My interest in Ayn Rand brought me to considering her views on the mind/body dichotomy. Of course I know she rejected the distinction altogether and called the human being a single, integrated entity, yet was still what can be appropriately called a dualist. She made the the assertions that (a) conscious organisms have both mental attributes and physical attributes, and ( B) both kinds of attributes may participate in determining the causal powers of the conscious organism. She then left the interaction mechanisms of mind and body to the sciences of psychology and neurobiology.
But this last part, according to my standards, does not address the problem. I am a physicalist, but recognize Rand as not a physicalist, simply because she recognized a difference between mind and matter. I think that a physicalist interpretation of her ‘primacy of existence’ would not be well-founded.
Anomalous monism, something I’m quite familiar with, can best be summarized as this: (a) mental events are identical with physical events and ( B) that the mental is anomalous; that is, under their mental descriptions these mental events are not regulated by strict physical laws (see Anomalous Monism for additional information).
My question is whether or not Ayn Rand believed that the mental is not reducible to the physical (a key tenet of anomalous monism as a non-reduction form of physicalism) and whether the theory of anomalous monism would be consistent with her views of the mind and body, and offers an acceptable thesis that she “left to the sciences”. Although Rand was a “dualist” and anomalous monism is monistic, I believe the two concepts can be reconciled in this case.
Reference: here