Are Rand and Peikoff right about materialism?

Lest anyone be misled, when Peikoff used the rhetorical device of “puffs of meta energy”, he explicitly states that he chose that combination of words because they represent something deliberately undefined. He elsewhere, in the 1976 lectures, explicates that as far as he is concerned the concept “energy” has not been defined in any meaningful way by physicists.

What’s more, I can tell you that the concept “energy” when it was formed originally directly involved conceptualizing entities as causal primaries; and it wasn’t until the Energeticist movement destroyed the concept that we have such foolishness in Physics. Energy is not a substance.

The real question to be answered is, how do you get people who embrace the concept “nonmaterial” to realize there is no way to form that concept using a valid epistemology.

Edit: Or put more broadly, what epistemological rules should guide one when forming concepts of fundamental constituents/unperceivables? How does one talk meaningfully about such existents using concepts from perception and imputing them to the nonperceivable without denying the concept itself?

Karl Popper said:

“One should never get involved in verbal questions or questions of meaning,and never get interested in words. If challenged by the question of whether a word one uses really means this or perhaps that ,then one should say"I dont know and im not interested in meanings”. “one should never quarrel about words , and never get involved in questions of terminology.one should always keep away from discussing concepts”

And we wonder why…

Red where did Popper discuss the chicken and egg issue you mention above?

Red said:

" Since these Puffs of Meta-Energy are themselves quality-less — they aren’t white, they aren’t red, they aren’t heavy, they aren’t light, they aren’t smooth, they aren’t rough, they aren’t hot, they aren’t cold, etc."…

" That’s right! In other words, even if some researcher found a very exact correlation between a thought, such as “I like HoneyCrisp apples!” and an electrical discharge of X-volts always at one specific spot in the brain, it still doesn’t show that the the interior thought “I like HoneyCrisp apples” is identical with that discharge. It’s simply a correlation, and a correlation always implies at least two things, and not an identity."

" So the main question is: how does the abstract, quality-less physical world of ultimate Puffs of Meta-Energy become the concrete, quality-filled world we all experience as soon as we open our eyes in the morning?"

In other words, “how does indentity come from non-identity”?

Red, I didnt see your responses to me above before posting my last responses. I will read it in a bit.

. . . I’ve only anonymously read some posts on that site since the owner, MSK, appears to be an alcoholic and a substance-abuser. Why should I waste my time posting there?

, , ,

 

RW,

 

No. Michael Stuart Kelly does not at all appear to be any such thing. You are writing about and to real persons with the real names and personal identities they have shared, and with real families who love them.

 

Stephen

>>>I don’t care what sort of assertion it is; a bodyless mind would be a ghost

 

 

So because you ideologically disapprove of the conclusion, (X cannot, according to my doctrine, exist) you decide, in advance of any studying of the issue, to dismiss the premises (Major Premise and Minor Premise, must not be conceded to exist).

Yep.  And I’d do the same thing if you told me that the moon is made of cheese.  What’s your point?

“But you see, that’s just it: thought becomes less meaningful the more you try to reduce it to a material substrate (e.g., electrical discharges, hormonal changes, etc.)”

 

…

“I don’t think meaning can be reduced to material entities (even if there are correlations between them), because then the interior experience of “meaning” disappears, or is defined away.”

 

Critics of evolution often use this argument. ‘Evolution makes life less beautiful, less meaningful..’ ‘You can’t break down the origins of the entire animal kingdom to a single common ancestor!!!’ ‘Humans are made in God’s image.. we aren’t related to other animals!’ ‘Life is too complex to be explained!!’ etc etc.

 

Meaning does not disappear just because something that was once mysterious or unknown is finally understood. I think life becomes more meaningful once you realize we have the capability to discover how our minds, bodies, and the world actually works.  Right now we don’t understand all the intricacies of the mind- but that doesn’t mean we will someday.

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Meaning does not disappear just because something that was once mysterious or unknown is finally understood. I think life becomes more meaningful once you realize we have the capability to discover how our minds, bodies, and the world actually works.  Right now we don’t understand all the intricacies of the mind- but that doesn’t mean we will someday.

I find it interesting to note that studying the mind requires acknowledging that personal experience is a real thing. I think sometimes it’s just lost in translation that the mind isn’t a thing, but a process (hence Boydstun’s use of feature rather than attribute). The stomach digests. The brain “minds”. I mean, it’s not like digestion is an “illusion” because there is no tangible thing called digestion “out there”. You won’t find a mind as an individual thing, yet just like digestion, it is measurable in terms of brain activity. Studying the mind is a study of processes, not merely the mechanics of the brain. Studying the circulatory system is a study of processes, not merely mechanics of the heart.

I find it interesting to note that studying the mind requires acknowledging that personal experience is a real thing. I think sometimes it’s just lost in translation that the mind isn’t a thing, but a process (hence Boydstun’s use of feature rather than attribute). The stomach digests. The brain “minds”. I mean, it’s not like digestion is an “illusion” because there is no tangible thing called digestion “out there”. You won’t find a mind as an individual thing, yet just like digestion, it is measurable in terms of brain activity. Studying the mind is a study of processes, not merely the mechanics of the brain. Studying the circulatory system is a study of processes, not merely mechanics of the heart.

 

This example of digestion is soo Victorian, you have got to be naive. Once you name a process or a part of a process it becomes a thing unto itself. As soon as something has a name it becomes the ‘meaning’ of that name. You then have to show that the thing with a name exists as an entity(out there). Since you can not, logically then it does not exist, until you can point to it, literally. Otherwise you are just constantly backtracking and yammering about , how you can’t just consider the ‘thing’ while dropping the context of it actually being a part of process and any examination of that thing has to always include the idea that the thing under consideration is really always just a part of process yada yada..ect. So naive.

 

This example of digestion is soo Victorian, you have got to be naive. Once you name a process or a part of a process it becomes a thing unto itself. As soon as something has a name it becomes the ‘meaning’ of that name. You then have to show that the thing with a name exists as an entity(out there). Since you can not, logically then it does not exist, until you can point to it, literally. Otherwise you are just constantly backtracking and yammering about , how you can’t just consider the ‘thing’ while dropping the context of it actually being a part of process and any examination of that thing has to always include the idea that the thing under consideration is really always just a part of process yada yada..ect. So naive.

 

Naïve meaning eliminative physicalist (there is no mind)?  If so then I disagree (if not then please correct me, as that’s the basic premise of this reply).

 

Let’s say, hypothetically, that someday we discover the exact pattern of firing synapses which forms the thought “A is A.”  So, if you think that A is A, that simply means that thus-and-such neuron was primed just so to initiate the “A=A” circuit.  Does this mean it wasn’t your thought, in the first place?

In this thread  http://forum.objectivismonline.com/index.php?showtopic=24331 Secondhander (way down towards the bottom), in my opinion, nailed the issue quite perfectly:

“It seems to me that the main mistake made is to tacitly presuppose that a man is something different than his attributes. Yes, you can look at my brain and “predict” what choice I am going to make. But my brain IS me, or part of what is me. So all you’re really saying is that you are looking at what I am choosing to do and then saying it’s not really me choosing it, just my brain, and therefore I don’t really have free will, as though my brain isn’t me.”

 

All I think (again, I make great assumptions here) Eiuol is saying is that the brain is part of someone, just as much as their liver or kidneys, and it would make only perfect sense that the mind is a product of its processes.

 

But, again, I’m not sure if that’s what you were asserting.

Naïve meaning eliminative physicalist (there is no mind)?  If so then I disagree (if not then please correct me, as that’s the basic premise of this reply).

 

Let’s say, hypothetically, that someday we discover the exact pattern of firing synapses which forms the thought “A is A.”  So, if you think that A is A, that simply means that thus-and-such neuron was primed just so to initiate the “A=A” circuit.  Does this mean it wasn’t your thought, in the first place?

In this thread  http://forum.objectivismonline.com/index.php?showtopic=24331 Secondhander (way down towards the bottom), in my opinion, nailed the issue quite perfectly:

“It seems to me that the main mistake made is to tacitly presuppose that a man is something different than his attributes. Yes, you can look at my brain and “predict” what choice I am going to make. But my brain IS me, or part of what is me. So all you’re really saying is that you are looking at what I am choosing to do and then saying it’s not really me choosing it, just my brain, and therefore I don’t really have free will, as though my brain isn’t me.”

 

All I think (again, I make great assumptions here) Eiuol is saying is that the brain is part of someone, just as much as their liver or kidneys, and it would make only perfect sense that the mind is a product of its processes.

 

But, again, I’m not sure if that’s what you were asserting.

 

I suspect that tad was indulging in a little bit of satire…

I think that Tad was being facetious.

Stephen actually said:

"By feature I meant that sort of more complex attribute. My first philosophy professor was a Thomist, so like you, I do use attribute for both simple ones (properties) and more complex ones (features). "

tad is as charged, mars any thing?

In this thread  http://forum.objectivismonline.com/index.php?showtopic=24331 Secondhander (way down towards the bottom), in my opinion, nailed the issue quite perfectly:

“It seems to me that the main mistake made is to tacitly presuppose that a man is something different than his attributes. Yes, you can look at my brain and “predict” what choice I am going to make. But my brain IS me, or part of what is me. So all you’re really saying is that you are looking at what I am choosing to do and then saying it’s not really me choosing it, just my brain, and therefore I don’t really have free will, as though my brain isn’t me.”

 

Thanks!

 

In my earlier years, when I was a good seminary student and graduate, I gave a lot of thought to predestination (in terms of Reformed Theology) and how a person could be predestined and yet still have moral culpability for their actions. Long story short, I’m no longer religious but some of those same questions and thoughts have helped me in my understanding of this same issue in terms of natural predestination (if you will) and personal culpability. 

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When I was a minister predestination vs free will was one of the main subjects that caused me to abandon Christianity.

get out ,ex monks, amongst us

 

whodathought

Right? I never would have taken Plasmatic to be a minister.. err, ex-minister.

Thanks!

 

In my earlier years, when I was a good seminary student and graduate, I gave a lot of thought to predestination (in terms of Reformed Theology) and how a person could be predestined and yet still have moral culpability for their actions. Long story short, I’m no longer religious but some of those same questions and thoughts have helped me in my understanding of this same issue in terms of natural predestination (if you will) and personal culpability. 

You’re welcome.  =]

 

For me it was the crucifiction.  I never could grasp why “everyone must be forgiven” translated into “kill him gruesomely” and the thought of sins being, not actually pardonable but sort of transferrable, did nothing to help ease my mind.

I still have yet to get a coherent answer to those questions. 

Thanks!

 

In my earlier years, when I was a good seminary student and graduate, I gave a lot of thought to predestination (in terms of Reformed Theology) and how a person could be predestined and yet still have moral culpability for their actions. Long story short, I’m no longer religious but some of those same questions and thoughts have helped me in my understanding of this same issue in terms of natural predestination (if you will) and personal culpability. 

 

I think “culpability” in the context of Objectivism does not rise to become a platonic existent “out there”, certainly “moral culpability” is nothing like its Religious, Platonic or Kantian counterparts, and hence from an operational point of view (personally how do you extend your sense of “justice”) you as an Objectivist would likely treat a “predestined” acting thing (human like robot?, or perhaps a human itself) in the same way you would treat the non-predestined thing, which/who acts in similar ways.  Steer clear of the thing which thinks (processes) X and does Y based on it. and reward or befriend, or trade with one who thinks K and does J.