But you don’t stop an attack on the Internet by shutting it down.
Sure you might.
Think about a law that would give govenrment the power to shut down the freeways if someone threatened to block them.
If some type of zombie traffic was suddenly coming off route 260A and jamming up a critical bridge into NYC, one might want to stop all traffic from that route. The president probably has the power to do that today, so this bill is not much different.
The notion that the President will cut off anti-Obama sites is fear-mongering. This draft bill allows the President to act only if he declares that the US infrastructure is under attack – something like a mini war-declaration. Also, it authorizes him to act against infrastructure that is compromised or that can compromise critical infrastructure.
I suspect that the real negatives from this bill will come from the bulk of its provisions, not from the emergency provision. The bulk of the bill is about setting up a government body to plan for and reduce the chances of a cyber-attack. I’d like to see Mother Jones objecting to some of the details under that: for instance the 1000 “scholarships-for-service” given to students who will work in cyber-security. Another big negative will come in the way of government-imposed software standards: which will likely have the equivalent of what Sarbane-Oxley have in the accounting realm.
I’m not sure if people realize the seriousness of the threat here. Imagine, enemy saboteurs blowing up a few bridges and tunnels to stop the flow of food and goods into NYC. Well, if one could take down certain key information systems in places far away from NYC (one would need to know which ones), one could have a similar impact. You could have a situation where supplier’s systems that decide what to send to NYC and when stop functioning. Today, many of these systems are very distributed (e.g. data from shop flows to HQ, consolidated data from there flows to servicing bureau across the country, new orders calculated there flow to various vendors across the country, various information flows to transportation and logistics providers). Many of these connections rely on the internet being functional, in order to work. Falling back to more manual alternatives is possible, but will be disruptive: visualize the Taggart terminal when the signaling system failed and they went to manual.
We’ve seen examples where credit card transactions were paused for a day in some far-eastern countries. We have an internet that sees certain government-controlled entities as being trustworthy, which once led to a huge amount of traffic being routed to Pakistan (I think it was Amazon traffic), because of a mistake by someone there. A few times in the past couple of years, fishing trawlers and such have cut some cable in the sea, slowing down traffic to India (some US-based systems increasing rely on links to India being up and running). These were accidents, but if an enemy planned well, they could do damage that was a little more disruptive.
Of course, none of this means that this bill ought to pass in the form it is currently written. The bulk of the bill is about preparing and preventing such an emergency. As expected, this goes over the top in allowing the government to dictate standards. In the emergency provisions arena, what the bill needs is clearer definitions of the nature of an emergency, the nature of “critical infrastructure”, limitations on the duration of such emergency, mechanism to challenge the government’s declaration, and some type of Congressional oversight (e.g. confirmation of a state of war, within a certain period).