Abstract concept versus literal concept

Abstract concept versus literal concept

When we throw a stone we develop a mental structure that is the concept of throwing a stone. When we run from a bear we develop a mental structure of the concept of running from a bear. These are literal (experiential, actual) concepts.

What is an abstract concept?

I think that a sentence or a paragraph might be good analogies for abstract concept. Think of words as being literal concepts and think of sentence or paragraph as being an abstract concept. The words are organized by the imagination to develop a sentence or paragraph. The coherence of the sentence or paragraph is dependent upon how well the imagination has formed it. A good sentence, like a good abstract concept, makes sense and will stand up to the empirical test of validity.

Cognitive science, as delineated in “Philosophy in the Flesh” by Lakoff and Johnson, presents a new paradigm for cognitive science. This new paradigm might be called the “conceptual metaphor” paradigm. The theory is that experiences form into concepts and some of these concepts are called “primary metaphors”. These ‘primary metaphors’ are often unconsciously mapped from the originating mental space onto another mental space that is a subjective concept, i.e. abstract concept.

Many years ago, before ‘self-service’, it was common to pull into a gas station and when the attendant came to the car the motorist would say “Fillerup”.

“More is up” is a common metaphor. I think of it every time I pour milk into a measuring cup when baking cornbread. The subjective judgment is quantity, the sensorimotor domain is vertical orientation, and the primary experience is the rise and fall of vertical levels as fluid is added or subtracted and objects are piled on top of or removed from a collection.

We can see (know is see) by this mechanism that we equate vertical motion in the spatial domain with quantity; we use the vertical domain to reason about quantity. We have a vast experience in vertical space domain reasoning and thus we derive this great experience to help us in reasoning about quantity; no doubt a very useful thing when first learning arithmetic. Teachers of mathematics, I suspect, depend upon this storehouse of knowledge to make abstract mathematical reasoning for children more comprehensible.

In a metaphor the source domain, ‘up’, is mapped onto the target domain ‘more’. The neural structure of the sensorimotor domain, the primary metaphor, is mapped onto the subjective domain ‘more’. Reasoning about the vertical motion in the spatial domain is mapped onto reasoning about the quantity domain. This is a one-way movement; reasoning about quantity is not mapped onto spatial domain reasoning. The direction of inference indicates which the source is and which the target domain is.

Physical experiences of all kinds lead to conceptual metaphors from which perhaps hundreds of ‘primary metaphors’, which are neural structures resulting from sensorimotor experiences, are created. These primary metaphors provide the ‘seed bed’ for the judgments and subjective experiences in life. “Conceptual metaphor is pervasive in both thought and language.” It is hard to think of a common subjective experience that is not conventionally conceptualized in terms of metaphor.

When we throw a stone we develop a mental structure that is the concept of throwing a stone. When we run from a bear we develop a mental structure of the concept of running from a bear. These are literal (experiential, actual) concepts.

This is a common misunderstanding of concepts. All concepts are abstractions, i.e. mental integrations of two or more units that have defining properties in common, irrelevant differences set aside and the exact degree of the defining property being omitted. Concept formation isn’t automatic, so after throwing a stone a few times, a concept could be formed, but why would you? The other important thing about concepts is that they are not just mental abstractions, they are abstractions unified with one symbol (word, typically).

Think of words as being literal concepts and think of sentence or paragraph as being an abstract concept.

Nah, paragraphs or sentences aren’t concepts. A sentence is a sentence, period. It may represent a proposition, but a proposition is much more complicated that a concept – it expresses numerous relations between concepts. On occasion, sentence and concept can coincide – for example “Crap!” – but that’s rare.

This new paradigm might be called the “conceptual metaphor” paradigm. The theory is that experiences form into concepts and some of these concepts are called “primary metaphors”.

While I think George should be credited with doing important work on a particular mode of language change, my opinion is that it’s overdone. There are huge numbers of concepts which are not metaphorical.

BTW, this forum is about Objectivist philosophy, not Lakoff & Johnson’s anti-objectivist philosophy.

Nah, paragraphs or sentences aren’t concepts. A sentence is a sentence, period. It may represent a proposition, but a proposition is much more complicated that a concept – it expresses numerous relations between concepts. On occasion, sentence and concept can coincide – for example “Crap!” – but that’s rare.

I am not sure I follow. If a read a definition of some word without the word attached, does it stop being a concept?

“The movable articles in a room or an establishment that make it fit for living or working.” for example. If I did not yet have a word for it, but understood the similiarity and differentia for it, why would it not be a concpet. Certainly applying a word like..oh…lets say furniture :slight_smile: , helps keep it organized and makes it transmitable to others through speech, but I fail to see why the concept itself does not exist without symbolic representation.

David

Lakoff and Johnson defines a concept in this way–“concepts are neural structures that allow us to mentally characterize our categories and reason about them…All living systems must categorize…The categories we form are part of our experience.”

When I say such things as a concept is a word I am using an analogy and do not mean it literally. When I say ‘knowing is seeing’ I am using a metaphor.

I am not sure I follow. If a read a definition of some word without the word attached, does it stop being a concept?

No; why would it? The word that is associated with the concept still exists, even if you don’t say it.

If I did not yet have a word for it, but understood the similiarity and differentia for it, why would it not be a concpet.

Because you don’t have a symbolic representation for the idea. I recommend ch. 7 ITOE “The Cognitive Role of Concepts”. Unit economy is a fundamental aspect of human cognition, and symbolic representation is the essence of what a concept is.

Lakoff and Johnson defines a concept in this way–“concepts are neural structures that allow us to mentally characterize our categories and reason about them…All living systems must categorize…The categories we form are part of our experience.”

I understand that. This is an error on their part, since that is not what “concept” refers to. In fact, they do some serious question begging there, in claiming that bacteria are conceptual beings.

Exactly the same post, on another bulletin board, from a year ago.

Exactly the same post, on another bulletin board, from a year ago.

Thanks for finding that.

Exactly the same post, on another bulletin board, from a year ago.

That post appears to be from just a couple of days ago. Or did I miss something???

That post appears to be from just a couple of days ago. Or did I miss something???

Right, the time was in error: the fact that we got Bialeked isn’t.

My mistake. Same post, not from a year ago.