Are Rand and Peikoff right about materialism?

Plas, in #12 I did not say the phrase I meant. I meant and should have said non-eliminative physicalism.

 

By non-eliminative physicalism, a non-eliminative reductionism, I mean only the general form as was accomplished when light was identified with electromagnetic radiation. It was learned that light was electromagnetic waves of a certain frequency range. Yet light did not then cease to be light, or become some sort of prior delusion now dispelled.

 

Similarly, we know that there are sensors in the skin that register the rate of heat flow out the surface into the environs. We feel that as coolness. My idea is only that if we someday fully understand the brain processing that culminates in the feeling of coolness from activation of the sensor, coolness will not have ceased to be coolness, or become some sort of delusion then dispelled.

 

Stephen

 

>>>I mean only the general form as was accomplished when light was identified with electromagnetic radiation. It was learned that light was electromagnetic waves of a certain frequency range. Yet light did not then cease to be light, or become some sort of prior delusion now dispelled.

 

It’s a common error committed often by Objectivists:  confusing identity with correlation.

 

Light is the name of a subjective experience (along with color). The experience is precisely that; an experience. The experience is not electromagnetic radiation (or quanta called photons). The experience we call “light” correlates with radiation in a certain range of the electromagnetic spectrum, but that’s about it. Other things also correlate with that spectrum in different parts of it: heat at one end, cosmic rays at the other. Neither one is an experience we call “light.”

 

“Light” (and color) as we know it exist only in the realm of subjective experience, i.e., the mind. Light correlates with electromagnetic radiation, and color correlates with wavelength, but there’s no identity here.

 

“Identity” and “correlation” are opposites. Two things cannot be identified with each other and still be “two things.”

Red said:

“A nice way of arbitrarily defining away half of the universe.”

Enough of this question begging! You are here in an Oist forum dedicated to persuit of Oism. If you want to oppose the epistemology of Objectivism, here, where it is assumed by those who are here because they are persuaded by it, YOU must present an argument against its epistemology particularly.

If you think Oist epistemology is arbitrary then start a thread were you lay out what in particular you think is wrong with it. Here you are the one who must do this. When you present more than assertions that Oism is wrong, or assumptions about others they dont hold, then I will have something to refute.

“Um, define for us, please, what you mean by the phrase “philosophically holding.” If only “entities” (whatever they are!) exist, and if only entities therefore can cause effects, what sort of entities cause the effect you’ve just called “philosophically holding”? How can entities “philosophically hold” something? And isn’t the “something” they hold itself composed of other entities?”

Um, I am the entitiy that holds the attribute of a conceptual consciousness. All the other questions pressupose your invalid assertion that concepts are entities.

Red said:

"And why should your entities in your physical material arrangements be called “right” and “true” and “correct” while other people’s entities in their material arrangements be defined as “wrong”, “false”, and “incorrect’?”

Again, the criteria is correspondence between the mental and the mind independent. Again, concepts are not entities.

Red said:

“If you define away the idea of a non-material — i.e., existing independently of any possible kind of physical, material arrangement of entities — part of existence, then you simply do away with the idea of objective truth. By your lights, everyone has his own set of material, physical, entity-arrangements causing them to have certain ideas (the ideas are simply “effects” of those physical arrangements). Thus, there is no right, wrong, moral, immoral, true, untrue, etc. There is simply “my entity-arrangements”, “his entity-arrangements”, “your entity-arrangements”, etc.”

I have no idea where you get this nonsense from. You are the one who has “defined” into existence the concept “non- material”. I cannot define away what I have not asserted to have abstracted from perception. You see, the onus is on you. Lay out your theory of concept formation and show why Oism is wrong.

Red said:

" 

And pretending to defend this sort of naive materialism by saying, “but I justify it according to principles of Objectivist epistemology, so it HAS to be right!” is absurd, as well as self-serving. What arrangements do material entities make when leading to the phrase “principles of Objectivist epistemology”? and why should those material arrangements of entities be “better” or “more true” than someone else’s material arrangements of entities leading to the phrase “principles of Kant’s analytic-synthetic dichotomy”?"

More of the same. Oist serve themselves as a moral ideal. You are here at OO where, by the purpose of its owners, Oist epistemology is the standard. It is YOU who have something to lay out. Stop making nonsensical assumptions about what others hold and demonstrate why Oism is wrong in particular.

What about entities being causal primaries do you repudiate in particular and how is your view justified?

 

>>>I have no idea where you get this nonsense from.

 

I get it from having studied philosophy. In any case, you have nothing to complain about. Since you’re a naive materialist who believes that consciousness is composed of entities, and that therefore, PRODUCTS of consciousness, such as ideas, premises, conclusions, arguments, theories, systems, etc., must also be composed of entities — and, in fact, these entities ARE the ideas — then it follows that my philosophical ideas are simply my arrangements of entities, just as your ideas are your arrangements of entities. Too bad for the poor naive materialist, but there’s no way to judge which arrangements of entities are better, more true, less true, false, etc., without referring to an objective non-material notion of " judge." It has to be 1) objective, and 2) non-material. Because if it were material, the “judgment” would simply be another arrangement of physical entities in someone else’s physical brain. And why should that arrangement have any more objectivity and higher truth-status than my arrangement of entities in my physical brain, or your physical arrangement of entities in your physical brain?

 

Too bad. Without the idea of the “non-material”, there is no such thing as “objective truth”, i.e., true for me, you, and everyone else.

 

>>>I cannot define away what I have not asserted to have abstracted from perception.

 

I don’t understand what the term “abstraction” can mean to a naive materialist, since an abstraction is itself an arrangement of particles, just as a percept is. And the process of performing the abstraction is itself just a stream of particles. For “abstraction” to mean anything would require, again, the notion of something that is NOT simply yet another arrangement of progressively smaller particles, but something truly “non-particle.” You can call it an “entity” if you want, but it’s a non-material entity.

 

When a materialist says, “I am a philosophical materialist,” that statement presumably corresponds to a thought that is simply an arrangement of physical entities in his physical brain. If someone else says, “I am a philosophical idealist”, that statement, too, (according to the materialist) corresponds to a thought, which, in turn, also corresponds to an arrangement of physical entities in joe physical brain. Clearly, the materialist prefers his own entity-arrangements to someone else’s, just as the someone else prefers his own entity-arrangements to those of the materialist. Additionally, the materialist could not turn to a 3rd-party philosopher (e.g., Ayn Rand) and ask her (assuming she were alive) what the “truth” of the matter was, because by the materialist’s own assumptions, Ayn Rand has a material brain, and the thoughts in that brain area also simply arrangements of physical entities. Why should her arrangements of entities insider her head have more “objectivity” or higher truth status than anyone else’s physical entities? That’s the problem with materialism: instead of referring to a non-material objective condition called “truth”, you’re forced to compare “arrangements of entities”, as if you were touring a fancy suburb and comparing people’s lawns (who has the “objectively truthful” lawn? The one whose grass makes the most objectively truthful arrangement? I don’t know. Pick whichever one you want. It’s an absurd question, because materialism is an absurd philosophical position.)

 

And in any case, what did you perceive FIRST that later allowed you to abstract the idea, “x^2 + y^2 = 1”. For that matter, what did you perceive that later led to the idea, “1”. (If you’re going to say, “Well, Mr. Ugg, the caveman, perceived one stone and then abstracted the idea of “number…which must exist in some degree but may exist in any degree”, then you’d be question-begging and concept-stealing, for in that case, Mr. Ugg, already possessed the idea of “1” and “number” and simply found a useful correspondence between his percept and his pre-existing idea. The question, however, was where did he get the idea of “1” from simply via perception?” It’s utter gibberish-mysticism to suggest, as Rand appears to do, that the IDEA of “1”, or “1-ness” is part of the percept itself, and that some abstracting power of the mind conveniently sifts it out for use. Dumb. Where would such “1-ness” be? Is it physically in the stone itself? No. Is “1-ness” in the light rays hitting the stone and reflecting off of it into Mr. Ugg’s eyes? No. Is “1-ness” located physically in the retina? No. In the optic nerve? No. In the visual cortex? No. That’s it for the material part of the process. After the visual cortex, the electro-chemical impulse gets dumped into the non-material part of the human called “the mind”. How? No one knows. Does the non-material part of the mind “recognize” some non-material “1-ness” in the stone that accompanies it from light-rays, to retina, to optic nerve, to cortex? I doubt it. 

 

This is why Plato thought the idea of “1-ness” was already there, in the non-material mind, and the abstracting process in this case was really just matching what was already there to what was freshly perceived in an act of “recognition.” I don’t accept his theory, either, because I reject the notion of innate ideas, including mathematical ones.

 

So the answer is, I don’t know. Neither did Ayn Rand, Neither do you. Neither does anyone.

 

 

>>>You see, the onus is on you. Lay out your theory of concept formation and show why Oism is wrong.

 

I’ve already shown why Objectivist epistemology is nuts in another thread. You were too busy spitting out popcorn watching “Iron Man 3” to pay attention.

 

And no, to criticize someone else’s philosophy, one need not also proffer a replacement or an alternative. If you’re a lawyer in a court of law defending your client (who is innocent, of course), you don’t have to proffer an alternative crime scenario to the prosecution, the judge, or the jury. You merely have to point out why the prosecutor’s argument is full of holes and unworthy of serious consideration. Same with philosophical argumentation. You don’t have to specify what is right in order to point out why someone else’s nonsense is wrong.

 

Suffice it to say that no one really understands what concepts are, how they are formed, and how the mind grasps them. It’s enough to say, however, that Rand’s arbitrary assertion that just as “1 gram is one unit” and “one meter is one unit” that therefore “one stone is one unit” is gibberish. Read my previous post on the subject.

RW,

 

No. I did not mean light in that sense. I meant light as in optics, a purely physical science, a very old one. In the nineteenth century, electromagnetism was comprehended sufficiently well that physicists were able to discover that light in the physical sense was electromagnetic radiation. This is a matter of physical identity. I can still remember the day over four decades ago when my physics professor demonstrated on the blackboard at the end of a long derivation that a ratio of a certain electrical and a certain magnetic property of the vacuum equals exactly the velocity of electromagnetic waves propagating in vacuum. The electrical and the magnetic characteristics of the vacuum are measurable to high accuracy, more and more as we go along, and from that we can calculate the velocity of electromagnetic propagation in vacuum. The velocity of light is measurable to high accuracy, higher and higher as we go along. The equality of the velocity of light with the computed velocity of the propagation of electromagnetic waves has been demonstrated by measurement of the velocity of light and measurement of the electrical and the magnetic characteristics of the vacuum. That is why one knows today that light—physical light absorbed by the retina, which signals receipt along the optic nerve to the thalmus—is electromagnetic radiation.

 

In my coolness example, I was indeed referring to our subjective sensation. The conjectured neuronal processes to which some, including I, expect it is non-eliminatively identical has not yet been discovered so far as I know, at least not with the kind of specificity we need for confirming identity.

 

As Eiuol surmised, I did deliberately chose feature instead of attribute. That was only to skirt the tendency of many to think of a simple property for example of an attribute. Many typically think of sonar as a feature of the the bat and color as a property of the bat. Me too. By feature I meant that sort of more complex attribute. My first philosophy professor was a Thomist, so like you, I do use attribute for both simple ones (properties) and more complex ones (features). Consciousness is a feature of some animals. Rand assumed it a feature of even insects (ITOE). Today, the neuroscientist Christoff Koch (an associate of Robert Efron, who was an associate of Ayn Rand and wrote an essay about reductionism for her journal) still thinks of them as having that feature, but that has become a minority view in the profession. I think the dominate view is that without cerebral cortex, there is no consciousness. That is not to say subcortical structures and their processes connected to cortex are not required for consciousness. 

 

Stephen

No doubt you’ve never experienced it and that’s reason enough to discount it as the classic Objectivist accusation of “arbitrary assertion.”

I misspoke, this is right. But still, bodyless mind… I’m just saying unless you have a *plausible* reason that there are bodyless minds, I don’t see what the use is arguing against it. I don’t need to prove that there are not invisible gnomes in my closet. Just because you can come up with some reply doesn’t mean it is actually possible any more than imagining unicorns means it’s valid to start theorizing about how to raise a healthy unicorn. I know Eccles’ reasoning, and I think it’s bad science, for various reasons. And Aristotle at least said the human mind couldn’t be separated and exist apart from a human body, even though he posited a bodyless mind could exist.

I’ve already shown why Objectivist epistemology is nuts in another thread. You were too busy spitting out popcorn watching “Iron Man 3” to pay attention.

 

I’d love to read that. Why don’t you provide a link to that demonstration, that is, if you can manage to do it without further displaying your 10 year old petulance.

Red said: 

I get it from having studied philosophy. In any case, you have nothing to complain about. Since you’re a naive materialist who believes that consciousness is composed of entities, and that therefore, PRODUCTS of consciousness, such as ideas, premises, conclusions, arguments, theories, systems, etc., must also be composed of entities — and, in fact, these entities ARE the ideas — then it follows that my philosophical ideas are simply my arrangements of entities, just as your ideas are your arrangements of entities. Too bad for the poor naive materialist, but there’s no way to judge which arrangements of entities are better, more true, less true, false, etc., without referring to an objective non-material notion of “judge.” It has to be 1) objective, and 2) non-material. Because if it were material, the “judgment” would simply be another arrangement of physical entities in someone else’s physical brain. And why should that arrangement have any more objectivity and higher truth-status than my arrangement of entities in my physical brain, or your physical arrangement of entities in your physical brain?

Too bad. Without the idea of the “non-material”, there is no such thing as “objective truth”, i.e., true for me, you, and everyone else.

 

Another reassertion. Listen Red, if you think that reasserting that its “non-material, or consciousness and volition is an illusion” is an argument, its not. I have not seen anything here or in the “Iron Man 3” post that constitues a justification of the concept “non-material”.

 

Saying “The non material is here. How did it get here? No one knows”, is not going to do it because I dont know what you mean by “non-material”. If Ive missed it please point out exactly where you justify the concept of non material. I have no idea how to conceptualize it. What observations lead you to it?

 

This is the closest thing so far:

And in any case, what did you perceive FIRST that later allowed you to abstract the idea, “x^2 + y^2 = 1”. For that matter, what did you perceive that later led to the idea, “1”. (If you’re going to say, “Well, Mr. Ugg, the caveman, perceived one stone and then abstracted the idea of “number…which must exist in some degree but may exist in any degree”, then you’d be question-begging and concept-stealing, for in that case, Mr. Ugg, already possessed the idea of “1” and “number” and simply found a useful correspondence between his percept and his pre-existing idea. The question, however, was where did he get the idea of “1” from simply via perception?” It’s utter gibberish-mysticism to suggest, as Rand appears to do, that the IDEA of “1”, or “1-ness” is part of the percept itself, and that some abstracting power of the mind conveniently sifts it out for use. Dumb. Where would such “1-ness” be? Is it physically in the stone itself? No. Is “1-ness” in the light rays hitting the stone and reflecting off of it into Mr. Ugg’s eyes? No. Is “1-ness” located physically in the retina? No. In the optic nerve? No. In the visual cortex? No. That’s it for the material part of the process. After the visual cortex, the electro-chemical impulse gets dumped into the non-material part of the human called “the mind”. How? No one knows. Does the non-material part of the mind “recognize” some non-material “1-ness” in the stone that accompanies it from light-rays, to retina, to optic nerve, to cortex? I doubt it.

 

This is why Plato thought the idea of “1-ness” was already there, in the non-material mind, and the abstracting process in this case was really just matching what was already there to what was freshly perceived in an act of “recognition.” I don’t accept his theory, either, because I reject the notion of innate ideas, including mathematical ones

 

Im formulating my response to it and will post it in a bit.

Red said: 

 

Another reassertion. Listen Red, if you think that reasserting that its “non-material, or consciousness and volition is an illusion” is an argument, its not. I have not seen anything here or in the “Iron Man 3” post that constitues a justification of the concept “non-material”.

 

Saying “The non material is here. How did it get here? No one knows”, is not going to do it because I dont know what you mean by “non-material”. If Ive missed it please point out exactly where you justify the concept of non material. I have no idea how to conceptualize it. What observations lead you to it?

 

This is the closest thing so far:

 

Im formulating my response to it and will post it in a bit.

 

>>>…justification…

 

Sorry, what is the non-material concept “justification” in terms of physical entities? Do the material entities in your physical brain assume a certain shape or arrangement that specifies a certain state called “justification”? And since physical entities ALL obey the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics, do you have any theory to explain how new states of mind-entities get ordered out of non-orderly states (such as when you’re asleep, or unconscious, or simply staring out the window thinking about nothing)? 

 

Never thought about that, eh? 

 

Naive materialism leads to pure solipsism: your entity-arrangements, my entity-arrangements, Harrison’s entity-arrangements, Peikoff’s entity-arrangements, etc. Why should any one of these entity-arrangements be superior in terms of objectivity or truth status? By what standard? There can be no standard, because according to your lights, that standard must itself be an idea…and that idea, according to you, is simply yet another arrangement of entities.

 

But if you’re happy being a solipsist, I certainly don’t want to ruin your fun.

@ plasmatic:

 

>>>Listen Red, if you think that reasserting that its “non-material, or consciousness and volition is an illusion” is an argument, its not.

 

Listen, plaz, if you think that reasserting that consciousness and its products — thoughts, ideas, theories, systems, language, concepts, etc. — are very, very tiny material entities inside of a material brain is an argument, it’s not…especially given the obvious fact that material particles don’t “assert” or “reassert”. They simply “act” under the influence of some other force.

 

The very concept of “assert” or “reassert” or “justification” or “argument” only makes sense within the non-material mental realm. Bowling balls don’t “assert” or “reassert” or “justify” or “conclude” or “argue”, even if they are very, very, very small, and inside someone’s physical brain.

Red said: 

 

Another reassertion. Listen Red, if you think that reasserting that its “non-material, or consciousness and volition is an illusion” is an argument, its not. I have not seen anything here or in the “Iron Man 3” post that constitues a justification of the concept “non-material”.

 

Saying “The non material is here. How did it get here? No one knows”, is not going to do it because I dont know what you mean by “non-material”. If Ive missed it please point out exactly where you justify the concept of non material. I have no idea how to conceptualize it. What observations lead you to it?

 

This is the closest thing so far:

 

Im formulating my response to it and will post it in a bit.

 

>>>Im formulating my response to it and will post it in a bit.

 

In other words, “blank out.”

Red said:
 

In other words, “blank out.”

 

No, in other words , I have to get to my research cd so I can copy and paste this:

 

Prof. D:
I can think of some cases that seem to present a difficulty for the statement: “All conceptual differentiations are made in terms of commensurable characteristics.” What would you say about the case of distinguishing mental entities from physical entities? You have the concept of “mental entity” vs. the concept of “physical entity,” and there you are distinguishing objects which presumably possess no commensurable characteristic.
AR:
But you don’t form those concepts directly. You form the concept “mental entity” only after you have formed the following concepts: the concept “man,” the concept “consciousness,” then you identify certain mental states or events in your own mind, such as thoughts, let’s say, which you call “mental entities.” Then you infer that other human beings also possess the ability to have mental entities in their minds. Therefore you have gone through a long conceptual chain, making differentiations as you went along. You didn’t start by looking at reality from scratch so to speak, and as a first-level concept form the concept “mental entity” as distinguished from “physical entity.” That would not be possible. They would be incommensurable.
Now remember, I said here that you cannot form a concept, a specific concept, by differentiating objects through an incommensurable characteristic. But, [once formed], you can relate such objects in a wider sense. And the commensurable characteristic between physical objects and consciousness is the content of consciousness, as I discuss in Chapter 4. <ioe2_146> There is a commensurable link [between concepts of consciousness and existential concepts], but that link will be found after you have established the fact of consciousness. Then you consider, “What do I have inside my mind?” and you see that it is exclusively made up of content derived from the outside world, from existence. (It may be indirectly derived, such as you may have thoughts about other thoughts, or you may think about your memories. But ultimately the content of your consciousness, since it begins tabula rasa, consists entirely of your awareness of the outside world.) And there you have the commensurable attribute, or one of the commensurable attributes, which is essential in forming concepts of consciousness

 

 

Dont forget she later repudiated using “mental entity”

 

What about the above do you reject and why? 

 

 

Red said:

 

And in any case, what did you perceive FIRST that later allowed you to abstract the idea, “x^2 + y^2 = 1”. For that matter, what did you perceive that later led to the idea, “1”. (If you’re going to say, "Well, Mr. Ugg, the caveman, perceived one stone and then abstracted the idea of “number…which must exist in some degree but may exist in any degree”, then you’d be question-begging and concept-stealing, for in that case, Mr. Ugg, already possessed the idea of “1” and “number” and simply found a useful correspondence between his percept and his pre-existing idea

 

Why do you think Ugg possesed the concept 1 already and how do you think this is not an instance of innate knowledge?

 

Red said:

 

Where would such “1-ness” be? Is it physically in the stone itself? No. Is “1-ness” in the light rays hitting the stone and reflecting off of it into Mr. Ugg’s eyes? No. Is “1-ness” located physically in the retina? No. In the optic nerve? No. In the visual cortex? No. That’s it for the material part of the process. After the visual cortex, the electro-chemical impulse gets dumped into the non-material part of the human called “the mind”. How? No one knows. Does the non-material part of the mind “recognize” some non-material “1-ness” in the stone that accompanies it from light-rays, to retina, to optic nerve, to cortex? I doubt it.

 I have already expressed that it is a relationship between subject and object. Identity and identification.

 

Red said:

Listen, plaz, if you think that reasserting that consciousness and its products — thoughts, ideas, theories, systems, language, concepts, etc. — are very, very tiny material entities inside of a material brain is an argument, it’s not…especially given the obvious fact that material particles don’t “assert” or “reassert”. They simply “act” under the influence of some other force.

 

The very concept of “assert” or “reassert” or “justification” or “argument” only makes sense within the non-material mental realm. Bowling balls don’t “assert” or “reassert” or “justify” or “conclude” or “argue”, even if they are very, very, very small, and inside someone’s physical brain.

We arent getting anywhere. Maybe I’m “dumb” but if you think so you must just enjoy castigating idiots. If thats not the case, then help me understand your position. I have a theory of concept formation and you know it. I have no Idea, based on what youve said, why you think the above is true. How do I form the concept non-material?  You in fact are pressuposing the concept “non- material” before you justify it.

 

And my position is that consciousness is a relationship amongst objects. I started a thread a long time ago called, The locality of Abstractions on this. Music is a relationship amongst objects. It is neither in the object itself alone or in the hearer alone.

 

How does one conclude that the mental is not a relationship amongst material objects?

Oh, and,

 

 Red said above:

 

I’m confident that Objectivism doesn’t hold “strong” views on materialism, just as I’m confident that, nevertheless, many self-styled Objectivists do.

 

 

When he said previously:

 

 

Objectivism is simply a mid-20th century restatement of 19th-century Victorian naive materialism. It has much in common with the naive materialist views of someone like H.G. Wells.

 

 

What difference are you pointing at here?

Both say that Objectivism isn’t metaphysical materialism. Peikoff says that materialism is a good theory of physics, but not a good theory of metaphysics. Can someone explain why Objectivism can’t be a philosophy of materialism? I understand that the reason is because they are drawing a distinction concerning consciousness, and are saying that the conscious mind is something more than the physical brain. But is this really against materialism? Insights please.

Materialists are essentially reductionists. They don’t believe that anything exists expect atoms, subatomic particles and their interactions. For them mind and reason are physical phenomena and free will is an illusion since all physical processes are determined. The mind as independent phenomenon doesn’t exist for them. they are obsessed with neurophysiological studies in order to understand free will and concept formation.

Plaz’s brain particles self-configures themselves into the following arrangement:

 

 

We arent getting anywhere. Maybe I’m “dumb” but if you think so you must just enjoy castigating idiots. If thats not the case, then help me understand your position. I have a theory of concept formation and you know it. I have no Idea, based on what youve said, why you think the above is true. How do I form the concept non-material?  You in fact are pressuposing the concept “non- material” before you justify it.

 

And my position is that consciousness is a relationship amongst objects. I started a thread a long time ago called, The locality of Abstractions on this. Music is a relationship amongst objects. It is neither in the object itself alone or in the hearer alone.

 

How does one conclude that the mental is not a relationship amongst material objects?

 

 

>>>We arent getting anywhere.

 

Correct. That’s the inevitable upshot of your materialist position: extreme solipsism. “Your material particle arrangements” vs. “My material particle arrangements” vs. “Anyone else’s material particle arrangements.” Obviously, there’s no way to get beyond material particle arrangements to say which one is THE TRUE material particle arrangement, because configurations of material particles can’t be “true” or “false” or “good” or “evil”, etc., they simply ARE.

 

>>>Maybe I’m “dumb”

 

Don’t worry. By your own lights, “dumb” simply corresponds to some sort of material particle arrangement, and there’s no way to claim that such an arrangement is worse than anyone else’s material particle arrangement.

 

>>>help me understand your position

 

Sorry, but you’ll have to translate that for us. Words like “help”, “understand”, and “position” derive from, and make reference to, the old, “mystical” belief in a non-material, purely mental, non-physical realm of existence. Please translate those terms into YOUR vocabulary derived from spatial arrangements of material entities. Do NOT duck this question: what is the spatial arrangement of material particles that specifies “help”, or “understand”, or “position”?

 

>>> I have a theory of concept formation …

 

Sorry, but you’ll have to translate that for us. Words like “theory”, “concept”, and “formation” derive from, and make reference to, the old, “mystical” belief in a non-material, purely mental, non-physical realm of existence. Please translate those terms into YOUR vocabulary derived from spatial arrangements of material entities.  Do NOT duck this question:  what is the spatial arrangement of material particles that specifies “theory”, or “concept”, or “formation”?

 

>>> I have no Idea, based on what youve said, why you think the above is true. 

 

 

Sorry, but you’ll have to translate that for us. Words like “idea”, “based”, and “true” derive from, and make reference to, the old, “mystical” belief in a non-material, purely mental, non-physical realm of existence. Please translate those terms into YOUR vocabulary derived from spatial arrangements of material entities.  Do NOT duck this question:  what is the spatial arrangement of material particles that specifies “idea”, or “based”, or “true”?

 

>>>How do I form the concept non-material?  You in fact are pressuposing the concept “non- material” before you justify it.

 

Sorry, but you’ll have to translate that for us. Words like “form”, “non-material”, and “presuppose” derive from, and make reference to, the old, “mystical” belief in a non-material, purely mental, non-physical realm of existence. Please translate those terms into YOUR vocabulary derived from spatial arrangements of material entities.  Do NOT duck this question:  what is the spatial arrangement of material particles that specifies “form”, or “non-material”, or “presuppose”?

 

>>>And my position is that consciousness is a relationship amongst objects.

 

Sorry, but you’ll have to translate that for us. Words like “consciousness”, “relationship”, and “amongst” derive from, and make reference to, the old, “mystical” belief in a non-material, purely mental, non-physical realm of existence. Please translate those terms into YOUR vocabulary derived from spatial arrangements of material entities.  Do NOT duck this question:  what is the spatial arrangement of material particles that specifies “consciousness”, or “relationship”, or “amongst”?

 

>>>It is neither in the object itself alone or in the hearer alone.

 

Sorry, but you’ll have to translate that for us. Words like “is”, “neither”, and “the” derive from, and make reference to, the old, “mystical” belief in a non-material, purely mental, non-physical realm of existence. Please translate those terms into YOUR vocabulary derived from spatial arrangements of material entities.  Do NOT duck this question:  what is the spatial arrangement of material particles that specifies “is”, or “neither”, or “the”?

 

>>>How does one conclude that the mental is not a relationship amongst material objects?

 

Sorry, but you’ll have to translate that for us. Words like “How”, “conclude”, and “mental” derive from, and make reference to, the old, “mystical” belief in a non-material, purely mental, non-physical realm of existence. Please translate those terms into YOUR vocabulary derived from spatial arrangements of material entities.  Do NOT duck this question:  what is the spatial arrangement of material particles that specifies “How”, or “conclude”, or “mental”?

 

Ultimately, the answer is that the category of the non-material/mental is axiomatic, ostensively defined by direct experience of introspection by each individual, and by obvious inference with respect to observing other people. We easily infer the existence of minds and intentionality in other people because we have direct introspective experience of “mind” and “intentionality” in ourselves. Later, of course, after having dumbed ourselves down with philosophy courses, we can loudly deny that the non-material exists, but in order to make ourselves understood to other people (as well as ourselves in our private musings) we must still use language as if it actually referred to, and derived from, the non-material realm. Groups of particles might move around and change position, but ultimately they simply “ARE”. Groups of particles don’t “conclude” or “theorize” or “hold epistemological theories”. Groups of particles do not correspond to words at all: no material group of particles is representative of “the” or “and” or “to” or “notwithstanding”. 

 

One final, very important question:

 

How old are you?

>>>You form the concept “mental entity” only after you have formed the following concepts: the concept “man,” the concept “consciousness,” then you identify certain mental states or events in your own mind, such as thoughts, let’s say, which you call “mental entities.” Then you infer that other human beings also possess the ability to have mental entities in their minds. Therefore you have gone through a long conceptual chain, making differentiations as you went along. You didn’t start by looking at reality from scratch so to speak, and as a first-level concept form the concept “mental entity” as distinguished from “physical entity.” That would not be possible. They would be incommensurable.

 

Any evidence for this?

 

I’d love to read that. Why don’t you provide a link to that demonstration, that is, if you can manage to do it without further displaying your 10 year old petulance.

I think this is what he was referring to.  http://forum.objectivismonline.com/index.php?showtopic=24986

I hadn’t read this thread yet, but what I was trying to describe was Non-eliminative physicalism.  Just because we know how all the different neurons fire together to form any given thought (as I think we will, someday) doesn’t mean that the thought didn’t occur in someone’s mind.

 

If Red Wanderer takes his own metaphysics seriously then the world he experiences must be a nightmare.

>>>nor have I ever had a reason to suppose there are bodyless minds.

 

No doubt you’ve never experienced it and that’s reason enough to discount it as the classic Objectivist accusation of “arbitrary assertion.”

I don’t care what sort of assertion it is; a bodyless mind would be a ghost and yes, Mars, Objectivists in general tend to reject that idea.  Cry me a river.

 

The fact that you’re implying that you HAVE seen ghosts shouldn’t surprise anyone else, here.  What you’re asserting, if not outright arbitrary, is that magick is real and minds can float around without physical extensions; as a matter of fact that MANY things can exist without ever being accessible to anyone’s sensory experience under any possible circumstances.

This is the metaphysical world of a bad trip; the world which chained men within their own terror throughout the Dark Ages.

 

Such claims aren’t worth the time spent to refute them.

I don’t care what sort of assertion it is; a bodyless mind would be a ghost and yes, Mars, Objectivists in general tend to reject that idea.  Cry me a river.

 

The fact that you’re implying that you HAVE seen ghosts shouldn’t surprise anyone else, here.  What you’re asserting, if not outright arbitrary, is that magick is real and minds can float around without physical extensions; as a matter of fact that MANY things can exist without ever being accessible to anyone’s sensory experience under any possible circumstances.

This is the metaphysical world of a bad trip; the world which chained men within their own terror throughout the Dark Ages.

 

Such claims aren’t worth the time spent to refute them.

 

>>>I don’t care what sort of assertion it is; a bodyless mind would be a ghost

 

 

So because you ideologically disapprove of the conclusion, (X cannot, according to my doctrine, exist) you decide, in advance of any studying of the issue, to dismiss the premises (Major Premise and Minor Premise, must not be conceded to exist).

 

That’s why Objectivism — at least as actually practiced among today’s self-styled Objectivists — is more of a religious cult rather than a system of philosophical investigation of the universe: it already specifies in advance of any investigation what the “right” answers have to be. That’s scarcely a way to expand one’s knowledge, which often relies on paradigm-shifting insights.

 

And, in fact, most Objectivists I’ve been in contact with since my own Objectivist days aren’t interested in expanding their knowledge; they’re interested in reifying and re-confirming their belief system. That’s typical of cults and religions. I believe this was first stated openly in Rand’s lifetime during Branden’s hegemony by Dr. Albert Ellis.

 

As far as bodyless minds are concerned, many have claimed to have experienced such phenomena personally, including people who were previously complete philosophical materialists, such as Dr. Eben Alexander, neurosurgeon, who just published “Proof of Heaven.” Another who claimed there was theoretical justification for bodyless minds was Dr. John Eccles, a Nobel laureate in medicine who himself had made major discoveries in neuroscience. Read “The Mind and Its Brain”, a series of dialogues between John Eccles and Karl Popper on the mind/body issue.

 

And finally: I have no opinion one way or the other on “ghosts.” But I certainly see no logical absurdity in the idea that they could exist, irrespective of whether or not I find the statements convincing by people who claim to have experience with them. It’s highly weird of you to suggest that that those who only believe in matter and energy have lives that are full of nothing but good dreams and benevolence, while those who entertain the notion that the material and the non-material co-exist as complementarities , and as irreducible primaries in the universe, have lives that are “nightmares.”

 

Truly, you’re one weird dude.

 

I do see the great convenience, of course, in habitually turning to one book (Atlas Shrugged) for knowledge and guidance in all issues, rather than turning to many, many, many books, in many subjects by many authors, for doing so. It saves a lot of time and energy.

Red, are you by any chance christopher from OL? In one thread he replies to the questions, “What are “thoughts” if they’re immaterial?” and “Or, more precisely, what is the immaterial composed of?” with this response: “The question is not whether thoughts have a material component, the question is whether the material component can meaningfully identify the thought. How does one measure and describe the content of “interior” reality in a meaningful way using “exterior” empiric methodology?”

 

My main question about this view is, how much do you need to reduce “thought” for it to become “meaningful”? You asked earlier, "what is the spatial arrangement of material particles that specifics “form”, or “non-material’”? I bet that even if that question could be answered, it still wouldn’t satisfy your search for “meaning.”

Red, are you by any chance christopher from OL? In one thread he replies to the questions, “What are “thoughts” if they’re immaterial?” and “Or, more precisely, what is the immaterial composed of?” with this response: “The question is not whether thoughts have a material component, the question is whether the material component can meaningfully identify the thought. How does one measure and describe the content of “interior” reality in a meaningful way using “exterior” empiric methodology?”

 

My main question about this view is, how much do you need to reduce “thought” for it to become “meaningful”? You asked earlier, "what is the spatial arrangement of material particles that specifics “form”, or “non-material’”? I bet that even if that question could be answered, it still wouldn’t satisfy your search for “meaning.”

 

Greetings, amiga!

 

Sorry to disappoint, but no, I am not Herr Christopher from OL. I’ve only anonymously read some posts on that site since the owner, MSK, appears to be an alcoholic and a substance-abuser. Why should I waste my time posting there?

 

However, your quote from this Christopher guy is very apt, and I agree with it. In this regard, I recommend an excellent 3-part article in the old “Objectivist” magazine by Robert Efron, M.D., a neurologist (and brother to the journalist Edith Efron, an early Rand acolyte). It’s titled “Biology without Consciousness: Its Consequences”, and does a very good job of describing and critiquing various reductionist theories of mind, such as the traditional “psycho-neural identity theories”, which claim that every thought is identical to some surmised physical change in brain tissue.

 

>>>how much do you need to reduce “thought” for it to become “meaningful”?

 

But you see, that’s just it: thought becomes less meaningful the more you try to reduce it to a material substrate (e.g., electrical discharges, hormonal changes, etc.)

 

>>>I bet that even if that question could be answered, it still wouldn’t satisfy your search for “meaning.”

 

That’s right! In other words, even if some researcher found a very exact correlation between a thought, such as “I like HoneyCrisp apples!” and an electrical discharge of X-volts always at one specific spot in the brain, it still doesn’t show that the the interior thought “I like HoneyCrisp apples” is identical with that discharge. It’s simply a correlation, and a correlation always implies at least two things, and not an identity.

 

I don’t think meaning can be reduced to material entities (even if there are correlations between them), because then the interior experience of “meaning” disappears, or is defined away. I think we have to think about this analogically: “meaning” is to “mind” as “particles” are to “matter.” “Meaning” is itself a fundamental particle (for lack of a better word) of thought within a non-material realm called Mind, which is separate from, but complementary to, matter. Rand used to say that consciousness is an irreducible primary. I agree. But I take it literally: it’s irreducible metaphysically. It wasn’t created by matter, or particles, in complex arrangements, and therefore, can never be reduced back to those particles by way of explanation.

 

Karl Popper was very critical of linguists for a similar reason. In most technical linguistics, the fundamental “unit of sound-meaning” is called the “morpheme.” In the view of linguistics, these morphemes appeared first among human beings, and then got combined and recombined to form words, and then sentences — complete thoughts in the form of an assertion. Popper claimed (rightly, I believe) that this was backward. The morphemes only have meaning that was imputed to them from previously existing complete sentences, or thoughts. The thought-meaning came first; the precipitating-out of smaller units, such as morphemes, came later — later, both in actual social and linguistic history of mankind, and logically, in terms of analysis.

 

I believe the great question in philosophy today is the following:

 

Science tells us, with quite convincing arguments and evidence, that the only things that actually have fully objective existence, and do not depend on any sort of interaction with consciousness (both perception and intellect) are “particles”, i.e., what Peikoff called in a lecture “Puffs of Meta-Energy” but which scientists today might call “Higgs Bosons” or “Strings” or some other odd name. These things can only be described very abstractly by means of mathematics. So the question is this:

 

Since these Puffs of Meta-Energy are themselves quality-less — they aren’t white, they aren’t red, they aren’t heavy, they aren’t light, they aren’t smooth, they aren’t rough, they aren’t hot, they aren’t cold, etc., by what means do they interact with the same sort of Puffs of Meta-Energy that ultimately compose human eyes, retinas, optic nerves, and visual cortices, to form the entire quality-filled world that we perceive with our eyes? For example, fluffy clouds, furry doggies, rough granite, smooth marble, cold ice-cream, hot coffee, etc.? How do quality-less Puffs of Meta-Energy become quality-endowed experiences that we recognize as the so-called “world we perceive”?

 

No one knows. Obviously, the Puffs of Meta-Energy entering our eyes from a red beach ball do not impart the quality of “redness” to the Puffs of Meta-Energy composing our retinas; and those Puffs of Meta-Energy do not add “redness” to the Puffs of Meta-Energy composing our optic nerves or our visual cortices. It’s simply a very complex chain of cause-and-effect involving nothing but different aggregates of Puffs of Meta-Energy. So clearly, the qualities of “redness” and “roundness” and “smoothness” don’t appear until those Puffs enter the non-material area called “Mind”, which is the ONLY part of the universe that has qualities, and in which it makes sense to speak of qualitative things like “redness, whiteness, lightness, darkness, hotness, coldness,” etc.

 

So the main question is: how does the abstract, quality-less physical world of ultimate Puffs of Meta-Energy become the concrete, quality-filled world we all experience as soon as we open our eyes in the morning?

Greetings, amiga!

 

Sorry to disappoint, but no, I am not Herr Christopher from OL. I’ve only anonymously read some posts on that site since the owner, MSK, appears to be an alcoholic and a substance-abuser. Why should I waste my time posting there?

 

However, your quote from this Christopher guy is very apt, and I agree with it. In this regard, I recommend an excellent 3-part article in the old “Objectivist” magazine by Robert Efron, M.D., a neurologist (and brother to the journalist Edith Efron, an early Rand acolyte). It’s titled “Biology without Consciousness: Its Consequences”, and does a very good job of describing and critiquing various reductionist theories of mind, such as the traditional “psycho-neural identity theories”, which claim that every thought is identical to some surmised physical change in brain tissue.

 

>>>how much do you need to reduce “thought” for it to become “meaningful”?

 

But you see, that’s just it: thought becomes less meaningful the more you try to reduce it to a material substrate (e.g., electrical discharges, hormonal changes, etc.)

 

>>>I bet that even if that question could be answered, it still wouldn’t satisfy your search for “meaning.”

 

That’s right! In other words, even if some researcher found a very exact correlation between a thought, such as “I like HoneyCrisp apples!” and an electrical discharge of X-volts always at one specific spot in the brain, it still doesn’t show that the the interior thought “I like HoneyCrisp apples” is identical with that discharge. It’s simply a correlation, and a correlation always implies at least two things, and not an identity.

 

I don’t think meaning can be reduced to material entities (even if there are correlations between them), because then the interior experience of “meaning” disappears, or is defined away. I think we have to think about this analogically: “meaning” is to “mind” as “particles” are to “matter.” “Meaning” is itself a fundamental particle (for lack of a better word) of thought within a non-material realm called Mind, which is separate from, but complementary to, matter. Rand used to say that consciousness is an irreducible primary. I agree. But I take it literally: it’s irreducible metaphysically. It wasn’t created by matter, or particles, in complex arrangements, and therefore, can never be reduced back to those particles by way of explanation.

 

Karl Popper was very critical of linguists for a similar reason. In most technical linguistics, the fundamental “unit of sound-meaning” is called the “morpheme.” In the view of linguistics, these morphemes appeared first among human beings, and then got combined and recombined to form words, and then sentences — complete thoughts in the form of an assertion. Popper claimed (rightly, I believe) that this was backward. The morphemes only have meaning that was imputed to them from previously existing complete sentences, or thoughts. The thought-meaning came first; the precipitating-out of smaller units, such as morphemes, came later — later, both in actual social and linguistic history of mankind, and logically, in terms of analysis.

 

I believe the great question in philosophy today is the following:

 

Science tells us, with quite convincing arguments and evidence, that the only things that actually have fully objective existence, and do not depend on any sort of interaction with consciousness (both perception and intellect) are “particles”, i.e., what Peikoff called in a lecture “Puffs of Meta-Energy” but which scientists today might call “Higgs Bosons” or “Strings” or some other odd name. These things can only be described very abstractly by means of mathematics. So the question is this:

 

Since these Puffs of Meta-Energy are themselves quality-less — they aren’t white, they aren’t red, they aren’t heavy, they aren’t light, they aren’t smooth, they aren’t rough, they aren’t hot, they aren’t cold, etc., by what means do they interact with the same sort of Puffs of Meta-Energy that ultimately compose human eyes, retinas, optic nerves, and visual cortices, to form the entire quality-filled world that we perceive with our eyes? For example, fluffy clouds, furry doggies, rough granite, smooth marble, cold ice-cream, hot coffee, etc.? How do quality-less Puffs of Meta-Energy become quality-endowed experiences that we recognize as the so-called “world we perceive”?

 

No one knows. Obviously, the Puffs of Meta-Energy entering our eyes from a red beach ball do not impart the quality of “redness” to the Puffs of Meta-Energy composing our retinas; and those Puffs of Meta-Energy do not add “redness” to the Puffs of Meta-Energy composing our optic nerves or our visual cortices. It’s simply a very complex chain of cause-and-effect involving nothing but different aggregates of Puffs of Meta-Energy. So clearly, the qualities of “redness” and “roundness” and “smoothness” don’t appear until those Puffs enter the non-material area called “Mind”, which is the ONLY part of the universe that has qualities, and in which it makes sense to speak of qualitative things like “redness, whiteness, lightness, darkness, hotness, coldness,” etc.

 

So the main question is: how does the abstract, quality-less physical world of ultimate Puffs of Meta-Energy become the concrete, quality-filled world we all experience as soon as we open our eyes in the morning?

 Shouldn’t the main question be: how does the concrete quality-less world of ultimate pme become the abstract quality-filled world we all experience?

 

Or do I have it backwards and centuries misplaced?