We were having a good debate on ‘lies’ that went a bit sideways (mea culpa), into the concept of Justice; or, the morality in not concealing truth, when an injustice of any kind is about to be commited to an other.
I’ve often thought that the Virtue of Justice in O’ism is misunderstood at times, and isn’t discussed enough.
There are plenty of references that influenced me back then in Rand’s writing - “Judge, and prepare to be judged.” “The courtroom of one’s mind” etc.
My own take on judgement and justice, that was not , I thought, implicitly expressed by her, was that judgement has two sides - the negative, and the positive. For me, the speed with which you do one, you should also do the other. (‘Give credit where it’s due.’)
I should have known better, because of course, she did explicitly explain it. I had forgotten, but
I finally found the quote in ‘The V.O.S.’ :
"Since men are born tabula rasa, both cognitively and morally, a RATIONAL man regards strangers as innocent until proven guilty, and grants them that initial good will in the name of their human potential…{A}
"If he finds them guilty of MAJOR evils, his good will is replaced by contempt and condemnation…{B}
“If he finds them to be virtuous, he grants them personal, individual value and appreciation, in proportion to their virtues.”{C}
(Caps, and lettering, mine).
Rand laid out a lot here. No other philosopher as far as I know, made personal judgement, and individual justice a crucial part of ethics.
I want to examine those two emphases. First, can I be as RATIONAL, in depth, or in consistency, as Ayn Rand could? No. But not many can claim that capability, and of course that doesn’t preclude any O’ist from being the most rational as possible, OR, from increasing his capability, there.
Conclusion: my judgement of a person should, I believe take a little longer, as a result.
Second, what constitutes a MAJOR evil? Examples of this are posted and discussed regularly on this forum. It might be easier, in fact, to identify lesser and minor, vices. My observation is that too often, judgement is passed upon people of confused, contradictory, and mixed premises - people who, given time and thought, and their “Human potential”, will learn, and self-correct, their errors.
Conclusion: before I condemn, carefully establish the size and scope of a person’s ‘evil’.
Therefore, with two options open to me, each containing the danger of injustice,{C} - the granting of value to a person, who is perhaps not worthy of it; and {B} - possible irrevocable condemnation of someone who may not deserve it ;
I resolve that I must always ‘grant that initial good will’ as long as is rationally tenable, and certainly only as far as my selfishness is not compromised.
I.M.O., then, ‘benevolence’ is a sub-virtue, waiting for the application of the main virtue, Justice.