Anomalous monism and Rand

My interest in Ayn Rand brought me to considering her views on the mind/body dichotomy. Of course I know she rejected the distinction altogether and called the human being a single, integrated entity, yet was still what can be appropriately called a dualist. She made the the assertions that (a) conscious organisms have both mental attributes and physical attributes, and ( B) both kinds of attributes may participate in determining the causal powers of the conscious organism. She then left the interaction mechanisms of mind and body to the sciences of psychology and neurobiology.

But this last part, according to my standards, does not address the problem. I am a physicalist, but recognize Rand as not a physicalist, simply because she recognized a difference between mind and matter. I think that a physicalist interpretation of her ‘primacy of existence’ would not be well-founded.

Anomalous monism, something I’m quite familiar with, can best be summarized as this: (a) mental events are identical with physical events and ( B) that the mental is anomalous; that is, under their mental descriptions these mental events are not regulated by strict physical laws (see Anomalous Monism for additional information).

My question is whether or not Ayn Rand believed that the mental is not reducible to the physical (a key tenet of anomalous monism as a non-reduction form of physicalism) and whether the theory of anomalous monism would be consistent with her views of the mind and body, and offers an acceptable thesis that she “left to the sciences”. Although Rand was a “dualist” and anomalous monism is monistic, I believe the two concepts can be reconciled in this case.

Reference: here

As far as I know, her use of “physical” corresponds to the concept “material, being composed of matter”. I don’t know what “reduce to” means; but I imagine that a relationship (for example a spatial relationship) between two material objects is not material, but would certainly be important in characterizing mental action. Rand had no position, that I know of, as to whether mental events are regulated by physical laws.

I don’t know what “reduce to” means

“Reduce to” = “can be explained in terms of”

First, I don’t understand how it is justified to think of Rand as a dualist.

If I can look at a diamond and appreciate that it is at the same time both a specific mass of carbon and a particular crystal structure of carbon, am I now a dualist?

If yes, then I don’t think dualism means anything. I thought the whole point of dualism was to attach man to the supernatural. If there are now doctrines of dualism which are purely physical, what is the new point?

If no, then Rand was not a dualist either because the specific properties of life, consciousness and volition are to a man what the crystal structure is to a diamond.

Second, the mental is not reducible to the physical. Anomalous monism is definitely ‘specific science’ subject matter.

I think it has some merit. When engineers build neural nets and then train them up to accomplish some task, there is no prinicple of explanation for the values assigned to the simulated synapses on the internal layers of the network. Of course one can step through training process and trace each calculation but the results of such an exercise provide no insights. This seems analogous to the token-identity and no-strict-laws principles as explained at SEP reference.

My question is whether or not Ayn Rand believed that the mental is not reducible to the physical (a key tenet of anomalous monism as a non-reduction form of physicalism) and whether the theory of anomalous monism would be consistent with her views of the mind and body, and offers an acceptable thesis that she “left to the sciences”. Although Rand was a “dualist” and anomalous monism is monistic, I believe the two concepts can be reconciled in this case.

Reference: here

Ooh, juicy. I see you are familiar with the works of D. Davidson. I can’t help but get involved in this one.

The short answer is that Rand certainly believed that the mental is not reducible to the physical. But that is a non-essential characteristic of anomalous monism, since the monism bit is the positive aspect of the position. I don’t see why you think that monism and Rand’s dualism can be reconciled.

The fact that she thought that the mind-body interaction question was to be left to the sciences does not indicate that she thought that mental states are token identical with physical ones. On the contrary, the very question of interaction presupposes that the two types of state are discernible.

My questions for physicalists are: First, what is it to be a physicalist? Second, what is it to be physical? Answers to this second question are usually revealing and point to the trouble with the monism part of anomalous monism. Leaving this aside, what argument do you rely on to support your physicalism?

My questions for physicalists are: First, what is it to be a physicalist? Second, what is it to be physical? Answers to this second question are usually revealing and point to the trouble with the monism part of anomalous monism. Leaving this aside, what argument do you rely on to support your physicalism?

A physicalist would philosophically be a materialist in the tradition of Democritus, Hobbes and Marx, no?

I find this issue to be a weakness in Objectivism: if reason is altogether independent of existence, there is no way to explain how consciousness is related to existence at all. It is only if consciousness is primary in some sense that we have any hope of their being related at all.

Although Rand was a “dualist” and anomalous monism is monistic, I believe the two concepts can be reconciled in this case.

I don’t think Rand was a dualist. While she recognized material and spiritual existents, she never suggested (to my knowledge) that these are the only forms of existence possible; she didn’t legislate what things can exist in reality.

A physicalist would philosophically be a materialist in the tradition of Democritus, Hobbes and Marx, no?

Yeah, but that’s virtually a circular definition. What is a materialist? Someone who believes everything is matter. Note that this is the old-fashioned definition. Physicalism is up-to-date because contemporary physics acknowledges that more than just matter exists. But then my question is, what is it to be physical?

I find this issue to be a weakness in Objectivism: if reason is altogether independent of existence, there is no way to explain how consciousness is related to existence at all. It is only if consciousness is primary in some sense that we have any hope of their being related at all.

Who says reason is independent of existence? What would that mean?

I don’t think Rand was a dualist. While she recognized material and spiritual existents, she never suggested (to my knowledge) that these are the only forms of existence possible; she didn’t legislate what things can exist in reality.

To say that she recognized both the material and the spiritual fits perfectly well the generic definition of dualism.

I find this issue to be a weakness in Objectivism: if reason is altogether independent of existence, there is no way to explain how consciousness is related to existence at all. It is only if consciousness is primary in some sense that we have any hope of their being related at all.

We exist, our consciousness exists. It is the result of the function of a living human brain. I am, therefore, I think. Consciousness can’t help but to be related to existance, to think otherwise would seem to belong to the realm of the mystic.

She made the the assertions that (a) conscious organisms have both mental attributes and physical attributes, and ( :stuck_out_tongue: both kinds of attributes may participate in determining the causal powers of the conscious organism.

I’m pretty sure that Ayn Rand never wrote down the words “both kinds of attributes may participate in determining the causal powers of the conscious organism.” Can you give exact quotes of her statements you consider to be examples of dualism?

Who says reason is independent of existence? What would that mean?

Exactly; which is why existence cannot be ultimately altogether distinct from consciousness. Only if reality is fundamentally related to mind can anyone explain how what exists is intelligible to a faculty of reason.

Exactly; which is why existence cannot be ultimately altogether distinct from consciousness. Only if reality is fundamentally related to mind can anyone explain how what exists is intelligible to a faculty of reason.

I asked a question, you responded with “exactly.” That doesn’t make sense. Let me be blunt, then.

Rand doesn’t say that “reason is independent of existence.” Far from it. The primacy of existence means precisely that existence has primacy over consciousness, which means that consciousness depends on existence. (Reason is just one form of consciousness.)

This is far from saying that consciousness is independent of existence. Consciousness cannot exist independently, with nothing to be conscious of. And there can be no faculty of consciousness without a physical organism that has that faculty.

All that Rand says that might qualify her as being a dualist is that consciousness cannot be reduced to matter, i.e., that matter and consciousness are two distinct types of existent. To say that this implies that consciousness is independent of existence assumes matter is the only kind of existent, which is question-begging. That is it presupposes an argument for physicalism, so I’d like to see that argument if you’ve got it!

All that Rand says that might qualify her as being a dualist is that consciousness cannot be reduced to matter, i.e., that matter and consciousness are two distinct types of existent. To say that this implies that consciousness is independent of existence assumes matter is the only kind of existent, which is question-begging. That is it presupposes an argument for physicalism, so I’d like to see that argument if you’ve got it!

My point is that primacy of existence makes Rand a materialist. It is only if mind is in some sense primary that existence is rationally intelligible at all.

My point is that primacy of existence makes Rand a materialist. It is only if mind is in some sense primary that existence is rationally intelligible at all.

Basically: says you.

I’ve had no problem understanding the primacy of existence, and reason’s derivative role of identifying existence. It is consciousness that conforms to existence, it isn’t a primary. Nor does it need to be primary to rationally understand it. In fact, I posit the exact opposite. The role and function of the mind would not be rationally intelligible if it were in some sense “primary.”

Interesting discussion so far. I appreciate the elaboration on Rand’s position. But for now, I’d simply like to point to certain consistencies between the two thinkers Davidson (the creator of anomalous monism) and Rand.

Firstly, anomalous monism does not deny the existence of mental events; that is, it is not epiphenomenalism, which claims mental events are the direct result of bodily processes. Similarly, Rand (obviously) did not deny the existence of mental events, while (obviously) accepting matter as existential.

Secondly, Rand said that both kinds of events have causal interaction with the whole organism (mental and physical). This position can be read about in various parts of For the New Intellectual, namely from pages 135 to 142. Anomalous monism, by “the principle of causal interaction”, says that there exist both mental-to-physical as well as physical-to-mental causal interactions.

Thirdly, Rand said that the mental events of consciousness cannot be reduced to the physical. Anomalous monism, by “the principle of the anomalism of the mental”, says that there are no psycho-physical laws which relate the mental and the physical as just that, mental and physical. In this, anomalous monism is not your everyday reductionist physicalism; the two cannot be analyzed in terms of one another.

A major problem I find in bringing these two together is in both parties’ conceptions of causation. Rand knows causation to be as “an ‘action’ is not an entity; rather, entities act. Therefore, an action cannot be properly regarded as the fundamental cause of another action, as actions do not exist apart from the entities that produce them.”

On the other hand, Davidson feels that “all events are caused by and cause other events and this is the chief, defining characteristic of what an event is.” Unless I am missing some vocabulary linkage here between “event” and “action”, this seems to be a contradiction. Or could an “event” itself be an “entity”, an these views be complementary? (see the next post)

Davidson’s view of properties (which is similar to Rand’s) can be put in this manner: “…properties are linguistic items, are ways of describing events. According to Davidson there is nothing “in” events that makes it true that they can be described using certain predicates as opposed to others. Thus, there are no recognition-transcendent facts about events that determine how they can be described. Since properties are not ontological parts of events, it makes no sense to say that events cause other events in virtue of certain properties.”

The problem here is that the bolded part seems consistent with Objectivism, that properties are epistemological and not ontological. But the italicized part seems in consistent; that is, Objectivists say that properties of entities play a direct role in what actions occur and how it interacts with other things.

The first three points of comparison you make between Rand and Davidson are genuine. I think his position (and several other contemporary nonreductive views) help demonstrate just how difficult it is to deny consciousness. Physicalists are still physicalists, but they desperately want to be compatibilist about our normal mental discourse–the consequences of incompatibilism are too obviously absurd and self-refuting.

But in the end, Davidson and other contemporary philosophers of mind still advocate physicalism. The biggest tension between Rand and these thinkers is not their views of causality (though that is a difference), but physicalism. I’m not sure why you don’t want to discuss that difference, it is the fundamental. So I ask again, why do you find physicalism compelling? What are your reasons for accepting it? And when you conclude that everything is physical, what do you mean by “physical”?

Incidentally, regarding this linguistic view of properties, I would say it is definitely not the Objectivist view. It’s true that Objectivism rejects intrinsicism. But it is also not subjectivism, which this view resembles. Property concepts, like all concepts, are in fact human concepts. But they are concepts based on real similarities and differences among entities.

So this helps explain the inconsistency you mention: Davidson rejects the possibility that entities cause events in virtue of their properties, because he is a subjectivist about properties. Rand affirms that entities cause actions in virtue of their nature (properties), because she thinks entities and their natures are real (though we come to grasp them by comparing and contrasting them with other entities).

Unless I am missing some vocabulary linkage here between “event” and “action”, this seems to be a contradiction. Or could an “event” itself be an “entity”, an these views be complementary?

To be honest, I think the agreements between Rand and Anomalous Monism are quite apparent in their premises. I believe the real issue likes in their respective laws of causality. I decided to investigate the respective meanings of ‘event’, ‘action’, and ‘entity’. I see it as such:

IF ‘event’ is an ‘entity’, THEN there is no contradiction

IF ‘event’ is an ‘action’, THEN there is no contradiction

IF ‘event’ is neither an ‘action’ nor an ‘entity’, THEN there is a contradiction

Definitions:

Event-- something that happens at a given place and time; a phenomenon located at a single point in space-time

Action – something done

Entity – something that has a distinct, separate existence

look them up–source: WordNet Search

Firstly, the obvious thing is that each definition begins with “something”, which is some unspecified thing. According to the Objectivist, something which has a distinct existence (entity) is incompatible with “something that happens” or “something done”. So thus, neither an action nor an event is an “entity”.

Secondly, it should be apparent that from these given definitions, action and event are equivalent and synonymous insofar as “to do” and “to happen” are both used passively. That is, something can be done, it need not do (perform) some thing itself, actively. For instance, I could say “the laundry was done”, when I could have equivalently said “I did the laundry”. They are the same, just as “the laundry happened” where laundry is the “action of completing the laundry”.

Thus, I believe there is no contradiction in both conceptions of causality because if we use the same term, either “action” or “entity”, consistently in both cases, they will say the same thing.

So I ask again, why do you find physicalism compelling? What are your reasons for accepting it? And when you conclude that everything is physical, what do you mean by “physical”?

Well, it is rational to be guided in one’s metaphysical commitments by the methods of natural science. Metaphysics should not be approached in a way that is distinct from the sciences but should rather be thought of as continuous with it. The metaphysical picture of the world that one is led to by the methods of natural science is physicalism. The conclusion is that physicalism is true, or at least physicalism is the only rational conclusion from this.

You’re right, there are no dominant, catch-all arguments in favor of physicalism. But I mostly advocate it because I find that it is impossible for there to only be non-material entities (idealism). I also find that dualism is an impossibility. A non-material entity, such as a consciousness or a soul, cannot have causal interaction with a physical entity such as the body. There cannot be energy continuation between a non-material mind and a material body as it violates the laws of physics. Occam’s Razor says that it is more likely, with the simpler explanation, that there is simply a body.

Between materialism and physicalism, I choose physicalism because hard materialism goes against a belief in free will. It advocates a strict determinism, which I could argue against but being on an Objectivist forum, I don’t feel such discussion is necessary.

Incidentally, regarding this linguistic view of properties, I would say it is definitely not the Objectivist view. It’s true that Objectivism rejects intrinsicism. But it is also not subjectivism, which this view resembles. Property concepts, like all concepts, are in fact human concepts. But they are concepts based on real similarities and differences among entities.

So this helps explain the inconsistency you mention: Davidson rejects the possibility that entities cause events in virtue of their properties, because he is a subjectivist about properties. Rand affirms that entities cause actions in virtue of their nature (properties), because she thinks entities and their natures are real (though we come to grasp them by comparing and contrasting them with other entities).

Thanks for correcting me.

Well, it is rational to be guided in one’s metaphysical commitments by the methods of natural science. Metaphysics should not be approached in a way that is distinct from the sciences but should rather be thought of as continuous with it. The metaphysical picture of the world that one is led to by the methods of natural science is physicalism. The conclusion is that physicalism is true, or at least physicalism is the only rational conclusion from this.

Yes and no. Obviously the methods of natural science are quite rational. Does this mean that philosophical rationality is the same as natural scientific rationality, that the methods and assumptions are the same? No. For that you’d need to argue for Quinean naturalized epistemology, which is quite a task (one I’ve analyzed in some detail, and I don’t think it works). Obviously in some sense science is continuous with philosophy, but in what regards? Yes, they’re both informed by logic and observation. But the sciences deal with specialized subject matters, whereas philosophy is the most general field that integrates all of the disciplines. To say that science assumes physicalism is, I’m afraid, to beg the question. It’s true that natural science (or at least the natural physical sciences) study only the physical world, but that doesn’t mean that they assume that only the physical world exists. The sciences as such take no position on this topic, precisely because of their specialized subject matter.

You’re right, there are no dominant, catch-all arguments in favor of physicalism. But I mostly advocate it because I find that it is impossible for there to only be non-material entities (idealism). I also find that dualism is an impossibility. A non-material entity, such as a consciousness or a soul, cannot have causal interaction with a physical entity such as the body. There cannot be energy continuation between a non-material mind and a material body as it violates the laws of physics. Occam’s Razor says that it is more likely, with the simpler explanation, that there is simply a body.

Absent some special argument, it does not seem clear at all that there can be no causal interaction between the physical and the non-physical. Why can’t two different types of existent interact? Which laws of physics do you think this violates? Yes, I’ve heard arguments about the conservation of energy, but I doubt that these hold up. See this paper by Barbara Montero, for example:

http://barbara.antinomies.org/papers/conservation/viewHTML

See also some useful remarks here:

http://maverickphilosopher.powerblogs.com/…131235741.shtml

Between materialism and physicalism, I choose physicalism because hard materialism goes against a belief in free will. It advocates a strict determinism, which I could argue against but being on an Objectivist forum, I don’t feel such discussion is necessary.

Yeah, but most physicalists also deny that there is any free will worth having. Yes, there are compatibilists who say we can have the mental supervene on the physical, but still make “choices” that aren’t coerced. But this is changing the subject and not what free will really is. If you argue for free will from Quantum Mechanics, at best this gives us indeterminism, which is not the kind of genuine agent-causality that a theory of genuine free will needs.

P.S.: You’ve still not told me what it is for something to be “physical.” It’s kind of a crucial concept to define, if you want to say everything is physical.

Yes and no. Obviously the methods of natural science are quite rational. Does this mean that philosophical rationality is the same as natural scientific rationality, that the methods and assumptions are the same? No. For that you’d need to argue for Quinean naturalized epistemology, which is quite a task (one I’ve analyzed in some detail, and I don’t think it works). Obviously in some sense science is continuous with philosophy, but in what regards? Yes, they’re both informed by logic and observation. But the sciences deal with specialized subject matters, whereas philosophy is the most general field that integrates all of the disciplines. To say that science assumes physicalism is, I’m afraid, to beg the question. It’s true that natural science (or at least the natural physical sciences) study only the physical world, but that doesn’t mean that they assume that only the physical world exists. The sciences as such take no position on this topic, precisely because of their specialized subject matter.

The sciences study only science for a special reason: because science studies only that which is falsifiable and can be confirmed by rational examination. To suggest dualism without a theory of how such a mechanism would work is not falsifiable, it’s a matter of asking an “if” question and not receiving an appropriate answer because it cannot be demonstrated to be false. Dualism is a place for philosophy because it is, as I say, not falsifiable. Physicalism is implied by science because the physical is all that is falsifiable.

Like Rand, we cannot deny the existence of consciousness. But what we can deny is that this consciousness is a separate entity, somehow controlling the physical body which everyone inhabits.

Absent some special argument, it does not seem clear at all that there can be no causal interaction between the physical and the non-physical. Why can’t two different types of existent interact? Which laws of physics do you think this violates? Yes, I’ve heard arguments about the conservation of energy, but I doubt that these hold up.

It’s not that nonphysical objects cannot interact at all with physical ones. This is too broad of an ontological claim that I want to get into. It’s simply in this case, with the mind and body, that they do not. I’m sure you’ve heard all of the arguments, I can’t drum up any new proofs against the possibility of dualism, but it’s simply a matter of recognizing that machines do not run on mysterious non-material forces. They are driven by energy input. “Ghosts” in the machine cannot run without energy, there is no way to transfer energy to a “ghost” if it has no material being. The only reasonable conclusion is that this “ghost” is actually an erroneous categorization of what consciousness is.

No one should care about the relation of causation to energy (as the paper you cited addresses). The only care is about the necessity of energy needed to move such a “ghost”, to keep it active. For example, say I stop eating. Why does my consciousness slowly deteriorate? Because my body is obviously intricately connected to my mind. My body sustains my consciousness, provides it with energy.

Yeah, but most physicalists also deny that there is any free will worth having. Yes, there are compatibilists who say we can have the mental supervene on the physical, but still make “choices” that aren’t coerced. But this is changing the subject and not what free will really is. If you argue for free will from Quantum Mechanics, at best this gives us indeterminism, which is not the kind of genuine agent-causality that a theory of genuine free will needs.

Perhaps you would care to enlighten me on what free will is because right now, I’m not seeing your claim here as valid, that is, your conclusion doesn’t follow the premises. What is the apparent defect of the “free will” which comes from physicalism and supervenience?

P.S.: You’ve still not told me what it is for something to be “physical.” It’s kind of a crucial concept to define, if you want to say everything is physical.

I don’t care to get into this long discussion. Almost all physicalists can agree on what is ‘physical’ (or more appropriately, all human beings can agree on just what is ‘physical’.) But I leave some reading to you: Understanding ‘Physical’.