A facade of innocence is convincing for those naive. NATO’s not only a military alliance, it is self-described, “political”. And, subsequently, economic. “Cajoling” more countries to join would naturally happen behind closed doors, and the total benefits it offered new members in three areas had to make it most attractive. Like “a pyramid scheme”, NATO growth was essential to its survival.
The “open door policy” was not ever allowed to Russia, not even when Putin showed ambitions to join. Yet, the previous foe of the Western allies, Germany was admitted in 1955, unified Germany in 1990, while their Russian ally in WW2 was turned down (after the Cold War.).
Why not? Russia inside NATO should bring about greater certainty of a peaceful Eurasia, no? With Communism officially on the decline, it had no ideology to unite and conquer those countries, whose populaces were strongly anti-Russian from previous experience.
Again, why not? Of course: NATO would lose its perennial “enemy”. Therefore, the entire purpose of its existence.
An excerpt from The Journal of Democracy poses the question-begging query, “Why would Putin want to join an alliance allegedly threatening Russia?”
Maybe “acting in good faith”? And why would the JoD consider his intentions suspicious? They even self-contradictorily provide quotations indicating Russia’s intentions toward reconciliation and cooperation.
The facts in such articles, rather than vindicating NATO’s actions, make the obverse case for why NATO had to “keep Russia out” - to maintain its identity and relevance- and by fear-mongering the RF’s presumed future belligerence. NATO’s self-fulfilling prophecy came true, finally. Nothing to be proud about, they missed a golden opportunity for continental stability.
When President Boris Yeltsin agreed to sign the Russia-NATO Founding Act in 1997, Russia and the alliance codified into this agreement a comprehensive agenda of cooperation. At the signing ceremony Yeltsin declared,
What is also very important is that we are creating the mechanisms for consultations and cooperation between Russia and the Alliance. And this will enable us—on a fair, egalitarian basis—to discuss, and when need be, pass joint decisions on major issues relating to security and stabilities, those issues and those areas which touch upon our interests.3
In 2000 while visiting London, Putin, then serving as acting Russian president, even suggested that Russia could join NATO someday:
Why not? Why not . . . I do not rule out such a possibility . . . in the case that Russia’s interests will be reckoned with, if it will be an equal partner. Russia is a part of European culture, and I do not consider my own country in isolation from Europe . . . Therefore, it is with difficulty that I imagine NATO as an enemy.4
Why would Putin want to join an alliance allegedly threatening Russia?
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, U.S. president George W. Bush and Putin forged a close, cooperative relationship to fight a common enemy: terrorism. At the time, Putin was focused on cooperation with NATO, not confrontation. The only time the alliance has ever invoked Article 5 on collective defense was to support a NATO intervention in Afghanistan, an action that Putin supported at the UN Security Council. He then followed up this diplomatic support with concrete military assistance for the alliance, including helping the United States to establish military bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. If NATO was _always _a threat to Russia and its “sphere of influence,” why did Putin facilitate the opening of these bases in the former Soviet Union?
During his November 2001 visit to the United States, Putin struck a realistic but cooperative tone:
We differ in the ways and means we perceive that are suitable for reaching the same objective . . . [But] one can rest assured that whatever final solution is found, it will not threaten . . . the interests of both our countries and of the world.5
In an interview that month, Putin declared,
Russia acknowledges the role of NATO in the world of today, Russia is prepared to expand its cooperation with this organization. And if we change the quality of the relationship, if we change the format of the relationship between Russia and NATO, then I think NATO enlargement will cease to be an issue—will no longer be a relevant issue.6
When NATO announced in 2002 its plan for a major (and last big) wave of expansion that would include three former Soviet republics—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—Putin barely reacted. He certainly did not threaten to invade any of the countries to keep them out of NATO. Asked specifically in late 2001 whether he opposed the Baltic states’ membership in NATO, he stated, “We of course are not in a position to tell people what to do. We cannot forbid people to make certain choices if they want to increase the security of their nations in a particular way.