Subjective vs Objective Theory of Value

Economics
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That’s not the correct definition of subjectivism.

I agree it is not a definition of subjectiv ism , it is instead as I intended a definition of subjective. I can cite a dictionary in support : “adjective 1 : of, relating to, or constituting a subject.”

But something more must be considered. What is the goal of such action? By what standard and purpose do you evaluate the action as aiming toward a value? Why does one make an evaluation in the first place? Why does one need the value? If I eat poison, nothing more must be considered to identify that the poison is a value to me? If I need to graduate a university in order to get a good job, but I spend the night before finals getting drunk, nothing more must be considered to identify that alcohol is a value to me? If “merely acting is necessary and sufficient to identify values” then everything is a value in relation to action, thus invalidating the need for the concept: there is nothing to distinguish one action from another. Are there no disvalues?

That is a very fine refutation of subjectivism, but you do not see yet that subjective and subjectivism are two different things. Your eloquent damnation of subjectivism in no way propagates over to the adjective subjective to damn it by association. It is plain equivocation to maintain that it does, because subjective is not a theory of value while subjectivism is.

A legitimate point of confusion is the question of what word to use to refer to a value justified by the subjectivist theory of value. It is straightforward but confusing to call such values ‘subjective values’. To avoid confusion it would be better to name them ‘subjectivist values’, which makes plain their origin, their cause. The long standing, critically useful plain meaning of ‘subjective’ as relative to a subject must be preserved.

This dispute over distinguishing subjective from subjectivist goes straight to heart of the topic of the thread, so we are on topic and not digressing at all.

Now you may be considering a reply argument using a reductio ad absurdum, that by my way of figuring we should stop saying ‘objective value’ and say ‘objectivist value’. My answer to that is it would not be absurd to do so.

From the same dictionary, the corresponding sense of the definition of objective is “1 b : of, relating to, or being an object, phenomenon, or condition in the realm of sensible experience independent of individual thought and perceptible by all observers”. The naive application of the the word ‘objective’ to a theory of value as was done in the formation of the word ‘subjectivism’ would result in intrinsicism, which is exactly what a lot of people do. Combatting that mistake was point of my post Objectivity in Truth and the Good.

Heaven is not a subjective value, it is an intrinsic value.

Heaven is a value held by an intrinsicist. Heaven does not exist in reality which makes it a subjectivist value. I like how use of the -ist word form clears things up.

Emotions are subconscious evaluations based upon one premises and values.

Yeah ok, but are they also subjective? Are they personal? I hope you see where I’m going here: that there is an inescapable need for the idea of a subject and the adjectival form subjective.

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That’s not the correct definition of subjectivism.

I agree it is not a definition of subjectiv ism , it is instead as I intended a definition of subjective. I can cite a dictionary in support : “adjective 1 : of, relating to, or constituting a subject.”

A definition of the concept for grammar is not a philosophic definition. The philosophic use of the concept “subjective” is derived from the concept of subjectivism. I’m not sure how you divorce the two. Dictionaries are not always the best places for all contextual definitions. Your claim that the adjective form of the ethical concept is not related to the metaphysical or epistemological noun form of the concept is context dropping.

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A definition of the concept for grammar is not a philosophic definition. The philosophic use of the concept “subjective” is derived from the concept of subjectivism. I’m not sure how you divorce the two. Dictionaries are not always the best places for all contextual definitions. Your claim that the adjective form of the ethical concept is not related to the metaphysical or epistemological noun form of the concept is context dropping.

There are two contexts, you are the one denying the second context. edit: And both contexts are used philosophically.

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A legitimate point of confusion is the question of what word to use to refer to a value justified by the subjectivist theory of value. It is straightforward but confusing to call such values ‘subjective values’. To avoid confusion it would be better to name them ‘subjectivist values’, which makes plain their origin, their cause. The long standing, critically useful plain meaning of ‘subjective’ as relative to a subject must be preserved.

This dispute over distinguishing subjective from subjectivist goes straight to heart of the topic of the thread, so we are on topic and not digressing at all.

I disagree. “Subjectivist” is most frequently a noun that refers to a individual: he is a subjectivist. “Subjective” is an adjective form of the subjectivism. I use the term in that context. And if you study Objectivism, I think you will find the terms used in that context. In some cases, “subjectivist” is used as an adjective but I think it an example of using a noun as an adjective. In the Objectivist literature, it is rarely used in such a manner. For example, “subjectivist theory” is not used in OPAR and only 8 times throughout Ayn Rand’s writings (courtesy searching The Objectivism Research CD ROM). According the AR Lexicon, “The subjective means the arbitrary, the irrational, the blindly emotional.”

I have no problem using the term “subjective” in different contexts, but you cannot stretch one context to cover the other. You cannot assert that all values are subjective simply because the subject is involved in valuing. That a subject is involved says nothing about the process of derivation or creation. To say that the subject is involved in values is to identify a basic fact; to say that all values are therefore subjective is to form an over-generalization. One could equally say an object is involved in all values and therefore, all values are objective. But such a usage would be meaningless.

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There are two contexts, you are the one denying the second context. edit: And both contexts are used philosophically.

In which philosophy?

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To say that the subject is involved in values is to identify a basic fact; to say that all values are therefore subjective is to form an over-generalization.

It is only an over-generalization if you accept that subjective is a synonym for arbitrary. Rand is certainly consistent in that usage, but that is jargon idiosyncratic to her and the context of Objectivism. The ordinary sense of subjective means personal as in agent-relative and most literally subject-relative. You don’t have to go far for ordinary use counter-examples to Rand because Carl Menger used the term subjective in the ordinary sense as mentioned in this very thread.

One could equally say an object is involved in all values and therefore, all values are objective. But such a usage would be meaningless.

I already covered this, it wouldn’t be meaningless it would be a variety of intrinsicism because value would be objective in the sense of object-relative.

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It is only an over-generalization if you accept that subjective is a synonym for arbitrary. Rand is certainly consistent in that usage, but that is jargon idiosyncratic to her and the context of Objectivism. The ordinary sense of subjective means personal as in agent-relative and most literally subject-relative. You don’t have to go far for ordinary use counter-examples to Rand because Carl Menger used the term subjective in the ordinary sense as mentioned in this very thread.

I already covered this, it wouldn’t be meaningless it would be a variety of intrinsicism because value would be objective in the sense of object-relative.

The name of this Forum is “Objectivism Online,” subtitled, “Reality, Reason, Rights,” so forgive me if I assume that should be the context for discussion here. If it is not, then feel free to use words however you’d like.

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The name of this Forum is “Objectivism Online,” subtitled, “Reality, Reason, Rights,” so forgive me if I assume that should be the context for discussion here. If it is not, then feel free to use words however you’d like.

Well lets see if that context, and particularly the equating of ‘subjective’ with ‘arbitrary’, is adequate to account for all the relevant phenomena.

Emotions are subconscious evaluations based upon one premises and values.

Are emotions also subjective in the sense of arbitrary? Are they subjective in the sense of personal?

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Well lets see if that context, and particularly the equating of ‘subjective’ with ‘arbitrary’, is adequate to account for all the relevant phenomena.

Are emotions also subjective in the sense of arbitrary? Are they subjective in the sense of personal?

Are you familiar with Objectivist theories on these issues? Have you read Peikoff’s book, Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand?

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Are you familiar with Objectivist theories on these issues? Have you read Peikoff’s book, Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand?

Quite. How do you answer the questions: Are emotions also subjective in the sense of arbitrary? Are they subjective in the sense of personal?

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Quite. How do you answer the questions: Are emotions also subjective in the sense of arbitrary? Are they subjective in the sense of personal?

Some emotions may be classified or described as arbitrary, some may be subjective. But it is not an exact description. They are certainly personal in any case: only an individual person can experience the specific emotion. The emotion, as such, is neither arbitrary nor subjective. An emotion is a physiological response to a psychological estimate of reality based upon one’s values, either conscious or subconscious. For example, if I see a lion running at me, I feel fear and run away. Also, I may be sitting reading a book, and I suddenly feel fear that the room is closing in on me. The first case, the emotion has a basis in reality; in the second, there isn’t. If I want the unearned, I feel that higher taxes on the wealthy is appropriate and right so that I can get health care.

The aspect of the emotion that may be properly classified as arbitrary or subjective is the evaluation involved in the emotion. It is arbitrary when there is no evidence for the evaluation; it is subjective when the evaluation is based upon the contents of one’s consciousness with no reference to reality, such as another emotion, desire, whim (“because I feel like it”), context dropping, etc.

If one doesn’t know why one is experiencing an emotion and one makes no attempt to identify the reasons behind it, the emotion may be classified as arbitrary in that context. If one feels like going to get drunk before a test because one feels more comfortable being with friends because it takes less effort and thought, then the evaluation (the “emotion”) is subjective. If one evaluates work as a requirement for living a productive life and one feels enjoyment going to the office in the morning, the evaluation is objective. Ultimately, a subjective “emotion” is arbitrary: if one attempts to find out what aspect of reality gives rise to the emotion, there is no basis for performing the evaluation. From the example just mentioned, if one values getting good grades because it leads to a degree and a good job, wanting to get drunk before a test, for whatever reason, has no basis in reality within the objective context. Thus it is an arbitrary evaluation.

One cannot simply refer to a person as a subject and conclude that every experience is subjective. You have suggested that “subjective” is an adjective form of “subject”. But philosophically, that is not the case. “Subjective” is an adjective form of “subjectivity” or “subjectivism.”

To equate the subject with the subjective is an error. Why does Von Mises claim that values or ends are subjective? “They [economists] are fully aware of the fact that the ultimate ends of human action are not open to examination from any absolute standard. Ultimate ends are ultimately given, they are purely subjective, they differ with various people and with the same people at various moments in their lives.” (P 95 in Human Action). This is NOT a statement that subjective is simply associated with the subject. Granted that Von Mises does not integrate the philosophic meaning of subjectivism into his economics. And he typically means that the subjective is the personal. This is a wrong reason for making the statement that values are subjective. Values are objective, as Rand has shown.

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The Lexicon says, “The subjective means the arbitrary, the irrational, the blindly emotional.” You claim an emotion, as such, is neither arbitrary nor subjective but a causal physiological response. The two senses of the word emotion come form two contexts: emotion is arbitrary and subjective epistemologically while metaphysically emotion is a fact within a causal universe and cannot be arbitrary in the sense of uncaused. The epistemological sense you have equated with the philosophical sense, and deprecated the factual, psychological sense. This is Rand’s usage and it certainly prevents equivocation and promotes clarity of expression when a word is used with only one meaning. But facts don’t go away when ignored and the factual, psychological sense of the meaning of emotion persists.

In fact Rand did not ignore the causal nature of emotions. The Lexicon also produces this line from Galt’s speech: “There can be no causeless love or any sort of causeless emotion. An emotion is a response to a fact of reality, an estimate dictated by your standards.” Rand can distinguish between contexts where emotions are arbitrary and where emotions are not arbitrary.

When entire philosophical systems continue to equivocate by equating the personal facts of emotion with epistemological arbitrariness that is a philosophical problem. Exposing the equivocation is enough to refute it, there is no need to eradicate one of the uses of a word and this case there is no justification or possibility of accomplishing an eradication of a fact.

This same pattern of equivocating two senses of meaning applies to the word subjective. There is a philosophic and a common sense of subjective, or as I have identified it an epistemological and metaphysical meaning. People are in fact equivocating subjective as personal and subjective as arbitrary whenever the assertion is made that a personal interest is arbitrary and therefore epistemologically and morally corrupting. This is the essence of Kant’s deontological ethics, a very philosophical issue.

edit: deleted unnecessary requote

edit: added last line about Kant’s ethics

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The Lexicon says, “The subjective means the arbitrary, the irrational, the blindly emotional.” You claim an emotion, as such, is neither arbitrary nor subjective but a causal physiological response. The two senses of the word emotion come form two contexts: emotion is arbitrary and subjective epistemologically while metaphysically emotion is a fact within a causal universe and cannot be arbitrary in the sense of uncaused.

I don’t see where you’re getting these two senses of the word. Where is it cited that emotions have these differences in epistemology and metaphysics? To be “blindly emotional” simply means that one has not thought about where one’s emotions are coming from or one has failed to identify one’s emotions, and yet one acts on one’s emotions without regard to consequences. The arbitrary is an epistemological issue, so I don’t follow what connection you are making to causality with respect to emotions and metaphysics.

The epistemological sense you have equated with the philosophical sense, and deprecated the factual, psychological sense. This is Rand’s usage and it certainly prevents equivocation and promotes clarity of expression when a word is used with only one meaning. But facts don’t go away when ignored and the factual, psychological sense of the meaning of emotion persists.

You have not cited facts that I have ignored. I have not ignored the psychological sense of the term. I have stated that emotion may be called subjective when the evaluation is subjective, that is, unconnected to the facts of reality by an process of identification. It is because the evaluation typically does not occur on a conscious level and the emotion is experienced almost instantaneously that provides the basis for calling an emotion subjective. However, it is not the emotion that is really subjective since it only follows from some evaluation, whether conscious or subconscious.

In fact Rand did not ignore the causal nature of emotions. The Lexicon also produces this line from Galt’s speech: “There can be no causeless love or any sort of causeless emotion. An emotion is a response to a fact of reality, an estimate dictated by your standards.” Rand can distinguish between contexts where emotions are arbitrary and where emotions are not arbitrary.

When entire philosophical systems continue to equivocate by equating the personal facts of emotion with epistemological arbitrariness that is a philosophical problem. Exposing the equivocation is enough to refute it, there is no need to eradicate one of the uses of a word and this case there is no justification or possibility of accomplishing an eradication of a fact.

This same pattern of equivocating two senses of meaning applies to the word subjective. There is a philosophic and a common sense of subjective, or as I have identified it an epistemological and metaphysical meaning. People are in fact equivocating subjective as personal and subjective as arbitrary whenever the assertion is made that a personal interest is arbitrary and therefore epistemologically and morally corrupting. This is the essence of Kant’s deontological ethics, a very philosophical issue.

edit: deleted unnecessary requote

edit: added last line about Kant’s ethics

I’m don’t understand what point you are making here. Which facts have been ignored? Equivocation (changing the meaning of a concept within a context) is being made on which concept? Which “common sense” usage of subjective have you demonstrated? By giving a dictionary definition and then using the term in a philosophic context, it seems to me that you are the one equivocating on the term’s usage. It was Kant who made the objective a species of the subjective, and I reject using the concept in that context.

Show me a common sense context (outside of grammar) where subjective means “of, relating to, or constituting a subject” and there is no philosophic implications relating to subjectivity or subjectivism - the subject creates the conditions of existence apart from external reality.

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Sorry for the choppiness, but you asked many questions.

I don’t see where you’re getting these two senses of the word.

I don’t see how anyone could be so obtuse, the two senses come from the first paragraph of your previous post. More specifically, you cited the Lexicon entry for subjectivism, I contributed the line on emotions. How is it possible emotions both are and are not arbitrary? There are two contexts and two senses of the word emotion.

… I don’t follow what connection you are making to causality with respect to emotions and metaphysics.

There is no connection, asserting that there is one is the error. The error of equivocation. You apparently think an excellent method to avoid the error of equivocation is to obliterate one of the meanings of a troublesome word. If a second sense truly is invalid then you are correct, but some words have multiple valid meanings and contexts in which case you are incorrect.

It is because the evaluation typically does not occur on a conscious level and the emotion is experienced almost instantaneously that provides the basis for calling an emotion subjective. However, it is not the emotion that is really subjective since it only follows from some evaluation, whether conscious or subconscious.

No, that is completely true but irrelevant to how emotions can be understood as arbitrary or subjective in the epistemological sense. The basis for calling an emotion arbitrary is that relying upon an emotion as guide to the truth about the external world is invalid procedure, emotions tell one nothing about the world. Emotions do not pertain to the world or the objects in it, they inform one about one’s own premises and evaluations, they pertain to the subject, they are subjective in the factual, metaphysical sense. Emotions are not intrinsic to objects, nor are they relations to objects as perceptual forms are. Emotions inhere in subjects, they are subjective.

Equivocation (changing the meaning of a concept within a context) is being made on which concept?

I am at loss as to how I could possibly be more clear. The fault is with your understanding: equivocation is changing the meaning of a word within a sentence or a syllogism, not a concept. Equivocation substitutes one concept for another by means of a single word that has multiple meanings, whether those meanings are valid or invalid.

Which “common sense” usage of subjective have you demonstrated?

That there are such things as subjects, that it makes sense to write about subjects and their attributes, their subjective attributes.

By giving a dictionary definition and then using the term in a philosophic context, it seems to me that you are the one equivocating on the term’s usage. It was Kant who made the objective a species of the subjective, and I reject using the concept in that context.

I am rejecting Kant’s equivocation without taking the absurd measure of denying there are such things as subjects.

Show me a common sense context (outside of grammar) where subjective means “of, relating to, or constituting a subject” and there is no philosophic implications relating to subjectivity or subjectivism - the subject creates the conditions of existence apart from external reality.

That is exactly what this whole foray into emotions is about, I’m sticking with that context.

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Sorry for the choppiness, but you asked many questions.

I don’t see how anyone could be so obtuse, the two senses come from the first paragraph of your previous post. More specifically, you cited the Lexicon entry for subjectivism, I contributed the line on emotions. How is it possible emotions both are and are not arbitrary? There are two contexts and two senses of the word emotion.

Obtuse or not, please cite where I made those implications you claim I did.

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No, that is completely true but irrelevant to how emotions can be understood as arbitrary or subjective in the epistemological sense. The basis for calling an emotion arbitrary is that relying upon an emotion as guide to the truth about the external world is invalid procedure, emotions tell one nothing about the world. Emotions do not pertain to the world or the objects in it, they inform one about one’s own premises and evaluations, they pertain to the subject, they are subjective in the factual, metaphysical sense. Emotions are not intrinsic to objects, nor are they relations to objects as perceptual forms are. Emotions inhere in subjects, they are subjective.

If "emotions do not pertain to the world or the objects in it, then how do you know you are experiencing one? And then how would you know about what it is you are experiencing? How would you differentiate an emotion from another conscious experience? Please tell me exactly what human activity does not “pertain to the subject.” Reason, evaluation, thought, value, virtue, desire, wants, needs, goals, purpose, rationality, knowledge, premises, etc. None of these are “relations to objects as perceptual forms are.” Are not “premises and evaluation” in reality? And if emotions tell us something about them, they tell us something about reality. If a lion charges at me, does not my fear tell me something about the danger of the lion to my values, as I evaluate it? If “emotions tell one nothing about the world” why would I feel fear after my evaluation? Would I not just run away after my evaluation and feel nothing? That emotions are experienced by subjects and not objects does not make them subjective any more than breathing is subjective because a rock does not have lungs.

Your last three sentences clearly indicate your Kantian leanings and premises. If something is not “out there” then it is “in here” and thus subjective. That you continue to use a dictionary definition in place of the philosophic meaning of the concept indicates who is doing the equivocating. That something is “in here” does not make it subjective any more than if something is “out there” makes it objective. If something is automatic, as perception is, then it is not subjective according to you; if a property of the subject is involved, such as experience, then it is subjective. The issue of subjective vs. objective pertains to the issue of one’s method of acquiring knowledge and validating it.

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That there are such things as subjects, that it makes sense to write about subjects and their attributes, their subjective attributes.

Not when the concept already has a clearly defined philosophic meaning that has been around since the time of Plato, and there is an alternative concept - personal. Using the term as you suggest merely obfuscates matters.

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Obtuse or not, please cite where I made those implications you claim I did.

Sure:

Some emotions may be classified or described as arbitrary, some may be subjective. But it is not an exact description. They are certainly personal in any case: only an individual person can experience the specific emotion. The emotion, as such, is neither arbitrary nor subjective. An emotion is a physiological response to a psychological estimate of reality based upon one’s values, either conscious or subconscious. For example, if I see a lion running at me, I feel fear and run away. Also, I may be sitting reading a book, and I suddenly feel fear that the room is closing in on me. The first case, the emotion has a basis in reality; in the second, there isn’t. If I want the unearned, I feel that higher taxes on the wealthy is appropriate and right so that I can get health care.

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If "emotions do not pertain to the world or the objects in it, then how do you know you are experiencing one? And then how would you know about what it is you are experiencing? How would you differentiate an emotion from another conscious experience? Please tell me exactly what human activity does not “pertain to the subject.” Reason, evaluation, thought, value, virtue, desire, wants, needs, goals, purpose, rationality, knowledge, premises, etc. None of these are “relations to objects as perceptual forms are.” Are not “premises and evaluation” in reality? And if emotions tell us something about them, they tell us something about reality. If a lion charges at me, does not my fear tell me something about the danger of the lion to my values, as I evaluate it? If “emotions tell one nothing about the world” why would I feel fear after my evaluation? Would I not just run away after my evaluation and feel nothing? That emotions are experienced by subjects and not objects does not make them subjective any more than breathing is subjective because a rock does not have lungs.

Assuming that our emotions tell us something about reality is the paradigmatic operating method of the primacy of consciousness perspective, i.e. mysticism. Fear tells you nothing except that you are afraid. Your conscious evaluation about the danger of lions is what causes your subconscious automatization of that evaluation and the subsequent emotion. If you later think you are in danger from a lion merely because you feel it, then the circular argument is complete. If your conscious evaluation is corrupted and wrong then the emotion will be as well, you may or not actually be in danger when you feel fear.

Consciousness is an existent and the law of identity applies to it, thus premises and evaluations are in reality. But they are not of the same epistemological status as that reality, they are derivative from it in a manner that may or may not preserve a basis in necessity. A process of reason will preserve that basis in necessity while an appeal to emotion will not.

Emotions can never be objective, they are either properly regarded as facts of consciousness or they are arbitrary interlopers that corrupt a process of thought. As facts of consciousness emotions are always experienced internally, subjectively. As epistemological corruption, they are always subjective. Emotions are subjective, in all ways.

Your last three sentences clearly indicate your Kantian leanings and premises. If something is not “out there” then it is “in here” and thus subjective.

You are accepting and using Kant’s equivocation when you assert that if something is “in here” it must be subjectivism. You try to pretend there is no “in here” at all, that all facts are facts of reality in precisely the same way, including facts of consciousness. But consciousness exists, it is real, there really is an “in here” derivative of reality “out there” and correspondence between the two must be willfully caused to exist by a valid method.

That you continue to use a dictionary definition in place of the philosophic meaning of the concept indicates who is doing the equivocating.

“In place of”? No, there are two contexts and two meanings where subjective can be used and I have no trouble keeping the two separated. Etymological monism is impractical in principle and contrary to fact.

That something is “in here” does not make it subjective any more than if something is “out there” makes it objective.

I agree with this, the mere locality is not decisive. Some things are always subjective, such as emotions. Other things are only conditionally subjective, they may be objective if grounded in a basis of necessity by means of perception and reason. Subjectivity is the result of the failure to be objective in method, but both occur “in here”.

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For brevity’s sake, I will simply say that I think a lot more progress could be made in this discourse (and quite possibly many more), if a general effort were made to replace the use of the word “subjective” with “agent-relative”, in the appropriate contexts (props to Eiuol).