Weak vs. Strong Emergence

Metaphysics and Epistemology
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“Would it be accurate to say that when carbon atoms are in the necessary arrangement, that the diamond is identical to its constituent arrangement?”

Yes, that’s accurate. The arrangement is a diamond. The arrangement is not equal to the pieces, clearly.

 

What’s the page of that quote? It wouldn’t change my position on emergence, though. Emergence is epistemological by that explanation in the quote still; I just think attributes are also epistemological by that explanation. It’s probably better to say that not all attributes are metaphysical, but some are. I think Rand might mean something specific by attribute. How would density be metaphysical? We’d be talking about Platonism if *all* characteristics are metaphysical. The question is serious - how can density be metaphysical?

122

Regi said:

Yes, abiogenesis is an assumption. Like the universe, many hold as an unjustified given, “life had to start somewhere!”…,

Edit:

Yes, the problem is that a rearrangement of components presupposes that the components were already in an arrangement previously…modus ponens

Edit: it occurred to me to ask what differentiates emergence from the concept of transmutation???

Yes. Whether abiogenesis can happen or not, it is dangerous to assume something as an axiom. It is certainly not self-evident, and there is no other evidence for it.

 

I’m not sure exactly what you are getting at. I’m sure you’re not asking me for the difference in the dictionary definitions. All explanations of “emergence” seem to me, either obvious, “There is no ‘carness’ in the parts of a car,” [so what!] or absurd, “beauty emerges from the organization of oil and pigments on a canvas.” Transmutation means the change of one chemical element into another, originally by alchemy (pseudo-science, so never happened) or by atomic reaction or radioactive decay (and it does happen). I don’t see how one thing being changed into another could be confused with the concept emergence, as useless as I think the concept emergence is. Perhaps some academic genius will propose that new elements “emerge” by the “submergence” of others. I can make up concepts too.

 

Oh dear, now you have me thinking, a very dangerous thing. Perhaps we should develop a whole new theory of ontology in which “emegence” and “submergence” are the metaphysical principles explaining all existence and change. I mean, if new stuff just keeps emerging the universe would jam-packed in no time at all, so there must be submergence to make space for all the new emerging things. No?

 

What do you think?

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All explanations of “emergence” seem to me, either obvious, “There is no ‘carness’ in the parts of a car,” [so what!]

See my post #117. Those questions I asked in response were not rhetorical, I’m actually asking you.

124

Eioul

 

“The question is serious - how can density be metaphysical?”  and similar comments

 

Ignoring the invalidity of the pseudo-concept of “emergence” for a moment:

 

A pile of fine graphite dust, is metaphysically speaking different from the same number of atoms in diamond form.  They have different densities, hardness, resistivity, opacity, clarity etc. and differences in respect of a whole host of other physical properties.  These are real differences in terms of the nature of the substances, both interactive, i.e. having causal consequences in reality with other entities and as can be measured in isolation.

 

Density is a real physical quantity, when for example a liquid freezes locally, the density of the solid determines whether it floats or sinks.  As you know ice floats on water, solid iron however sinks in molten iron.  Whether something floats or not, is not an example of “epistemological consequence” but metaphysical causation.

 

 

Also, to state physical properties are epistemological is to give up the notion of properties being Objective, causally linked both to reality and means of perception. 

 

Of course a property purported to be a “physical property” which really was subjective is not an Objective property, but I believe that removes it from the realm of “physical property”

 

 

All this said, I may have misunderstood what you mean.  If I did, I apologize.

 

Edit:  Actually I cannot understand what “epistemological property” could mean… so I’ve butchered it to mean something like a “subjective property”… which also is unfathomable to me.

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See my post #117. Those questions I asked in response were not rhetorical, I’m actually asking you.

My initial response was serious enough. I’m sorry if you didn’t appreciate the irony. I’ll refrain.

 

I read your post #117 but did not get any clarification of what it is, exactly, you are asking.

 

I did see this:

 

“Metaphysically, there is no emergence, that’s because properties of anything are epistemological - they exist as part of entities and don’t exist on their own.”

 

…and have no idea what it is supposed to mean. If an entity has properties ( inherent ones, like it size, or weight, or color, not extrinsic ones like where one lives, “Athenian,” or what one does for an occupation, “painter”) those properties are metaphysical properties. The entity has those properties whether anyone is aware of them or not. They exist metaphysically as properties of the entity. It is an entities properties that identify it, in fact, an entity is its properties.

 

Strictly speaking, an entity’s properties are not part of the entity, they are the entity. It is true, no properties exist independently of the entities they are the properties of, and they certainly do not exist epistemologically.

 

The properties of an entity may be identified epistemologically, but that identification is only a true one if the entities actually have those properties.

 

I think you might be referring to abstract qualities, like “dogness” or “humaness.” Such concepts do only have epistemological existence because they are not part of the entities they refer to. A dog is a dog because it has all the properties necessary to dogs, and we can, epistimologically refer to all those properties as dogness. We can even say a dog is a dog because it has dogness, because that means it has all the properties that make a dog a dog. But dogness has no metaphysical existence. It is a concept for what we know about a dog’s nature.

 

The same would be true for humaness. This is as close as I can come to making sense of what you said, but that may be just because I’ve misunderstood or misinterpreted something. Please correct me if that is the case. I also am no closer to understanding exactly what you are asking me.

126

A general note on “Emergence”

 

 

Take the following statement:

 

“The composite is greater than the sum of its parts”

 

Now, imagine a rationalist’s take on it, in the context of a complicated machine.  He looks at the parts and decides each in isolation do not amount to the whole, he then considers the notion “sum”.  Because a rationalist does not hold concepts as integrations of concretes and treats all concepts as floating abstractions independent of reality, he imagines each part in an arrangement like an equation separated by a plus sign:  “iron lever with hole” + “axle” + “grease” + …  Perhaps he imagines each part with a little picture, but the “sum” is nothing more than “holding them all in his mind”.  Perhaps this kind of reasoning is subconscious but essentially all he has in his mind are isolated things “piled” together.  That’s his sum.  Clearly the  complicated machine is “more than” this sum of parts.

 

If one considers what the rationalist did, it is true… the machine is greater than the unintegrated holding of a set of isolated parts in an unimaginative mind.

 

The truth is, the statement : “the composite is greater than the sum of its parts” in its most meaningful sense, is false.  The sum of parts is the combination of the parts in reality, in the particular arrangement they find themselves in the composite. It is the axle with grease on it inserted appropriately in the hole of the iron lever… etc.  A meaningless sum of parts held in ones mind is so meaningless as to wonder why such a statement would ever be made.

 

To avoid the misinterpretation of our rationalist, the statement is:

 

“The composite is greater than the complete, correct, composition of the parts of which it comprises”.

 

And this statement… now correctly worded… is simply false.

127

I also am no closer to understanding exactly what you are asking me.

“Can carbon atoms be dense? Can carbon atom arrangements be dense? Is there a concept that already makes this distinction?”

128

If someone would be so kind as to clarify for me:

 

Suppose trajectory X [the motion of a single atom within a wheel] traces a circle as it rolls along (for lack of the technical vocabulary).  Trajectory X is an action, but the capacity to repeat that action under certain circumstances is a property.

Now if we categorize the propensity to follow X as “emergent” from the fact that the atom is part of a wheel, that’s perfectly coherent.

If we omit the emergence then we would be left with “this atom, in isolation, tends to follow trajectory X” which is completely nonsensical.

 

Would anyone care to point out the redundancy there?

129

Don’t remember who brought up the concept of society as an “emergent organism” but the concept of emergence has nothing to do with the error therein; that’s outright reification.

To start with, the denial of one’s own consciousness is the confession of its anti-conceptuality (since it’s a noise which cannot be made with reason or sincerity).  The attribution of consciousness to social interactions is one form of such a confession, but conjoined with an altruistic conscience (since it further reveals the motives behind such mindless noises).

And any reference to some societal super-organism includes them both beneath a tribal premise frosting.

 

Still unsure what the big deal is with “emergence” anyway but I just wanted to point out that whatever it is, it has nothing to do with that foolishness.

130

“Can carbon atoms be dense? Can carbon atom arrangements be dense? Is there a concept that already makes this distinction?”

Well, yes, but you’re not going to like it.

 

First I’ll answer your questions directly.

 

“Can carbon atoms be dense?” Yes. In whatever form carbon atoms are found, there is some level of density.

 

“Can carbon atom arrangements be dense?” Yes. Since there is some density in whatever form they are found, but I assume you are asking if they can be as dense as diamond. Of course, when they are in that particular crystaline form.

 

“Is there a concept that already makes this distinction?” Yes. It is called a proposition, a statement that describes the relationship between two things, such as, “diamonds are a form of carbon.” If we attempt to identify every possible proposition with a concept, that would be an epistemological nightmare. We could have a concept, “carbtodiamond,” that identified the fact that diamonds are carbon in a particular crystaline form, but what would the epistimological value of such a concept be. None. The concept of “emergent” attributes is the same kind of epistemological mistake.

131

“Can carbon atoms be dense?” Yes. In whatever form carbon atoms are found, there is some level of density.

This is where the disagreement is. I would answer “no”, then “yes” to the second. I really don’t understand how a carbon atom can be dense in the same a sense as a diamond is dense. If you answer “yes” to both, then there really is no distinction, so emergence is at best a useless concept. But we disagree on a pretty basic level.

132

This is where the disagreement is. I would answer “no”, then “yes” to the second. I really don’t understand how a carbon atom can be dense in the same a sense as a diamond is dense. If you answer “yes” to both, then there really is no distinction, so emergence is at best a useless concept. But we disagree on a pretty basic level.

But your first question was not if carbon could be dense in “the same sense as a diamond is dense,” it was only if they could be dense. The answer to that is yes. because in any form, carbon has some density.

133

If someone would be so kind as to clarify for me:

 

Suppose trajectory X [the motion of a single atom within a wheel] traces a circle as it rolls along (for lack of the technical vocabulary).  Trajectory X is an action, but the capacity to repeat that action under certain circumstances is a property.

Now if we categorize the propensity to follow X as “emergent” from the fact that the atom is part of a wheel, that’s perfectly coherent.

If we omit the emergence then we would be left with “this atom, in isolation, tends to follow trajectory X” which is completely nonsensical.

 

Would anyone care to point out the redundancy there?

 

The atom is not in isolation.  To talk about it in isolation when in fact dealing with it in another context… is well.. context dropping.

134

If someone would be so kind as to clarify for me:

 

Suppose trajectory X [the motion of a single atom within a wheel] traces a circle as it rolls along (for lack of the technical vocabulary).  Trajectory X is an action, but the capacity to repeat that action under certain circumstances is a property.

Now if we categorize the propensity to follow X as “emergent” from the fact that the atom is part of a wheel, that’s perfectly coherent.

If we omit the emergence then we would be left with “this atom, in isolation, tends to follow trajectory X” which is completely nonsensical.

 

Would anyone care to point out the redundancy there?

First, a single atom on a rolling wheel does not trace a circle. If it is rolling on a flat serfice it traces a cycloid, if it is rolling around a circle, it traces an epicycloid, one version of which is the basis of the wankel engine.

 

Second, the trajectory of that which moves is not an action, it is the description of the path the object moves in. There is nothing “emergent” in the fact the parts of a wheel must take specific paths when that wheel is rolling.

135

Eioul:

 

Any comments on the errors of our rationalist… ?

 

Just curious.

136

The atom is not in isolation.  To talk about it in isolation when in fact dealing with it in another context… is well.. context dropping.

Yes, exactly! I’m ashamed I did not notice that. Bravo!

137

But I’m not referring to two different atoms; I’m referring to a single atom, which is contained within a wheel of other atoms, as considered in isolation.

This is the same conceptual isolation involved in any discussion of a single species’ evolution (since any species’ adaptations are deeply entwined with its neighbors’) or any motion of any atom, for that matter.

 

If it can’t be conceived of apart from the wheel then, since we’re all part of the system we call the universe, nothing can be conceived of point-blank.

138

Eioul:

 

Any comments on the errors of our rationalist… ?

 

Just curious.

139

Things are what they are.  Nothing we can interact with even remotely and indirectly can be in complete isolation or else we would not be able to interact with it.  Everything in our universe which we can know is interactable in some fashion, causally linked in some way, whether in the past or the future.

 

Cosmic rays dislodge your genes, photons hit your eyes, you are literally related by blood to every mammal on this planet, gravity pulls you to rotate about a planet, about a star, about a galaxy about a galactic group… you are by no means completely isolated. 

 

This should not cause you a psycho-epistemological crisis.  Be careful of rationalistic wistfulness. 

 

Things are as they are and we can form concepts. You still have identity, you still are “conceivable”.

 

The truth is when an atom IS momentarily not reacting with anything, it behaves in certain ways when you “prod” it.  When the atom is interacting, bonded, or otherwise in a particular context, it will react in a different way when “prodded”. 

140

But your first question was not if carbon could be dense in “the same sense as a diamond is dense,” it was only if they could be dense. The answer to that is yes. because in any form, carbon has some density.

So are you saying that a dense structure of a diamond is different than a carbon atom is dense? Or are you saying a carbon atom is dense just like a diamond is dense, so diamonds are dense due to carbon atoms being dense? The first is my point. The second makes no sense. I can make it simpler - do carbon atoms have a crystalline structure? Swap “density” with “crystalline structure” to take ambiguity away from my example. If yes, that’s as bizarre as saying carbon atoms have life, and if no, then how is it that a crystalline structure behaves differently than the carbon atom when it is alone? Lest you say “together” and “alone” are different contexts, well, the point is that some properties are only present in one context (combined, perhaps with pressure as for a diamond) but not the other (not combined, no pressure), that is emergence…

 

SL, I’ll get to you tomorrow.