Since Olex (and perhaps others) have not or could not see the essay “Epistemological Anarchy,” I will now post it. Note that I just received Don Watkins’ permission to do so:
Epistemological Anarchy
by Don @ 8:46 AM [Dec. 22, 2005]
If you have ever debated the issue of limited government versus anarchy with an anarchist, you have undoubtedly run into this argument: “Every government in history has violated individual rights, so what grounds do you have for believing there could be a government that doesn’t?”
In fact, our own Stephan Kinsella raised this point in his current discussion with Dave Harrison. He said, “All of our experience and history shows all states to ride roughshod over citizens’ rights.”
(Dave’s response was perfect: “To some extent or another, depending on the state. And therefore what?”)
What I want to note is the epistemological error in the anarchist’s argument. Specifically, the false view of induction.
To take the standard example, suppose I observe a hundred swans, all of which are white. This by itself would not justify concluding that all swans are white. Induction does not work by enumeration. To generalize, you would have to know why all swans must be white – what in their nature causes them to be white?
In the same way, you cannot argue that because all governments have violated individual rights, that all governments must violate rights. You would have to be able to identify something in the nature of government that necessitates the violation of individual rights. Never has an anarchist succeeded at this task.
The closest anyone has ever come was Roy Childs, who famously argued that in barring other individuals and organizations from the use of retaliatory force, a government is initiating force. But, as I have argued elsewhere, Childs’ argument shares the fatal flaw that plagues almost every anarchist argument: the complete evasion of the requirements of objectivity.
In one of her Ford Hall Forum speeches, Ayn Rand read a quote so horrific and illustrative of the point she was making that the audience burst into applause. Rand paused for a moment and explained to the audience that their applause was non-objective, since she had no way of knowing whether they were agreeing with the quote or with Rand. Rand’s point is that objectivity imposes requirements, not only in a person’s mind, but in how they express themselves in a social context. Each audience member knew why he was applauding, but his applause was non-objective because the person he was trying to communicate with, Ayn Rand, had no means of knowing what his applause was attempting to communicate.
The same principle applies to the issue of retaliation.
In his open letter to Ayn Rand, Childs disputes Rand’s claim that, “The use of physical force – even its retaliatory use – cannot be left at the discretion of individual citizens.” He writes:
Morally, a man has the right to retaliate against those who initiate force. In fact, as Ayn Rand pointed out, assuming he is able to do so, retaliation is a moral imperative. Refusing to retaliate against an aggressor is to sanction his aggression – and to welcome more of it. Yet, if he is living in a society of other men, it is not enough that an individual determine in his own mind that his use of force is retaliatory. Since whether an act of force is initiatory or retaliatory is not self-evident, and since a man who initiates force is by that fact a threat to society, any man who engages in force that has not been proved by objective means to be retaliatory must be considered a threat. This is the deepest reason why the use of retaliatory force must be delegated to the government: an act of retaliation that isn’t first proved to be an act of retaliation is indistinguishable from an act of aggression – and must be treated as such.
What, then, are “objective means”? To determine that an instance of force is retaliatory, men must know what the act of force was, the general standard by which guilt is to be determined, and what evidence was used to meet that standard in a particular case. Every member of society must have access to this information. And, of course, each of these elements must be objective (the laws, standards of evidence, and the evaluation of whether the evidence in question meets that standard). By its nature, then, objectivity in retaliation cannot be achieved without a government (assuming we are speaking here of a society of men and not individuals or isolated tribes). If an individual uses force, by that very fact he is an objective threat to other members of society and may properly be restrained, even if he was responding to another man’s aggression. He has no grounds for claiming his rights are being violated.
Imagine you are walking down the street and a man walks up and punches the person next to you in the face. The anarchist would argue that if you use force to restrain that person, you are initiating force if it turns out that the man he punched hit him first. Yet that is pure intrinsicism. It is non-objective in the same way that the audience’s applause was non-objective. He may be retaliating but you don’t know it.
Contrary to Childs, the point is not that individuals are unable to make objective determinations of what constitutes retaliatory force – it’s that objectivity demands they prove it to every other member of society. Only a government can provide such a mechanism. (The anarchist would of course dispute this last claim as well, but the point here isn’t to make the case for limited government – merely to demonstrate that government is not inherently aggressive.)