Why Philosophical Statements About the Vacuum are Invalid

I don’t know about 1) but for 2) I think Objectivism makes room for a distinction between entities and existents, so your comment 2) is suspect without further clarification.

 

The “category” existent is for making the secondary derivative status explicit. All secondary existents, categories like attributes, actions and relationships are secondary to _ entity _. They are epistemically secondary because the isolation is mind dependent. They are causally dependent as well… Legs come before walking etc. That doesn’t mean legs “exist more or less” than walking.

 

ITOE said:

 

 

Prof. E: In any process of concept-formation, you have to differentiate certain concretes from the field around you. You and I discussed this once in regard to forming the concept of “existence,” but how does differentiation apply to forming the concept of these metaphysical categories: entity, attribute, action, and relation? What would you differentiate entity from? Would it be that you differentiate entity from attribute, or attribute from action, in order, as an adult, to form such concepts? Do you differentiate one such category from another?

 

AR: Yes, except in one respect. To be exact, you would have to say you learn to differentiate those concepts by differentiating them from the concept “entity.” Because “entity” has to be the basic concept. And then, as you observe that entities move or change or they have certain characteristics, you isolate those attributes or actions from the concept “entity.” So that the concept “entity” serves as the context. But it is basic.

 

Prof. B: In connection with this, would there be any CCD behind attribute, action, relation?

 

AR: Well yes, in regard to everything based on or derived from the concept “entity,” the CCD is that they all pertain to entities.

 

 

 

The confusion here is created because many don’t realize the metaphysical basis for epistemic hierarchy. There is a causal primacy that is not mind dependent.

 

Is the Axiomatic concept entity merely logical or is its status as a metaphysical primary factual? 

 

When Ms. Rand says “abstractions as such do not exist” She is depending on the hearer to understand what a metaphysical primary is. That’s why she relates the “mental entity” discussion to Aristotle and primary substance. Abstraction, like consciousness, is something substantial entities do, not a substance itself. That being said, I think she could have been more clear on this.

 

So relational existents are not causes as such. Its the entities that are relating that are the causes. They are basic.

 

SL reread our statements in this thread with this in mind:

 

http://forum.objectivismonline.com/index.php?showtopic=22062&hl=emergence

 

Relations are not “super entities”. Space is not a “super entity”. Do you agree?

 

 

Why? Because philosophy has nothing to say about anything in the physical world (including a “hole” in it with no matter) except this: whatever the physical world contains, they exist.

 

In other words, if such a “hole” were to exist, it would not contradict, in any way, the (first) axiom of existence of the Objectivist metaphysics.

 

As for the validity of a “hole” in existence being ruled out by philosophy, what can we derive from this quote :

 

Prof. D: “Nothing.”

 

AR: That is strictly a relative concept. It pertains to the absence of some kind of concrete. The concept “nothing” is not possible except in relation to “something.” Therefore, to have the concept “nothing,” you mentally specify—in parenthesis, in effect—the absence of a something, and you conceive of “nothing” only in relation to concretes which no longer exist or which do not exist at present.

 

You can say “I have nothing in my pocket.” That doesn’t mean you have an entity called “nothing” in your pocket. You do not have any of the objects that could conceivably be there, such as handkerchiefs, money, gloves, or whatever. “Nothing” is strictly a concept relative to some existent concretes whose absence you denote in this form.

 

It is very important to grasp that “nothing” cannot be a primary concept. You cannot start with it in the absence of, or prior to, the existence of some object. That is the great trouble with Existentialism, as I discuss in the book [page 60]. There is no such concept as “nothing,” except as a relational concept denoting the absence of some things. The measurements omitted are the measurements of those things.

 

Prof. A: Does the concept of “non-existence” refer only to an absence? Is there no valid concept of sheer non-being, of something that never was and never will be?

 

AR: That’s right. Non-existence as such—particularly in the same generalized sense in which I use the term “existence” in saying “existence exists,” that is, as the widest abstraction without yet specifying any content, or applying to all content—you cannot have the concept “non-existence” in that same fundamental way. In other words, you can’t say: this is something pertaining to the whole universe, to everything I know, and I don’t say what. In other words, without specifying content.

 

You see, the concept of “existence” integrates all of the <ioe2_150> existents that you have perceived, without knowing all their characteristics. Whereas the concept of “non-existence” in that same psycho-epistemological position would be literally a blank. Non-existence—apart from what it is that doesn’t exist—is an impossible concept. It’s a hole—a literal blank, a zero.

 

 

 

 

that pertains to this statement?