Resolved: that Peikoff is wrong about agosticism

I always thought an agnostic was one whose position was “show me the evidence, or I’ll dismiss the claim out of hand” - which is precisely Peikoff’s position.

Well now we get into a difficulty because agnostics are notoriously vague when identifying themselves. Let’s focus on what the proper meaning for the word ought to be. A person who says, I don’t believe in God until you show me the evidence, is not an agnostic, but an atheist. A person who says that there is evidence either way, or not enough contrary evidence either way, or generally insufficient information to accept or reject the concept of God, is the agnostic. An a-gnostic, etymologically, means a person without belief, while an a-theist, etymologically, means a person without a God. Very different concepts here; the former may still accept the idea of God but is just lacking in resolution to take one side or the other.

Let’s focus on what the proper meaning for the word ought to be. A person who says, I don’t believe in God until you show me the evidence, is not an agnostic, but an atheist.

I think that atheism claims more than that a claim to the existence of God is arbitrary; atheism also claims that a claim to the non-existence of God is valid, resting that claim upon a definition of God that would violate the axioms of existence and upon the axioms themselves.

Given your definition, I agree that the discussion splits into two topics. I am less interested in why some people believe things without any evidence or whether it is right to characterize them as cowards, than I am of the actual strength of the atheist claim since it is not, as commonly understood, a claim of proof of God’s non-existence, but a claim of validity resting on man’s perceptual experience, i.e. it is so limited in its context that it cannot mean what many people take it to mean. The claim to the non-existence of God is, like all knowledge, a claim made in a definite context, in relation to man, man’s perception, and man’s present mode of awareness, and not a contextless proof that God cannot exist (as I think the claim is often misunderstood). I suspect that a mistaken belief that atheists claim such a proof is what leads many to regard themselves as agnostic. But that’s not the way that Peikoff defines agnostic, and to avoid an endless debate over terms I am content to leave the discussion here.

Rather, claims of God must be dismissed as arbitrary unless and until evidence is brought forward. This is precisely the agnostic position as I understand it.

What other agnostic position could there be? If an agnostic didn’t dismiss claims of God as arbitrary it would mean that he thought there is at least some evidence to indicate there may be a God. If you told him Elvis Presley created the world he would reject that out of hand. That he doesn’t reject the proposition that there is some type of a God out of hand yet doesn’t see any evidence that proves there is a God means he thinks the claim is arbitrary and therefore dismissible unless new evidence is brought forward to prove the existence of a God. I hardly would call an agnostic cowardly or mentally lazy. I’d call him wise to use his time judiciously and not waste it pondering about something which has no practical effect on his life. How much time did Howard Roark spend debating proofs of whether or not there was a God?

Main Entry: ar·bi·trary

3 a : based on or determined by individual preference or convenience rather than by necessity or the intrinsic nature of something <an arbitrary standard>

What other agnostic position could there be? If an agnostic didn’t dismiss claims of God as arbitrary it would mean that he thought there is at least some evidence to indicate there may be a God.

As Peikoff states in OPAR (p. 170):

The agnostic treats arbitrary claims as matters properly open to consideration, discussion, evaluation. He allows that it is “possible” that these claims are “true”, thereby applying cognitive descriptions to verbiage that is at war with cognition. He demands proof of a negative; it’s up to you, he declares, to show that there are no demons, or that your sex life is not a result of your previous incarnation as a pharoah of ancient Egypt. … In struggling to elevent the arbitrary to a position of cognitive respect, he is attempting to equate the arbitrary with the logically supported.

According to Peikoff, therefore, an agnostic is one who knows that there is no evidence and that the claim is arbitrary, yet doesn’t dismiss the claim out of hand.

As Peikoff states in OPAR (p. 170):

According to Peikoff, therefore, an agnostic is one who knows that there is no evidence and that the claim is arbitrary, yet doesn’t dismiss the claim out of hand.

Yes, but I think it goes much further than this. I think the epistemological significance of the agnostic’s position is that he then goes on to demand proof of a negative. By demanding proof of a negative, the agnostic undercuts the very meaning of logic as the non-contradictory identification of reality since there can never be a situation where you can point to something in reality for which there is no sensory-perceptual evidence.

The agnostic’s essential position is that the existence of god cannot be proven nor disproven, and so therefore the arbitrary claim of the existence of god has equal validity to the position of the athiest who demands positive sensory-perceptual evidence. The corrupting influcence of this aspect of the agnostic’s position on logic per se is the worm in the apple.

But the claim does lack evidence, doesn’t it?

The “does exist” claim, yes. But not all false claims are arbitrary. To quote from OPAR p. 164, “An arbitrary claim is one for which there is no evidence, either perceptual or conceptual”. Not just “no evidence in support”, but “no evidence”, period. So since there is ample evidence, all pointing away from the conclusion, the claim is not arbitrary. It is false: “when the mental content does not thus correspond, when it constitutes not a recognition of reality but a contradiction of it, then it is false”. That is what the god claim is: a contradiction of reality, thus a false claim.

However: I fully agree that the positive claim should in addition be treated with the same intellectual contempt as the Hegelian gremlin claim, because the theists will simply try to diffuse the non-existence proof by claiming that god is above existence (to put it in Latin, supernatural).

However: I fully agree that the positive claim should in addition be treated with the same intellectual contempt as the Hegelian gremlin claim, because the theists will simply try to diffuse the non-existence proof by claiming that god is above existence (to put it in Latin, supernatural).

Aren’t most concepts of God supernatural though? What good does it do to be able to disprove the existence of a natural God when that’s not what people mean by God? It’s misunderstandings like this that probably make atheism seem silly to a lot of people. It seems to me that we’re back to having no proof of God’s (supernatural) non-existence and dismissing, as arbitrary, the positive claim. That makes sense to me - then we’re no longer using the existence of apples to disprove the existence of oranges.

Aren’t most concepts of God supernatural though? What good does it do to be able to disprove the existence of a natural God when that’s not what people mean by God? It’s misunderstandings like this that probably make atheism seem silly to a lot of people. It seems to me that we’re back to having no proof of God’s (supernatural) non-existence and dismissing, as arbitrary, the positive claim. That makes sense to me - then we’re no longer using the existence of apples to disprove the existence of oranges.

It’s amazing here how the agnostics (or at least those who argue from the point of view) keep proving Peikoff’s point.

The supernatural is as arbitrary and invalid a claim as God. Seeker all that you are doing is giving credence to the same arbitrary claim that the original poster does, except whereas he gives standing to the arbitrary claim of God, you give standing to the arbitrary claim of supernatural. Supernatural is as much a non-sequitir as God. This isn’t an apples an oranges sort of argument. The existence of nature, disproves the “super”-natural. Nature is all there is.

It seems to me that we’re back to having no proof of God’s (supernatural) non-existence and dismissing, as arbitrary, the positive claim. That makes sense to me - then we’re no longer using the existence of apples to disprove the existence of oranges.

No, a supernatural God is in direct contradiction of the axioms and all evidence. That claim is false.

A “natural god” is the claim that is arbirary, just like gremlins.

Please pay more attention; this has now been repeated several times.

The “does exist” claim, yes. But not all false claims are arbitrary. To quote from OPAR p. 164, “An arbitrary claim is one for which there is no evidence, either perceptual or conceptual”. Not just “no evidence in support”, but “no evidence”, period. So since there is ample evidence, all pointing away from the conclusion, the claim is not arbitrary. It is false: “when the mental content does not thus correspond, when it constitutes not a recognition of reality but a contradiction of it, then it is false”. That is what the god claim is: a contradiction of reality, thus a false claim.

However: I fully agree that the positive claim should in addition be treated with the same intellectual contempt as the Hegelian gremlin claim, because the theists will simply try to diffuse the non-existence proof by claiming that god is above existence (to put it in Latin, supernatural).

The idea that any claim that contradicts reality is not arbitrary but false essentially means that any arbitrary claim is not arbitrary but false. In essence, what you are saying is that there is no such thing as an arbitrary claim.

If I claim that there are green gremlins on Mars, then there is certainly ample evidence pointing away from this claim: Mars has no atmosphere to support life, has no water to support life, etc. My claim certainly contradicts everything that is thus far known about reality. Bingo, my claim is no longer arbitrary, it is false.

The idea that any claim that contradicts reality is not arbitrary but false essentially means that any arbitrary claim is not arbitrary but false. In essence, what you are saying is that there is no such thing as an arbitrary claim.

Interestingly, I was going to ask you if you think there is such a thing as a false claim. Here is how I understand true, false and arbitrary – I want to know if you disagree with any part of this:

Truth is a relationship between a proposition and fact, i.e. the recognition of reality. If the product of your cognition (as a proposition) corresponds to reality, it is true. If the mental content does not correspond and contradicts reality – it inversely corresponds – it is false. An arbitrary claim has no relationship to evidence and thus to man’s means of acquiring knowledge.

I surmise that you reject my position that a claim contradicting reality is false (that is how I understand “The idea that any claim that contradicts reality is not arbitrary but false essentially means that any arbitrary claim is not arbitrary but false”, followed by the conclusion that this would mean that there is no such thing as an arbitrary claim).

If there is no evidence, the claim is arbitrary and the claim cannot be processed. If there is evidence, the claim can be cognitively processed, and it is either true or false: if the proposition describes a fact, it is true; if it anti-describes a fact (contradicts reality) it is false.

If I claim that there are green gremlins on Mars, then there is certainly ample evidence pointing away from this claim: Mars has no atmosphere to support life, has no water to support life, etc.

I will admit that I’m not sure about why Peikoff used the Hegel-studying Venusian gremlin convention example, and maybe I should stop using that one. If you’d like to substitute Mars, I don’t think it matters. An arbitrary claim can be made non-arbitrary by adding evidence: being “arbitrary” is not a permanent state, where once someone advances an arbitrary claim, the claim – even if it actually described a fact – is forever doomed to be arbitrary. You’ve contributed evidence, and that evidence shows that the claim is in fact false. That was a nice contribution, but by no means required since nobody here is seriously giving a second’s worth of consideration to the gremlin claim. I don’t think that Peikoff is saying that it is wrong to contribute evidence bearing on an arbitrary claim, just that one has no intellectual obligation to even consider such a claim that has no evidence.

Interestingly, I was going to ask you if you think there is such a thing as a false claim. Here is how I understand true, false and arbitrary – I want to know if you disagree with any part of this:

Truth is a relationship between a proposition and fact, i.e. the recognition of reality. If the product of your cognition (as a proposition) corresponds to reality, it is true. If the mental content does not correspond and contradicts reality – it inversely corresponds – it is false. An arbitrary claim has no relationship to evidence and thus to man’s means of acquiring knowledge.

I surmise that you reject my position that a claim contradicting reality is false (that is how I understand “The idea that any claim that contradicts reality is not arbitrary but false essentially means that any arbitrary claim is not arbitrary but false”, followed by the conclusion that this would mean that there is no such thing as an arbitrary claim).

If there is no evidence, the claim is arbitrary and the claim cannot be processed. If there is evidence, the claim can be cognitively processed, and it is either true or false: if the proposition describes a fact, it is true; if it anti-describes a fact (contradicts reality) it is false.I will admit that I’m not sure about why Peikoff used the Hegel-studying Venusian gremlin convention example, and maybe I should stop using that one. If you’d like to substitute Mars, I don’t think it matters. An arbitrary claim can be made non-arbitrary by adding evidence: being “arbitrary” is not a permanent state, where once someone advances an arbitrary claim, the claim – even if it actually described a fact – is forever doomed to be arbitrary. You’ve contributed evidence, and that evidence shows that the claim is in fact false. That was a nice contribution, but by no means required since nobody here is seriously giving a second’s worth of consideration to the gremlin claim. I don’t think that Peikoff is saying that it is wrong to contribute evidence bearing on an arbitrary claim, just that one has no intellectual obligation to even consider such a claim that has no evidence.

I understood you to mean that an arbitrary claim contradicts reality. Is this true? If this is so, then I reject this position since an arbitrary claim has no relationship to reality whatsoever–contradictory or otherwise. When someone utters an arbitrary claim, nothing was said, there is nothing to contradict, nothing means nothing, leads to nothing and nothing cannot be posited in any way such that it corresponds to or contradicts anything.

I understood you to mean that an arbitrary claim contradicts reality.

Where did you come to understand that? Clearly, he did not say any such thing.

Truth is a relationship between a proposition and fact, i.e. the recognition of reality. If the product of your cognition (as a proposition) corresponds to reality, it is true. If the mental content does not correspond and contradicts reality – it inversely corresponds – it is false. An arbitrary claim has no relationship to evidence and thus to man’s means of acquiring knowledge.

Where did you come to understand that? Clearly, he did not say any such thing.

If so, I will clarify my position further. Any claim for which there is no sensory-perceptual experience is arbitrary.

Since there is no sensory-perceptual experience for the existence of god, any claim for the existence of god is arbitrary.

If so, I will clarify my position further. Any claim for which there is no sensory-perceptual experience is arbitrary.

Since there is no sensory-perceptual experience for the existence of god, any claim for the existence of god is arbitrary.

Again (and it seems we are going in circles here), the claim of “God” is not just arbitrary, but false, since it is in blatant defiance of all sorts of evidence.

Again (and it seems we are going in circles here), the claim of “God” is not just arbitrary, but false, since it is in blatant defiance of all sorts of evidence.

So we are agreed then, that a claim that has no sensory-perceptual experience is arbitrary?

So we are agreed then, that a claim that has no sensory-perceptual experience is arbitrary?

I’d replace “sensory-perceptual experience” with “evidence,” as the former is too empiricist-limited. Obviously, everything is based, in the end, on the evidence of the senses.

I’d replace “sensory-perceptual experience” with “evidence,” as the former is too empiricist-limited. Obviously, everything is based, in the end, on the evidence of the senses.

Ok, so we are agreed then, that any claim without sensory-perceptual evidence is arbitrary?

Ok, so we are agreed then, that any claim without sensory-perceptual evidence is arbitrary?

If there is no evidence, either for or against it, then it is arbitrary, yes.

If there is no evidence, either for or against it, then it is arbitrary, yes.

Then is it so that the distinction between the arbitrary and false is that the former has no evidence whatsoever in sensory-perceptual evidence while the later has at least some possibility in sensory-perceptual evidence?