On Objectivist Epistemology
The validity of the senses, this is one I can’t get my head around. Rand seems to hold that our perception of reality is objective reality. Is this so? This makes no sense to me, as it seems to suggest physiological infallibility on mans part. What we perceive is not objective reality, since our sensory systems act imperfectly.
Objectivism holds that the claim that our sensory systems act “imperfectly” is not tenable. This can be seen by considering the causal connections that give rise to our perception and how our sense organs interact with outside stimuli. Let’s (very briefly) examine some common objections to see if they hold up.
Most objections to the reliability of our senses stem from instances in which our perception appears to be faulty. A common example put forth of this is the fact that a stick which is partially submerged in water will appear bent. This occurs because light passing through the water is refracted. Although we know the stick is straight, it clearly appears bent. Thus, our perception is imperfect.
These contentions rest on faulty ideas about how information *should* present itself to us. The change in the stick’s appearance is due to real phenomena. The presence of water actually changes what is happening with the light rays. Are we supposed to still see the stick as straight, when the light which is reaching our eyes is different than before? This would be wishing for our knowledge to appear in our minds by magic, independent of causality and reality. In fact, our perceptions are fully and consistently based on reality. This must be true, if causality always holds. The same light stimuli should always produce the same effect. This is ultimately the basis for the reliability of our senses: the axiom of identity. These apparent illusions are still instances of our senses working perfectly; we are simply observing the stick under abnormal conditions. We literally could not continue to perceive the stick as straight, when the light rays coming off of it are bent by water. In fact, the very reason that we can identify this as an “illusion” or as “abnormal” conditions is that we can compare this with our (reliable) perception of the stick when it’s not in water.
Other common objections to the reliability of our senses stem from people’s concerns about dreams, hallucinations, etc giving false information. While it is certainly possible for someone to incorrectly conclude that these are instances of perception, the fact is, these are not perception. They are different phenomena. The unreliability of information “observed” while dreaming does not invalidate one’s waking perceptions.
These issues are discussed extensively in David Kelley’s book The Evidence of the Senses, written in 1986 (although it should be noted that this forum generally holds that none of Kelley’s work after his break with ARI in 1989 is truly in the Objectivist tradition).
On Objectivist Ethics
Objectivism seems to hold that a persons life should be their highest value. I see no reason why a rational person could not hold something else, e.g. their child’s life to be of greater value than their own.
Objectivism holds that the concept of “value” is genetically dependent on the concept of “life.” It is only in relation to life that things can have value. Additionally, my own life is the only end which I can *consistently* pursue. Furthermore, every action I take will have some effect on my life, either furthering it or obstructing it (however minutely). Only my own life can provide a consistent standard against which I can produce a consistent set of values to pursue.
Other people’s lives can become incorporated into my value system according to the value I see in their character (or in their potential, as is the case with children and strangers). It is indeed possible, according to Objectivism, that another person’s happiness and well-being can become so enmeshed within my value structure that it is rational for me to give my life in order to save them (if I truly would prefer this to continuing on without them). Thus, my own life is the basis, the standard for the formation of my values, but those values can be formed in such a way that giving my life is in accordance with pursuing them.
The point is, I cannot use another person’s life as the standard in forming my values. By the very nature of a living organism, it must engage in some self-oriented action. Living a life fully and consistently committed to any other end then one’s own life leads inexorably to death.
On Objectivist Metaphysics
The problem of free will and causality. This is the biggest stumbling block for me, as one who holds no belief in free will. The arguments I have found against this problem have seemed very weak to me. Free will is held to be self evident in Objectivism, but an argument brought for it seems to be that choice and free will are not contradictory to the law of causality, but a part of it, that volition is causality. Seemingly volition is a causa sui?
The Objectivist notion of causality is quite distinct from the common perception of it. Causality is most commonly conceived as the idea that the occurrence of one event inexorably leads to another event. The collision of two billiard balls causes them to bounce off of each other. However, Objectivism recognizes that it is not events themselves that act. Rather, it is the entities involved which act. It is Billiard Ball A which causes a change in the direction of Billiard Ball B, not the collision itself. Events are completely dependent on the acting entities, and causality is based not on events, but on the *identity* of the entities. The effect with the billiard balls is produced by their identities (their masses, densities, hardness, etc), and what happens when two objects with those identities hit one another.
Free will is not compatible with the first conception of causality. If one event inexorably causes another, there is no room for choice. However, the Objectivist notion of causality leaves room for free will. This is because free will is a fundamental characteristic of the identity of human beings. By our nature, we have free will. Because it is part of our nature to be able to choose, causality and free will go hand in hand. A person’s exercise of choice, far from defying causality, is an instance of it. We can observe that free will is part of our natures in the immediate sense only through introspection (reflecting on the workings of your mind easily illustrates that you make choices all the time, and that you could have made different ones). We can infer free will in others through observations of their actions. Once we observe the existence of free will as part of human nature, we know that the exercise of human free will is an instance of a person acting like a person (in accordance with his nature), and thus acting in accordance with causality.