What I am getting at is that if it is good that each person be self-interested, it would be ideally moral to uphold others’ right to other lawful self-interest, within reason, for reasons that do not revolve around our own benefit. The reason for this would be very abstract, but would revolve around the idea of making an ethical principle universally realized.
This reasoning strikes me as more Kantian than Randian. Kant was very big on the notion that moral actions had to be based on maxims that could be universalized. That’s not Rand’s argument. She argues that each individual should pursue his own self-interest, and that in fact it is in the self-interest of each agent to also encourage others to pursue their own self-interest as well.
The key point here, which I think has not yet been mentioned in this discussion, is something Objectivists call the “harmony of interests”. The claim here is that the rational self-interests of different people do not conflict with each other, which means it is possible for everybody to pursue their interests without harming others. Rejection of this principle is a powerful driver towards viewing ethics as requiring altruism. If my pursuit of my interests necessarily harms other people, and other people pursuing their interests necessarily harms me, then ethics turns into a system for balancing the pursuit of interest across society, so that everybody gets some values while minimizing overall harm. Such a conception of morality is necessarily social (because its purpose is to solve a problem that would not arise apart from other people) and altruistic (because its guidance is to tell people not to pursue their self-interest because it allegedly harms others).
Typically, objections to the harmony of interests principle are rooted in misconceptions about what actually is in a person’s self-interest.
If in another sense, it is our good that we be self-interested, it is our duty to uphold our own desires.
And this is one of those misconceptions. Our self-interest is not defined by our desires. Sometimes satisfying a desire is bad for us. I may desire to stay up late watching “Alias” on DVD, when it would really be in my self-interest to go to bed and get a good night’s sleep in preparation for a major presentation at work the following day. I may desire to get drunk to mask my pain at a disintegrating romantic relationship, when it would really be in my self-interest to go to marriage counseling. And does anybody ever desire to go to the dentist, even though having healthy teeth is clearly in their self-interest? Such examples can be multiplied endlessly.
It is obvious that people have conflicting desires. But desires are not the proper standard for measuring interest.
The principle that it can never be of self-interested personal net benefit to murder a person who has not wronged you is demonstrably false. I am not making an argument, but I am saying, surely neither you nor Rand mean this, do you?
Yes, Rand (and I, and I expect the other Objectivists in this thread) really are making that claim. Murdering the innocent is never in your self-interest.
If that’s demonstrably false, then demonstrate it.
It would be very silly for a philosophy to make demonstrably false claims that are effectively falsified by the real world. I am not saying it is smart to kill people willy-nilly, but one in a thousand people might rationally receive benefit from killing someone who did not wrong them. So the principle is very important.
It is possible post-facto for an immoral action to have limited destructive consequences, though luck or coincidence. But to take such instances as demonstrating that a policy of taking immoral actions is justifiable does not follow. Suppose that you jump off a building and, instead of breaking your leg, you land in a passing truck filled with hay and thus sustain no injury. Does that mean that jumping off the building was a good idea, or does it just mean that you got lucky? Morality doesn’t provide guidance after the fact, it provides guidance prior to acting.
In effect, you are proposing to replace the moral principle “Don’t kill the innocent” with the pseudo-principle “Don’t kill the innocent unless you can get away with it.” The latter, though, is not actually a principle at all. The guidance it provides would lead anyone who accepted it to be constantly on the lookout for cases where he could kill and get away with it. What would such an outlook do to the other aspects of that person’s life? He would view people not as potential values, but as potential prey. This would severely restrict his ability to build fruitful relationships with those other people. It would hamper his ability to engage in long-term planning (because that once-in-a-lifetime chance to kill and benefit could crop up at any time). Etc. That’s not a good strategy for survival and flourishing.
I can create a situation and demonstrably show you that murdering another person can be to ones rational self-interest if all they care about is their own happiness.
No, I really don’t think you can. It only looks to you like you can because you’re ignoring the consequences to a person’s life of abandoning principle in favor of perceived short-term gains.
If your flat response to the question “Would you hypothetically kill someone innocent if, by extraordinary circumstances, you were positive it were to your net benefit” were “yes” I am not sure what to say. It still seems reasonable for me to ask you to answer a hypothetical question, though, even if you are convinced such a situation can never occur.
I disagree with the premise of the question. Killing the innocent is not in one’s self-interest. We can debate the premise, but I see no point in pretending to accept a premise I think is false, just to debate what would follow. That would be like discussing what would happen if 2 + 2 equalled 5. What would be the point, given that 2 + 2 is not in fact 5, but 4?
At the same time, I do not think Rand would have answered “Yes” to this question and I do not think she would have been lying. I guess I could be mistaken, and truthfully, that would be disturbing.
You are correct. Rand’s view was quite clear; she did not think that it was possible to benefit by killing the innocent (or, more generally, by violating valid moral principles in contexts where they applied).