Kyary, you mentioned among affinity between Kant and Rand, “the ‘subjugation’ of nature (production) as central to morality.” I’d think the word for the relation between Kant and Rand on this would be “dissonance”, not a harmony or an affinity. Do you know of some place in which Kant praised human alteration of external nature to serve the interests of humans? Kant salutes F. Bacon famously in his Preface to the second edition of KrV, but that is a salute to experimental methods in physical sciences (of heat and chemistry). It is no notice of Bacon in his saying that was so noticed by Rand and her intellectual kin: “Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed.” I don’t recall Kant taking any interest in commanding physical nature by getting better knowledge of it. Indeed, compared to his Enlightenment predecessor Christian Wolff, I have not found Kant concerned with the Enlightenment project of improving the physical lot of humanity. Correct me, if I’m neglecting something in Kant. Wolff, in addition to being a distinguished and influential German Rationalist formalizing the system of Leibniz, tried and succeeded in increasing the yields of grains in agriculture.
As for subjugation of nature and its place in morality, Rand and Kant are opposed. Productivity in the empirical world could not be morally significant for Kant, certainly not be so morally central as in Rand. In Kant’s view, reason is given us “as a practical faculty, that is, as one that is to influence the will. . . . This will need not . . . be the sole and complete good, but it must be the highest good and the condition for every other, even of all demands for happiness” (Groundwork 4:395; similarly, KrV, A841–42 B869–70). Rand did not entirely neglect the making of a good will,* along with other character traits, in production bettering human life. Successful life, with its expression in happiness, is the centerpiece of Rand’s morality, not crafting of a good will or (4:393) the making of oneself worthy of happiness in a world in which happiness seldom attains and anyway would be an improper central moral aim.
The subjugation of nature in the moral realm for Kant, as for many others, is subjugation of natural impulses for life and joy. Rand would have a subjugation of irrationality to the purpose of life, including one’s life in its interactions with others. For Rand the moral notion of duty—that subjugator is out the window.
In his secular construction of morality, Kant would give to good will the role Luther had given to right faith. Kant wants to keep with individual necessary reward and penalty for individual condition of will, and he thinks he can find this necessary connection right here in the constitution of human will and reason. Beyond the sure sanctions for a good will is the hope of happiness in this life and hereafter.
At Collegium Fredericianum, Kant had excelled in Latin. Among the Latin works he read there was Cicero’s On Duties (De Officiis). Cicero sees virtue in terms of duty. It is no controversy to say, as anyone should, that moral virtue is a performance of or disposition towards what one ought to do. But when a philosopher such as Cicero or Kant undertakes to cast all occasions of doing the morally right thing as performances of duties, he is giving a systematic and controversial slant to the entire moral plane.
Duties are various things owed, usually in various social relationships. In all things, Cicero is on the lookout for bearings on duties. “No part of life, neither public affairs nor private, neither in the forum nor at home, neither when acting on your own nor in dealings with another, can be free from duty. Everything that is honorable in a life depends upon its cultivation, and everything dishonorable upon its neglect” (O 1.4).
Kant’s ethics, like Cicero’s, is an ethics of duty. For Cicero the source of duties is honorableness, which is in contrast to personal advantage. “There are some teachings that undermine all duty by the ends of good and evil things that they propound. The man who defines the highest good in such a way that it has no connection with virtue, measuring it by his own advantages rather than by honorableness, cannot . . . cultivate either friendship or justice or liberality. There can certainly be no brave man who judges that pain is the greatest evil, nor a man of restraint who defines pleasure as the highest good” (O 1.5).
As the source of duties, Kant will replace honorableness with the nature of pure reason and a good will. That replacement understood, the following formula of Cicero will agree with Kant. Ethical systems in which the highest good is personal advantage “say nothing about duty; nor can any advice on duty that is steady, stable, and joined to nature be handed down except by those who believe that what is sought for its own sake is honorableness alone . . .” (O 1.6).
I do not see any affinity between Kant and Rand where there is affinity between Rand and F. Bacon. I do not see any affinity between Kant and Rand where there is affinity between Kant and Cicero. There is no distinctive affinity between Kant and Rand in the realm of morality. Kant’s organic structure of reason too, fails to link, unlike Rand’s reason, to the situation of reason within human physical life, which is the larger structure and process for the moral value of reason in Rand’s morality.