It is pretty much universally accepted amongst respected economists across the political spectrum, from Milton Friedman to Keynes, that leaving the gold standard helped America’s recovery.
It is true that the Monetarists are also bad on the theory of fighting depressions, like their Keynesian brethren. They want monetary stimulus, while the Keynesians want fiscal stimulus. It is a mistake to think of the Monetarists and Keynesians as spanning a large spectrum of economics. They typically do span the political spectrum, but not the Economics one. In basic (“positive”) economics, they’re actually very similar.
I think this shows where you guys are unclear - your first sentence is exactly what a gold standard is defined as.
Not “you guys”. While Lethalmiko does not understand the gold standard, Thomas correctly clarified that the gold-standard implies that gold is money, with a dollar just another name for a particular quantity of gold. I suspect you simply mis-read or misunderstood what Thomas wrote.
Finally, on your graph. As Maarten said, it is pretty weak. It is not just that the upwards trends don’t particularly jump out at one, but also because many other variables were at play. However, there is a more fundamental problem with it: even if the post-gold upturn in GDP did happen, it does not imply that the gold standard is bad. Imagine a patient with a heart-attack, given a powerful drug to get him going again. One would not use this to claim that everyone should take that drug all the time.
To attack the gold standard, one cannot use the example within the depression. Rather, one has to attack it by showing that it did not work well across the centuries (or at least the modern decades of those centuries) when it was in place. You did mention that it causes deflation, etc. Though this is not true, it is the correct way to argue against the gold standard, rather than using the example from the depression.
Essentially. a credit boom is solved either by the passage of time or by the recognition of loss. There are all sorts of structural factors that slow the recognition of losses. The pre WW-1 notion of “liquidate labor and capital” simply meant: force everyone to take the losses as soon as possible. The recession of 1921 is a good example where capital was liquidated really fast, by bankers, and we came out of that little recession without much fuss, and without government stimulus. Going off the gold standard is simply one way to – overnight – force some people in society (especially creditors) to take a loss. To hell with fairness and justice: they’ll take the loss and it’s too bad for them! Still, despite the injustice, once losses are recognized, it does have a positive impact in the medium term. However, in the long run, by setting a precedent by which the government can throw out private contracts, it hands ever more power to government and essentially brings us to where we are today. Keynesians and Monetarists love to look at the credit-booms and recoveries they engineer, but refuse to take responsibility for the busts that come down the line. After all, in the long run, said Keynes, we’re dead.