Bohm’s theory is irredeemably flawed, it remains a fact that no local theory can account for the results of certain experiments. That’s what Bell proved. Superluminal causation is a fact of nature. Lewis Little’s claims to have refuted this are not just wrong, but foolish – and so it does real harm to the Objectivist cause when people proselytize, in public and qua Objectivists, for TEW.

  Even if one (erroneously) believes on some (rationalistic) philosophical grounds that Bohm’s theory is irredeemably flawed, it remains a fact that no local theory can account for the results of certain experiments.  That’s what Bell proved.  Superluminal causation is a fact of nature.

Let me make sure I understand your terms. A “local theory” is one in which all causation can be shown to propagate at less than the speed of light. And you are saying that Bell has proved “superluminal causation” – which I presume means causation that propagates faster than the speed of light. But, Bell does not claim to have proved “instantaneous causation”, i.e. causation that propagates at an infinite speed. Is that correct?

Let me make sure I understand your terms.  A  “local theory” is one in which all causation can be shown to propagate at less than the speed of light.  And you are saying that Bell has proved “superluminal causation” – which I presume means causation that propagates faster than the speed of light.  But, Bell does not claim to have proved “instantaneous causation”, i.e. causation that propagates at an infinite speed.  Is that correct?

That’s right.

Maybe this will be clarifying, though. There’s a slight imprecision in saying that “Bell proved superluminal causation”. What Bell proved is that theories of type X will always predict that a certain correlation obeys a certain inequality. X here means that, according to the theory, the outcome on each side is determined by local variables: the settings of the detector and the state of the particles. (I assume you’re aware that in the relevant experiment, pairs of particles are emitted from a central source, and then certain of their properties are measured by well-separated detectors.) Now, when they actually do the experiments, the inequality is violated. That means the “true theory” (whatever it is) is not of type X. It must involve some sort of dependence of one of the measurement outcomes on the distant apparatus/setting/particle/outcome – something “nonlocal” to that particular measurement event. So that is the “action at a distance.” That Bell’s inequality is violated simply proves that there is some kind of action at a distance.

The specific claim that the action is superluminal comes, not from anything Bell proved, but from the experiments. The apparatus settings on the two sides are randomly flipped back and forth in such a way that the final setting – the setting actually used in the measurement of the particle – isn’t even made until right before the particle gets there. And the timing and distance between the two wings is such that the “information” about the setting on one side would have to travel faster than c to make it to the distant side in time to affect the outcome there. (And we know it *does* affect the outcome there because the inequality is violated.) Does that make sense? So what the experiments give us is a lower-limit on the propagation speed involved. (Basically, it’s the distance between the two detectors divided by the timescale of the setting swapping.) My point is just to stress that it’s the experiments, not Bell’s theoretical analysis, that tell us something about the speed. Bell’s inequality is simply a criterion for whether or not something on one end is affecting something on the other end. The experiments tell us that this kind of effect is indeed present, and it’s details of the experiment (namely, how “late” the relevant somethings on each side even come into existence, and how far away the distant something is at that time) that speak to the speed.

There are a number of different experiments which all imply somewhat different lower limits on this speed. And the various experiments are different in other relevant ways, too, e.g., efficiency: the fraction of emitted particle pairs which are actually detected in the relevant way. In principle, so long as some of the pairs are missed, one could have a kind of conspiracy theory view that the sample of actually detected pairs is biased (so that, if only those missing pairs had also been detected, Bell’s inequality *wouldn’t* have been violated). But I think we can leave all those “loopholes” aside and just say: the weight of the evidence to date *strongly* suggests that Bell’s inequalities *are* violated and that the relevant causation (if it involves propagation of anything at all) involves propagation with a speed that is at least several times faster than the speed of light.

You may have heard elsewhere that “superluminal” and “instantaneous” are in some sense equivalent, so that it makes no sense to talk about signals which are superluminal-but-not-instantaneous. This is valid only if one assumes that relativity has got it right when it comes to the basic causal structure of the world. But what these experiments show is precisely that relativity *hasn’t* got it right. If there is superluminal causation (and the experiments say there is) then relativity (which is supposed to prohibit this) is just wrong, and the relativity-motivated identification of “superluminal” and “instantaneous” is off the table. So nobody needs to worry that faster-than-light causality somehow entails “real infinities” or anything else that could be regarded as in conflict with metaphysical axioms.

I recognize that many honest people may not be in a position to assess the technical evidence on this issue. 

[…]

I am not a physicist, so I can not address your points coherently. Stephen Speicher, on the FORUM for Ayn Rand Fans, is who you should be talking to. If you go to the website, send him a PM, and see if you can get in touch with Dr. Lewis as well.

In general, I would have to say that it is a Theory, and as such certain kinks are inevitable.

Doesn’t an instantaneous action at a distance require an infinite speed?

Is a stationary object moving infinitely slow?

You can say ‘instantaneous = infinitely fast’ if you like, just like you can say ‘not moving = infinitely slow’. But a theory doesnt automatically become invalid just because youve managed to rephrase it in a way that lets you include the word ‘infinite’. I’ve seen people argue that the law of identity rules out instantenous travel, but I’ve no idea why this is the case. If things travel instantaneously, then thats just the way the universe is.

Is a stationary object moving infinitely slow?

No, a stationary object is not moving at all (within a given frame of reference).

You can say ‘instantaneous = infinitely fast’ if you like, just like you can say ‘not moving = infinitely slow’.

Velocity is a measure of distance traveled over elapsed time. V = D/T. If an object is stationary, then D = 0 and the expression = 0 for any value of T. If D is some positive value and T is zero, then the expression has no meaning.

But a theory doesnt automatically become invalid just because youve managed to rephrase it in a way that lets you include the word ‘infinite’.

I did not rephrase anything. I asked Travis a question to confirm what he meant by “instantaneous”.

I am not a physicist, but I would say that any theory that depends on the ability of something to move with infinite speed has some explaining to do.

I’ve seen people argue that the law of identity rules out instantenous travel, but I’ve no idea why this is the case. If things travel instantaneously, then thats just the way the universe is.

Instantaneous travel would mean that an object exists at its departure point and it exists at its arrival point at the same time. It means one object becomes two objects, which would be the creation of matter out of nothing. I am not aware of anything that suggests such a possibility; absent any supporting evidence, the notion of instantaneous travel is as arbitrary as the notion of god.

I am not a physicist, so I can not address your points coherently. Stephen Speicher, on the FORUM for Ayn Rand Fans, is who you should be talking to. If you go to the website, send him a PM, and see if you can get in touch with Dr. Lewis as well.

In general, I would have to say that it is a Theory, and as such certain kinks are inevitable.

I have a long history of debating this issue with those two. At this point I have no desire to talk to them further, and I’m *certain* they feel the same way about me.

Did you mean to imply that I was confused about something and that Speicher or Little could clarify it for me? I’m pretty sure that’s wrong on both counts. But of course if you’re not a physicist, I don’t expect you to be able to judge which side is right in this debate. I only wanted to make you aware that there is a debate, and that there do exist a number of very knowledgeable Objectivist physicists who regard TEW as foolish crackpot nonsense. And I would encourage you and others to take that into account before you publicly proselytize for the theory under the banner of Objectivism.

Is a stationary object moving infinitely slow?

You can say ‘instantaneous = infinitely fast’ if you like, just like you can say ‘not moving = infinitely slow’. But a theory doesnt automatically become invalid just because youve managed to rephrase it in a way that lets you include the word ‘infinite’. I’ve seen people argue that the law of identity rules out instantenous travel, but I’ve no idea why this is the case. If things travel instantaneously, then thats just the way the universe is.

This is a good point. I think I might disagree with you about velocity: if something is moving with a velocity, philosophy tells us that the velocity isn’t infinity, because infinity isn’t any particular velocity. But the broader point I agree with: philosophy can’t tell us that there is something moving with a particular velocity. That’s a question for physics.

A similar example I’ve used in the past is the following fallacious proof that there must be at least one giraffe in any given square mile of land. If there weren’t any, then the local area per giraffe would be infinite – a contradiction with the law of identity!

This is a good point.  I think I might disagree with you about velocity:  if something is moving with a velocity, philosophy tells us that the velocity isn’t infinity, because infinity isn’t any particular velocity.  But the broader point I agree with:  philosophy can’t tell us that there is something moving with a particular velocity.  That’s a question for physics. 

If something travels instaneously then we do not have to say that it is moving with “infinite velocity” or “no particular velocity” - we could instead choose to revise our idea of velocity and say something like “the concept of velocity does not apply to objects/information which trasmit instaneously”. It only really makes sense to talk about velocity in the context of an object which is moving with finite speed between point A and point B - if the travel was genuinelly instanteous then I dont think it would be correct to talk about ‘velocity’ when describing it (and we certainly shouldnt say that it has an ‘infinite’ or ‘undetermined’ velocity).

The philosophical problems only seem to arise when we conceptualise instantanous travel as being a ‘limitiing case’ of an object moving very fast, rather than as being something qualatively different. Its as if we have a picture in our head of an object moving between 2 points at faster and faster speeds, then we tell ourselves that no matter how fast it goes, it must take SOME time to travel the distance. But the problem only stems from us choosing to think of instaneous travel in terms of this particular picture - Zeno encountered a similar problem when he conceptualised moving between 2 points as a picture of Achilles “continually travelling half the distance” and was forced to conclude that motion was impossible because otherwise travelling a finite distance would necessitate doing something infinitely many times. But this paradox was not intrinsic to the concept of motion - it was just a feature of the peculiar way Zeno chose to think about it. I believe the same holds for instantaneous travel - if we can shake off our misleading picture of ‘instaneous’ being the limiting case of ‘infinitely fast’ then the philosophical objections will vanish, and it will become a purely scientific question. And as far as I know, science is still undecided.

A similar example I’ve used in the past is the following fallacious proof that there must be at least one giraffe in any given square mile of land. If there weren’t any, then the local area per giraffe would be infinite – a contradiction with the law of identity!

Yeah, this is a good example. Its important to seperate contradictions caused by particular ways which we conceptualise and describe things, with intrinsic contradictions in the concepts themselves.

AisA

Velocity is a measure of distance traveled over elapsed time. V = D/T. If an object is stationary, then D = 0 and the expression = 0 for any value of T. If D is some positive value and T is zero, then the expression has no meaning.

Indeed. But this only suggests that it is wrong to think of instaneous travel in terms of velocity. D/T does grow arbitrarily large if D is fixed and t->0, but D/0 is not infinite, it is undefined. This is what I mean by the (what I view as misleading) idea of thinking aobut instantenous speed as being a limiting concept

But this is a different sort of objection, since you seem to be suggesting that instaneous travel is incompatible with some equations of physics. And if this were true (and I dont think it is since afaik Bohmian mechanics is a consistent theory despite placing no upper bound on the ‘speed’ of information transmission) then this would be a good reason for discounting it. But this is a scientific objection, not a philosophical one. There might be good scientific reasons for rejecting instantaneous travel - I dont know enough about physics to comment one way or the other. However, I dont think there are any purely philosophical reasons for rejecting it.

There might be good scientific reasons for rejecting instantaneous travel - I dont know enough about physics to comment one way or the other. However, I dont think there are any purely philosophical reasons for rejecting it.

I gave you a philosophical reason for rejecting it in post #30. Unless someone can show some evidence to suggest it is possible, the assertion that instantaneous travel is “a possibility” is arbitrary.

I have a long history of debating this issue with those two.  At this point I have no desire to talk to them further, and I’m *certain* they feel the same way about me. 

Ok.

Did you mean to imply that I was confused about something and that Speicher or Little could clarify it for me?  

Yes and No. I mean that either you you could be wrong (in general), but it has to do with the fact you are dealing with a theory, not a law.

I only wanted to make you aware that there is a debate, and that there do exist a number of very knowledgeable Objectivist physicists who regard TEW as foolish crackpot nonsense.  And I would encourage you and others to take that into account before you publicly proselytize for the theory under the banner of Objectivism.

From my intial reading of Speicher’s summary, it seeming to make sense. I speak only from my limited knowledge of the subject.

I only wanted to make you aware that there is a debate, and that there do exist a number of very knowledgeable Objectivist physicists who regard TEW as foolish crackpot nonsense. And I would encourage you and others to take that into account before you publicly proselytize for the theory under the banner of Objectivism. 

While I am not as knowledgeable about this as ttn, I also get the impression that TEW is a crackpot theory.


With regard to Bohm’s theory and Newton’s theory:

A force acting instantaneously over a distance is not the same as an object moving instantly from one place to another.


With regard to teleportation and time travel:

For an object to disappear from one event (place and time) and then reappear at another event, without something equivalent going the other way, would violate the conservation laws of: energy, linear momentum, angular momentum, and electric charge. It would require violating the known laws of physics, not only at the events of the disappearance and reappearance, but also throughout all space-time because General Relativity and Maxwell’s equations link the gravitational field and electromagnetic field throughout space-time to all their sources.

I gave you a philosophical reason for rejecting it in post #30.  Unless someone can show some evidence to suggest it is possible, the assertion that instantaneous travel is “a possibility” is arbitrary.

If you want to say its arbitrary, thats something entirely different from the normal claim that it ‘violates the law of identity’. If your position is just that its arbitrary, thats fine.

What evidence do you believe there is for TEW out of interest? It has the exact same level of observational support as every other interpretation of quantum theory, and is surely equally arbitrary.

If you want to say its arbitrary, thats something entirely different from the normal claim that it ‘violates the law of identity’. If your position is just that its arbitrary, thats fine.

Being arbitrary is, in some ways, a more damning indictment than violating an axiom.

In any event, I am not familiar with the arguments you have encountered regarding the law of identity.

I can see an argument along the following lines: Instantaneous travel means that an object is both at its departure point and at its arrival point at the same time. However, if a thing is what it is, and not something else, at the same time and in the same respect, then a thing is also where it is, and not somewhere else, at the same time and in the same respect.

What evidence do you believe there is for TEW out of interest? It has the exact same level of observational support as every other interpretation of quantum theory, and is surely equally arbitrary.

What distinguishes TEW from *some* QM theories is that it does not violate the fundamental axioms of philosophy.

The problem with QM is not the “interpretations of quantum theory”; the problem is the interpretations of the experimental observations, certain of the interpretations, anyway. Modern skeptics have latched onto what they claim are “conclusions” of quantum mechanics to attack Objectivist metaphysics and epistemology.

We are told, for example, that the fact that things can be both particles and waves at the same time means that the law of identity does not hold. We are told that since a cat can be both dead and alive at the same time, and is only forced into one state or the other by our observations, then the primacy of existence does not hold and consciousness determines reality. We are told that since the act of measuring one property of a particle affects another property of that particle, that man’s means of gaining knowledge is limited and uncertain.

(For what it is worth, Stephen Speicher has said repeatedly that the more “bizarre” interpretations of experimental observations are not held by many practicing physicists; that they are left at the door of the laboratory where the real science begins. )

TEW is an attempt to explain the experimental observations of QM within the confines of philosophic axioms. If it does not explain all of the experimental observations, then it is either incomplete or incorrect. Either way, its approach, i.e. its attempt to explain observations in compliance with the axioms of philosophy, is surely correct. The fact that we cannot, at the moment, explain certain experimental observations does not refute the axioms of philosophy. Nor does it justify an “anything goes” approach to forming a proper theory.

I don’t know if TEW is correct or not. Frankly, I have a difficult time believing it is “foolish crackpot nonsense”; I know it is not arbitrary.

I also have a difficult time believing that relativity is wrong. I understood that a vast amount of experimental evidence supported relativity. I suppose time will tell.

…  I mean that either you you could be wrong (in general), but it has to do with the fact you are dealing with a theory, not a law.

From my intial reading of Speicher’s summary, it seeming to make sense. I speack only from my limited knowledge of the subject.

Fair enough. Many years ago I too was seduced by what sounded like good philosophy in Little’s writings, and assumed that the physics part was equally good. Now I know better, and now your “limited knolwedge” is less limited – it includes the fact that some very knowledgeable experts in the field think that TEW is an embarrassment to Objectivism.

BTW, I don’t know what point you were trying to make with a distinction between theory and law. Whatever you want to call it, TEW is just wrong, and the people who continue to advocate it do this out of negligent ignorance (or worse).

What distinguishes TEW  from *some* QM theories is that it does not violate the fundamental axioms of philosophy.

Neither does the flat earth theory.

TEW is an attempt to explain the experimental observations of QM within the confines of philosophic axioms.  If it does not explain all of the experimental observations, then it is either incomplete or incorrect.  Either way, its approach, i.e. its attempt to explain observations in compliance with the axioms of philosophy, is surely correct.  The fact that we cannot, at the moment, explain certain experimental observations does not refute the axioms of philosophy.

The problem isn’t just that certain facts remain unexplained. That it doesn’t explain everything is surely no valid objection to a theory! The problem is that the theory’s whole reason for existing is misguided. Little thinks that the non-locality in Bohm’s theory is a flaw. But Bell’s theorem and the relevant experiments show that this is actually a feature, not a flaw. Local theories are ruled out by experiment. I think you’re focusing too much on “the axioms of philosophy.” Of course it’s right that any physics theory which contradicts valid metaphysical principles should be rejected. But being consistent with metaphysics is hardly a *sufficient* condition for the truth of a theory. Not even close. So focus on epistemology – e.g., does the theory integrate with everything else that is known? Is it true? Are its advocates rational in their advocacy?

I was also confused by your last sentence. It seems to be based on the premise that TEW is the only possible theory that is consistent with metaphysics. That’s preposterous.

I don’t know if TEW is correct or not.  Frankly, I have a difficult time believing it is “foolish crackpot nonsense”; I know it is not arbitrary.

I agree. TEW is a perfectly meaningful theory. And it contradicts known facts. So it’s false. Just like the flat earth theory.

I also have a difficult time believing that relativity is wrong.  I understood that a vast amount of experimental evidence supported relativity.  I suppose time will tell.

Yes, it’s a very surprising conclusion. It’s entirely proper to scrutinize Bell’s argument and the relevant experiments very closely. But of course it would never be proper to evade that evidence.